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Challenges in the Study of Language and Politics, Challenges for *JLP*

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From time to time it is appropriate in the life of a journal to pause and take stock. The first issue of the *Journal of Language and Politics* was published in 2002. The intention then was, and certainly still is, to provide a scholarly forum with the highest standards of intellectual inquiry and debate, to create a publishing space in which researchers could respond to pressing contemporary issues, to open an arena in which intellectuals from all parts of the globe could share ideas and learn from one another, and to deepen our understanding of human discourse by developing methodological and conceptual frameworks rooted in a variety of disciplines. The common ground was and is the human capacity for language and the human capacity for communication and indeed miscommunication.

The current issue displays great diversity but revolves in one way or another around topics that are methodologically or theoretically controversial or else attract attention because they are politically sensitive or sensational. Among the political events or processes that generate both political discourse and the analysis of political discourse, scholars focus repeatedly on violence and war, on identity (whether national identity or internal political group identity), on the closely related phenomenon of migration, and with critical moments in internal political life such as elections and referenda. It is certainly one of the functions of *JLP* to reflect contemporary political concerns, although in the future research articles that probe the very nature of the political across a plurality of cultures will be welcome.

Discourse analysis in all its various forms and with all its various purposes has spread to many parts of the globe. The particular focus of *JLP* is whatever is understood by the term "politics". It is by no means obvious that everyone will agree on a definition but we hazard the guess that the definitions that people may offer from within their own societies, polities and cultures will overlap and that at the intersection there will be a conceptual consensus.

Among the theoretical and methodological questions that surface in the current issue we find several that have for some time bedevilled discourse analysis,

especially in its "critical" variety. Henry Widdowson's widely quoted critique of "critical" analyses of discourse has served a fruitful purpose in stimulating scholars in the discourse-analysis business to address the question of objectivity, selectivity and interpretation. There seem currently to be two lines of thought for addressing this problem. One is for the analyst to overtly acknowledge a political or ethical bias in data selection and/or in interpretation and critical assessment. In the present issue of JLP, Pozhidaev's paper takes this position in a particularly clear fashion, concerned as it is with a political context that is fraught with hazardous polemic. Another response to the problem is to argue, as McKenna and Waddell do, for a methodological separation between two analytic phases, one phase establishing data and describing textual features with minimal selectivity, a second phase acknowledging hermeneutic commitment on the part of the analyst.

Even if such a separation is possible — and readers will be the judge — there remains a very wide variety of possible approaches at the level of textual description. In some cases, the studies that *JLP* publishes have minimal reference to the linguistic details of text, and minimal use of a linguistic-theoretic framework. Such analyses are often richly compensated by more detailed accounts at the level of political, historical and contextual description. Sometimes, insightful studies hinge on the analysis of a single word. In the present issue, Böse and Busch focus on a single word in the complex context of migrant workers in Austria. Their analysis of the political implications of irony shows how far one can go within a framework that is in many respects an eclectic postmodern-literary framework rather than a linguistic one. Pozhidaev also draws inspiration from the philosophical-literary tradition of late twentieth-century Europe, using ideas from Foucault and Derrida. In a potentially controversial move, however, Pozhidaev attempts to combine this framework with some of the approach found in Critical Discourse Analysis. In a quite different paradigm, Edwards and Valenzano address the profound historical shift brought about by the end of the Cold War, and seek to elucidate President Clinton's attempt to redefine US foreign policy in his Africa tour of 1998. This they do by drawing on traditional rhetorical-literary notions of narrative, meshed with a detailed analysis of the historical environment that is in turn informed by American academic approaches to international relations.

The LP has particularly called, and continues to call, for discourse-analytic approaches informed by linguistics. Mazid's paper illustrates an element of this framework, drawing on a number of scholars who have puzzled over the phenomenon of presupposition within the disciplines of linguistic semantics and the philosophy of language. Presupposition is of central importance to discourse analysts, and in particular to those concerned with elucidating what is not said, what is taken for granted and what is assumed to hold valid for a political community.

Matu and Lubbe also adopt a linguistic framework, albeit a different one from that used by Mazid. In common with many other discourse analysts their aim is to unearth ideologies, in this case ideologies in Kenyan newspapers in the run-up to the 1997 Kenyan general elections. The methodology that they advocate to this end is not unfamiliar in the pages of *JLP* and has the aim of revealing adversarial identities in the political arean by applying Hallidayan systemic-functional grammar (SFG). An interesting theoretical point emerges, however, if one compares the different approaches of Mazid on the one and hand of Matu and Lubbe on the other, for Mazid is seeking to elucidate non-obvious ideologies by showing what is not explicitly said but rather presupposed, while Matu and Lubbe seek to reveal ideologies by describing what *is* said, what *is* given linguistic form. While SFG lends itself to this latter approach it does not appear to lend itself to describing *le non dit*. One may think that the point I am making here, to the extent that it is valid, may lead to questioning the usefulness of SFG.

Petersoo also addresses questions of non-explicit meaning. The first-person plural pronoun has frequently been noted in studies of English political discourse as a marker of national or sub-national identity. In fact *we* is semantically sparse so far as linguistic coding goes, but pragmatically rich in the sense that many, often polyvalent, meanings may arise in contexts of actual use. Petersoo's analysis of this word's possible discourse meanings shows how a "wandering *we*" can give rise to dynamic shifts and uncertainties that lead one to question the notion of a single consensual *we* underlying what Billig has called banal nationalism.

But texts involve the weaving together of many words. One increasingly important method of description is corpus-based electronic data-mining, which promises statistical generalizations over the lexical structure of texts. Whether it fulfils such promises, or to what degree it fulfils them, is a matter that future contributors to *JLP* may wish to assess. McKenna and Waddell, partly in response to the fundamental bias question mentioned above, outline a particular concept-based software application. One outcome of their investigation is confirmation of what numerous researchers already have noted — the importance for political discourse of deontic words such as *should* and *must*. The result is important because McKenna and Waddell can also show the co-occurrence of these words with particular kinds of action concept. The result is also interesting for future work because the semantics of these expressions (found in various forms in all languages, it seems) necessarily presupposes — or presumes — shared value systems. Intriguingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, this paper is ultimately framed within the ancient Western tradition of rhetorical analysis.

The *JLP* has always given space for articles that might be regarded as controversial, a space where authors run the risk of adopting ideologically polemic positions or where debatable versions of theoretical or methodological frameworks are

put forward. In the Discussion section, Zev Bar-Lev picks up what has emerged as an important concern in this issue of *JLP* — the question of values and ideological commitment in academic research. In the second of the Discussion articles Lily Chen undertakes the difficult task of cross-cultural comparison within a theoretical framework that may stimulate theoretical questions, combining a notion of "negative" and "positive" meaning with Halliday's transitivity theory.

The *JLP* encourages a variety of theoretical approaches in the belief that no one approach is ever complete and consistent and that a plurality of approaches will facilitate creative critical development through cross-fertilisation. Of course, such creative cross-influence only occurs in a shared space of communication. To what extent is full scholarly understanding possible? The fact that scholars and researchers now do their work in a global, multicultural and multilingual environment constitutes another challenge. The *JLP* publishes in English but we have an open door policy towards scholars for whom English is not their first language, toward scholars who may find access to academic archives and information sources difficult or even dangerous, and toward scholars who to a greater or lesser extent do or do not share the knowledge and value assumptions of Western academia.

In the broadest of terms, we face the challenge of maintaining and enhancing rational argumentation and evidentiality, while giving scope for the exploration of these very notions. This is surely the responsibility of all who claim to be intellectuals and scholars. The English lingua franca that *JLP* has had to adopt must not be allowed to overshadow the multiplicity of languages and cultures in which the world's scholars work. A number of specific challenges are provoked precisely by this linguistic and cultural plurality.

The *JLP* has sought to foster studies of societies, cultures and polities that are under-represented in the world's academic publications. And many more of these are needed and welcomed. At the same time, a comparative dimension is slowly emerging, in which analysts compare and sometimes contrast two political cultures, represented by specific genres. As global flows and exchanges proliferate such approaches will become more and more urgent and will open up fundamental issues of theory and method, including such fundamental matters as the desirability of cultural relativism as opposed to cross-cultural generalisation, as well as the often forgotten but profound problem of translation. We shall have to question also the methodological issues raised by attempting comparative research on language and politics, given what often seems to be the indissoluble ink between the practice of politics and the language in which it is performed.

For some time now discourse analysis has revolved around a few theoretical and philosophical totems. It is true that there is much shared ground that we will continue to need. However, there remains great scope for extending our interdisciplinary collaborations and for exploring linguistic and discourse-analytic

frameworks that are more than superficial adaptations or minor tinkering with this or that theory of language or discourse. While continuing to expect ongoing refinements in existing approaches, the *JLP* looks forward to proposals for articles that seek to break new philosophical, theoretical and methodological ground.

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Bill Clinton's "new partnership" anecdote

Toward a post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric

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This essay explores the composition of United States post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric under President Bill Clinton. We contend that Bill Clinton offered a coherent and comprehensive foreign policy narrative for the direction of U.S. foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, we analyze the "new partnership" narrative that Clinton articulated in his 1998 trip to Africa as a representative anecdote for the larger body of his foreign policy discourse. This "new partnership" narrative was structured by three narrative themes: (1) America's role as world leader; (2) reconstituting the threat environment; (3) democracy promotion as the strategy for American foreign policy. These three themes can be found throughout Clinton's foreign policy rhetoric and serve as the basis for a foreign policy narrative used by Clinton and perhaps future administrations.

Keywords: Bill Clinton, foreign policy rhetoric, Africa, representative anecdote, post-Cold War, democracy promotion, narrative

The American president is the center of the United States' foreign policy universe. Everything he says and does holds some form of meaning (Denton and Woodward 1990). Because of the central role the president plays in U.S. political culture, he has the greatest ability to influence the discourse surrounding any particular issue. Essentially, the president's foreign policy discourse offers "directional clarity" for U.S. foreign affairs. That is, it supplies American foreign policy with a distinct direction in international affairs (Rockman 1997). However, there have been moments when the direction of American foreign policy has been called into question. At these moments, the course of U.S. foreign relations needed to be revisited and ultimately rearticulated (Ikenberry 2001). Typically, these junctures appeared after major wars, as the aftermath of such conflicts involved great transformation in the international system which left dominant powers with the puzzle of how to create and maintain order in international politics (Gilpin 1981).

In the twentieth century alone there have been several of these moments of transition when the United States confronted a world where the traditional political landscape had been altered. In those moments it fell to specific presidents to provide directional clarity for their country in the "new world" they confronted. For instance, in the aftermath of World War I the Great Powers sought to create a means for international diplomacy in the hopes of avoiding future global conflicts. Although the product of their efforts, the League of Nations, failed, President Woodrow Wilson clearly offered a specific direction for shaping the international environment, characterized by engagement. Following World War II the approach of international engagement shifted in response to the growing communist threat of the Soviet Union. President Harry S. Truman did not eschew engagement per se, but instead modified the approach by establishing containment of communism as the goal of engagement. This approach characterized the Cold War for the next several decades. In both of these instances American presidents attempted to reconstruct the world around them as well as re-articulate the direction of American foreign policy.

The end of the Cold War supplied the most recent historical occasion that called a president to rearticulate the course of American foreign policy (Schonberg 2003). Initially, President George H. W. Bush attempted to provide a different path by proclaiming a "new world order" based on the promotion of democracy, human rights, and free trade. Yet, much like his Cold War predecessors, a good deal of Bush's discourse revolved around war (Cole 1996) and Bush's declaration of a new world order, while simultaneously employing discourse reminiscent of the Cold War, yielded discursive incoherence. As Cole (1996: 107) explained, Bush was "clearly not articulating a vision of politics that might transcend Cold War prescriptions." Joseph (2006) further argued that Bush's new world order was supposed to be shorthand for a new form of moral leadership for the post-Cold War world, similar to the prescriptions enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, but Bush was unable to fully define what he meant by the phrase. Consequently, his defeat in the 1992 presidential election gave the Clinton administration its own chance to shape the story of U.S. foreign policy rhetoric in the post-Cold War world.

This essay concerns the composition of Clinton's foreign policy rhetoric for the post-Cold War world. President Clinton did offer a direction for American foreign policy that moved it away from the Manichean logic of the Cold War. However, the directional clarity that Clinton offered could not be encapsulated in a catchphrase. In fact, for the most part, the president eschewed the use of slogans to define his foreign policy. Former Clinton foreign policy official, Nancy Soderberg (2005: 97) explained that Clinton did not want a summary of his foreign policy that "could be put on a bumper sticker," but instead he "defined it in a set of principles that guided his policies and America's engagement." Rhetorically, those principles can be found in a consistent set of themes the president discussed throughout his

presidency. These themes explained how he understood America's position in the world, the threats the nation faced, and the specific mission for American foreign policy in this new era. These premises supplied the building blocks of a foreign policy narrative for the post-Cold War world.

Understanding how Clinton shaped U.S. foreign policy discourse is important on a couple of levels. First, as the first true post-Cold War president, Clinton's discourse set the tone for his successors in how they would deal with opportunities and challenges within a new foreign policy environment. Second, all presidents leave their rhetorical signatures on American foreign policy in some way, shape or form. That signature could be with huge modifications or small nuances. Either way, these signatures indicate the evolution of the institution of the presidency. Examining the signature Clinton left upon American foreign policy discourse will offer a greater theoretical and practical understanding of not only Clinton, but the future of the presidency in dealing with various issues.

To examine how Clinton supplied direction for U.S. foreign policy we examine Clinton's 1998 Africa Trip. The president characterized this trip through the complex narrative of a "new partnership" within U.S/Africa relations. We argue this narrative not only signified a new chapter in U.S/Africa relations, but more importantly was a representative anecdote for the larger body of Clinton's discourse. The same themes contained within the "new partnership" that Clinton expressed can be found throughout his eight years in office. Thus, we analyze the "new partnership" narrative the president articulated on his trip to Africa. We focus on the thematic components that structure this narrative and then tie those themes to the larger body of Clinton's foreign policy rhetoric. We further claim those themes may influence future administrations to carry on the rhetorical signature Clinton left behind on American foreign policy.

