



Project no. CIT2-CT-2004-506027

Project acronym: **EMEDIATE**

Project full title: Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror'

Instrument: Specific Targeted Research or Innovation Project

Priority 7 Citizens and Governance
in a Knowledge Based Society

EMEDIATE Work Package Eight, Deliverable Fifteen (D15) Month 36

Final Report

Due date of deliverable:

Actual submission date:

Start date of project: 1 September 2004

Duration: Three Years and One Month

Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable: European University Institute

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme (2002-2006)		
Dissemination Level		
PII	Public	X
PP	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	
RE	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)	
CO	Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)	

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Introduction

This project, EMEDIATE, *Media and Ethics of a European Public Sphere from the Treaty of Rome to the 'War on Terror'* has made innovative theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of a European public sphere (EPS). It proposes a new critical, networked and two dimensional conceptualisation of the public sphere casting light upon an elite intellectual and popular mundane as well as real European integration process which accelerated significantly in the second half of the twentieth century with roots spanning two centuries. In the research undertaken the development of the European expansion and integration project and the concomitant EPS from the Rome Treaties to the 'War on Terror' has been explored in the project through qualitative political/media analyses. The point of departure are political media discourses on and in Europe in five crisis periods with reference to an emerging public sphere as well as "European" institutions. EMEDIATE has devoted particular attention to questions of ethics and their mobilisation in connection to the overall discourse on 'European values' as well as to their political use as reflected in the media. Foci have been on relevant media in each period studied, taking into account the technological development from printed media (newspapers) to the Internet, in literal and visual form, and the power implications of these technological and formal dynamics.

In addition to the exploration of the public sphere and democracy, this research includes the analysis of national editorial cultures, media discourse analysis and their evolution in the five crisis periods viewing comparatively how, if and when they framed notions of a European 'ethical responsibility'. It additionally engaged in original research in the evolution in visual media of European narratives that transcend language barriers as well as actual and potential use of the Internet as a means to constitute the EPS and to increase citizen participation in it.

From a theoretical perspective, EMEDIATE refined the concept of the public sphere(s) in the European context. From an empirical perspective, it explored questioned the role of the media in creating and transforming an EPS. From a policy perspective, it developed ethical guidelines for media professionals as well as politicians and produce innovative educational materials.

Significantly four volumes are being completed as the most significant fruit of this project as well as over fifty contributions to a large number of individual publications, a dozen seminars countless conference presentations¹ and an online Archive of Visual Europe. The volumes that showcase the results of this work are *The "European Public Sphere" and the National Media in the Post-War Period* edited by Michał Krzyżanowski, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruth Wodak. *Making the News: Contemporary Journalism Practices and News Cultures in Europe* edited by Paschal Preston, *Democracy without Politics? On the European Crisis of Legitimacy* by Bo Stråth and Hagen Schulz-Forberg and *History Writing and the Visualisation of Values through and in European Politics* by James Kaye. These works individually, and as a group, develop new theoretical understandings of the European public sphere and providing for a comprehensive overview of the media debates in Europe and their definition and representation of European ethics and values.

The exploration and definition of the European Public Sphere(s) has been a fundamental task of EMEDIATE. We propose the existence of a transnational public sphere, like the European one, as an entity that involves *a set of common issues, discussed simultaneously, by different actors, in different locations of media and politics. These actors recognise and interact with one another.* The creation of such a transnational public sphere from this perspective requires

¹ See the Annual progress reports Months 12, 24 and 36.

not shared values per se but a common and mutual *problematization of values* by the actors. This very problematization of values and interaction within a European framework can then be conceived as a core value. In different definitions and epochs the problematization of values can claim to have and have had sufficient cross-national and cross-cultural communication, a common arena for exchanging opinions and information, a set of leaders (national or European) recognised by wide publics, and a set of events that are deemed important and are debated simultaneously by broad national and transnational publics within Europe.

Crisis Eras

Specifically international crises offered the temporal framework for EMEDIATE.

International crises are most commonly understood to be interactions between states in which a high probability of war exists.² Wars and the fear of war do indeed define the eras in which crises are addressed in this volume. The eras begin with one in which Europe had just been the central showplace of the second of two colossal World Wars. The narration of these Wars was far from closed or unified when the second of these Eurocentric conflicts had come to a close. Implicit and explicit confrontation with these Wars has been central to discourses of Europe over the past six decades. Europe additionally became a central battleground of a third and new form of war, the Cold War, in the epoch studied. The eras in question end with a period following the close of the Cold War initiating a new world order. In this age, Europe has been and remains both peripheral to and on opposing sides of a contemporary war in Iraq. The majority of the international crises studied in within EMEDIATE approach definition as possible pre-stages of war, others can be considered “wars” themselves such as the British, French and Israeli joint invasion of Egypt and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Budapest in 1956 in which over two thousand died in battles between Hungarian Soviets (councils) and Warsaw Pact forces and the Alliance invasion of Iraq in 2003. In yet others, war did not take place or appear imminent such as with the fall of the Wall in 1989 or the Cartoon crisis of 2006 that paralleled war. The emergence of war was a significant threat in 1981 following the strikes and declaration of martial law in Poland (in one narration justifying the declaration martial law), as well as the un-resisted Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The unrest generated by the mass protests and strikes in Paris in 1968 raised the spectre of civil war in France.

These were all political media events although an international crisis as an event in which the possibility of war exists need not necessarily have been one within the framework of the Cold War. The Cold War was itself a long enduring proto-war replete with proxy wars foreshadowing and possibly precipitating an apocalyptic Third World War. A fictive example of an event precipitating war in this epoch is dramatised in the world-destroying international crisis in Stanley Kubrik’s meticulously researched *Dr. Strangelove* (1963). In fact, twenty years later the Able Archer incident of 1983 might have brought the world closer to the brink of nuclear war and annihilation due to fear and misunderstanding than it had ever been.³ Able Archer was not an international crisis that is, or could be studied by EMEDIATE, because as a secret event it was absent from contemporary media. On the contrary, the international crisis incidents investigated here are full blown political media events as well as widespread discourses, i.e. they were reported and commented in diverse media across state bounds, and were the raw stuff out of which much political capital was forged as well as fundamentals of the discursive construction of the social and political world. The crises studied in this volume were selected because they were widely covered in the media and thus had consequences and meaning in the public sphere. Specifically that they contributed as an important factor to the production of a specific form of European polity since the Second World War.

This connection between the concept of international crisis and the probability of a future war as well as being the raw stuff of the construction of the social and political world implies that the crises were perceived to have had significance importance beyond themselves. They were not crises in a stripped down form un-associated with causal narratives, when they were

² Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

³ Christopher M. Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

narrated.⁴ The crises are conceived as revealing of, or decisive in, larger situations beyond the crises themselves. They occurred in a context characterised as perilous where change takes place that may reveal or precipitate the survival or demise, success or failure of a greater constellation.

An example of this capacity to reveal can be seen in the coeval revolt in Hungary and invasion of Egypt by the UK, France and Israel in 1956. These events and their combined solutions marked an era. They were important factors in the revelation of how the world had shifted from one in which European states were central and dominated, as they had since the accumulation of power they had taken place among European states since the Renaissance, to one that was defined by the Post War balance of Soviet and US power within which European states would have to operate. In its immediate wake the Rome Treaties were signed and ratified in 1957.

Revelation often leads to action and decision. This represents further amplification in meaning and causality in connection with crises. Crises are events in which (difficult) decisions, which may emphasise the importance of actors, within perilous situations, must be made. These decisions may then have determinant effects in the future. An example of this from the following is the resolution by the GDR Council of Ministers in 1989 to reform travel rules and its announcement by Günther Schabowski on 9 November at 18.57. Within hours, this decision (announced live on television) of the Council and its pronouncement effectively influenced the fall of the Wall that divided Berlin as well as the “Iron Curtain” that divided Europe.

Additionally, the international crises, the discourses of which are studied in detail, occurred and are assessed within complex networks, the crisis eras. These networks are not individual events but the international crisis eras forming the context of the crises explored in this volume. They differ from individual events, like the three mentioned in the above, as they are clusters of events thus not international crises but blocks of international crises. We claim that the crises if not directly concurrent were cumulate, and related due to their temporal, medial and political proximity. The claim, however, is neither that the individual crises nor these phases were necessarily perceived to be European when they occurred over the past five decades, but that because they were international and because they became media events they could be relevant to an EPS. This is affirmed by the fact that they were considered highly relevant to politics and society in Europe when they occurred. It follows that they influenced the concomitant construction process of what has become the European Union.

Grouping the crises in eras offers a special perspective from which the construction and transformation of a European polity, European Society and conceptions of Europe can be observed in the media since the close of the Second World War or, as it has also been dubbed, the “European Civil War”. The subsumation of wars from the Franco-Prussian through Second World War including the First World War, Russian Revolution as well as Spanish Civil War, and sometimes even proceeded through the Cold War until 1990, as a “European Civil War” was itself a significant step in the construction of a transgressive idea of Europe.⁵ Nevertheless, as opposed to a simplistic teleological narrative of progressive expansion and

⁴ Crises may be understood in an elemental form as isolated events in which extreme difficulty, trouble or danger is experienced and/or perceived but without effects. In this sense crises have no residual meaning, or no meaning is imparted upon them in the development or construction of anything beyond themselves.

⁵ The concept of the European Civil War was developed by a group centred at the London School of Economics. Cf. Paul Preston and Ann L. Mackenzie, *The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936-1939* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).

integration resulting in an ever-larger and stronger polity the crisis epochs selected reveal the precarity of the construction of a European polity and European unity over this epoch. Notably, it was not until the Post War era that a transgressive European project around concrete political orders enduring through the present was constituted and developed.

Clearly the difference between language or better, rhetoric and institutions is fundamental with respect to this development. Yet even if the concept, idea or ideal of Europe was appropriated to national ends, as for example in the exploitation of the idea of European unification in an attempt to rescue European nation states and their institutionalisation through coordination and cooperation,⁶ a growing understanding and polity of (at first Western) Europe as a special transforming transnational unit was constructed in the long aftermath of the Second World War. Thus language, specifically the allure of the concept and idea Europe, was an important factor in the creation of European institutions and a degree of transnational European sentiment in this era. This is evidenced in both the institutions that were invented and the ways in which they were used and transformed over the decades into the European Union as well as the less dominant and more inclusive Council of Europe. These polities dwarfed Interwar attempts to unite Europe such as the Pan Europa movement or the ineffective European based and dominated League of Nations.