To accomplish this task we first outline a theoretical understanding of the representative anecdote and exploring narratives. Second, we consider Clinton's "new partnership" narrative within Africa as it coalesced around three thematic components. Third, we tie those themes to Clinton's larger body of foreign policy rhetoric by providing textual examples of how the president used those ideas at other times during his presidency. Finally, we discuss implications regarding foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War era.

The representative anecdote and narrative

Presidents act as the chief storytellers for the American people, and as such articulate narratives that emphasize the course the United States should embark upon with the world. Each president attempts to offer a clear course for American foreign policy.

To determine how a president may craft this foreign policy narrative, critics can take a small sample of a president's foreign policy rhetoric and examine it as a representative anecdote for the clear consistent foreign policy narrative a president offers during their term in office. This section explains how narrative analysis can be used in such efforts by discussing its relationship to the notion of representative anecdote.

Burke (1937) originally developed the representative anecdote as part of his theory that all discourse is somehow dramatically constituted and this is so even when social dramas and story lines are not overtly dramatic (see also Burke 1945). One way in which Burke's representative anecdote has come to be used is as a critical tool, a filter or lens that a critic uses to study and reconstruct the discourse (Brummett 1984b). Used in this way the critic can uncover the "vocabulary" of a particular body of rhetoric (Aune 1994). In order to uncover this overall "vocabulary," a critic identifies a particular storyline or plot within a body of discourse that supplies an understanding of "the essence of the whole discourse" (Brummett 1984a: 3; see also Brummett, 1984b; Smith & Golden). For example, Paulson (2002) identified the anecdote of "good-citizen" within Theodore Roosevelt's 1902 New England speaking tour. According to Paulson, Roosevelt often discussed the virtues of the "good citizen" within the polity of the United States. Men and women should strive to model themselves after this "good-citizen." This basic anecdote of the "good-citizen" served as the basis for Roosevelt's political philosophy and his policy initiatives. Thus, the objective for the critic to use his/her powers of abstraction and identify an anecdote that can illuminate a rhetor's overall body of discourse.

Representative anecdotes can come in a variety of forms such as orientational metaphors, myths, or narratives. The third of these, narration, is a common form of communication. Fisher argued that all human beings are "homo-narrans" or human story-tellers. He called story-telling "the master metaphor" (1984: 295) or the way we understand human experience. This view maintains that we as humans are narrators, and we discuss our history, development, and existence in story form. That is to say we construct social meaning within the context of a protagonist, antagonist, conflict, and solution. As we are different individuals with different perspectives on social meaning the style of the story may vary from person to person but the essential characteristics are the same. The characterization of humans as story tellers is the first of five interrelated presuppositions that structure the narrative paradigm.

The second of these presuppositions privileges "good reasons" as essential for decision making within the narrative of human existence. These "good reasons" vary along with the overall situation in which rhetors find themselves. The "good reasons" of a moment indicate the ideological assumptions of the speaker in that moment, and those ideological assumptions can change when the context does, leading us to the third presupposition of the narrative paradigm: "the production

and practice of good reasons is ruled by matters of history, biography, culture and character" (Fisher 1984: 297). What constitutes "good reasons" in one situation, may not in another. For instance, "good reasons" dictated the containment aspect of Truman's Cold War narrative, but when the Cold War ended other "good reasons" would influence the development of the American foreign policy narrative.

The fourth presupposition of the narrative paradigm moves from the importance of context to the importance of individual agency. That is to say the "good reasons" offered in the narrative must conform to narrative probability and narrative fidelity, or as McIntyre calls it, dramatic probability and verisimilitude (1981: 200). Narrative probability refers to coherence in the story, while narrative fidelity refers to the degree to which the story offered reflects how audiences' see the stories of their own lives (Fisher 1984). Both speakers and members of the audience as actors must understand the story as believable in terms of logical flow and as a close approximation to the individual story of their life, their own story-teller lens if you will. If the offered narrative is not both believable and relatable it will not gain traction as a viable explanation of social existence.

Finally, the narrative paradigm presupposes that the world is a set of competing narratives that are continually recreated to express what constitutes the "good reasons" of the time. Not everyone has equal power and influence by way of offering a narrative. There are, as Fisher noted, "key story-makers/story-tellers, whether sanctioned by God, a 'gift,' heritage, power, intelligence, or election" who can direct the narrative of a society's experience in the world. In the case of the United States, presidents serve the role of chief story-teller and their articulations offer an opportunity to identify the "good reasons," or themes, of the American story. In moments of historical transition, like the end of the Cold War, analyzing how a president, as the nation's chief story-teller, articulated American foreign policy rhetoric enables a better understanding of how the United States weaves a foreign policy narrative as the world's lone superpower in the post-Cold War era.

We contend that President Clinton's "new partnership" narrative on his trip to Africa served as a representative anecdote for demonstrating the overall consistent direction he communicated for American foreign policy throughout his term. We conducted close textual analyses of all of Clinton's Africa speeches to discover the central themes of this narrative. Our analysis revealed that Clinton built this "new partnership" narrative around three ideas: (1) continuing U.S. world leadership; (2) threats and interests must be defined broadly; and (3) democracy promotion was the mission for the post-Cold War world. These three themes represent consistent arguments the president used throughout his eight years in office and constitute a coherent vocabulary for directing U.S. foreign policy for the post-Cold War world. This next section, then, consists of examining Clinton's "new partnership" anecdote.

Clinton's trip to Africa as representative anecdote

Stories are not articulated in a vacuum, they are influenced by a variety of factors, and the foreign policy narrative U.S. presidents offer the public is no different. American presidents respond to certain contextual factors when weaving their tale of international relations, even at a moment of transition such as the one that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end to the Cold War. Consequently, this section begins with a brief discussion of the scene Clinton confronted on his 1998 Africa trip. We then illustrate three themes Clinton articulated as part of his "new partnership" American foreign policy narrative.

Clinton–Africa relations

America's relationship with Africa has always been a peripheral one. During the Cold War, Africa served as a proxy battleground for the deeper global contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Africa, the United States supported any regime and insurgency that helped stem the tide of communist aggression within Africa, and the Soviets supported communist revolutions and governments across Africa. The Clinton administration's first real engagement with Africa was connected to the American deployment of peacekeepers in Somalia, a policy holdover from the Bush administration. The Somalia mission began as a humanitarian mission under Bush, but Clinton transformed it into the more ambitious policy of nation building (Butler 2002). The mission soon turned sour in October 1993 when 18 Marines were killed and their bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Six months later, the Clinton administration removed American troops from Somalia and reappraised its peacekeeping policy (Meisler 1994; Preston & Williams 1994).

The first test of this reassessment came in April 1994 as a consequence of the unfolding Rwandan genocide, a conflict in which the United States and the United Nations failed to intervene. In July 1994, U.N. peacekeepers, along with a contingent of U.S. soldiers, eventually restored a semblance of stability and protected refugees fleeing Rwanda, but they were too late to prevent the worst genocidal atrocities. In only one hundred days, the Rwandan military government killed an estimated 800,000 Rwandans (Lynch 1999). Malvern (2000) and others have identified U.S. inaction as one of the greatest scandals of the twentieth century. Madeline Albright (2003), U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide, wrote the Rwandan genocide was the worst mistake the Clinton administration made during its tenure. At the time the failures in Somalia and Rwanda mainly reinforced American amnesia about Africa, a collective "forgetting" that lasted another four years (Morrow 1998). It was only at March 23, 1998, when

Clinton began his six-nation, twelve-day tour of Africa, a tour deemed "historic" by some (Apple, Jr. 1998; Clinton's are coming 1998; Ross 1998), that America's almost total absence from the continent was interrupted.

During the tour, Clinton met with eleven leaders from sub-Saharan Africa, including officials from Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Ethiopia, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal. The sites chosen for Clinton's public addresses included Ghana's Independence Square (where 500,000 people heard the president speak), a Ghana Peace Corps site, a school in Uganda, the Kigali Airport in Rwanda, a conference of African environmentalists, the South African parliament, and finally the former slave prison located on Goree Island in Senegal. During the visit, the president discussed the virtues of democracy, economic prosperity, and human rights. He introduced an Education for Development and Democracy Initiative, a Great Lakes Justice Initiative, created a Rwandan genocide survivors' fund, and demonstrated the African Growth and Opportunity Act, all aimed at demonstrating the new partnership with Africa Clinton sought to create.

The speeches Clinton gave on his African tour told the story of this new partnership. We argue this anecdote contained three "good reasons" important not only for the trip, but for his overall foreign policy narrative. First, Clinton acknowledged America's leadership failure in Africa, but used this failure to justify a committed reassertion of U.S. leadership. Second, Clinton used the "new partnership" between the U.S. and African nations in a post-Cold War world to characterize *threats* and *interests* as broadly defined and of mutual concern. Third, to ameliorate threats and deepen the partnership Clinton extolled the virtues of democracy. Clinton defined "democracy" primarily as a system of government committed to free trade and the promotion of human rights, but also as an umbrella term used for the mission aspect of the president's post-Cold War narrative.

A continued commitment to global leadership

A continued commitment to global engagement and leadership was the first theme that structured Clinton's narrative of U.S./African relations. We say continued because throughout his presidency Clinton argued the United States must maintain its role as world leader (Edwards 2006; McCormick 2002). This role as global leader is closely connected to American history.

Since its founding the United States has viewed itself as a unique nation, blessed by divine providence. In the Puritan tradition, America was considered a new Israel, a "shining city upon a hill" for the entire world to emulate (Cole 1996; McEvoy-Levy 2001). Throughout the nineteenth century the United States committed itself to the exceptionalist mission of exemplar in foreign relations where America appeared

as a model of democracy and freedom, but would not entangle itself in the affairs of other nations. At the turn of the twentieth century, the United States became a global and imperial power with its victory in the Spanish-American War. America's role in the world then changed from one of exemplar to the exceptionalist mission of intervention. According to this tradition, the United States has a responsibility to lead, promote, and at times impose its values upon the world. Furthermore, it holds America's values as universal and calls for the United States to adopt policies that promote those values (Coles 2002; Kane 1991). In order to warrant an argument for continued commitment to global leadership within Africa, Clinton needed to apologize for the sins of indifference that characterized America's past with the continent and its people. Once he performed this *mea culpa* the president could then modify this theme within America's foreign policy narrative. Clinton made each of these actions — the apology and subsequent story adjustment — possible by invoking the exceptionalist nature of America's foreign policy narrative.

Before Clinton could position the United States to establish a new relationship with the African continent, the president had to acknowledge the sins of America's past. As Clinton (1998b: 426) argued, "it is well not to dwell too much on the past, but I think it is worth pointing out the United States has not always done the right thing by Africa." Americans had stereotypes of Africans that "warped our view and weakened our understanding" (1998a: 419–420). Specifically, the president acknowledged Americans "received the fruits of the slave trade. And we were wrong in that" (1998b: 426). Later he observed that "America's struggle to overcome slavery and its legacy forms one of the most difficult turns in our history" (1998f: 496). Clinton also described how America's preoccupation with the struggle with the Soviet Union during the Cold War led the United States to "often deal with countries in Africa and in other parts of the world based more on how they stood over the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union" (1998b: 426) than on how they dealt with their own people.

But the worst sin the United States committed was "the sin of neglect and ignorance" and "lack of understanding" (1998b: 426–427). For example, in his Rwandan apology, Clinton admitted that the "international community…. must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy…. [since] we did not act quickly enough after the killing began" (1998c: 432). Each tragedy resulted from U.S. neglect, ignorance, and self-serving behavior. Clinton argued this could have been avoided if issues were addressed as concerns shared by African nation-states and the United States. The neglect Clinton chastised was a direct abrogation of America's ideal as a unique and indispensable world leader. Therefore, in the context of apology, Clinton was required to reassert a role for American leadership on the African continent if it wanted to move toward a more productive association. The president's acknowledgement of U.S. foreign policy transgressions partially tore

down symbolic barriers that existed in U.S./African relations. This discourse positioned Clinton to offer a different conception of the leadership theme of the U.S./Africa relationship for the post-Cold War world.

Clinton (1998a-1998h) characterized this new relationship with Africa through phrases such as "political cooperation," "common future," "common challenges," "common threats," "shared humanity," "working together," and "building toward the future." The logic of these phrases was two-fold. First, they suggest that the United States and Africa faced mutual opportunities and challenges that were characteristic of an international environment different than the Cold War. The Cold War was marked by a bipolar conflict where the United States fought for its own interests, not those of other nation-states. According to Clinton's logic, the post-Cold War international environment was different because it was interdependent and integrated, where mutual opportunities and challenges abound.

The common opportunities and challenges led to the president's second level of logic, which was how could the world dealt with this new international environment. For Clinton, the way to deal with the "common challenges" and "threats," of the post-Cold War world was to establish a different affiliation with Africa than in its past so they could build a future together that was beneficial to both communities. The president described this new relationship with Africa as a "new partnership." Partnership implied the United States and Africa were now on somewhat equal footing. American leadership was certainly still paramount to solve the world's problems, but as Clinton put it "we need partners to live in peace. We will not build this new partnership overnight, but perseverance creates its own reward" (1998a: 420). Here, Clinton's discussion of needing "partners to live in peace," was a modification of America's self-proclaimed role as world leader because it widened the circumference of associations the United States needed to deal with the opportunities and challenges of the post-Cold War world. Clinton's discourse signaled a shift away from a Manichean logic where the world was divided into two camps and to a more cooperative environment, where the United States was still the leader, but that leadership flowed from cooperation, not necessarily competition.

During the Cold War, the United States was largely not interested in pursuing relationships that were not battlegrounds within the conflict. For the post-Cold War world, the president recognized that American leadership depended greatly on the partnerships of other nations; the more partners the more peace throughout the world. Clinton, as the author of this attempt at reinventing America's relationship with Africa and the world, implicitly asserted the leadership of the United States in spearheading the "new partnership's" development. By establishing a new relationship with Africa, the United States would make American leadership truly global because it would mark one of the first times that a presidential administration would be working in concert with every region on the planet, thereby promoting

American values and interests in every part of the world. In the course of a new relationship with Africa, the United States established its primacy over most of the globe, reinforcing America's role as world leader through intervention.