Six eras, alluded to in the above, have been selected for this research: the first covers the mid 1950s and ends in 1957 including the revolt in Budapest, signature of the Treaty of Rome and Suez Crisis; the second frames the years 1961 to 1963 in which the Berlin Wall was erected, the French-German *Entente Cordial* was created and John F. Kennedy would declare he was a Berliner; the third epoch includes events from 1968 to 1973 with the revolts in Prague and Paris, ongoing war in Vietnam as well as the Oil Crisis and first stage of European expansion; the fourth period spans from 1979 through the early eighties during which the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Margaret Thatcher came to dominate British politics and Francois Mitterrand and the Socialists came to power in France and Martial Law was declared in Poland; the fifth encompasses the implosion of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the unforeseen sea-changing initial period from 1989 to 1991. The sixth as well as final time period begins in 1999 and includes the introduction of the Euro, the accession of 17 new Member States in the EU (primarily former members of the East Block) and continues with the ongoing 'War on Terror' and European constitutional crisis.

Within these periods studies of media discourses undertaken include an enormous spectrum of information. They constitute an investigation of the political aspects of media history and the medial aspects of political history. The contention is that media are the premiere quotidian forum for and expression of politics. The investigations are a confrontation with the at times ambiguous, contradictory and banal media discourses in and of Europe that transcend exclusive oppositional discourses and point towards a number of pluralities and contradictions that have been indicated in much of contemporary research on Europe. Most recently the concept "Europhrenia" was proposed to describe this situation.⁷

The first three international crisis periods (1953-57, 1961-63 and 1968-73) as well as the fifth (1989-91) were, by in large, followed by deepening European integration as well as expansion. This was not exclusively the case between 1979 and the early 1980s and the question as to whether European integration and expansion will continue following the disputes sparked by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Cartoon controversy within our

⁶ Alan S. Milward, George Brennan, and Federico Romero, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

⁷ Strath Triandafyllidou "New Europe at a Crossroads" in EURONAT Chap 1.

contemporary crisis era remains open. Within these six periods at moments of crisis, Europe as an entity is absent, debated and appropriated in discourses. Exploring the ways this is and has been done is a central aim of research in the of the current research project.

The historical context and dynamic of EMEDIATE's temporal framework offers a narration marked by rupture and transformation but also continuity that runs through the six crisis eras investigated. Implicitly, the public and political offer the framework of media discourses examined, and it is within this field of tension that values, shared and individual, are constructed. One basis for the framing of our research in crises lies in the research of Reinhart Koselleck. According to Koselleck the critical character of an Axial Age in Europe that he termed the *Sattelzeit*⁸ was the driving force of ideological and discursive shifts that lead to a series of redefinitions and re-evaluations of individuals' and societies' self-perceptions. That is to say that social criticism created crises and this was countered by attempts to integrate and canalise the critique.⁹ Values constructed and transformed during these political and social crisis periods were used to justify, support and further political agendas; peace and prosperity, even happiness and justice for example. These were alternatively evoked as tools, ideals and goals during the *Sattelzeit*.

A point of departure of this research is in questioning if and how societal and political transformations since the Second World War have continued to be critique-based, formed in crises and provide a capacity for and the dynamics of change since the *Sattelzeit*.¹⁰ This itself questions the idea of a perpetual acceleration of time in the wake of the *Sattelzeit*. In comparison to the Western industrial/bourgeois "revolutionary" era of great change spanning from the mid-eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century in which there was a wide self-perception in the initiation of a mundane utopian age, the transformations of the Post-War era may seem petty. The former was an era of the rise of bourgeois society fuelled by the Industrial Revolution, and although it began in Europe, its repercussions were of global relevance. These were events, alterations, of a new order not confined to the inner lives of a small elite segment of populations in specific areas but affecting most of the inhabitants of the globe on an eminently perceptible level.¹¹

The era we research begins roughly a century from the close of the *Sattelzeit*. Even with a greatly exaggerated perception of the transformation since the Second World War it is difficult to see the era as having spawned as fundamental shifts as did the *Sattelzeit*. In contrast it may have been an era in which many of the conflicts spawned in the *Sattelzeit* were still relevant, that is to say newly contested and confronted under transformed exigencies which brought them to the forefront in the context of crises. For Europe, crises in this framework of our chronology may also offer moments in which a new type of European Public Sphere emerges and is defined.¹² It was in this era that the European polity that would

⁸ On Koselleck's *Sattelzeit* as the Axial Age See Peter Wagner "Palomar's Questions. The Axial Age Hypothesis, European Modernity and Historical Contingency" in Jóhann Páll Árnason, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Björn Wittrock, *Axial Civilization and World History, Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture*, 4 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004). and James Kaye, *No One Such Place: "Home" In Austrian and Swedish "Landscapes"*, vol. PhD (Florence: European University Institute, 2003).

⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der Bürgerlichen Welt*, 7 ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

¹⁰ Hagen Schulz-Forberg, "Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere (D2)," in *EMEDIATE Deliverables* (Florence: IUE, 2005).

¹¹ Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der Bürgerlichen Welt*. P. 5.

¹² The public political and the private individual were linked in the creation of an aspect of bourgeois society that Jürgen Habermas, designated using the term *Öffentlichkeit* in this era of revolutions. The thesis published in German by Habermas in 1962 was translated into English in 1989. With the thesis

become the European Union was constituted and the process accelerated, albeit not steadily and without setbacks, its institutional development. Thus on a macro level studies of these eras offer the opportunity to glimpse the relevance of conceptions of Europe and the EU (including its precursor institutions) because the concept and the institutions are either especially tested or absent from view with relative degrees of conspicuity in media discourses and debates within the framework of these crises. These are central issues examined by EMEDIATE.

Based upon Koselleck's thesis of critique and crisis the six above mentioned crisis periods classified as European and international political crisis eras in the Post War epoch were selected. A claim that can be made in support of this chronology is that European values and politics in a transgressive sense have been actively developed in the wake of war experiences and under threat of war since the 1950s as active spaces of identification and political orders. This occurred within the framework of the Cold War and in its wake. It is also highly significant that a European polity different from any previous European order has been developed during the epoch under investigation. This has not been exclusive from and has in fact developed in uneven synchronism with national as well as block cultures. The history of European enlargement and integration in institutional and political terms, beginning in the 1950s, also signified an acceleration of European culture's dynamics. These dynamics are, nevertheless, marked as much if not more by contestation and confrontation as they are by consensus and compromise.

the German term *Öffentlichkeit* was translated as the term "Public Sphere" and discourses surrounding the Public Sphere have mushroomed despite Habermas' doubts as to its application to industrially advanced mass democracies organised in the form of welfare states. More recently, a new Public Sphere on a European level, has become an object of political desire in Europe. This quickly necessitated and resulted in re-conceptions of the term. CF. Jürgen Habermas, "Öffentlichkeit," in *Staat und Politik: Das Fischer Lexikon*, ed. Ernst Fraenkel and Karl Dietrich Bracher (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Vlg, 1964), Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). Schulz-Forberg, "Theoretical Paper on the Notion of a European Public Sphere (D2)."

Public Sphere

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, academic interest in a category termed the public sphere blossomed. Initiated and stimulated by the first English translation of Jürgen Habermas' seminal work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* in 1989 (originally published in 1962)¹³, research on the public sphere has provided a variety of theoretical approaches which either postulated the imminent demise of the public sphere in (late) modern democracies¹⁴ or related the evident crisis of the (national) public sphere(s) to the growth of global tendencies rooted in the emergent trans-nationalisation of media production and reception.¹⁵

It was particularly the second of the post-Habermasian approaches that clearly influenced the debates on the European Public Sphere (EPS) which were initiated when the public sphere oriented academic disputes reached Europe and became tied to the then ongoing (predominantly normative, political-scientific) debates about the crisis of the European Union as a democratic, supranational constellation.¹⁶ In what followed, a number of theoretical discussions about the need for creating a strong EPS were developed at the backdrop of a claim that, without the EPS which could link the EU with its citizens/demos, no actual democratisation of the EU could take place.¹⁷ It was also argued that the then state-of-the-art of the EPS did not allow for any prediction of its imminent development¹⁸ or any prompt reaching of its 'strength' and 'quality'.¹⁹ Slavko Splichal poses the relevant question if the EPS is quasi "imposed" and "essentialized" by the EU or the researchers involved in trying to investigate this; moreover, if media analysis is the best and only way to investigate a possibly existing EPS; or if other data or other theories should be drawn upon. This critical position certainly has to be taken into account.

At the backdrop of these scholarly and political debates, several empirical studies²⁰ tried to

¹³ See Note 12.

¹⁴ Craig J. Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1992). Nick Crossley and John M. Roberts, eds., *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere* (Oxford, UK ; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing/Sociological Review, 2004).

¹⁵ N Frazer, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," in *The Phantom Public Sphere*, ed. Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

¹⁶ Giandomenico Majone, *Understanding Regulatory Growth in the European Community*, vol. 94/17, *Eui Working Paper Sps* (Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute, 1994), Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London: UCL Press, 1998), Joseph Weiler, Iain Begg, and John Peterson, *Integration in an Expanding European Union: Reassessing the Fundamentals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).

¹⁷ Klaus Eder and H-J Trenz, "The Democratising Dynamics of the European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism," *European journal of social theory* 7, no. 1 (2004), Jürgen Habermas, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution?," *New Left Review* 11 (2001).

¹⁸ Dieter Grimm, "Braucht Europa Eine Verfassung?," *Juristenzeitung* 50, no. 12 (1995), P.G. Kielmansegg, "Integration und Demokratie," in *Europäische Integration*, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996).

¹⁹ Wolfgang R. Langenbucher and et al., eds., *Europäische Öffentlichkeit und Medialer Wandel Eine Transdisziplinäre Perspektive* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), Slavko Splichal, "In Search of a Strong European Public Sphere. Some Critical Observations and Conceptualisations of Publicness and the (European) Public Sphere " *Media, culture & society* 28, no. 5 (2006). For an overview see C. Bärenreuter, "Studying the European Public Sphere. Theory of Democracy and Empirical Evidence" (University of Vienna, 2007).