In sum, the first theme of Clinton's "new partnership" anecdote was built upon a continued commitment to global leadership. We say "continued" commitment because Clinton pledged throughout his presidency that the United States would not abandon its role as world leader. However, Clinton's Africa narrative indicated there was a change in how America viewed its leadership position for the post-Cold War world. This change produced a good reason for establishing a new, mature, and modified relationship with Africa that was part of Clinton's story for directing American foreign policy. For Africa, this "new partnership" meant the United States could work in concert with the African community to combat mutual threats and interests, but it also meant that the United States extended its reach to every part of the globe, thereby, cementing its primacy as the global superpower. Thus, American leadership continued within Clinton's broader foreign policy narrative, but it involved, at the least the profession of working in concert with African nations.

Reconstituting the threat environment: Defining interests and threats broadly

The second theme of Clinton's "new partnership" narrative was the reconstitution of threats and interests in the America/Africa relationship. Smith (1995:22) explained that "the sense of threat … has necessarily expanded with America's role in the world." As we noted above, Clinton committed the United States to a leadership position within Africa. However, Clinton also recognized that a more integrated era meant that the United States would face new threats. This new era produced the need for a reconsideration of what constituted the threat environment of the U.S.-Africa relationship. In the post-Cold War world, the threats faced by the United States and Africa were no longer the Cold War superpowers engaged in a cosmic battle of good vs. evil, but were instead amorphous, diffuse, and able to affect everyone. The president defined the threats to the U.S., Africa, and the world as "poverty, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, and terrible conflicts" (1998f: 496), in addition to "terrorism, disease, and proliferation of weapons, drug trafficking and environmental degradation" (1998d: 434).

Clinton viewed the antagonists in his foreign policy narrative as substantively transnational in nature. The interdependence of the world placed every region in common jeopardy, and recognition of mutual threats obliged the world to deal with them in concert, so dangers could be contained or prevented. It was also significant that the threats Clinton mentioned were not distinctively connected to any single nation-state, thus making it difficult to locate the roots of these dangers.

Instead, Clinton needed to look elsewhere to find their cause. Many of the problems Clinton enumerated were products of poverty and oppression. After the Cold War, McDougall (1997) contended that global meliorists — those who saw the United States' goal as making the world a better place — saw the real threats to the post-Cold War world as rooted in poverty and not in ideology. Many of the antagonists in the Clinton narrative — disease, illiteracy, terrible conflicts, etc. — clearly emerged from those root causes. The threats Clinton identified were diffuse, but since they affected both the U.S. and Africa they must be commonly confronted. By identifying these threats Clinton demonstrated that the United States needed help to defeat these dangers. In an interconnected world, the United States could not combat every problem alone; rather it needed the assistance of African nations so that both the U.S. and Africa could prosper. Redefining what constituted the threat environment offered a "good reason" for the audience to subscribe to Clinton's foreign policy narrative.

Clinton not only broadened what constituted a threat but also yielded an expanded perception of *interest*, which included ambiguous terms like *stability*, *prosperity* and *security*. During the Cold War, presidents often defined American national interests narrowly (Schonberg 2003). In such a worldview, Africa was merely a battleground in the struggle between the U.S. and Soviet Union. America fought for its own interests, but in a globalized era, it must view its interests in a broader fashion (Nye 2003). By redefining American interests and threats to include areas that just did not effect the United States Clinton offered a diverse conception of the threat environment theme within the chronicle of America's foreign policy.

As Clinton articulated this world of shared interests and common threats, what was good for Africa became good for the United States because "your stability, your security, and your prosperity will add to our own. And our vitality can and must contribute to yours" (1998e: 438). The three "yours" implied an Africa on the road to a better future. Implicit in Clinton's construction was the judgment that the United States had already achieved stability, security, and prosperity. This passage simultaneously asserted America's primacy, celebrated its continuing vitality, and offered a deeper U.S./African relationship where partnership actually enabled U.S. leadership. Broad and mutual interests place the U.S. and Africa on the same historical path. This shared trajectory rhetorically culminates in the affirmation of a common humanity. As Clinton (1998b: 428) stated, "we share a common future on this planet of ours that is getting smaller and smaller and smaller."

The most explicit example of this common humanity came in the president's Rwanda address, where Clinton (1998c: 433) admitted and accepted responsibility for the international community's failure to help stop the genocide, while also pledging a new vigilance against genocide. The lessons of the Rwandan genocide reminded him that

> there is only crucial division among the peoples of the Earth. And believe me after over five years of dealing with these problems, I *know* it is not the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, or Serb or Croatian and Muslim and Bosnian, or Arab and Jew, or Catholic and Protestant in Ireland, or black or white. It is really the line between those who embrace the common humanity we all share and those who reject it (our italics).

Note how Clinton named the groups — Hutu/Tutsi, Serb/Croatian, Muslim/Bosnian, Arab/Jew, Catholic/Protestant and black/white — his administration attempted to bring together to resolve their differences. President Clinton, arguably more than any other American president, had more "hands-on experience" in bringing groups of people to the peace table to realize their commonalities rather than their differences. This experience, coupled with America's role as world leader, granted him the authority to claim what he understood as the *true* nature of differences between peoples. Traditionally, the conflict in the American foreign policy narrative maintained that ethnic, religious, and national differences caused conflict. Clinton, however, changed the conception of difference within the narrative to focus on whether or not people embrace and recognize their common humanity.

Clinton's concept of shared humanity provided rhetorical leadership in a time filled with great opportunity and change. In a sense, Clinton became not only a *U.S.* president, but also a *world* president, and the chief storyteller for the world. He supplied a story where the world was guided by common principles of humanity, interests and threats. Not only was the United States an indispensable nation, but President Clinton was the indispensable leader and storyteller for providing a narrative of the future.

Rhetorically broadening threats and interests from a narrow national view to a broader global one implied recognition by Clinton that the U.S. could not tackle global challenges on its own: it must have the help of the international community. This acknowledgment resembled what Joseph Nye (2002) called "soft power." Soft power grows out of the United States understanding common interests and threats with other states. The amorphous threats and common global interests present in Clinton's chronicle required the United States to seek partners, like Africa. Additionally, his emphasis on common humanity and a "new partnership" with Africa served as means for combating the new global threat environment within his American foreign policy narrative.

Democracy promotion

Clinton's commitment to maintaining America's role as global leader and broadening the conceptions of threat and interest constituted two thematic building

blocks for a post-Cold War world narrative. The third dominant theme of this narrative involved the mission of democracy promotion. For the president, the goal of his trip was to help Africa "nurture democracy, knowing it is never perfect or complete" (1998a: 420). Here Clinton emphasized democracy as both a means and an end. Democracy is a form of government that comes with the requirement of "human rights for everyone and everywhere," but it also "must have prosperity" through "greater access to our (American) markets" and an additional commitment by African nations to "reform their economies to take advantage of new opportunities" and "spur private investment" (1998a: p. 420; 1998f: 467–468; see also 1998d: 438–439; 1998e: 442–444). Here, Clinton's form of democracy promotion was not only constitutional government, but included free markets and human rights. When Africa adopted all the facets of democracy it truly made the United States partners, instead of competitors. Democracy promotion supplied a means to deepen the relationship between the United States and Africa within Clinton's "new partnership" narrative.

The president depicted democracies as places with both internal and external stability. According to his logic, democracy promoted stability within Africa by spurring greater investment. As evidence of this claim, the president stated that investments in sub-Saharan Africa "earn a return of 30 percent, higher than any other continent in the entire world," (1998h: 496). The strengthening of African democracy offered an incredible opportunity for U.S. investors in a resource as yet untapped and American investment in Africa also produced benefits for both the U.S. and Africans because "everyone deserves the right to prosper so that all of our children can have decent lives and get decent education and build a decent future" (1998g: 479). For better or worse, the U.S./Africa democratic partnership implied both had a stake in each other's future.

A U.S./Africa democratic partnership also created external stability. The president claimed "we need partners to deepen the meaning of democracy in America, in Africa, and throughout the world. We need partners to live in peace. We will not build this new partnership overnight, but perseverance creates its own reward" (1998a: 420). In this context "we need partners to live in peace," Clinton made a bigger claim about how democracy enhances external stability for everyone, perhaps referring to the so-called *democratic peace* hypothesis. The idea that democracies co-exist peacefully is not a new idea; Immanuel Kant had written about the prospects for *perpetual peace* in the eighteenth century. American presidents such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan typically argued that democracies are relatively stable internally, but also do not threaten their neighbors with war (McDougall 1997; McEvoy-Levy 2001; Schonberg 2003). Doyle (1983, 2000) asserted democracies are not immune from internal conflict, but the longer democracy takes hold within a nation, the more violent internal

conflict will subside. Additionally, the thesis predicts that democracies will not fight wars against each other. Thus far, the thesis has proven to be empirically correct. There is no guarantee that it will continue to hold, but President Clinton forcefully defended the idea. In order for a new partnership between Africa and the United States to truly succeed democracy and all its facets must be developed and encouraged.

For Clinton, democracy was not only a means to deepen the U.S./Africa partnership, but also viewed as an end, or to use Fuyakama's (1992) famous (or infamous) phrase, "the end of history." American presidents view(ed) democracy as an enduring principle that enabled more freedom and prosperity than any alternative (Ivie 2000; Nye 1993). In one of his first major foreign policy addresses, the president argued "the democratic aspiration is not a mere recent phase of human history. It is human history" (1993:1614). The story of the struggle for democracy was the story of every person in the world. Clinton highlighted this idea in Africa with what he called "completing the circle." In one of the last lines of his address in Ghana, the president quoted a native son, Kwame Nkrumah, who wrote "the habit of democracy must be to encircle the Earth. Let us together resolve to complete the circle of democracy" (1998a: 421). Twelve days later, in his last speech before leaving Africa, Clinton echoed that statement: "now is the time to complete the circle of history to help Africa fulfill its promise as not only as a land of rich beauty but as a land of rich opportunity for its entire people. If we face the future together, it will be a future that is better for Africa and better for America" (1998h: 496). The circle of history and the circle of democracy were thus equated within Clinton's "new partnership."

More importantly, completing the chronicle of the struggle for democracy became the strategic mission in the post-Cold War world. This replaced the Cold War idea of containment as the foreign policy grand strategy following the demise of the Soviet Union. Clinton's theme of democracy promotion continued a long tradition of twentieth century presidents such as Wilson, Roosevelt, and Reagan who argued that promoting democracy is America's ultimate mission. Smith (1995) viewed America's twentieth century articulation of mission as centered on the aims of democracy promotion, but also noted that presidents, especially during the Cold War, often muted their enthusiasm for democracy when it seemed at odds with the goal of containing communism. An interdependent post-Cold War world created an opening for the United States to encourage and support democracy discourse across the globe.

The successful triumph of American power in the Cold War, combined with America's success in rebuilding Europe and Japan, can easily be seen as having earned for it the *know-how* to deepen, strengthen, and spread democracy (McDougall 1997; McEvoy-Levy 2001). Moreover, as Kane (1991) has argued, an exceptionalist tradition gives presidents an additional corollary: the claim that American leadership

is in accord with the direction of history itself. President Clinton merely affirmed America's responsibility to direct history and help nation-states continue along the democratic path. Africa thus represented the last holdout against the historical inevitability of democratic self-governance, and the last place where democracy, on a large scale, needed to take root. The partnership between the United States and African nations put it on the path to completing the circle of history, as well as establishing a foreign policy mission for the post-Cold War world.

Toward a post-Cold War foreign policy narrative?

In Clinton's African tour rhetoric, the "new partnership" anecdote was structured by three themes: (1) *continued commitment* to American global leadership; (2) *threats* and *interests* are broadly defined; and (3) *Democracy promotion* as the mission of U.S. foreign policy. These three themes were prevalent throughout Clinton's foreign policy discourse. They demonstrate that Clinton supplied a clear rhetorical vocabulary for American foreign policy. In this section, we provide textual examples to illustrate this point.

Before we begin it is worth noting that Clinton's admission of American foreign policy neglect was not typically a part of his overall foreign policy message. In fact, it was/is rare for any president to admit American foreign policy mishaps. What was significant was how his expression of national remorse turned into an unlikely vehicle for the reassertion of continued American leadership worldwide. It was perhaps not surprising that the first and continuing subject of a U.S. post-Cold War narrative was a continuation of American global leadership. One of the primary questions for American foreign policy after the Cold War was: what kind of leadership role, if any, shall the U.S. assume? In one of Clinton's (1993a: 8; see also, 1995; Edwards, 2006) first major foreign policy addresses he clearly stated that he would maintain America's role as world leader.

The president criticized those who espoused an isolationist impulse. For Clinton, the most important subject of American foreign policy was "the imperative of American leadership in the face of global change," for "we must serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace" (Clinton 1993b: 1613). The president maintained that the United States must continue to lead. It must use its influence to advance its vision of the international environment. Those same thoughts had not changed by the time Clinton (1997) got to his second inaugural, where he called the United States the world's "indispensable nation." This commitment to American leadership was a continuation of his predecessors' assertion of American leadership during the Cold War. Clinton remained just as steadfast in his belief in America's role as world leader in 1993 and 1997, as he did during his African tour.

Thus, the leadership the president espoused in his "new partnership" narrative was part of his larger story for American foreign policy. For Clinton, the United States remained as the primary protagonist on the world stage.

The second theme of defining foreign policy ideas broadly such as *threat* and *interest* can also be found in other places within the president's foreign policy rhetoric. As the president (2000b: paragraph 5) pointed out, "it seems to me that both for Africa and the world, we will be forced increasingly to define security more broadly." In a post-Cold War world of interdependence and integration world terms once defined narrowly *must* be defined more widely because "capital has clearly become global," "services have become global," and "information has become global" (Clinton 1993a/2000: 10). Practically everything was global; therefore, our interests must be global too.

Rose (1991) was among the first to position such presidential discourse as postmodern, in the sense that global interdependence raises uniquely difficult challenges for the office and its occupant. According to Rose, a president must "go international" to compensate for the inevitable inability of a president to control events in this significantly more complex world by engaging the help of others. Whether seen through Rose's "postmodern presidency" or Nye's "soft power," Clinton (2000a: 1759) argued that "whether we like it or not, the world is growing more interdependent. We must look for more solutions in which all sides can claim a measure of victory and move away from choices in which someone is required to accept complete defeat." In the post-Cold War era, there were no clear winners and losers because all world events created global impacts. Solutions must be generated so that all could benefit from opportunities, while at the same time sharing the burden of challenges in more equitable fashion. For Clinton, everyone must be able to walk away from a negotiating table secure on the common ground agreed to by all (2000a, 2000b). Defining interests broadly was a consistent position throughout his presidency. Clinton recognized from the day he took office that the post-Cold War world was different than the Cold War and that the United States must define its interests differently. He articulated this idea in Africa as well as throughout his term in office.

Clinton also expanded how the United States should view the challenges it would face. Rubenstein et. al (2000: 7) maintained that "each president redefines the national interest in the light of the new threats, challenges, and opportunities that he sees facing the nation." During his Africa trip, Clinton defined the American national interest as coinciding with those of Africa. He also defined the threats of the post-Cold War era as pluralistic and transnational (see also 1993b, 1994, 1999a, 2000a, 2000b).

Further evidence of this claim can be found in a brief discussion of how Clinton characterized the "other" when the United States threatened or used force.

Typically, presidents define America's enemies through the rubric of the modern savage (Butler 2002; Ivie 1980, 1974). The savage is modern because it has some sort of visible form of civilization. These modern savages are typically specific leaders or governments such as Saddam Hussein. However, Clinton defined America's enemies through the rubrics of the modern and imperial savage (Butler 2002; Edwards 2006). Employing both rubrics to construct the "other" demonstrates that Clinton had a broader view of the threat environment the United States faced. The post-Cold War world was no longer filled with monolithic enemies, as it had been during the Cold War with America's fight against the Soviets. Instead, the post-Cold War world unleashed a whole host of different threats the United States had to manage. By using two forms of savagery to define the enemy "other," Clinton demonstrates that the threat environment must be defined in a broader fashion to deal with these pressures.

Democracy promotion was the final theme of Clinton's "new partnership" narrative for the post-Cold War world. Similar to the two other arguments, Clinton made the promotion of democracy his mission for American foreign policy throughout his eight years in office. Stuckey (1995) observed that, for better or worse, American presidents must articulate a foreign policy mission and democracy promotion has been a primary goal for the foreign policy of the United States in the twentieth century. For instance, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the American mission was to make the world safe for democracy. Harry Truman planned to make democracy promotion his central mission in the aftermath of Allied victory (Baritz 1985; Ikenberry 1999). Other challenges silenced both of these presidents. Wilson had his isolationists and Truman, and his successors operated in a Cold War environment where the defeat of communism regularly eclipsed democracy promotion.

Clinton continued the work of Wilson and Truman. On his Africa tour he called the promotion of democracy "completing the circle," but the president had declared this to be his primary goal earlier in his presidency. For instance, in a speech before the United Nations on September 27, 1993, Clinton (1993: 1614; see also Brinkley 1997; Cox 2000; Ikenberry 1999) explained that the overriding purpose of his administration as "expand[ing] and strengthen[ing] the world's community of market-based democracies." According to Clinton, the enlargement of free-market democracy would bring greater security, prosperity, and peace to a world that was still dangerous, but brimming with opportunity. In other words, Clinton was promoting the virtues of democracy in 1993, just as he did in Africa in 1998. Thus, democracy promotion represented a clear coherent mission for the direction of American foreign policy throughout the president's eight years in office.

Conclusion

This essay examined Clinton's foreign policy discourse during his 1998 trip to Africa. We demonstrated how the narrative embedded within this trip served as representative anecdote for the body of Clinton's foreign policy discourse. During the Africa trip, the president espoused a "new partnership" narrative to characterize the relationship in U.S./Africa relations, and the themes articulated in his "new partnership" narrative, provided a representative anecdote for the body of his foreign policy discourse. That is to say Clinton consistently articulated the themes that structured that narrative throughout his eight years in office. Taken together, those thematic arguments supplied the foundation for directing American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world and served as the basis for a post-Cold War foreign policy vocabulary.

The first theme of the "new partnership" narrative involved an emphasis on continued global leadership in the post-Cold War world. With the demise of the Soviet Union the United States remained as the world's only superpower, and how it chose to act with that newfound power and authority would shape both how the United States acted and how the international community expected it to act for the foreseeable future. Clinton proffered an almost utopian version of leadership in his "new partnership" narrative where the United States sought to provide direction for all the countries of the globe to reach its level of advancement and civilization. As the "indispensable nation" the U.S, alone could help the countries of the world achieve peace and stability. Once achieved through the multilateral efforts implied by a "new partnership" every nation would be at the United States' level and there would no longer be a need for a superpower to direct and educate the world. This peaceable multilateral notion of leadership set the tone for American leadership in the post-Cold War era, and even Clinton's successor remained somewhat bound by the expectations of a multilateral "new partnership."

President George W. Bush has often been accused of unilateralism in the wake of September 11, 2001 and the advent of the War on Terror. This approach is completely antithetical to the multilateral approach advocated within Clinton's "new partnership" narrative and has arguably resulted in a breakdown in the "new partnership" Clinton desired to create. Many countries expected the United States to act in a multilateral fashion when fighting terror, but many argue he has not done so. This friction may very well be the result of Bush's abandoning the "new partnership" narrative his predecessor offered.

Clinton also established the nature of the post-Cold War threat environment within his "new partnership" narrative. For Clinton, threats became more amorphous and transnational, and their root causes could not be pinpointed. These threats affected everyone, and as such required multilateral action to combat

them. One of the many transnational problems the world faced after the Cold War was terrorism, and as now-President Bush has reminded the world time and again, it has become the main foe for the United States and the world in the post-Cold War era.

There may be something to a comparison between the nature of Clinton and Bush's articulations of the threat environment. Perhaps, for example, Democrats construe the notion of a threat environment in a broader way than Republicans. If so, this also begs the question as to how Bush, or Republicans for that matter, construct the other elements of a broader threat environment. In other words, do they view HIV or other health concerns as a threat? In any event, Bush appears to have narrowed the threat environment from the broad conception laid out in Clinton's narrative. Clinton, then, appears to have articulated the foundation of the threat environment for the post-Cold War world.

Clinton also articulated a mission and means for combating threats such as terrorism in the new era: democracy promotion. Whereas Clinton sought to accomplish the spread of democracy through primarily diplomatic and economic means, his successor has so far concentrated on democracy promotion through military pressure. As in the case of the threat environment, there may be a partisan difference in understanding what exactly democracy promotion entails. Nevertheless, the strategy and aim of democracy promotion as the primary method for countering the relatively nebulous threat environment of the post-Cold War world appears to have originated with Clinton. Given the seeming differences in interpretation of the three themes between Clinton and Bush, it would be interesting to compare and contrast how the narrative is developed by the two presidents.

President Clinton offered a clear coherent narrative for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world that laid the foundation for both American action, and international expectations of how America would act now that it alone was a world superpower. The themes of the narrative he articulated during his 1998 Africa trip encapsulated those that characterized the body of his foreign policy discourse. Furthermore the themes of continued global leadership, a new nebulous threat environment, and the mission of democracy promotion seem to have resonated with his successor. Thus it appears Clinton is the chief author for the story of American foreign policy in today's world.

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What statements do not state

*Sine ira et studio**

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Building on the ideas of Michel Foucault and Jacque Derrida, the paper examines a statement issued by the Serb Orthodox Church in Kosovo as an example of particular political discourse. The paper draws on the concept of problematization to reveal explicit and implicit aspects of this discourse. Combining the analytical framework used for Critical Discourse Analysis with that designed for analysis of conflict situations, the paper contends that the analyzed discourse contains explicit as well as implicit topics, sometimes complementary and sometimes mutually contradictory. The paper analyzes the practical consequences of the statement's implicit problematization, arguing that this problematization leads to further confrontation and leaves no option for the Serb community in Kosovo. An analysis of the emotional aspect of the implicit problematization, which the text contains, shows that it represents a discourse of fear and rejection, not that of understanding and reconciliation. In conclusion, the paper introduces some "what if's" pointing out several topics in the statement's discourse which can and should be questioned and revised to open up prospects for survival of the Serb community in Kosovo.

Keywords: Kosovo, discourse, deconstruction, problematization, conflict, explicit and implicit aspects, Serbs, Albanians, United Nations Mission

Introduction

This paper was inspired by a statement which the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raška and Prizren in Kosovo[1] had issued as a reaction to my radio interview several days before.

I should note here that I do not agree with this Statement (annexed to this paper) because, in my opinion, it deliberately misrepresents the contents of my presentations (not to mention the fact that it calls me a liar). However, arguing with this Statement, bringing to light facts and figures to disprove it word by word did not

seem either very promising politically or very productive theoretically to me. The results of such *exposé*, spectacular as they may be, are short-lived and conceal the true significance of statements. The significance of this particular Statement is that it represents a certain discourse, within which (mis)representations of the kind which this Statement contains, is inevitable. It is therefore much more important to attempt to remove the veil of utterances (and silences) behind which this discourse is concealed and to understand why and how it leads to certain (mis)representations. I was emotionally speaking on the radio, Father Sava (to whose pen the statement belongs) was certainly emotional writing and, generally speaking, no human quest for the truth is possible without human emotions, as Karl Marx rightly remarked once. However, whatever emotions I may experience while analyzing this statement, I will try to bring my small research to a conclusion *without ire and prejudice*.

Before proceeding to the methodological and analytical framework, one point needs to be stressed. This paper was written before March 2004, at a time when violence seemed to be left in the past, the security situation was improving, and one of the major obstacles to the integration of the Serb community into Kosovo's life and institutions appeared to be their lack of will to reconsider their views on Kosovo and relations with the Albanian majority. The riots of March 2004, which mutated into a large-scale violence directed against Kosovo's minorities and resulted in the ethnic cleansing of entire minority villages and neighborhoods,[2] demonstrated that the situation was more complex, and that the propensity for violence remains high in Kosovo. The minority communities do have reasons for fear and mistrust.

Still, I stand behind the conclusions I made at the time when the paper was written: the current political discourse on Kosovo in the Serb community is leading this community to further isolation and confrontation with the majority. In a place where the two communities are so much intermingled — historically and geographically — no Berlin Wall can be erected to separate them. For both communities, it is vitally important, using Said's formula, "to introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent collective identity rather than understanding and intellectual exchange" (Said 2003: xvii). It is even more relevant now that Kosovo's status process has presumably entered into its final stage, and the final decision may be expected as early as the end of this year (2006). It is, however, the responsibility of the Albanian community in Kosovo to prove, in deeds not in words, that minority communities, including Serbs, do have a future in Kosovo, and that their change of perspective will pay back in terms of better security, freedom of movement and a happier life. For this, the majority has to go a long way to reconsider its own discourse of fear, hatred and mistrust with regard to Serbs and Serbia.

Methodological and analytical framework

The key notion which I will use for my further analysis is *discourse* as introduced into academic use by Michel Foucault. For Foucault, discourses are systems of knowledge (e.g. medicine, economics, linguistics) that inform the social and governmental 'technologies' which constitute power in modern societies. Power, knowledge, and discourse are intricately intermeshed: it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together (Foucault 1990: 100). In this paper, the term "discourse" is defined as a particular coherent representation of social life developed and practiced by a particular social actor or actors. Discourse entails the negotiation and (re-)construction of reality by individuals or groups through the use of symbolic tools. Through discourse, social agents make sense of reality and also formulate in a particular way the world that surrounds them. From this perspective, discourse is seen as the context in which communicative interaction takes place, and as the process by which society itself is reproduced.

Power structures (whether they are in power or not) establish and encourage certain favorable discourses while discouraging others, which results in particular "problemizations" of the reality. Herbert Marcuse's bitter critique of the contemporary society back in the 1960s emphasized its ever increasing trend to shape the entire universe of discourse and action and merge it into an "omnipresent system, which swallows up or repulses all alternatives". (Marcuse 1991: xlix). Hence, the main task of a scientific analysis in social sciences is "…to define the conditions in which human beings 'problemize' what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live" (Foucault 1992: 10).

A problemization is something that makes possible thinking in terms of problems and solutions; it is something that "has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions" (Foucault 1984: 389). The importance of particular problemizations in the political sphere cannot be overestimated: discussing the international response to the recent tragic events in Bosnia, David Campbell (Campbell 1998: 209) rightfully notes that different problemizations produce different 'Bosnias', and those different 'Bosnias' are rendered as different problems to be addressed by different political options. The same is, of course, true for any other political situation.

The significance of such an analysis for the study of political interplay in society, particularly in a conflict and post-conflict situation, is that it exposes the way in which a situation is problemized. Even the protagonists directly involved in a conflict situation, not to mention the various representatives of the international community who often become engaged in conflict resolution or post-conflict reconciliation, may not completely realize the consequences of the discourse which

they promote and customarily reproduce. In the meantime, to define how the parties to a conflict problemize the situation by means of deconstruction of the established discourses means to understand how they visualize the problem and what solutions they consider preferable and possible. It means, therefore, to find the key to their conflict attitudes and conflict behavior, which together with the conflict or contradiction itself constitute the conflict triangle (Wallensteen 2002: 35). This understanding is the first step towards conflict resolution, which allows for the second decisive step — changing the conflict dynamics through changes in the corners of this triangle. A new problemization arising as a result of these changes may be equal to a challenge of what Johan Galtung (1996) called 'transcendence', that is a resolution where both parties win. Transcendence indicates the challenge of finding solutions beyond the established rules and thinking. A new problemization established and expressed through a new discourse opens to the actors new solutions that were not conceivable within the old discourse. As William Thomas aphoristically put it, "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences".