²⁰ Cf. Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, "Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede Vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit," in *Kolner Zeitschrift Fur Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie*, ed.

show how, mainly through the progress of the so-called ‘Europeanisation of national media’ and through the rise of common/similar ways of referring to and interpreting specifically-European occurrences, a creation of EPS was already ‘in the making’. However, importantly, these empirical approaches crucially share several characteristics: they were all ‘incidental’, synchronic case-studies of isolated EU-specific or EU-rooted events (e.g. the 2000 Austrian ‘Haider Crisis’) and were all undertaken solely from quantitative perspectives. Additionally, all of the empirical approaches to the EPS presented so far have clearly disregarded the historical aspect of the development of the EPS and, as if a priori assigned a unique role to the European Union as a crucial point of reference on the basis of which the EPS could/should be created.

Our research attempts to avoid the normative and (to the extent, deterministic) perspectives on the European Public Sphere that have been proposed in the past. The first crucial feature of our approach resides in its novel, open, yet historically conditioned way of defining and exploring the (potential) existence of an EPS. The project as a whole is an empirically founded longitudinal study of how and if at all a European Public Sphere was created in the national media of several European countries during crises in European history since the 1950s.

This transnational public sphere would be European in three distinct and inter-related ways: from a geographical perspective defining Europe as the geographical area between the Atlantic and the Urals, the North Sea and the Mediterranean; from a point of view of intellectual traditions in that ideas and conceptions of European history, culture, and modernity²¹ and thirdly that it is European insofar as it is a common arena where the existence, shape and scope of Europe and Europeanness, European unity or conflict, similarity or diversity are discussed and contested. It recognises the power games and struggles within the very definition and historically situated character of what Europe is or might be.

There is good reason to integrate Koselleck’s emphasis on critique and social conflict as the engine of politics into theories about the European public sphere and the European Union. The public sphere is not primarily a civil society arrangement for consensus-oriented reflection governed by Reason as Habermas contended, but an arena of critique and conflict that needs a political centre in order to respond.

Much has been written about the existence of a European public sphere. Since the early 1990s, research has been carried out in an increasing number of networks. The focus has been

M Bach, *Kolner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (Sonnerheft 40)* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002). J. Gerhards, "Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung Einer Europäischen Öffentlichkeit," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 22, no. 2 (1993), R. Koopmans and J. Erbe, "Towards a European Public Sphere? Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Europeanised Political Communication," *Innovation* 17, no. 2 (2003). J. Downey and T. Koenig, "Is There a European Public Sphere: The Berlusconi-Schultz Case," *European Journal of Communication* 21, no. 2 (2006). Thomas Risse and M. van de Steeg, "An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications," in *Europeanisation of Public Spheres: Political Mobilisation, Public Communication and the EU* (Berlin: WZB, 2003). E. Grey and P. Statham, "The Public Sphere and Debates About Europe in Britain, Internalized and Conflict-Driven?," *Innovation* 18, no. 1 (2005). H-J. Trenz, "Media Coverage on European Governance. Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers," *European Journal of Communication* 19, no. 3 (2004).

²¹ Bo Stråth, ed., *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, vol. 10, *Series Multiple Europes* (Bruxelles: PIE Lang, 2000).

upon possible indicators of something European in transnational communication and on the role of the EU in the media. Public sphere has become a mantra and contested concept in its own right, but what does it mean? Today's mainly media-centred research justifies itself according to the idea that the public sphere is the intermediate space between the ruling authority and the citizenry, in this intermediate space, media play the role of the communicator and thus media is source material. In particular, mass media are believed to represent reflect and form something close to 'the' public opinion.

A public sphere is much more, however. It connotes a semantic field built up by concepts such as citizenship, civil rights, civil society, market exchange, media, information society, technology, public-private, democracy, critique, debate, rational communication, dialogue and reasoning. Media as one of the key concepts in the discussion of the public sphere also implies simplification and mass manipulation. Public sphere can mean many different things as it is elaborated in the above-mentioned volumes *Democracy without Politics? On the European Crisis of Legitimacy* and *The "European Public Sphere" and the National Media in the Post-War Period*. The public sphere, nevertheless, has a clear political dimension. Questions about legitimacy and representation are central.

We discern two dimensions of the public sphere. The soft public sphere is based on non-institutionalised discourses and refers largely to civil society communication, arenas of debate and the circulation of meaning-making representations, processes of semiosis in cultural systems, identity-based group and other arenas of communication in society. The strong public sphere is politically institutionalized and has a capacity to absorb social pressures. Questions of power are negotiated in both parts of the public sphere, which constitute each other in a process of critique and crisis. In a functioning democracy, these two dimensions can be regarded as mutually constitutive. Our perspective is that the public sphere is basically political, as was the imagination of the public sphere during the creation of the liberal nation states. Arguably, this is the role it must play at the European level if it is going to have any relevance.

The European Public Sphere's existence has been questioned due to the multilingual composition of Europe which it is claimed inhibits communication among the continents inhabitants. Against this argument, assertions have convincingly been expressed that publics across Europe simultaneously debate the same issues.²² The Cartoon crisis of 2006 was just one of many cases in point. Although we maintain that translation is not an insurmountable obstacle to an issue-oriented public sphere²³, our argument is that this ignores an important point in the analogy with the national public spheres – which serve as the model for a European public sphere – as they emerged in the framing of the debate in the liberal processes of nation building. National public spheres had political targets; emerging parliaments and a political power centres. There was a clear political dimension of the public spheres and a core element of this was social critique. *Demos* does not emerge top down through symbol production by an elite, but in bottom up processes of critique, crisis and political responses to crisis. A *demos* emerges not out of consensus but out of conflicts, which in the long run mould together images of a shared framework for the contention of values. The lack of a clear

²² Klaus Eder and Cathleen Kantner, "Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik Der Rede Vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit," in *Europa (Sonderheft Der Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie)*, ed. Maurizio Bach (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000).

²³ Thomas Risse, "Auf dem Weg zu Einer Europäischen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft: Theoretische Überlegungen und Empirische Evidenz," in *Europäische Öffentlichkeit*, ed. Claudio Franzius and Ulrich K. Preuß (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004).

political target is the flaw of the European public sphere that in many other ways functions like the national public spheres, i.e. with critique and value clashes as a crucial ingredient.

The volume *Democracy without Politics? On the European Crisis of Legitimacy* demonstrates how the European public sphere works in these respects. The lack of a clear political target and subsequent erosion of legitimacy for the European centre potentially leads the social critique towards national political centres. The big problem for Europe today is the gap between the public sphere and a political power centre and between critique and response to critique.

This gap can be described as a tension between pretensions of rhetoric and institutional footing. The language of European integration implies that the European market leads to a European democracy, and that the European identity, another vision was that the European public sphere and the European constitution would have the same effect. The public sphere language is a discourse on the emergence of democracy, but there are no institutions to respond to the requirements of a democracy, unless one considers the Parliament at the level of the House of Lords in such a role.

In Habermas' view, constitutional patriotism or *Verfassungspatriotismus* (patriotism linked to civil freedom and the constitution) based on confrontation with past experiences and belief in social security could replace fictions about the ethnically defined nation as the cohesive social cement. This was the crucial dimension of Habermas' theory, that the militant defence of the constitution produced political allegiances distinct from those based on ethnic identity. Habermas introduced the idea of *Verfassungspatriotismus* as a possibility for European unification. Key questions are how realistic this potential is and on what preconditions it can be based. Such a European Public Sphere promoting a constitutional patriotism would not *per se* solve the question of the political centre. It would on the contrary require the political centre established through a constitution experienced as worthwhile to defend.

One way to bring the democratic deficit to an end would be to politicize and democratize the EU. Another way would be to expressly pronounce that the EU is *per se* not a democratic organisation but an instrument to safeguard democracy in the member states. This is the perspective for which Alan Milward coined the term 'the European rescue of the nation states'.²⁴ It implies a step back towards the EEC of the 1960s before the European identity discourse and the interest in a European demos. The equation that identity will build European self-awareness, which will make people vote and will thus legitimise the EU, simply does not hold. Identities are dynamic, multiple and entangled, and in the long term cannot be manufactured from above.

Democracy is bottom up. A problem is in this context that the dominant thinking in the Commission has a decidedly top down perspective of mobilizing symbol production and rational arguments. The mediation of symbols and arguments is seen as a mere matter of communication, and the lack of sympathy for the EU as a matter for explanation. There are too many a-historical misunderstandings of how processes of construction of community and the invention of nations occurred in nineteenth century Europe. These processes were complex contrary and fraught with conflict. They occurred in a bottom up perspective and were not the result of symbol production by elites. This implies a rethinking of the nation building process both in the nineteenth century and a broadening of perspectives when approaching the post-1945 model of the nation state.

²⁴ Milward, Brennan, and Romero, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.

The diachronic examination of the context-specific negotiations of different values at times of crisis allows us to effectively assess whether Europe still remains the sole “invention of nation- states”²⁵ or whether it has already become a concept for post-national ways of thinking and talking about Europe (as conceptually convergent or divergent from the meaning of the European Union for instance)²⁶.

Moreover, an important and novel aspect of this project is its emphasis on the links between ‘discourse’, ‘media’ and ‘history’ in the study of the EPS. Our perspective is discourse historical. The term is re-appropriated here from the discourse-historical tradition in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)²⁷. This research points to the inherent and ongoing links between discourse, media, and history. In this research, discourse is seen as a strictly historical construct which is based on the ongoing negotiation of concepts and ideas developed in both synchronic and diachronic dimensions.²⁸ It is in those different historically-specific contexts that various social and political ‘concepts’ (in the understanding of the German Begriffsgeschichte or Conceptual History²⁹) are negotiated. These concepts may be recontextualised and redefined³⁰ both in a historical/diachronic and in a synchronic dimension). In this perspective, our key concept of Europe is also seen “as a discourse (...) under continuous negotiation and re-negotiation”³¹. Thus, different ways of understanding ‘Europe’ in different contexts change in discourse over time, creating ever-newer ways of understanding that concept as well as its media-negotiated, EPS- specific semantic fields³² and its neighbouring- or counter-concepts (Nebenbegriffe or Gegenbegriffe)³³.