The Diocese Statement represents a particular discourse on Kosovo, very common in the Serb community. To analyze it, I intend to use what is known in the academic practice as critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA, and discourse analysis in general, are not "methods" that can simply be applied in the study of social problems. Rather, CDA is a — critical — perspective on doing scholarship: it is, so to speak, discourse analysis 'with an attitude', which focuses on social problems, especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination (van Dijk 2001: 96). Social scientists developing CDA as a theory and a combination of methods emphasize the importance of "analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)." (Wodak 2001: 2). Implicitness is something inherent in the nature of discourse: by problemizing the reality, it inevitably highlights certain aspects at the expenses of some others. Foucault speaks of "restrictions, reticences, evasions, or silences" that are part and parcel of the process to form "a political ordering of life" (Foucault 1992: 123).

In my further analysis of the Statement, I propose to demonstrate the explicit and implicit problemizations of the situation described in the Statement. I will contend that the Statement is generated through two interrelated and interdependent but different problemizations. With due regard to the fact that the Statement represents a discourse related to a conflictual situation, I have found it useful to combine the analytical framework usually employed for CDA (Fairclough 2001) with that designed for analysis of conflict situations (summarized in Fisher, Ury and

Patton 1991). I will use the following units of analysis, which will appear in a different order depending on the aspect analyzed — explicit or implicit: topoi; actors; and the problemization as such, including the problem, obstacles to solving the problem and solutions possible within the given discursive framework.

Furthermore, the paper argues that the contemporary Serbian discourse on Kosovo is in essence a kind of orientalist discourse, engendered by the need to prove the Serb 'Europeaness' on the one hand, and by the desire to politically exclude Kosovo Albanians and to establish the Serb pre-eminence, on the other. This is the kind of orientalist discourse, which, according to Edward Said, is grounded in a "system of thought that approaches a heterogeneous, dynamic and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above." (Said 1995: 3). The Saidian orientalism may be construed as an extension of the Foucauldian concept of problemization. Not only did Said borrow the term 'discourse' from Foucault, but also the central attention devoted to the relation of knowledge to power. Said exposed specifically the dangers of essentializing the Orient as the Other, but even more importantly, he highlighted the need for the reflexive understanding and genuine disclosure of the Other (Said 2003).

It has been suggested recently by Maria Todorova that 'Balkanism' can be posited as a "variation on the orientalist theme" for the part of Europe that was under Ottoman rule (Todorova 1997). Balkanism developed a rhetorical arsenal of its own to represent Balkans as a transitional project, "a composite of Easterner and Westerner…no longer Orientals nor yet Europeans." (Todorova 1994: 476). The paper therefore attempts to place the Serbian orientalist discourse on Kosovo in the specifically Balkan context.

Problemization: The explicit aspect

Topoi

As noted above, a problemization is something that makes it possible to present a situation in terms of problems and solutions. The Statement describes the situation through a number of topoi, or argumentative schemes. These topoi "embody most important information of a discourse" and represent the global meaning that language users constitute in discourse production and comprehension and the "gist" that is best recalled by them" (van Dijk 2001: 102). Reading the Statement without any further analysis allows one to differentiate the following explicit topoi:

1. The international community more and more often accuses Serbs of not wishing to return to Kosovo cities, saying that conditions are ripe for return.
2. The real situation (lack of freedom of movement, insecurity, unresolved property issues) does not permit Serb returns.
3. The UN Mission does not know the reality and behaves immorally, calling on Serbs to return under undignified conditions, of which it is not even aware.
4. Serbs do not want to return before the international community (the UN Mission) fulfils its duty to create conditions for a dignified and secure life for all citizens.
5. The genuine purpose of the UN Mission is to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo as an ethnically pure territory of Albanians.

Thus, the Statement explicitly introduces two actors: Serbs and the UN Mission. As will be illustrated below, the Statement uses two different discursive strategies to picture these two actors: Serbs are consistently presented as victims, whereas the UN Mission is discredited as incompetent and malevolent. These discursive strategies are implemented as follows:

Actors

Serbs: they "lack basic freedom of movement and security, not to mention the possibility of employment and free access to institutions"; their apartments and houses have been "illegally occupied by Albanians after the war"; it is "more dangerous to be a Serb today than a US national in Iraq"; Serbs are "elderly women and men" (i.e. defenseless); Serbs are facing "an uncertainty with a knife held to their throats"; "in the crowds which throng the streets of Pristina and Pec daily there are no Serbs"; they "can be seen in their dingy enclaves (where they have forgotten long ago what to hope)"; Serbs "receive no guarantees, not even protection of their very lives".

UN Mission (UNMIK) is pictured in the following terms:

a. as incompetent and ignorant: its representatives are described as people "who see Kosovo reality from their armored cars and luxurious villas protected by armed guards"; they "are not even aware that in the crowds which throng the streets of Pristina and Pec daily there are no Serbs"; they are unable to return displaced persons to their homes and "simply switch their story around, claiming that they cannot return them by force 'when they don't want to come'";
b. as malevolent and anti-Serb: UNMIK representative is "obviously and highly provocatively falsifying the reality in which Kosovo-Metohija Serbs are living"; "in the past three years UNMIK has failed to free thousands of Serb-

owned apartments and houses"; UNMIK calls on people "to return to insecure surroundings and … certain deaths";

c. as not concerned with the fate of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities: "The fact that there will not be a single Serb on the territory of such a country and soon probably no other non-Albanians is perhaps unimportant because a Kosovo comprised of ethnic Albanians and members of the Mission from over 50 various world countries… is already the most multiethnic area in the Balkans."

Problem, obstacles, solutions

The explicit statement of the problem puts it between these two actors. The problem, as the Statement tackles it, is the impossibility for the Serbs to return to Kosovo cities. The major obstacle to this problem is the precarious situation in which the Serbs find themselves, which seems to rise from lack of engagement of the international community (specifically, the UN Mission in Kosovo), which is not only ill-aware of the actual situation but also favors creation of an ethnically pure territory without Serbs.

This problemization suggests that the only solution to the problem is in changing the attitude of the international community (more specifically, UNMIK) towards the Serb minority. The Serb minority, as a victim of the situation, cannot do anything, even if they wish. Thus, it is the duty of the international community "to create conditions for a dignified and secure life for all citizens". However, the Statement does not state explicitly *how* this can be done. One can assume, though, that the author of the Statement means a general improvement in the security situation through more vigorous crime fighting and better security arrangements for the Serb minority as well as resolution of long pending issues, such as illegal occupation of Serb properties, which prevent their return to Kosovo cities.

Problemization: The implicit aspect

It is not possible to immediately differentiate implicit topoi of the Statement (by virtue of their implicitness) to begin an analysis of the implicit aspect of problemization. I will use, therefore, a slightly reversed order, starting with the analysis of the main players.

In order to initiate an implicit problemization analysis based upon a set of problems and solutions related to a particular situation, this situation needs to be described first. The Statement deals, as can be seen from the analysis of explicit problemization, with a situation that can be categorized as conflictual. A fundamental part of conflict theory (Wallensteen 2002: 16) requires the presence

of *actors* or *parties* in order for conflict to exist. If the actors are formed, and if they make an analysis where their needs for survival are in conflict with others, then there is conflict built into the system. The text of the Statement speaks explicitly about only two actors — Serbs and UNMIK. However, a closer analysis of the Statement shows that there are some more.

Actors

First of all, the Statement implicitly appeals to the international public opinion, thus introducing it as a relevant actor. Indeed, the Statement was published in English only on a website called Kosovo Highlights. This, in turn, is linked with another site http://www.kosovo.net, which is the official site run by the Serb Orthodox Diocese of Raška and Prizren. The latter site is, in principle, bilingual (English and Serbian), but the Serbian update is always significantly lagging behind the English update. The Serbian version of the Statement has not been published anywhere (I suspect that it just does not exist), which demonstrates that from the very beginning the Statement was in all likelihood designed for an international reader, and had as an implicit goal the intention to influence international public opinion by promoting a political discourse on Kosovo very different from the one practiced by the international community.

The next implicit actor of the Statement is the Albanians. Explicitly, they are mentioned in the text only once, in the context of the illegal occupation of Serb apartments in Pristina. This reference is, however, very telling when the entire sentence is considered: "Serb-owned apartments and houses were illegally occupied by Albanians after the war and now treated by them as their 'private property' contrary to all laws and regulations." This sentence suggests that Albanians are a lawless element, unacceptable for any modern society ruled by law. Referring to the unlikelihood of finding Serbs in Pristina, there is an apparently sarcastic if somewhat vague remark that they were certainly not to be found at New Year celebrations in the city, in a square dedicated to Skenderbeg "next to direct video broadcasts from Tirana."

This remark is absolutely unintelligible unless taken in context with certain local cultural and political reference points.[3] The reference to Skenderbeg and Tirana needs to be viewed through "a glass with some text printed". It is not a passing remark at all, and serves to introduce two interrelated qualifications of Albanians, which are of particular concern for the Statement's author. What this remark strongly implies is that Albanians are, firstly, nationalistic (they have named the main square in Pristina after their national hero Skenderbeg[4]) and, secondly, cherish hidden dreams about a Greater Albania (hence the reference to Tirana). This

brings into the discourse an image of Albanians as nationalists, not only danger-ous for Serbs and Serbia, but also a destabilizing factor to the entire region.

The Statement attempts to bolster further the thesis of the imminent threat to the Serbs (and other non-Albanians in Kosovo) by mentioning the pro-inde-pendence sentiments of Albanians ("President Rugova opened an independence house"). One could think that independence as such may mean many things, not necessarily negative — but not the author of the Statement. The remark about the "independence house" should be read in conjunction with the last paragraph stat-ing that the territory (Kosovo), which will be granted the status of an independent state, will be "an ethnically pure territory", where "there will not be a single Serb … and soon probably no other non-Albanians". This paints a picture of Albanians as not only nationalistic, but also prone to ethnic cleansing, if allowed their own state (how else can one explain disappearance of Serbs and other non-Albanians?).

But this is not the end of the story. The Statement pictures Serbs as victims whose very lives are seriously endangered ("with a knife held to their throats"). However, the Statement does not state explicitly who is responsible for this de-grading situation of the Kosovo Serbs. Despite all its alleged failures to protect Serbs and provide "dignified conditions" to them, it is certainly not the UN Mis-sion that "puts a knife to the Serb throats". The perpetrators are not mentioned; however, the contents of the Statement leave no other possible option except for Albanians. Here we come to the most important thesis (in terms of its conse-quences for problematization) introduced implicitly: Albanians not only as per-petrators of crimes against Serbs, but also as those who are threatening Serbs with death. That the author does not present Albanians as an actor explicitly, can in all likelihood be explained by the fact that, first, the text of the Statement is meant for an international audience and, second, the author has formulated his message in such a way so as to avoid possible accusations of inciting inter-ethnic hatred. There is another example of politically correct reverence to the sensibilities of the international community: when the author speaks about UNMIK's duty "to create conditions for a dignified and secure life for all citizens regardless of their national affinity" (the expression "national affinity" should not be misleading as it is just a literate translation for "ethnic background").

Thus, the implicit discourse of the Statement introduces another important actor into the situation — <u>Albanians</u> — who are pictured in the following terms:

a. as lawless and therefore unacceptable in a modern society ruled by law;
b. as nationalists dreaming of a Greater Albania;
c. as potential perpetrators of an ethnic cleansing campaign, if allowed their own state;
d. as actual perpetrators of crimes against Serbs who are after the Serbs' lives.

Nonetheless, there are some other implicit actors besides the Albanians. The next very significant actor, despite its total absence in the text, is Serbia. The presence of Serbia is reconstructed through several discursive strategies applied by the Statement. The first strategy consists of referring to Kosovo as Kosovo and Metohija.[5] This term appears in the very title of the Statement and is then repeated throughout the text. The Statement refers to Kosovo simply as Kosovo only on two occasions: first when the Statement speaks of "UN Mission representatives who see the Kosovo reality from their armored cars…", and then when the Statement describes a future Kosovo as an ethnically pure territory where "there will not be a single Serb… and no other non-Albanians". In both cases, Kosovo loses its Serbian connotation because it is mentioned in connection with the actors (and situations) whom the Statement places outside the cognitive (and physical) space called Kosovo and Metohija, thus stressing the incompatibility of these actors with the idea of Kosovo 'Serbness'. A careful reader will also notice that nowhere in the text is there any reference to 'Kosovo Serbs' (a usual category in international use). The term used in the Statement is "Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija", with the evident implication that they constitute a single whole with Serbs living elsewhere.

<u>Serbia</u> represented by the Statement has the following characteristic:

a. it has historic rights to Kosovo;
b. it represents all Serbs wherever they live (one can also reformulate it in a way that all Serbs belong to Serbia wherever they live);
c. the presence of Serbia in Kosovo is incompatible with both the international community and Albanians.

Now we come to the last (but not the least) actor in the implicit picture that we are analyzing. Impossible as it may seem, this is the United States. Mentioned *in passim* and only three times, the United States still plays an important role in the implicit aspect of the discourse. The first mention of the US is in the phrase which says that being a Serb in Kosovo is "more dangerous than it is to be a US national in Iraq". This comparison is hardly understandable unless the reader is familiar with the discourse of Serb propaganda calling Albanians by no other name than 'terrorists'. By comparing the imaginable perils for a US national in Iraq to those for Serbs in Kosovo, the Statement makes a very subtle attempt to draw a parallel between the US policies towards Iraq and the Serb Government policies towards Kosovo (Albanians). Yet another inference is that the situation existing (or about to come into existence) in Kosovo is no better than the one established by the Iraqi regime recognized worldwide as terrorist and totalitarian. This comparison has a very straightforward consequence: if the United States is opposing Iraq, it must

also oppose the forces that threaten Serbs in Kosovo (i.e. Albanians who, as we have seen, are the major threat to Serbs in the implicit discourse).

The US is mentioned for the second time in the context of the "US Army mercy", to which Serbs in Gnjilane (and by implication, elsewhere in Kosovo) are left. This mentioning reflects the ambivalent attitude towards the USA: on the one hand, it is a dangerous and insurmountable power, to which one can only surrender without fighting; on the other hand, it is a potential ally in the fight against terrorism. As a proof, the Statement mentions the United States once more, this time in connection with USAID, which "has already set aside considerable monies for integration of displaced persons".

Thus, the Statement gives the following picture of the <u>United States</u>:

a. as an insurmountable force to the mercy of which Serbs have been left;
b. as a potential ally, if it realizes that Serbs are facing the same evil in Kosovo as the US does in Iraq (terrorism).

The description of the other actors makes it possible to add some characteristics to the original actors identified through the explicit discourse: Serbs and UNMIK. <u>Serbs</u> can be additionally characterized as (i) inherently linked to the state of Serbia and (ii) facing terrorism of the worst kind which is fought against by the international community. On the other hand, <u>UNMIK</u> is not just malevolent but openly pro-Albanian (its goal is "creation of an ethnically pure" Kosovo without Serbs or other non-Albanians) and therefore, by implication, pro-terrorist.

Topics

Now that the main actors have been described, an attempt can be made to define the implicit topics:

1. Kosovo is part of Serbia, to which Serbia is entitled morally and historically.
2. Serbs are facing Albanian terrorism that threatens their very lives and are left to the mercy of the United States.
3. Albanians are dangerous not only for the Serbs, but they also threaten the stability of the whole region by their nationalistic and pro-independence aspirations.
4. The pro-Albanian UN Mission intentionally falsifies the actual situation with the aim to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo.
5. An independent Kosovo can only be an ethnically pure territory of Albanians without Serbs and other non-Albanians.
6. The actual situation in Kosovo is unbearable and the UN Mission cannot be relied upon to improve it.

The relationship between the explicit and implicit topoi is not straightforward: they are interwoven, and there may be pervasive topics developed throughout the entire text. Very schematically, the relationship between explicit and implicit topics of the discourse represented by the Statement is shown in a table below. One can see that in some cases, explicit and implicit topics are complementary (the implicit topic intensifies the meaning already contained in the explicit topic in the same paragraph or throughout the text): explicitly the UN Mission is pictured as ignorant and unprofessional, whereas implicitly it is characterized as malicious and ill intended. In other cases, the implicit meaning differs from the explicit one to a degree where they become contradictory: on the one hand, the Statement says explicitly that the Serbs can return only when UNMIK fulfills its duty to create secure conditions for all; on the other hand, its implicit discourse implies that UNMIK cannot be expected to live up to this task because the UN Mission prepares for the creation of an independent Kosovo, which means total insecurity for Serbs

Table. Relationship between explicit and implicit topoi in the discourse

Explicit topoi	Implicit topoi
The international community more and more often accuses Serbs of not wishing to return to Kosovo cities, saying that conditions are ripe for return.	Kosovo is part of Serbia, to which Serbia is entitled morally and historically.
	The pro-Albanian UN Mission intentionally falsifies the actual situation with the aim to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo.
The real situation (lack of freedom of movement, insecurity, unsolved property issues) does not permit Serb returns.	Serbs are facing Albanian terrorism that threatens their very lives, and are left to the mercy of the United States.
The UN Mission does not know the reality and behaves immorally, calling on Serbs to return under undignified conditions, of which it is not even aware.	The pro-Albanian UN Mission intentionally falsifies the actual situation with the aim to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo.
Serbs do not want to return before the international community (the UN Mission) fulfils its duty to create conditions for a dignified and secure life for all citizens.	The actual situation in Kosovo is unbearable and the UN Mission cannot be relied upon to improve it.
The genuine purpose of the UN Mission is to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo as an ethnically pure territory of Albanians.	Albanians are dangerous not only for the Serbs but also threaten the stability of the whole region through their nationalistic and pro-independence aspirations.
	An independent Kosovo can only be an ethnically pure territory of Albanians without Serbs and other non-Albanians.

and other non-Albanians. It is this combination of explicit and implicit meanings that makes the discourse as it is.

Problem, obstacles, solutions

With the implicit topics identified, it is possible to move to the implicit problemization of the situation. Contrary to what is stated explicitly, the problem seems to be not just the lack of adequate conditions for Serb returns, but the unbearable situation for Serbs in Kosovo (Kosovo and Metohija) in general. The situation is thus problemized as an opposition between degraded and suffering Serbs whose very survival is at risk, on the one hand, versus malevolent, dangerous, nationalistic and lawless Albanians, on the other, coupled with an incompetent, uncaring and essentially anti-Serb UN Mission and the United States as a potentially useful but dangerous force.[6] According to the Statement, the foreign audience to whom the Statement is appealing should realize that Serbs are facing a danger of extermination, and the UN Mission is no protection to them. The situation is even more appalling because this is happening to the Serbs in their own place (Kosovo and Metohija), and their situation can be compared to what could be the situation of a US citizen in such an abhorrent and hostile state as Iraq. Furthermore, the independence of Kosovo is a mortal threat to Serbs and other non-Albanian communities: as soon as it comes true, Kosovo will become an ethnically pure territory. However, this is not the only danger: Albanians are nationalistic and threaten the stability of the region as a whole and, therefore, must be deterred.

The major obstacle to the problem described in the implicit discourse is the anti-Serb policy of two actors — UNMIK and Albanians that cannot change due to their inherent characteristics (Albanians cannot stop seeking independence and UNMIK cannot stop supporting them). What could be the practical consequences and solutions to such a problemization?

The first practical consequence is that there cannot be and must not be any cooperation between Serbs and Albanians because of the malevolent nature of the latter. Therefore, there can be no integration, and the very co-habitation of Serbs and Albanians in the same territory is highly improbable if the current situation within Kosovo under its present, internationally defined status persists — not to mention within a prospective, internationally sanctioned independent Kosovo. The international community should not even mention the idea of inter-ethnic cooperation as purely utopian. Considering that the UN Mission is not willing or able to protect Serbs or change the situation, which is steadily sliding toward Kosovo independence, the only practical solution is that the Mission should be terminated. How then can the resulting political vacuum be filled to improve the Serbs' situation? As a matter of course, an independent Kosovo (meaning a Kosovo

governed by Albanians since these two situations are interlinked) is not an option. What is left? The United States is an unlikely option because of its unpredictability and dualistic nature. The only actor left from the list given in the Statement is Serbia. Serbia (that is the Serb Government, police and army) should come back to Kosovo as the only logical consequence of this discourse and the only practical solution. Thus, the latent appeal to the international reader (and to the international community) is to support this return.

Qu'est-ce qu'il y a de hors-texte?

Now that the text has been analyzed, the question is (if Derridian assertion "*il n'y a pas de hors-texte*" can be paraphrased) what exactly is there behind the text? The piece of text analyzed in this paper, to what extent is it typical and representative of the Serb political and popular discourse with regard to Kosovo? As I have mentioned before, the Statement and the views it professes are typical enough. One should not assume that the Statement is extremist. As a matter of fact, the author, Father Sava is a decent and moderate clergyman who helped Kosovo Albanians during the tragic events of 1998–1999 and most recently has made very significant contribution to improve the attitude of Kosovo authorities to the monastery where he serves. The Statement, however, reflects a typical problemization of the Kosovo situation in the Serb community.

Before going further, let us recall some implicit topoi of the Statement: (1) Kosovo is part of Serbia, to which Serbia is entitled morally and historically; (2) Serbs are facing Albanian terrorism that threatens their very lives, and are left to the mercy of the United States (Great Powers); (3) the pro-Albanian UN Mission intentionally falsifies the actual situation with the aim to enable the creation of an independent Kosovo; (4) Albanians are dangerous not only for the Serbs, but they also threaten the stability of the whole region through their nationalistic and pro-independence aspirations; (5) an independent Kosovo can only be an ethnically pure territory of Albanians without Serbs and other non-Albanians.

To demonstrate that the Statement falls into the mainstream political discourse on Kosovo in Serbia, I will quote the statements of two famous Serb public figures. The former dates back to 1988 when the Kosovo crisis only started taking its shape. It was Dobrica Ćosić, dissident, academician, writer and even President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for a few months in 1992, who made that statement in an interview to the Zagreb review *Danas* (Imami 2000: 350). The second quotation is fairly recent, dating to September 2006 and belongs to Sanda Rašković-Ivić, President of the Serbian Government's Coordination Center for Kosovo (Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija 2006).

Here are the two statements:

1. It is for the first time after two centuries that the greater part of the international community doubts and questions the free-loving nature of the Serb people, the democratic nature of the Serb question, the righteousness and legitimacy of the actual political struggle of the Serbian people against Great Albanian genocide and aggression… The Kosovo Albanian (Čosić uses the deragotory term "Šiptarski" in the original — D.P.) separatist movement is shaking the foundation of Yugoslavia and aims at integration with Albania, that is the creation of a Greater Albania, doing it steadfastly, by all means available, undemocratic and anti-civilizational.[7]

2. By their recent attacks Albanians are sending a message that Serbs are not welcome whereas their message to the international community is that Albanians have lost patience and in case the outcome of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo is not to their liking, they will react aggressively. The people here (Kosovo Serbs — D.P.) have realized that the goal of Albanian extremists is an ethnically clean Kosovo… UNMIK and its officials should stop turning their heads away from the reality in Kosovo and Metohija so that they could see who the victim is and who the aggressor is. If the international community wants a stable and safe region, it should support Serbia, which is ready to assume her share of responsibility for Kosovo in conformity with the democratic values of the contemporary world.

I will leave it to the reader to decide which topoi are reflected in the former and which in the latter — obviously, not such a difficult task — but that texts separated by almost 20 years (!) can so smoothly be read as a continuation of each other is truly amazing.

But what is behind this continuity of discourse, which, incidentally, may be extended for at least another fifty years into the past?[8] A great deal of political rhetoric that led to the collapse of former Yugoslavia was based on the power of the orientalist discourse, a process which Bakić-Hayden (1995) described as "nesting orientalisms". This discourse represents peoples (nations) to the east or sometimes to the south of the writer as non-European and, therefore, less valuable. Bakić-Hayden explains it by the need of those Yugoslavs who have not scored high on the Western scale of Europeaness, to find their own 'others,' whom they perceive as even lower.[9] Thus Serbs, Montenegrins and, to a lesser extent, Macedonians share an ambiguous identity: they have felt compelled to defend their 'other'-Europeaness by stressing their complementary contributions to the European cultural heritage and the cultural discontinuity created by the Ottoman conquest of their part of Europe." (Bakić-Hayden 1995: 923). Indeed, many Balkan self-identities have been constructed in direct opposition to an actual oriental other, i.e. the Ottoman

Turks who conquered the region from the east. On the other hand, as 'Byzantine,' they have already been perceived by the European countries to the west as European 'other.' It is not a coincidence that Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians are referred to in Serbian popular use as "Turks".

The political point of the orientalist rhetoric is obvious — to exclude the Other politically by emphasizing the Other's inferiority and immaturity (from the point of view of 'real' values) and, therefore, prove the need for political guidance and domination by 'more progressive', 'more cultured' mentors. On the other hand, it can also serve the purpose of justifying ethnic divisions: if the Other is non-European and therefore less valuable, the need for separation (and the impossibility of common life) is presented as self-obvious (Hayden 2000 162). There is also, as Todorova points out, a less ambitious but more immediate political purpose: to justify actual misfortunes and misconducts by demonizing the Other through orientalist discourse (Todorova 1997: 187).

Conclusions

It is deplorable that the Statement (though the author(s) may not realize it) represents, in fact, a discourse of intolerance, fear, suspicion and hopelessness. It does not leave any practical chances to the Serb community, for which the author (I am convinced) sincerely cares. If the Albanians are so dangerous and malevolent, then it is hopeless to try to change the situation at the community level. As long as the current situation persists, enclavization and isolation would be the best option. No help can be expected from the UN Mission because it is so anti-Serb and pro-Albanian. The only hope for the future is the return of the Serb army and police. But as can be inferred from the tenor of the argument presented, it is highly unlikely that the Albanians will change the course they are on, which means new armed clashes, a new conflict, new deaths and sufferings… The discourse of the Statement is a discourse leading the Serb community to an abyss.

Similar to the man reading a half-black and half-printed paper, this discourse does not allow for any way to be seen out of the situation. It is a rigid discourse that does not foresee the possibility of changing the perspective. It is a discourse that attempts to present all developments as driven by the blind force of conflict, which can be only met with an equal or superior force. The best description of such a discourse is given by Noel Malcolm in his *Bosnia: A Short History* (Malcolm is speaking about the Bosnian conflict, yet 'Bosnia' can be replaced with 'Kosovo' without any loss to the meaning): "The biggest obstacle to all understanding of the conflict is assumption that what has happened in this country is the product — natural, spontaneous and at the same time necessary — of forces lying within

Bosnia's own internal history. That is the myth which was carefully propagated by those who caused the conflict, who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gunmen were doing was not done by them but by impersonal and inevitable forces beyond anyone's control." (Malcolm 1996: xix).

The rigidity and the seemingly impeccable logic of the Statement can be easily retested through a number of "what if"s. What if the Albanians are not so intrinsically bad and inter-ethnic cooperation with them is possible? What if the UN Mission is not anti-Serb and cares about the situation of the Serb community? What if the UN Mission is not pro-Albanian and its purpose is not "ethnic cleansing" of Serbs from "an independent Kosovo"? What if "an independent Kosovo" may mean positive changes for the Serb community? What if not only Serbs but Albanians also have historic rights to Kosovo? What if part of the responsibility for the current "unbearable" situation in Kosovo lies among members of the Serb community itself? What if the Serb community can change the situation for the better through participation in common institutions?

In other words, what if the actual problemization based on fear, mistrust and intolerance is replaced with a problemization of understanding and acceptance of the Other? What if the discourse of confrontation is replaced with a discourse of cooperation? Wouldn't the Serb community be the first to benefit from such a change of discourse and a subsequent problemization? I could have mentioned here many facts and figures to support legitimacy of all these "what if"s, but this is not the point. The real point is that without a different discourse and a different problemization — *sine ira et studio* — the Serb community in Kosovo is doomed to further decline into a state of despair and miserableness without any hope for a better future — the only direction, in which the discourse of the Statement stubbornly points. Of course, this new discourse should meet an adequate recognition in practice by the Kosovo institutions and Kosovo Albanians in general, but it is up to the Kosovo Serbs to realize a need for a change in discourse. Different geopolitical calculations condition the interests of a host of international actors involved in Kosovo but there can be no actors more sincerely interested in a prosperous and stable Kosovo than Serbs and Albanians living there.