Unlike earlier studies, our approach is diachronic/longitudinal and predominantly qualitative. By studying the diachronic development of the EPS from a qualitative (i.e. discourse-based and discourse-analytic perspective), we show how different, EPS-constitutive media-discourses changed over time and in different contexts. We thus intend to avoid (over-) generalisations (at the level of theory and analysis) typical of quantitative research on the EPS. By analyzing different discursive patterns of ‘talking about Europe’ in the national

²⁵ Mikael af Malmberg and Bo Stråth, eds., *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations* (Oxford, UK; New York: Berg, 2002).

²⁶ Cf. Michał Krzyżanowski and Florian Oberhuber, eds., *(Un)Doing Europe? Discourses and Practices of Negotiating the EU Constitution* (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2007).

²⁷ M. Krzyżanowski, *Becoming European: Discourses of Identity and Social Change in Polish Politics after 1989* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, Forthcoming), Michał Krzyżanowski, *Becoming European: Discourses of Identity and Social Change in Polish Politics after 1989* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, Forthcoming), Ruth Wodak "Critical Discourse Analysis," in *Qualitative Research Practice*, ed. Clive Seale (London: SAGE, 2004), Ruth Wodak, *Disorders of Discourse, Real Language Series* (London: Longman, 1996), Ruth Wodak "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Introducing Qualitative Methods*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), Ruth Wodak and et al., eds., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Critical Discourse Analysis Series* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), Ruth Wodak and et al., eds., *"Wir Sind Alle Unschuldige Täter!" Diskurshistorische Studien Zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990).

²⁸ Wodak, *Disorders of Discourse*.

²⁹ Reinhart Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft: zur Semantik Geschichtlicher Zeiten*, 2 ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

³⁰ Wodak "The Discourse-Historical Approach."

³¹ Bo Stråth, "Europe as a Discourse," in *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Bo Stråth, *Series Multiple Europes*, 10 (Bruxelles: PIE Lang, 2000). P. 14.

³² J. Ifversen, "Text, Discourse, Concept. Approaches to Textual Analysis.," *Kontur* 7 (2003), Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

³³ Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft: zur Semantik Geschichtlicher Zeiten*.

media over time, we capture the qualitative features of discursive constructions of Europe and the nation-state at different times of crisis. Thus, we adopt the so-called abductive ('back-and-forth procedure')³⁴ which allows continuous mediating between theoretical exploration and empirically grounded and methodologically rigorous analysis.

³⁴ Cf. Wodak "The Discourse-Historical Approach.", Wodak and al., eds., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*.

Media Research

The research provides a synopsis and comparison of key findings of a set of country specific 'Reports on Media Research'. These reports were prepared by EMEDIATE's project consortium. The main aim of this research is to see how, in respective countries taken under examination the analysis of secondary sources (existent media studies on media discourses) yielded a variety of visions and conceptions of 'Europe' 'European identity' and/or 'European values' (all jointly hereinafter referred to as 'European issues'). Also, throughout our research, we wanted to see how these visions and conceptions were debated in an event specific manner, i.e. whether different 'real world' social and political occurrences which were either of specifically national or pan-European (or even of broader, international) character prompted media negotiation of 'Europe' and 'Europeanness'.

This comparative synopsis will account for key similarities and differences between research findings in respective countries while it will also try to see inasmuch various national, regional or, indeed pan-European characteristics were key for the explorations of media-contents (media discourses) undertaken to date. This research thus also provides a comprehensive overview and meta-analysis of existing research on media discourses related to 'European issues' in the post war period while it subsequently seeks to assess the possible emergence of a European Public Sphere (EPS) through the analysis of the (national) media coverage of transnational issues. Thus, we also 'test' whether the EPS has grown to include both Western and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or whether, even after 1989, various ways of constructing Europe in media discourses can still be defined as strictly 'Eastern' and/or 'Western European'. Also, we investigated whether the growing pan-European importance of the political construct of the European Union (EU) in the post-war European history (in Western Europe) and in recent years (in CEE) has actually changed the ways in which media account for 'Europe' and whether the latter remains an EU-independent philosophical concept or is actually 'dominated by the EU in its drive to control and standardize domestic spaces of several European nation states and to legitimise its ever- more controversial, organisational/political actions.

The final set of conclusions of this research in EMEDIATE pertains to the actual role that the academic research plays in the enactment and elaboration of the idea of a transnational, European Public Sphere. Here, two issues have received our special attention. On the one hand, we wanted to see how (and the degree to which) the transnational (state-transcending) scope of the analysed media studies might be informative for the existence of issues that are debated in a pan-European perspective (as proved by the cross-national academic interests). On the other hand, we wanted to see how various academic and disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) traditions active in the studied countries may be influential for such transnational interests as well as for the elaboration of the concept of the European Public Sphere. Here, we also elaborate whether, e.g., any international links are active within particular disciplines to strengthen the transnational research as well as the way the arrival of interdisciplinary and problem oriented approaches has supported the emergence of a more active transnational research on Europe in several countries.

Looking for state transcending nature of the analysed media studies, we see that, in general, there exists only limited interest in studying issues debated in the transnational perspective. Hence, on the one hand, in several of the countries in question we identified almost no studies presenting transnational comparisons of media discourses (e.g. in Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Spain where, in all cases only one study was identified, or in Ireland where no such study was proposed) while, in most of the countries we have witnessed a uniquely 'bilateral' focus of

the studies which, in a frequently recurrent manner, have pertained to the comparative analyses of two national public spheres as was the case with, e.g., frequent studies on German and French media in Germany. In several of the countries, diverse state transcending studies were proposed in various scopes and were limited to two studies in Austria, three studies in Poland or several studies in Sweden, where, however, the main focus was clearly put on comparing Swedish media to that of other Nordic countries. By far, the largest number of state transcending studies have been undertaken in France, yet, it is also in that case that all of those studies compare French media contents with those of other (mainly Western) European countries.

As one can infer from the scope and number of those state transcending studies a very limited analytic attention to other than 'core' national public spheres exists. In turn, if proposed, the state transcending media studies have some clearly national slant and are aimed at portraying the contents of the national media as 'internationally fit and up-to-date', viz. as focusing on the similar set of issues as those debated from the national perspectives elsewhere. This leads us to the conclusion that the truly transnational studies covering, in an equal way, several countries without favouring any of them as the 'basis' of analysis are indeed very limited (viz. they have been identified only in Austria, Germany, France and Italy). Accordingly, the academic research on the transnational aspects of the European Public Sphere (recently very strong in countries like Germany, France or the UK, yet very weak in all other countries) must still be perceived as emergent and not actually based on some long-lasting traditions.

On the other hand, we have seen very clearly that the interest in public spheres in general, and in their transnational variations in particular, cannot be subscribed (in the pan-European dimensions) to any particular disciplines. As we have been able to establish, various 'historical' academic traditions react in a different ways and approach media contents in a highly diversified manner. In a similar way, various national contexts of media research (still) very strongly influence the media studies (both quantitatively and qualitatively) while clearly impoverishing the scope of its Europe-related focus. For example, in the Anglophone academic tradition, we see that the research on media has been approached differently in various countries. While, in the UK (Europe's largest 'academic market') media were approached from different disciplinary perspectives (of, e.g., sociology, political economy, media studies) it is only later that some interdisciplinary research traditions have clearly taken over (e.g. cultural studies or linguistically-based Critical Discourse Analysis). However, of all of the studied 'academic areas', it appears that the British media studies researchers have been uniquely active in incorporating 'foreign' foci of media research to their national-specific explorations. Thus, the British media studies borrowed from and shared core concepts and analytical categories with the researchers active in the USA (fostered by the 'shared language' of the US and British academic spheres), as well as, yet to a lesser degree, with colleagues operating in other European countries. Also, in the UK, the clear divide between 'journalism studies' (focusing on journalist and editorial cultures) and 'media studies' (focusing on media policies and media contents) is still very strong and clearly acts to the detriment of the latter. In a similar vein, of other countries of the Anglophone academic area, like Ireland, the very late arrival of any media research as such (starting, practically, only in the 1980's at Dublin City University) has had some very clear influence on the number and scope of media studies provided so far.

A somewhat different picture appears with regard to the two key countries of the German language academic tradition (Germany and Austria) where the interest in media contents has been fairly strong yet clearly unequally distributed (viz. it has been present in Germany ever since the 1950's while truly accelerating in Austria only from the late 1980's). In both of those countries, clearly different disciplines have dominated media research in general, and its

focus on media contents and media discourse in particular. Hence, in Germany, the discipline which has been very strong is that of 'publicist and media studies' ('Publizistik- und Medienwissenschaft') which, clearly changing and accelerating in the spirit of 1968 (particularly in West Germany), has, yielded the largest number of studies. Interestingly, this discipline has strongly been supported by several other social sciences of which the political science research proved to be very productive in the recent years. On the other hand, in Austria, the 'publicist and media studies' have clearly focused on the journalist studies (in the UK sense, cf. above) thus leaving room for other disciplines to study media contents. Here, the 'Viennese Tradition' of the linguistically based research in Critical Discourse Analysis, has, as far, proved to be the most productive while other social sciences (e.g. political science) are still only developing their media related research paradigms at the same time when some media content related studies (slowly) started to emerge in the publicist and media studies.

Finally, in the Francophone academic tradition sociology and various social and cultural sciences have dominated the media oriented research in the Post War period. Interestingly, in France, the discipline of media studies as such emerges strongly only in the 1980's yet, ever, since, came to dominate the most of the research on the media including its content oriented variation. In other countries of different academic traditions, a similarly late arrival of 'media studies' may be noted in Spain and Greece which start serious research on media contents only in the late 1980's. In other countries, various disciplines lead the way, while, in general it seems that the bulk of media research is performed in various social sciences (mainly sociology - in Sweden, the Netherlands and Italy; or in political science – in Greece, Italy and Spain) as well as in the field of media studies. Similarly, in the Eastern European countries (Slovenia and Poland), the equal number of studies can be noted in both social, political and media sciences.