Notes

* To my Serb friends in Kosovo whose feelings I appreciate and on whose understanding I rely.

1. The Diocese of Raška and Prizren is a territorial area of the Serb Orthodox Church covering Kosovo (Kosovo i Metohija, in Serbian) and administered by a bishop (presently, Bishop Artemije). Kosovo itself is a province of the former Yugoslavia currently under UN administration (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo — UNMIK) in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

2. The two-day rampage of partly coordinated arson, looting, shooting, and stone-, petrol bomb- and grenade-throwing left nineteen dead, nearly 900 injured (more than twenty gravely), over 700 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes, up to 10 public buildings and 30 Serbian churches and two monasteries damaged or destroyed, and some 4,500 Kosovo Serbs displaced (ICG 2004:1).

3. I cannot but mention here an excellent graphic representation, illustrating the selective power of a discourse to 'thematize' reality. It is a political cartoon by the Serb cartoonist Dušan Ludvik which appeared in 1993 as a reaction to media manipulations by public opinion (Jovanović 2002: 356). The cartoon shows a bespectacled man reading a newspaper. It is not a usual newspaper, though. Only half of it has a text whereas the other half is completely black. Neither are usual the man's glasses. The glass looking at the page with the text is completely black whereas the other glass looking at the black page reflects some text. The cartoon illustrates media manipulations as much as the reader's selectiveness. The reader cannot perceive what is outside a particular discourse and, on the contrary, they can make sense out of what is meaningless, except in this discourse.

4. Skenderbeg (Skanderbeg, *Albanian* Gjergj Kastrioti) is the Albanian national hero who for more than 20 years in the 15th century was successfully leading resistance to the Turkish conquest of Albania. In recognition of his great services, Skenderbeg was named captain general of the Holy See by Pope Calixtus III and became the symbol of resistance and national proud for all Albanians wherever they live.

5. Kosovo and Metohija (*Serbian,* Kosovo i Metohija, or Kosmet) is an attribute of political discourse and a very specific political discourse at that. Metohija is the Serb name for the western part of Kosovo. This name is derived from *metochia*, a Byzantine Greek word for monastic estates, and reflects the fact that many Orthodox monasteries were granted rich endowments here by medieval Serb rulers. Kosovo Albanians, on the other hand, resent the use of this name, since this seems to imply that the identity of the territory itself is bound up with the Serb Orthodoxy and Serb rule. This is how the official site of the Diocese of Raška and Prizren (http://www.kosovo.net) introduces Kosovo: "Kosovo and Metohija is the cradle of the Serbian Orthodox people and their Church. With over 2,400 Serbian Orthodox religious sites and monuments, this southern Province of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia is the very heart of Serbian spiritual and national identity." The Albanian name for the western part of Kosovo is Rrafsh i Dukagjinit, the "Dukagjin plateau" — Dukagjin being a medieval Albanian ruling family which also gave its name to a broad swathe of territory in northern Albania (Malcolm 1998: 3). Not only this: the territory has been habitually called just Kosovo for centuries by all people who populated it: Serbs, Albanians, Turks and others. Even today, despite apparent politization of place names due to the specific problematization of the Kosovo situation, you can hardly hear a Serb referring to Kosovo as Kosovo and Metohija in everyday communication. The fact that Kosovo as a name for the whole region is historically shared by all ethnic groups was the main reason why in 1968, following amendments to the federal and Serbian constitutions, a decision was taken to officially call the province Kosovo, not Kosovo and Metohija. In his research *Serbs and Albanians Through Centuries* Petrit Imami mentions a book published in Belgrade in 1985 and entitled *Kosovo Inheritance — Monuments of the Serb People* which covered the entire territory of Kosovo without any reference to Metohija and was edited, among others, by the actual Serb Patriarch Pavle (Imami 2000: 318). The situation changed in 1989 when, with the rising tide of Serb nationalism and anti-Albanian propaganda, the Serbian parliament abrogated the autonomy of Kosovo and returned the province its former name of Kosovo and Metohija (Omari 1993:

290). (Still, even today the officialized Serb discourse often refers to the province as "Kosovo": in 1999 the Serb Orthodox Church published a book entitled *Crucified Kosovo*, with a foreword by Patriarch Pavle.) Therefore, the use of the name "Kosovo and Metohija" has additional strong connotations on both sides: for Serbs it symbolizes "return of Serbia to Kosovo", for Albanians it evokes the memories of their institutional humiliation in 1989 and the ten years of suffering that followed.

6. Many international and local analysts of the Balkan events in the last decade single out the discourse of victimization and victimhood as the most typical one extensively used by the conflicting parties: "In the distorted pictures which I observed in Yugoslavia each party consistently presented itself as a victim and the Other as a threat or a potential threat. None of the parties reacted to the Other directly but to its own projections of the Other…" (Denitch 2002: 71). Nicola Mai who interviewed Serb refugees from Kosovo in Serbia, remarks in a section aptly called *Narratives of antagonism and victimization: 'Look what they did to us…'*: "Throughout the project, narratives of self-victimization and malevolent conspiracy recurred in interviews collected." (Mai 2001: 101). Other researchers emphasize the deliberate misuse of the victimhood concept by national elites in Yugoslavia to justify war against other ethnic groups: particularly representative is the account given in *The Death of Yugoslavia* of the systematic representation of Serbs as victims in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo by the Milošević regime (Silber and Little 1996). According to Milan Milošević's reconstruction (Milošević 1997), it was during the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in Gazimestan (the battlefield in Kosovo) that Slobodan Milošević first explicitly mentioned the possibility of war, in his mind, then in Kosovo itself (even though, as is well known, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina erupted before the Kosovo conflict). In his speech, Slobodan Milošević addressed the Serbs as victims living in the heart of their own ancestral land, harassed by the Albanians who were taking advantage of their autonomy and would try, sooner or later, to unite Kosovo with Albania.

7. It appears that Čosić forestalled Huntington in his theory of the conflict of civilizations. It should be noted in parentheses that no other political theory has been given warmer reception and greater prominence in Serbia than this. It gave a flavor of academic respectability to what Serb propaganda always claimed anyway: that in the conflicts of the 1990's in former Yugoslavia, Serbia defended the values of (Western) civilization on *mission civilizatrice* against its enemies.

8. Very characteristic in this respect are the writings of Serb nationalist Vasa Čubrilović, who officially submitted in 1937 a program aimed at the expulsion of all Kosovo Albanians as "anarchist elements", who " managed not only to resist the hardcore of our state but also to harm us" and who understand only "the brute force of an organized state" (Čubrilović 1993: 178–179).

9. Compare this to the representation of Europe in Italian political party discourse: "They (the Italian political parties) use the term 'Europe' as synonymous to the 'European Union', and while in some instances a reference to accession countries and an enlarged Europe is made, the EU is ultimately represented as Europe, *tout court*. The implicit claim is that those who do not belong to the EU are not "European countries or peoples" properly speaking, which in turn gives to the EU member states the power to decide who will be included to the Union and hence who will count as European and who will not." (Kosic, Ankica and Anna Triandafyllidou 2004: 64)

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Annex

SERBIAN ORTHODOX DIOCESE OF RASKA AND PRIZREN
KOSOVO AND METOHIJA

INFORMATION SERVICE

ERP KIM Info Service
OBVIOUS UNTRUTHS BY THE UN DEPUTY MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATOR OF PRISTINA
Dmitry Pozhidaev, deputy municipal administrator of the city of Pristina, claims that it is Serbs themselves who do not want to return to Kosovo and Metohija

GRACANICA
January 3, 2003

While making a guest appearance on the KIM Radio program "Dialogues" on December 30, 2002, Dmitry Pozhidaev, the UN deputy municipal administrator of Pristina, stated an entire series of obvious untruths and openly accused Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija of not wanting

to return to Kosovo-Metohija cities. Pozhidaev indicated that the current security situation in the region of central Kosovo is "satisfactory and that Serbs are able to move freely and join all institutions of the system". As proof of his claim, he cited that the United Nations mission had called on Serbs to return to Pristina but they failed to do so. The UN deputy municipal administrator of the city of Pristina therefore believes that among displaced Serbs "there is a lack of true desire to return to Kosovo cities". When asked to comment on news that Kosovo president Ibrahim Rugova recently opened an independence house in Pristina, Pozhidaev confirmed that no one had consulted UNMIK beforehand because it allegedly "concerns a historical building".

As one can conclude from these selected quotes, Mr. Pozhidaev is obviously and highly provocatively falsifying the reality in which Kosovo-Metohija Serbs are living. He directly accuses Serbs of not wanting to return to Pristina, at the same time forgetting that there are presently only about two hundred Serbs living in that city who lack basic freedom of movement and security, not to mention the possibility of employment and free access to institutions. If by some miracle Serbs were to return to a city where no one can guarantee anyone's safety, one wonders where they would live because in the past three years UNMIK has failed to free thousands of Serb-owned apartments and houses illegally occupied by Albanians after the war and now treated by them as their "private property" contrary to all laws and regulations. The situation in Pristina, in all honesty, may be the best in comparison with Pec, Djakovica and Urosevac, where it is more dangerous to be a Serb today than it is to be a U.S. national in Iraq. In Prizren some 60 Serb elderly women and men who stayed barely manage to resist daily pressure and threats to sell their property while in Gnjilane, frequently pointed out as a model of multiethnicity, barely a couple of hundred Serbs remain who, at the mercy of the U.S. Army enjoy two whole days for free "shopping", which is considered to be a great success on the part of the Mission.

To call on people to return to uncertainty, with a knife held to their throat, is not only immoral but represents the pinnacle of irony of the part of UN Mission representatives who see Kosovo reality from their armored cars and luxurious villas protected by armed guards. Many internationals are not even aware that in the crowds which throng the streets of Pristina and Pec daily there are, in fact, no Serbs. They can be seen, it is true, in their dingy enclaves where they have forgotten long ago what to hope for except perhaps for the unexpected mercy of God. In the cities you will not find them in restaurants nor in movie theaters, and certainly none were present in the Pristina square dedicated to Skenderbeg to await the beginning of the new calendar year next to direct video broadcasts from Tirana.

It is tragic that one hears with increasing frequency comments by international officials that Serbs in fact do not want to return to Kosovo and Metohija. The influential US AID in Serbia has already set aside considerable monies for the integration of displaced persons. Unable to return these unfortunate people to their homes, representatives of UNMIK simply switch their story around, claiming that they cannot return them by force "when they don't want to come". Of course it's true that Serbs do not want to return to Kosovo and Metohija under these degrading conditions in which they receive no guarantees, not even protection of their very lives. UNMIK's duty is not to call on people to return to insecure surroundings and, not infrequently, certain death but to create conditions for a dignified and secure life for all citizens regardless of their national affinity.

After such views by a senior UNMIK official, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Rugova can nonchalantly open a Kosovo Albanian "independence house" before the eyes of the confused international community. We can even agree with Mr. Pozhidaev that the building is "historic" because

it best illustrates why UNMIK came to the Province in 1999 in the first place. Today the answer is almost completely clear: to enable the creation of an ethnically pure territory which will ultimately be magnanimously granted the status of an independent state. The fact that there will not be a single Serb on the territory of such a country and soon probably no other non-Albanians is perhaps unimportant because a Kosovo comprised of ethnic Albanians and members of the Mission from over 50 various world countries, including Mr. Dmitry Pozhidaev, is already **the most multiethnic area in the Balkans.**

F.S.

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1st proofs

Presuppositions and strategic functions in Bush's 20/9/2001 speech

A critical discourse analysis

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This paper provides a critical discourse analysis of presuppositions and strategic functions, in addition to brief comments on the use of propaganda devices in the speech delivered by George W. Bush nine days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and some other US targets, September 11, 2001. This approach makes it possible to explore the tension between idealism and pragmatism, the conflict between 'us' and 'them', and the other aspects of ideologies and power relationships found in the speech.

Keywords: presupposition, strategic functions, propaganda devices, idealism and pragmatism, Us and Them

1. Introduction

On September 11, 2001 four U.S. planes hijacked by terrorists crashed in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania killing more than 3,000 people in a matter of hours. This was not only a tragedy and a trauma, but also a turning point in modern history. The US, the unrivalled superpower, after what Bush (2005) later refers to as "the shipwreck of communism" and the "years of relative quiet, years of repose, years of sabbatical," received a severe blow, probably the severest in its history. Bush, in his second-term inauguration speech, describes the blow in retrospect as "a day of fire." Nine days after the attacks, George W. Bush, the 43rd president of the US, delivered a speech to both houses of the US Congress. Widely regarded then as "the speech of George Bush's life" and described as a "historic address" (Bush, 2001), the speech is an extremely important document, not only instantiating characteristics of political discourse in general and of American political speeches in particular, but also revealing certain American ideologies and attitudes towards other countries and groups.

Taking a great deal for granted and assuming familiarity with the history and current position of the US, bin Laden, al Qaeda and Taliban, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the present study analyzes presuppositions and strategic functions, with occasional references to propaganda devices, in this speech, in an attempt to uncover some of the underlying ideologies and implicit claims made by Bush. The analysis is carried out within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Political Discourse Analysis (PDA).

2.   Framework

The paper does not explore the various dimensions or models of propaganda; it simply seeks to illustrate how its devices relate to presuppositions, a central theme in pragmatics, and to contribute to the realization of strategic functions of political discourse.

2.1   Critical Discourse Analysis

CDA may be traced back to Gramsci, Habermas, and Althusser and to the work of Foucault on discourse (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). The adjective "critical" is associated with the Frankfurt school of philosophy, and it means both "self-reflexive" and "socio-historically-situated" (p. 261). Self-reflexivity and socio-historical situatedness, in addition to the concern with power, control, and ideology, are the defining characteristics of CDA (Fowlerand Kress, 1979: 180). CDA takes it for granted that inequality of power is prominent among the social structures, which influence linguistic structures (Fowler and Kress, 1979; see Mazid, 1999, for a review of the history of CDA and its critiques of traditional linguistic approaches). CDA has matured into a full-fledged discipline. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 262–267) distinguish eight approaches to CDA (see Mazid, 1999). All of these approaches to CDA have in common the concern with "the partially linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures" (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271), with "power in discourse" and "power over discourse" (273), and also power through discourse, how discourse "constitutes" society and culture and how it is "constituted" by them (278).