We have been able to establish that from the enumerated disciplines active in the field of media research in the post-war European history none was able to actually propose any truly transnational research on Europe. By the same token those examples of transnational research which have recently started to appear within particular disciplines (e.g. in political science within the clearly German led trend of the research on the European Public Sphere) cannot be perceived as sufficient as they are largely based on some widely normative theoretical foundations and not fully able to cope with qualitative aspects of analysis indispensable for research on media contents. On the other hand, the very disparate disciplinary landscape of the media related research emphasises the fact that in each of the countries (and definitely in the large-scale academic areas) different disciplines are leading the way thus, in turn, willing to defend their country specific variations and foci, are fuelling back to the solely intra-national focus of media research. By the same token, it is crucial to observe that a significantly low degree of transnational interest in problem oriented interdisciplinary approaches (e.g. thematically focused on 'Europe') acts clearly to the detriment of 'European Media Research' which still, as it appears, is doomed to cope with 'disciplinary parochialism and imperialism'³⁵ as well as with the closeness within the national borders.

³⁵ Andrew Sayer, "For Postdisciplinary Studies: Sociology and the Curse of Disciplinary Parochialism/Imperialism," in *For Sociology: Legacies and Prospects*, ed. J. E. T. Eldridge, et al. (Durham: Sociology Press, 2000).

Constructions of 'Europe' in Media Discourses

The textual material stemming from the national and international media coverage of our Crisis Events provides a very modest and highly diversified set of different conceptualisations of Europe. Europe never comes to the foreground of the analysed media discourses and is debated only 'as a whole' in the very last of our Crisis Events, i.e. in the reporting of the Mohammad Cartoons in the European media in the early 2006. It is only within that last of our events that Europe is additionally strongly linked to its ethical conceptualisation (to be portrayed as a certain community of common values, see below) and is perceived as a more or less congruent entity whose features are different from non-European others such as 'the Arab world, the Muslim states, the USA and so on'.

As it appears, in the most of the events analysed before 2006 (particularly within Crisis Eras between 1956 and 1989), Europe is portrayed as a synonym to other geopolitical conceptualisations: in particular it is defined geographically (as a place) and is mainly perceived as an intermediary space somewhere between the 'East' and the 'West'. Hence, the notorious East-West divide of Europe lasting until 1989 may be defined as an overarching conceptualisation of not only European but also of the entire global space: it must be noted that the both the 'East' and the 'West' frequently included non-European actors such as, particularly, the USA within the 'Western' strand. Also, the East-West logic seems far more appealing to the media than any attempt to conceptualise Europe at the times of crisis: it was easier for the media to perceive most of the Crisis Events as rooted in the East-West struggle evident at the times of the Iron Curtain rather than to look for any other conceptualisations of Europe in which Europe was not divided and conflicted. Therefore, in several of the analysed Crisis Events, and in particular in those of 1956 in Budapest, 1961 in Berlin, 1968 in Prague, 1981 in Poland and 1989 in Germany, we encounter the very elaborate definitions of the East-West struggle (still located and actually taking place in Europe) much earlier than any other perceptions of Europe in a philosophical or ethical way. One event, (Paris 1968), stems out from the described processes of *spatialising Europe* and *perceiving it in terms of East-West divide* (of seeing it as a locus of that struggle): within that event Europe is mostly defined as an economic space and the pan-European economic repercussions of the French crisis are debated.

In case of all of the described Crisis Events, we also see the crucial importance of the so-called '*national filter of perception of Europe*' which we have described in the previous parts of our EMEDIATE research.³⁶ Hence, while in most of the countries Europe is (if at all) congruently accommodated in discourse through the 'spatial' and 'East-West' lens before, it is crucially always defined differently and in ways which help defend and legitimise the very different national perceptions of Europe³⁷ and of the crises in question. Interestingly those national filters of perceiving Europe remain more or less stable over time throughout the Crisis Eras where the media from the similar countries were investigated. For example in the

³⁶ Michał Krzyżanowski and Ruth Wodak, "Comparative Report on Media Research," in *EMEDIATE, WP2 – Media Research* (Lancaster/Firenze: EMEDIATE, 2006).

³⁷ Malmberg and Stråth, eds., *The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among Nations*, Bo Stråth and Anna Triandafyllidou, *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member-States : Media, Elites and Civil Society : The Collective State of the Art and Historical Reports* (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003), Bo Stråth and Anna Triandafyllidou, *Representations of Europe and the Nation in Current and Prospective Member-States: Media, Elites and Civil Society: The Collective State of the Art and Historical Reports* (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003).

UK press, investigated in the Crisis Eras, the perception of Europe and of events taking place in foreign (European) countries remains stable and is rooted in Britain's specifically 'Euro-sceptic' or 'British pragmatic'³⁸ (perception of the European space (it is also notable that, in the British case the Euro-sceptic perception persists even further in the later Crisis Eras). In a similar vein, the West-German media also display the very similar characteristics of their 'bilateral perception' typical for the post-War German will to restore stability in the European space. Additionally, those national perceptions found their further diversification according to the intra-national perceptions of Europe which differed according to the liberal or to the conservative character of the investigated media: as we could clearly see in the case of the aforementioned British press, whenever investigated the latter remained successively divided into 'more' and 'less' British-like Euro-sceptic (in the conservative and the liberal strand respectively).

On the other hand, the existence of the *national filter* is also persistent in the interpretation of the Crisis Events by diverse national media which thus attempt to mirror their own countries' relation with/to Europe. For example, in the 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall, we witness a very peculiar perception of that event in the Greek media which attempt to describe the 1989 occurrences in Germany in a way which is specific for the traditional perceptions of Europe's relation with Greece (it is rooted in a similar emphasis that, as once was the case with Greece, the relationship between Europe and East Germany must be established anew). Still within the same 1989 event, the aforementioned British media also postulated in a specific UK-like manner that, just like those of the UK, the relations between Europe and East-Germany must remain very 'realistic' or even 'Euro-sceptic' (therefore Europe was specifically almost totally omitted as an element of the British media discourse on the 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall).

Finally, looking at the development of the presence of Europe in the media discourse over time, an important issue must be mentioned in relation to the Iraq War 2003. The first event analysed after the 1989 fall of the Iron Curtain and in the process of redefinition of the EU as an ever-more clearly defined European-political actor did not herald any crucial change to the previously-described nationally-conditioned and (at the most) bilateral perceptions of Europe evident in the preceding crises. On the contrary, the media coverage of Europe's reaction to the US' and allied forces' invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought a crucial revival of the strongly national perception of Europe since European countries positioned themselves differently vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis. Accordingly, Europe was portrayed as an arena of various struggles and was frequently brought down in the constructions of media discourse to the very personal level of the key (national) actors representing differing national perceptions of the Iraq Crisis (e.g. Blair vs. Chirac standing for the different stand of the UK and France, etc.). Importantly, the EU, as a transnational European actor did not play a crucial role in unifying the European space: as it is suggested in the report on the Iraq War the limited role of the EU resided mostly in the fact that the Union (unlike several of its member-states) could not agree on a firm stance vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis.

While our expectations with regard to the constructions of Europe in the analysed discourse remain highly diversified and fairly inconsistent over time (cf. above), it must be stated that values and other ethically-charged notions were one of the key features of the analysed textual material. Hence, we believe, one of the central hypotheses of EMEDIATE that the negotiation of 'crises' in the media constitutes at once an almost automatic elaboration of values. This was definitely confirmed in our media research.

³⁸ Gerlinde Mautner, *Der Britische Europa-Diskurs : Methodenreflexion und Fallstudien zur Berichterstattung in der Tagespresse* (Wien: Passagen, 2000).

That claim is additionally substantiated by the fact that, in all of our Crisis Events, values are embedded in the media perception of crisis in a dual way. On the one hand, in all of the analysed cases, values are embedded in the media descriptions of the *ontology of the crises* in question. For example, the 1956 crisis in Budapest is perceived as stemming from a will of a Hungarian reformist government to retain Hungary's independence from the Soviet Union and thus to restore/defend the country's freedom of self-expression on the international scene. On the contrary, the Soviet invasion to curb the Hungarian protest was perceived as a violation of all those values. Then, the 1961 crisis in Berlin was perceived as a violation of Berlin's symbolic will to remain free and independent of the macro-political division of the city into different zones of influence and the subsequent creation of the city's Eastern and Western part. Similarly, the 1981 crisis in Poland was almost unanimously defined as stemming from the trade unions' attempts to restore or keep various forms of freedom of political self-expression and gathering while the imposition of martial law in the country was seen as the state-regime's clear violation of those values. In any case, in all those and other events, the roots of the crisis were based in a strictly value-laden discourse while it was not only the description but also the actual nature and character of the described social and political processes (i.e. the crises themselves or the processes leading to those crises) which were perceived strictly in terms of various values.

On the other hand, the *reaction of different countries to the Crisis Events* (importantly co-constructed by the analysed national media in/through their discourse) were also seen as inherently based or legitimised by certain values. Here, we have witnessed that countries aligned themselves differently in a will to show their relation to the crises in terms of different values. For example, in case of the Polish 1981 crisis we could see that the Western-European countries almost unanimously perceived themselves as standing for the values of the Western-like democracy (also evident, e.g., in the media discourses on the 1961 and 1989 crises in Germany) and therefore saw their crucial role in condemning the actions of the Polish regime as opposing those values ending the freedom of political expression seemingly underlying the democratic order. On the contrary, various communist countries (extensively quoted in the coverage of the Polish crisis in the Polish regime- and Soviet-obedient media) were portrayed as allegiant to the values cherished by the Polish regime - such as peace and stability - which were apparently defended by the actions of the Polish communist rulers. Secondly, in a very crucial process, varied reactions of different countries were almost always evidently legitimised by different values. In most cases (e.g. 1956, 1961, 1981 or 2003) various humanitarian values (e.g. humanitarian aid, protection of human rights) were recalled to legitimise different countries' reactions to the critical occurrences elsewhere. In a similar vein, the value of solidarity with the country in crisis (evident particularly in 1961 and 1981) was also key to legitimise foreign reactions to the turbulent situations in the countries where the radical events actually took place.

In a peculiar way, values which were introduced into media discourse in the specifically-defined and aforementioned dual way, can be grouped under several different headings or within several *catalogues of values* which remained significantly stable over time. First, we have seen several 'freedoms' as the key elements of discourse in most of our Crisis-Event-oriented instances of discourse. According to our previous research those freedoms (of political expression, of gathering, of the press, of expression through the media, of elections, of trade unions, etc.) could be defined as the specific '1968 values', as was the case during the 1968 events in Paris when their construction accelerates and acquires a fundamental meaning. However, it is worth noting that those values are also pivotal for the Crisis Events which took place before 1968: 'freedom of speech and action' is a pivotal value in the media discourse on the 1956 occurrences in Budapest while the 'freedom of elections' appears to be one of the values underlying media perception of the 1961 crisis in Berlin. Secondly, another set of

values which clearly stand out in our analyses of media discourse are those which can be defined as ‘humanitarian’. Within the latter there are values such as ‘humanism’, ‘humanitarian efforts’, ‘humanitarian aid’ which were crucial for the international media perceptions of the Crisis Events of 1956, 1961 and 1981. Finally, within the third group of values which can be defined as ‘democratic’, we mainly encounter various expressions of and differed understandings of ‘democracy’ as well as other value of ‘peace’ frequently associated with the introduction of the former. Those values were crucial in such Crisis Events as those of 1956, 1968 (Paris and Prague), 1981 and 2003.

In an interesting way, just as in different discursive constructions of Europe in the analysed textual material, *the existence of the national filter was also pivotal for the varied understandings of the three basic groups of the identified values*. Thus, in almost all of our cases, most of the aforementioned values were defined differently depending of the country in which our analysed media originated. For example, in the first of the analysed Crisis Events (1956 Budapest), ‘democracy’ was perceived in the Hungarian media as a specifically ‘socialist democracy’ which, in turn could emphasise Hungarian national *Sonderweg* postulated at the time of crisis. By the same token, the Austrian and West-German reporting also saw ‘democracy’ as a crucial aspect of the 1956 Hungarian revolution: however, they saw it differently, i.e. as the chance to introduce ‘Western democracy’ into Hungary. In a similar way, values like ‘democracy’ and ‘peace’ (as well as an additional value of ‘progress’) were defined differently in the Yugoslavian (viz. Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian) and in the British media reporting on the 1968 crisis in Prague. Here, again, a unique Yugoslavian-like form of democracy which could be followed in Czechoslovakia was postulated in the Yugoslav countries while the British media clearly favoured a form of a ‘Western-like democracy’ as a model to be followed.

The aforementioned existence of the national filter in the specific interpretation of values clearly acted in favour of perceiving most values as predominantly ‘national’ and resulted in the lack of any overt constructions of ‘European values’ in the analysed instances of discourse. As it can be defined, the latter, clearly falsifying one of our key hypotheses which took linking Europe and values in discourse through the construction of European values, was additionally fuelled by the fact that most of the analysed media did not define Europe in ethical- and value-oriented terms. However, two Crisis Events (of 1981 and 2006) seem to stand out from the said general rule and provide us with interesting links between ‘Europe’ and ‘values’ in the analysed discourse. Within both of those events, however, we witness the discursive linkage between Europe and values being constructed for significantly different aims which include legitimization of the crises or of the varied reactions to the latter.

First, in case of the media discourse on the 1981 ‘State of War’ in Poland, we witness a very specific set of *processes of its spatio-temporal accommodation* of Europe in discourse. This also allows linking ‘Europe’ and ‘Values’ in the analysed media reporting on the Polish case. Within that spatio-temporal accommodation, Europe was invoked in discourse to portray different (spatial and temporal) entities which it was allegedly supposed to embody or be a part of and which were all affected through the activities described (i.e. reported) and legitimised in the analysed texts. The three of the identified processes were those of (a) *globalising Europe*, (b) *regionalising Europe* as well as of (c) *making Europe and intermediary between East and West*. Within the first of the processes - of globalising Europe – the latter was supposed to denote the extra-national spaces that it co-represented (such as, e.g. ‘Europe and the world’), while the process also allowed linking Europe and values (as it was frequently argued in the Polish media at the time the imposition of the martial law in Poland was crucial for keeping the values of peace in ‘Europe and the world’).

The second process of the regionalisation of Europe saw it as an element of discourse which described (still, strictly-national) actions which were apparently motivated by the will to express some regional (therefore locally-European) ties. Those ties, such as, e.g. those embodied by the Austrian *Mitteleuropa*-based compassion for Poland or the West-German will to help its suffering Polish neighbour, also helped linking 'Europe' and 'values': e.g. the Austrian will to show *solidarity* with Poland was rooted in its geographical (viz. spatial) proximity with Poland, while it was also crucially embedded within Austrian historically-conditioned actions: notably, Austria was willing to help Poland just as it did to Hungary (also a member of the Austrian space of *Mitteleuropa*) in 1956. Finally, the third of the processes – i.e. of making Europe latter an intermediary between the East and the West and specific for the British press reporting of the Polish crisis – was constructed its discourse by referring to the geopolitical struggle between the East and the West. Here, Europe, despite its objectively-possible placement in both of the strands, was crucially perceived as the synonym of the 'West' (in the British quality press) or of the 'East' (in the British boulevard press) and helped defending such values as, e.g., the value-like 'East-West arms control process' (in the Western-specific definition) or 'freedoms' (e.g. of political expression or of expression through the media – in the Eastern like definition focused on Polish 'Solidarity' as a unique Eastern-European movement).

On the other hand, the most recent media discourse on the 2006 Crisis Event on the Mohammad Cartoons in the European Media we observe a very crucial linkage between 'Europe' and 'Values' through the introduction of the previously-described value-based and ethically-charged conceptions of Europe in media discourse of several of the analysed countries. While the discourse and understanding of values in the countries analysed with regard to the Cartoon Crisis (in Italy, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK) still varies along the nationally-specific lines and different 'European interests' of the countries in question, it is generally suggested by the authors of the report that 'a common set of European values exists within media discourses' while 'there is also a certain representation of Europe and the EU as one whole if compared with countries and social or cultural units outside the European continent'. The key value which is used to link 'Europe' together in this context is that of 'solidarity and common ethics' which are all apparently 'shared within Europe'. Crucially, in the media discourse on the 2006 case, we also find (albeit less prominently) the 'reference to an ethical responsibility of Europe or the EU' which is unprecedented in discourse on the earlier Crisis Events.

Editorial Cultures

The research on Editorial Cultures within the EMEDIATE framework involved primary and secondary research. All five partners engaged in desk research and conducted interviews with media professionals in a total of eleven countries (i.e. Four of the partners have researched the editorial culture in their own country as well as that of one other country in line with the original contract whilst one covered their home country. In addition, DCU undertook studies of two additional countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia).

This research began with a critical review of the existing literature on editorial cultures including both country studies and comparative work. All partners have undertaken a review of the relevant literature on editorial cultures in their own country in countries outside their own in line with their linguistic expertise and geographical proximity. The collection and analysis of secondary sources was centred round a historical framework with a view to assessing how press and TV newsmaking cultures and related values have evolved in the past 10-15 years in the countries studied.

In addition, the partners undertook a set of interviews with senior media professionals working in a mix of media organisations within each of the 11 countries studied. The interviews were conducted with professionals involved in the production of news in TV (both public and private channels) and in the press (a sample of major newspapers covered in each country). These interviews were taped and researchers listened to them repeatedly and transcribed the full interview or those excerpts most directly relevant to this research. Interview transcripts were then analysed following the tradition of qualitative discourse analysis. The findings were discussed against the background of the bibliographical review. The partners' analysis of editorial cultures paid attention to identifying the values that characterise the news production process in each country. The participating partners translated relevant interviews and documentary evidence and then produced 'national reports' summarising the key findings and an annotated bibliography related to the research on the editorial cultures in the countries studied.

This research included a specific responsibility to identify and check "whether there is a common set of values emerging among the countries studied and ... whether this set of values could be characterised as peculiarly European or whether it is global in character, converging to the news production values in the U.S".

The Editorial Culture literature reviews tend to indicate that European-centred studies form a relatively small portion of the existing research and knowledge base related to news and editorial cultures in the 11 EU countries studied. In essence, the academic research literature generally reflects the wider situation whereby European and EU related news and current affairs topics tend to play a relatively minor and sporadic roles in the overall content of the mass media. The review of the relevant research suggests that this trend is not necessarily the consequence of any anti-European/EU bias (although it may be so in some cases). Rather, to a great extent, it merely reflects the operations of more general selection processes and shifts in news values and journalistic practices, including :

- The long-established pattern whereby national news and current affairs topics have always had a privileged status relative to the seemingly 'foreign' ;
- The declining role of 'hard' news in favour of softer and more celebrity-focused news;

- The related shift towards more entertainment, sports and lifestyle orientated media content;
- A consequent squeeze on ‘foreign’ news and current affairs reports (other than sports, travel and tourism issues)

The majority of the relevant studies (identified in the literature reviews) also tend to clearly emphasise that EU issues are still largely treated and viewed via specifically national media cultures or set of news-making values -- or via the ‘national prism’.

But here, we note that the British case poses some interesting questions or ironies as to the meaning of such ‘national’ news values, frames or prisms in the early twenty first century. Two of the British newspapers that are most likely to invoke ‘national’ cultural values and traditions in their avidly anti-European discourses happen to be effectively owned and controlled by a powerful multi-national (multi-) media mogul who traded his Australian citizenship for US citizenship in recent years.

The interview stage of this research involved in-depth interviews of 90 journalists across the eleven countries covered. The major findings largely concur with those indicated by the survey of the research literature. The interviews with media practitioners underline the newsmaking factors which serve to limit the extent of coverage of EU and European news topics, their treatment through a specific ‘national prism’ and the essentially national dimension of news cultures. The findings suggest that it is to all intents and purposes impossible to create a common informational or editorial product across national/cultural boundaries in the short or medium-term horizons. The intrinsic ethnocentrism of journalism cultures means that there is a possibility for a “European” editorial product in each culture only if that product’s own style and content is consonant with those of the culture in which its anticipated consumers live.

In general, our findings suggest that there is a high degree of commonality between the issues highlighted in literature review and interview sections of the national reports. The relationship between the literature review and interviews seems comparatively clear when it comes to the questions of whether there a recognisable ‘European’ journalistic culture and/or whether there a pattern to the way in which ‘European’ topics are addressed. For many of the countries studied, this is simply because there was little or no national research literature engaging with the specific kinds of issues posed by two of the questions (numbers 7 and 8) put to the interviewees (e.g. Italy, Slovenia, Serbia, Ireland). In this respect, the interviews with practicing journalists indicate that the neglect of such issues on the part of academic researchers is not some peculiar aberration.

In all countries covered by the research teams, there is a striking convergence of findings concerning the absence of any shared “European” dimension to journalistic cultures. In this regard, the French case is typical of the findings for most countries: *‘The interviews back up the results of French literature on editorial culture ...: there is no European journalism as such but journalists addressing European issues from different media, different socio-political and cultural backgrounds, using different languages Most interviewees point out that a European journalistic culture is a mere utopia. There cannot be common references as professional practices are marked by national traditions or systems of interpretation’.*

Such findings are echoed in other Editorial Cultures national reports, for example, these flagged in the national report for the Netherlands. Here, both the literature review and interview stages converge around the finding that ‘European issues are predominantly

reported from a domestic perspective, with a focus on domestic actors or concerns'. The importance of the 'national prism' in the selection and packaging of any EU/Europe related news items was confirmed by the interviewees, who claimed this was the condition for making news about Europe newsworthy and for tailoring the news to their audiences. As in other countries, several interviewees also emphasised the need to translate or link European issues to the question of how decision-making in Brussels affects ordinary citizens in their daily lives --hinting at economic or quality of life influences, consumer-oriented interests attributed to audiences.

As noted in the relevant research literature, the prominent role of public service broadcasting (PSB) has been one of the most distinctive features of the media landscapes found in almost all European countries since the mid-twentieth century. PSB is frequently characterised as being framed around a specific editorial culture and attendant journalistic ethos ('to educate, inform and entertain' as the BBC's first director-general defined it) combined with a commitment to a diversity of both programming content and universal service with respect to the national audience.

The precise definitions and formats deemed to express the specific editorial culture of PSB have evolved and changed significantly in recent decades in line with changing socio-cultural norms, policy shifts as well as the competitive and inter-textual relations prevailing between PSB and the increasing range of commercial broadcast services. The result has been that the relative roles of PSB services have declined significantly in most EU countries compared to the situation some 10-20 years ago. Some of the literature reviewed in the national reports indicates that one major source for such developments have been policy changes at both the national and EU levels. At the same time, the increasing role and power of commercial broadcasting services, allied to public policies favouring such competition, has led to a certain convergence in the programming content, schedules and formats of PSB services and their competitors.

Yet our research findings suggest that in some countries, as the British national report indicates, the public service broadcaster is deemed (by governmental appointed inquiries) to have a special responsibility for the provision of 'European' news and current affairs coverage – including the 'education' of the public with respect to such affairs. The bulk of the research literature examined as well as the interviews suggest that such policy strategies may be highly limited in their impacts or even counter productive. Given the overall policy pressures, increasing economic pressures framing the operations of PSB services, their potential role in this regard is highly limited. Indeed, the research considered here suggests that such policy strategies may even be counter-productive given the competitive and inter-textual relations prevailing between PSB and the increasing range of commercial broadcast services

Clearly, the issues surrounding PSB should be looked at also in the perspective of audience. In some countries PSB viewing has declined to a tiny fraction of the total audience, especially those where there has been a distinct failure to ensure institutional insulation of PSB from direct government influence. In other countries, such as Britain and Ireland, PSB shares of broadcasting audiences have remained relatively high. At the very least, this suggests there is a need for some fundamental research in this area to examine the scope and potential of maintaining a future role for PSB as a distinct feature and domain of journalistic culture in European countries.

Paradoxically, it may well be that PSB, although formerly criticised for its uniformity and even, in certain cultures, an unwillingness to explore controversial issues because of

apprehension about the role of governments and regulators, may now offer one of the best, and in some countries perhaps the only, locale of media diversity in a world in which all commercial media are increasingly serving up the same product.

The empirical findings produced in our research on Editorial Cultures clearly point to the relative absence of “European” dimension. This is no real surprise in light of the specialist research literature related to the international communication and journalism studies field. Whilst we find many references to a crisis in EU communications – the so-called democratic deficit – our research tends to show that there may also be a crisis in journalism, not least of a kind indicated in the report on British editorial culture. Ironically, this seems to be happening at a time when, according to many accounts, that same Anglo-Saxon model of journalism is becoming the dominant model internationally. It seems that there is also a pressing need to refocus academic study in such a way as to weaken or at least modify or supplement) the dominant Anglo-American research paradigm, and to explore the gaps, particularly in the academic literature, disclosed by this report.

One overriding implication is there appears to be a distinct absence of unified policy for the communication sector at the EU level. On the one hand, the major contours of public policy for all communication sub-sectors, have been determined at the EU-level to an increasing extent over the past 20 years. On the other hand, the cumulative effects of these policies at the level of media ‘content’ services – including news and current affairs – has been pushing towards a distinct privileging of commercially orientated and economic logics leading to ‘lite-news’ and entertainment orientated (or infotainment) news forms and formats. These policy trends and resultant media developments do not really favour or support the treatment of novel and complex news events related EU or ‘European’ events and developments. These same EU-level policy trends and resultant media developments also result in the erosion of the role and status of public service orientated media (eg. PSB) which have traditionally sought to ‘inform’ and ‘educate’ as well as merely ‘entertain’ their audiences and publics. Indeed, we may further note that when it comes to the media content services sub-sector, US-based media firms and industry have been the major beneficiaries of the expanding array of communication networks and infrastructures in the EU area (despite successive EU media policy statements proclaiming a contrary mission and expectation).

Thus, an urgent and fundamental revision of this lack of unified policy for the communication sector at the EU level seems to be required on two grounds: .a) if the EU mission is to seriously engage and mobilise support from major portions of the citizenry of its member states, and .b) if the EU is to develop a coherent strategy for the role of communication to advance its geo-political aims.

Internet and a European Public Sphere

A central question for EMEDIATE addressed the Internet as a medium within the contemporary European Public Sphere. The role of the Internet and the European Public Sphere is related to who is able to participate in this online sphere, on the connected side of the digital divide. Additionally, Internet actors who are independent of the European Union and yet target a pan-European audience are highly relevant. The number of these actors is small, and many are supported by the European Union. A final consideration addresses a microcosm for Europe, how the Internet may be useful for transnational minorities to find ways of representation within Europe and at the European institutions.

The Internet is a rapidly developing medium, and it has spawned at least as much hope as it has raised condemnation. For many, it is a democratic medium par excellence while for others it is a socially dividing medium that enhances individualism to such a degree that it is regarded as a negative invention. The truth is that neither of the two extremes has come to fruition. The Internet remains a dynamic medium with an immense potential for future development.

Within Europe, the digital divide is less prominent than in the developing world. Nevertheless, Central and Eastern European countries still show a smaller percentage of Internet usage denying them possibilities open to Internet users. This form of digital divide can be found in all societies. While there is a generational divide in relation to the usage of the Internet for information, there is a social divide as well. Economically poorer citizens use the Internet to a far lesser extent. This divide represents the information divide apparent in any society. Democratic divide: within democratic societies, there is a stark divide of using the Internet in order to participate in the democratic process. Here, there is a tendency of amplifying the gap instead of closing it. Those citizens actively using the Internet's supply of participation possibilities continue doing so and have a larger influence on decisions taken online, and those who do not participate in political dialogue online will have even more difficulties in accessing the political process. This point raises the general question of participation. Mainly, those who are active politically or culturally in any event, use the participation and information. The Internet thus may enforce already existing social inequality.

For those Europeans using the Internet, i.e. those who are on the online-side of the digital divide, among the local, the regional, the national, and the global, the European public sphere stands a difficult ground. The Internet sites produced for a pan-European audience explicitly are rare. Few civil society groups independent from the EU address all of Europe. Those that exist are designed to 'translate' Brussels-talk into normal everyday language, inform European citizens on European policy and provide pages explaining the many abbreviations used by the European Commission. That is to say, while many WebPages dedicated to the EU exist, such as www.europa-digital.de, www.euobserver.com, or www.euractiv.com (a page that translates into most European languages), here the question is whether websites that cater to a European audience by producing European content beyond the explanation of EU policies exist.

The list of actors in this field is short.³⁹ It represents the difficulties that exist when trying to

³⁹ It includes: Café Babel (Paris), an independent, yet partially EU sponsored magazine with many cultural and political news and stories that target a European reader and goes beyond EU information; Argument y I Fakty (Moscow), the online version of a Russian newspaper yet online catering for a decidedly pan-European market; Ouzhou Dao Bao (Amsterdam), "The European Times", produced in

produce content of European character for a pan-European audience. While the space of Europe is currently mapped out by mobile phone companies and by cheap-flight airlines bringing millions of Europeans to each other's cities and beaches, actors engaged beyond the support of the European Commission within a European public sphere are rare.

Nevertheless, the Internet influences or changes political communication decidedly in Europe. The Internet as a technology of communication has changed the way civil society and protest movements are organising themselves. It has enabled many organisations to link and refer to the European Commission or other European institutions. The Council of Europe, e.g., is actively cooperating with civil society organisations, especially with special knowledge NGOs that are experts in certain policy fields. Internet plays an important communicative role in this respect. It must be critically annotated, however, that many NGOs are cooperating with the European institutions and are financed by those same institutions simultaneously, which sheds a different light on the democratic nature of this cooperation.

Independent of the European institutions, the Internet has served as a tool for communication and organisation for civil society groups. Many NGOs have a transnational character because of the Internet's capacity to connect them. Internet telephone services that have increased in recent years are another major argument for the Internet as a platform for communication. Most international NGOs use the Internet and its telephone features for conference calls and for working arrangements. Many organisations have consultants or employees that have never seen each other, or, rather, have never shook hands, since they might have seen each other through web cams. While political social movements may profit from the Internet, the question as to political communication within a European public sphere including the EU and its institutions remains an open.

If there is one minority that has been European for centuries, that is transnational and not bound to a national territory, then this European minority are the Roma. Furthermore, if there is a single minority that is facing all the downs of the digital divide, with reference to access to technology, to information, and to participation – then this is the Roma minority. Since the last election to the European parliament, one Roma parliamentarian has a seat in Strasbourg and Brussels. However, the minority is still underrepresented in general and still faces daily discrimination. The Internet could become a tool for both the Roma minority and the European Union to find ways of representation and information more aptly representing Roma reality in Europe. The difficulties are numerous, of course. Roma illiteracy is still very high, and computer illiteracy even higher. How could Roma vote or be informed via the Internet when they do not know how to use the technology? Some do, but do they represent their people? Sure, the possible disillusiones are numerous, but maybe the Roma should be regarded as a chance for Europe to truly try and integrate a minority so diverse into its decision making process.

The Roma themselves are active in lobbying for their rights and against discrimination on a European and global level and many organisations are supported by the EU in their effort to ameliorate quality of life, legal status, and poor education standards for their fellow Roma. Consequently, they direct their lobbying in the direction of the EU and the UN – and they are

Amsterdam for Chinese readers; New Europe (Athens), mainly a shopping and travel information site; NewEuropeans Magazine (Paris), a true European online magazine catering for a European market mostly in English; SEEurope.net (Sofia), a site mainly for business news in the South-Eastern part of Europe, yet informing a general European audience for this special sector; The Three Monkeys Online (Dublin, Barcelona, Milan), a truly independent European site on current affairs and arts; Forum46 (Berlin), an interdisciplinary NGO providing information, in-depth articles, and events from a pan-European perspective.

supported by a number of NGOs. Roma remain poorly represented, however. Mainly, this is due to their heterogeneous character and their highly apolitical lives. Having been victims of discrimination for many centuries, they are united in having learned to mistrust European development efforts. With the enlargement of the EU, the case of the Roma is put high on the agenda. A population of up to 15 million cannot continue living in circumstances of poverty comparable only to sub-Saharan conditions, which in some areas is the case. Some Roma use the Internet to represent themselves.

The case of the Roma summarises the main deficiencies in relation to the European public sphere and the Internet. While numerous NGOs and interest groups exist, the lack of democratic structures beyond the mere possibility of gathering information and participating in a online forum and the lack of a Europeanised political dialogue beyond exclusive state actors become apparent in the case of the Roma.

In relation to a European public sphere the Internet has been put to good use in relation to transparent information, as a provider of knowledge and as a tool for connecting people beyond borders in all of Europe. To a certain extent, it has mobilised political communication in Europe and about European politics. Yet as a political factor in a European public sphere that is more than a diversified news space and more than a space of overlapping multilingual public spheres sometime talking about similar subjects, the Internet still has to reach beyond the stratum of the population engaged in European politics.

Archive of Visual Europe

The construction of the Archive of Visual Europe including the concomitant research involved in and motivated by its production within the framework of the EMEDIATE project have produced a number of results that lead to the formulation of conclusions which point toward a reassessment and widening of the conceptions of the public sphere and historiography of Europe.

Insofar as it created a collection of photographs (some of which are widely considered iconic) depicting key events in the six crisis eras defined as European, it offers an alternative basis and perspective from which the notion of a European recent past and public sphere can be investigated. This is the case because it is a collection and assembly of linked visual images from Europe's past as opposed to texts which have been the predominant source of academic research. Due to the litero-centric bias of academia, much of the criticism of the conjectured the existence of conventionally conceived European history, culture, public sphere and journalism that has centred on the problematic of linguistic pluralism of Europe. This was confirmed in the literally based Editorial Cultures segment of EMEDIATE's research as mentioned in the above. The fact that linguistic pluralism in Europe limits or hinders the existence of an EPS was firmly established by an academic world centred on and fluent in literal language, and with little ability, desire or training to see beyond literal aspects of discourse. As noted in the above the simultaneous debate of specific issues was seen and widely accepted as a solution to the problematic of a multilingual public in Europe.

Discourse, nonetheless, is not limited to the literal, which for the human mind is far less complex than the visual. The social world is partially literal but also to an extent visual and this visual has been widely disregarded in academic discourses of the Europe's history and public sphere. Although photographs have documented events and experiences, and some have even become and remain events and experiences they are rarely included in research on and the expression of European history and public spheres. This is so although as opposed to literal expressions in specific languages, they do not require literal translation to be comprehensible to masses of individuals across Europe. With their reproduction in newspapers and magazines photograph may be one of the most shared communicators of events and experienced of the post war period across Europe.⁴⁰ Although the interpretation of these images has been plural and transformed over time merging and diverging they are an important component of the European Public Sphere and History neglected in academe. In addition the linking of them the Archive tells a new European history and offers a new platform for its dissemination.

A paradigmatic example of the importance and neglect of photographs within the framework of our research as belonging to shared public sphere and discourse can be seen in the discussions that followed the publication of the images of Willy Brandt genuflecting before the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising on 7 November 1970. Brandt travelled to Warsaw in the Cold War era of détente to sign the "Treaty of Warsaw" committing West Germany and Poland to non-violence and existing borders. The Cold War and Treaty signing was almost immediately eclipsed in the West by the knee-fall that took place on a diplomatic side trip because photographs of the act were widely published. These photos made the event, in a profound sense they were the event, and preserve it in a public sphere through the present. This is not to say that photographs are independent from the literal and exist without text, but that they can stamp and construct intensely.

⁴⁰ Those with grave sight impediments are notably excluded.

In the West the initial reception in this case, although universally strong, was not universally positive. The knee-fall was referred to in West Germany as a “Canossagang”, a trope known as an act of submission that is unjust, unwilling or coerced.⁴¹ Beyond state socialist societies where the photographs were not distributed, the photographs contributed significantly to a reassessment of and heightened respect for Germany. It would later be widely recognized as one significant act promoting the re-entry of Germany into European politics. Brandt became *Time Magazine*’s “Man of the Year” in December of 1970 almost immediately following the event and the bestowal of the Nobel Peace Prize upon Brandt 1971 was certainly and acknowledgement of this photographic event as well as concurrent Ostpolitik.

Although historical sociological contexts are central to understanding the event, much of its power is related to the way it was visually mediated in the form of photographs appearing in the press and then and then in innumerable books, exhibitions and in the internet. These, the roles of the visual and the photographs of the act, are an aspect not addressed in most analyses of Brandt’s knee fall. There the event itself is overwhelmingly narrated literally.

Ironically the introductory paragraph to the contemporary confrontation with the photo in the leading West German magazine *Der Spiegel* reads, “Almost every newspaper in West Germany printed the image ... (b)ut almost no newspaper printed a commentary...”⁴² The phrase was not intended to emphasise the visual importance of the photograph but criticise the lack of published opinions about an event that *Spiegel* claimed few individual citizens did not voice opinions.

The act’s power to change Germany’s perception in the world and maintain relevance through the present would not have been possible without the photographs of the event, and little would have been written about it since. The photograph is a central element in the connection of political history with the real immediate experience and an instrument in politics. In fact, it is plausible that this specific event would have had little or no meaning had it not been photographed, or if the photos were not reproduced in the international media. Although both the contexts and the photographs stamp many of us through the present, among the most potent experiences of the event, those marking and imparting meaning upon it are visual. Therein lies an important message both for those attempting to deepen the integration of and communication in the European Union as well as those analysing the process.

The archive, in a wider sense, is an exploration of the at times ambiguous, contradictory and banal imaginary discourses in and of Europe that transcend exclusive oppositional discourses and point towards a number of pluralities and contradictions that have been indicated in much of contemporary research on Europe. Most recently the concept “Europhrenia” was proposed to describe this situation.⁴³ In the wake of these oppositional discourses history has been devalued, while the memory industry which is not limited to literal expression, has prospered and the imprecise concept of memory has been elevated to a primary cultural and political value.

In cultural studies, the exclusive oppositional discourses that contributed to Eurphrenia, are what Barbara Maria Stafford calls a “vacancy of our current disciplinary and social landscape,

⁴¹ This is a reference to the Emperor Heinrich IV’s knee fall before Pope Gregory VII as Canossa in 1077, incidentally, this was preserved visually in a Miniature in *Vita Mathildis* (1115). Donizio di Canossa, *Canossa 1115, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4922* (Münster: Bibliotheca Rara 2006; reprint, Belser-Edition Nr. LXII).

⁴² “Kniefall Angemessen oder Übertrieben Spiegel-Umfrage: Durfte Brandt Knien?,” *Der Spiegel*, 14 December 1970.

⁴³ Strath Triandafyllidou “New Europe at a Crossroads” in EURONAT Chap 1.

voided of anything standing tangibly between oppositional choices and glutted by innumerable competing esoteric differences.”⁴⁴ If this is the contemporary fare, then analogy, specifically visual analogy, not extended beyond hermeneutical excess, provides an additional element of aesthetics and offers a broadening alternative. That is to say, beyond merely employing visual images as sources to political history, they also are used as an expression of research of political history in the visual archive. Photographs as material representations and analogies, translators and communicators of the past offer part of a solution insofar as photographs have the capacity to provide a tool that imparts credibility though their capacity for verisimilitude in the preservation and reproduction of detail.

Additionally, just as Susan Sontag claimed that photography changed the way we see, transformed the very language and grammar of seeing and that almost everything imaginable has been photographed in the human thirst to capture⁴⁵, contemporary computer information technology has had a profound effect upon the way we communicate and has arguably begun to change the way we think. It forms new communities and multiplies the qualities and quantities of information and forms of expression as well as the range of tools currently at the disposal of over a billion individuals worldwide. As humans once used photographic technology, computer technology has been used to accrue almost everything that imagination has invented both literally as well as in narration. Beyond this, the Visual Archive orders and creates relationships of knowledge in a manner that surpasses the ordering capacity and possibility of photography. The Archive of Visual Europe provides a collection of images in which a plural iconography of Europe is available and accessible to media professionals, journalists, governments and users with particular applications in the pedagogic sphere. It categorises and links these images along a set of semantic connotations of European values/ethics utopian and dystopian, making them retrievable and combinable in narrative forms revealing a visual aspect of the European Public Sphere that has long been ignored.

⁴⁴ Barbara Maria Stafford, *Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of Connecting* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1999). P. 3.

⁴⁵ Susan Sontag, *On Photography*, 1st Picadore USA ed. (New York: Picador USA: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001). P. 3.

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