CDA has given attention to control and power because of their importance in the development as well as the interpretation of any linguistic interaction (Thomas, 1985). The distribution of control and power in a given interaction is based on the roles of the participants (Brown and Gilman, 1972). The relationships resulting from this distribution are always non-reciprocal because "two people cannot have power over each other in the same area at the same time" (Fasold, 1990: 4). On the

other hand, power and control are "processural" rather than "static" (Kramarae et al., 1984). They can be negotiated, transferred, or challenged through language, among other things. Because of its inherent concern with power and control, with legitimation and delegitimation, CDA has given special attention to political discourse. The major strategic functions of this discourse are introduced below.

2.2 Political Discourse (Analysis): Strategic Functions

Chilton and Schaffner (1997: 212–213) identify four strategic functions that are characteristic of political discourse: coercion, e.g., laws, edicts, commands, censorship, agenda setting and "making assumptions about realities that hearers are obliged to at least temporarily accept"; resistance, protest, and opposition, e.g., slogans, chants, petitions, rallies and appeals that oppose existing power structures; dissimulation, i.e., diverting attention from troublesome and controversial issues, and finally legitimation and delegitimation. The four functions are by no means restricted to political discourse; however, they are more explicit in this genre in particular, and thus especially important in PDA.

These strategies overlap with what Thompson (1990) calls the modi operandi (modes of operation) of ideology. In addition to legitimization and dissimulation, Thompson discusses the following modes (60–67): unification, i.e., establishing "a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity" regardless of racial, religious, social, gender, or political barriers which may separate them; fragmentation, the opposite of unification, maintaining dominance by fragmenting the individuals and groups whose unity may challenge the dominant individuals and groups; reification, i.e., "representing a transitory, historical state of affairs as if it were permanent, natural, outside of time. Processes are portrayed as things or as events of a quasi-natural kind, in such a way that their social and historical character is eclipsed."

In a later publication, Chilton (2004) adds two more strategic functions — representation and misrepresentation (46). These seem to be pan-human discursive functions that correspond to van Dijk's "ideological square" ("de/emphasize good/bad things of Us/Them"), as well as to the earlier pragmatic polarities of positive and negative politeness and face in Brown and Levinson's (1987) model and cost/ benefit to Self vs. cost/ benefit to Other in Leech (1983). On the other hand, the two strategic functions are linked to legitimation and delegitimation (see below). These macro-functions can be effectively performed through the use of presuppositions.

2.3   Presupposition

In speech act theory and in Paul Grice's (1975) approach to meaning, presupposition is one type of implied meaning, the others being conversational implicature, inference and entailment. "A *presupposition* is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions. One major empirical test of presupposition is *constancy under negation*, that is, if an affirmative sentence conveys a presupposition, it will convey the same presupposition when it is negated" (Yule, 1996: 29 and *passim*). For example, both "My mobile is expensive" and "My mobile is not expensive" presuppose "I have a mobile."

Another way of defining presupposition is by means of the distinction between what is treated as "given" and what is treated as "new" in a linguistic exchange; what is presupposed seems synonymous with what is given or agreed upon. (Chapman and Routledge, 1999). Grice gives the example "My aunt's cousin went to that concert" to demonstrate that it is not the case that a proposition, in this case that "I have an aunt," and that "my aunt has a cousin," needs to be "given," in the sense that it is established between speaker and hearer, in order for it to be successfully presupposed, here by the use of a definite description. He suggests, instead, that a proposition need only be "non-controversial," or "something we would expect the hearer to take from us (if he does not already know)" (Grice 1991: 274). Many authors identify "presupposition triggers". Levinson (1983: Ch. 4), for example lists the following:

(1)   **Referential expressions/definite descriptions**
      The King of France has/hasn't talked to Jane.
      >> There is a King of France, Jane exists.
      The King of France is/isn't bald
      >> There is a King of France.

(2)   **Factives**
      Jane regrets / does not regret that she insulted the Chairperson.
      >> Jane insulted the Chairperson.

(3)   **Cleft sentences**
      It was/wasn't Jane who laughed.
      >> Someone laughed.

(4)   **too**
      Jane laughed / didn't laugh too.
      >> Someone other than Jane laughed.

(5) **Implicative verbs**
Jane forgot / didn't forget to lock the door.
>> Jane intended to lock the door.

Two relevant examples of political presuppositions are given by Engel (2004: 36–37): "There will be no flinching in this war on terror" (George W. Bush, 23 August 2003) presupposes, through the definite description "this war," that "there is a war on terror," and more basically that there is terror; whether the threat "there will be no flinching" is accepted or rejected, the presupposition "remains unchallenged." In the loaded question "Why do they hate us?" (see below), no matter what answer is given, the proposition "They hate us" is presupposed, through the *wh*-structure, and is likely to be unchallenged.

Another approach, deriving from Stalnaker (1974, 1978) and known as the common-ground approach, explains presupposition as a *pragmatic* phenomenon. "Presuppositions are what is taken by the speaker to be the COMMON GROUND of the participants in the conversation, what is treated as their COMMON KNOWLEDGE or MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE" (1978: 321). Presuppositions arise from what Stalnaker calls *presuppositional requirements*. These are requirements a sentence places upon a *context* for the use of the sentence to be *felicitous* in the context. According to this view, presupposition is pragmatic in that it is a matter of the behavior of sentences in contexts. Lewis (1979) argues that presupposition is governed by the *Rule of Accommodation for Presupposition*: "If at time *t* something is said that requires presupposition p to be acceptable, and if p is not presupposed just before *t*, then presupposition p comes into existence at *t*. (172). The pragmatic approach still informs a lot of work on presupposition. For example, Simons (2007) concludes that "presuppositions, whatever exactly they may be, are the result of conversational factors" (1052).

A dynamic semantic approach views presuppositions as "constraints on the context" in which an utterance is made. All presuppositions are essential parts of the lexical composition of a word or utterance (Simons, 2003). Abbott (2000) proposes a simple view of presupposition — "that grammatical presuppositions are a consequence of a natural limit on how much can be asserted in any given utterance, where what is asserted is what is presented as the main point of the utterance — what the speaker is going on record as contributing to the discourse" (1431; see also Flowerdew, 2004). Some presupposition scholars, e.g., Atlas (2005), adopt a reductionist, neo-Gricean, approach where presuppositional phenomena are explained in terms of other concepts, mainly entailment and implicatures, e.g., the presuppositions of affirmative sentences are almost always entailments.

Moreover, presupposition has important stylistic and ideological functions beyond the economy or natural limit view mentioned above. It is an important

device for distributing given and new information in discourse. It is almost impossible to define everything every time we speak, but "the degree of explicitness will vary from situation to situation, and depend on the knowledge that speakers and hearers will assume of each other." In fact, presupposed knowledge can be manipulated, "either for economy, or for the insinuation of information, or a value-system or a world-view" (Wales, 1989: 375–376). Presupposition can be "notoriously manipulative" (Huckin, 1997) when it is unchallenged — or unnoticed altogether. "Presupposed content is," Wodak (2007) argues, "under ordinary circumstances, and unless there is a cautious interpretive attitude on the part of the hearer, accepted without (much) critical attention (whereas the asserted content and evident implicatures are normally subject to some level of evaluation)" (214). The analysis of presupposition is, therefore, "a powerful instrument for (a) detecting what speakers believe (or know) that recipients believe, and (b) tracing strategic moves by which speakers suggest that specific (presupposed) beliefs are true, although that may not be so" (van Dijk, 1998b). A reductionist view strips presupposition of its very essence and a natural limit view strips it from its important ideological functions. A hybrid view where semantics and pragmatics are taken into account is an ideal way of handling presupposition. On the other hand, whether a presupposition is the result of a natural limit on the amount of new information or of an ideological stance remains context-dependent.

There are several classificatory models of presupposition. Maingueneau (1996: 68–69) identifies two main forms of presupposition, "le préconstruit": the first is triggered by linguistic structures; the second derives from the relationship between the énoncé, utterance or sentence, and its context and has pragmatic significance. Short (1989) classifies presuppositions into *existential, linguistic* and *pragmatic,* whereas Yule (1996) classifies them into *existential, factive, lexical, structural,* and *non-factive.* Levinson's (1983) classification is based on the kind of presupposition triggers, or inducers (words, phrases, or structures that convey or signal the presupposition). A presupposition trigger is simply the clue to the presupposition. Although the present study does not pay any adequate attention to the types or triggers of presuppositions in Bush's speech, the identification and the discussion of presuppositions in the speech are based on the hybrid model used by Mazid (1999). One more distinction to be taken into account is that between informative and ideological presuppositions (Sbisà, 1999). Unlike ideological presuppositions, informative presuppositions do not make value-judgements or express world-views, e.g. The car is new" >> "There is a car."

Following Fairclough (2003), presuppositions, assumptions in his terminology, may be existential, propositional or value-laden (evaluative). Existential assumptions are assumptions about what exists; propositional assumptions are assumptions about what is or can or will be the case; value assumptions are assumptions

about what is good or desirable (55). Another place where presuppositions are referred to as assumptions is, for example, Jackson's (2007) study of "Islamic terrorism" — the Western formulation of which derives from the tradition and archive of orientalist scholarship on the Middle East and Arab culture and religion; Chilton (2004) uses the term presumptions (see below) and Gamson and Herzog (2007) use the expression "taken-for-granted."

The ultimate goal of most presuppositions is to make a piece of information that the speaker believes appear to be what the listener should believe (Yule, 1996: 29). Presuppositions have other discursive functions: "La présupposition assure la cohérence du discours en évitant les redites inutiles; elle impose aux participants à la communication un cadre de discours implicite" (Dubois et al., 1994: 379). That is, presuppositions help the writer/speaker avoid redundancy and also establish a common ground, or a conceptual framework that has to be accepted by the audience. Presuppositions are not only about knowledge, but also about "expectations, desires, interests, claims, attitudes towards the world" (Caffi, 1993, quoted in Mey, 1993: 203), about what the discourse producer wants, or forces, the audience to take for granted. Presupposition is a "very useful concept" in CDA. "It allows people to make implicit assumptions about things being true that may not be true at all. By presupposing q, instead of actually asserting q explicitly, speakers may want to hide or downplay the fact that q may be false or at least questionable" (van Dijk, 1998b). This is part of the "ideological square" where devices such as presupposition can be used "to indirectly emphasize our good properties and their bad ones": "these properties are simply assumed to be known, as if they were common sense, and hence need not be specifically asserted (van Dijk, 1995: 157).

2.4 Propaganda Devices

The definition of the propaganda devices given here is adapted from Victoria (2002), following Lee and Lee (1939). The devices explored in the analysis are: name-calling, glittering generality, transfer, band-wagon, plain folks — which is synonymous with populism in van Dijk's (1998) model — and fear. Name-calling usually uses "derogatory terms that dehumanize the enemy." It uses terms that evoke "fear, anger and hatred"; and it "distances the audience, making it easier to accept a course of action toward the enemy that would usually be objectionable." Glittering generalities refer to the use of "virtue words" such as "civilization," "good," "patriotism," "liberty," "obligation," "freedom" and "democracy." Virtue words can also be negative, e.g., "violate," "evil," "deceit," "horror" and "dictator." The meaning of such words varies from one context to another. A person will assume, or presuppose, that a word is being used in the sense s/he thinks it is; so a glittering generality can "make an audience approve and accept a concept or

person or, conversely, disapprove a concept or person based upon what s/he thinks s/he is hearing without examining all of the evidence."

Transfer is another technique where the speaker or writer carries over the authority, approval, and prestige of something or someone society respects or approves to something or someone that the propagandist would have his/her audience accept. It can be used negatively to carry over the disapproval or dislike of something or someone to something or someone else the propagandist wants his/her audience to condemn. The band-wagon device, on the other hand, uses a theme of "everybody's doing it. Why not you?" It is usually combined with a theme of inevitable victory. If you do not join me/us, you will be alone; in fact, you will be against me/us, and you will be a loser. The plain folks or "common man" device is used to convince the audience that "the propagandist's positions reflect the common sense of the people." It can be enacted in the use of homey words, humanization of leaders and soldiers and a discourse of togetherness, in addition to the propagandist's indications of "I am one of you." Finally, fear is an important propaganda device where discipline and obedience are secured through waging a perpetual war against a never-dying enemy. When there is no real enemy, a leader may manufacture one. As long as people are scared, they will follow the leader who promises to fight the enemy, or the danger, they are scared of.

2.5   Context of the Study

2.5.1   *(Partial) Literature Review*

Lakoff (1991) analyzes the ways in which Bush, the father, sought to convince Americans that his war against Iraq, after its invasion of Kuwait, was "morally justified," and that it makes sense to think of "winning such a war" and concludes that "the justification is based very largely on a metaphorical system of thought." Granting that "metaphors can kill," Lakoff identifies the following metaphors: <u>politics as business</u>, <u>the state-as-person</u>, <u>state strength as military strength</u>, <u>rationality as the maximization of self interest</u>, <u>the fairy tale of the just war</u>, <u>the ruler standing for the state metonymy (in the case of Saddam Hussein)</u>, <u>war as a game</u>, <u>war as risk</u>, <u>'costs' and 'gains' of war</u>. <u>Saddam as irrational</u>, <u>Kuwait as victim</u> and <u>America as hero.</u>

Calvo (1994) examines an open letter from the president of the United States of America, George Bush, the father in which he justifies the US intervention to liberate Kuwait and punish Saddam Hussein. The letter was published on Nov. 26, 1990 in *Newsweek*. In addition to references to metafunctions, some anaphoric and cataphoric relations and parallelism, Calvo's study explores the multiple referents of the pronoun "we" and how they relate to the objectives and the ideological background of the letter.

Bostdorff and Goldzwig (1994) argue that "American rhetors have tended to rely upon two basic types of appeals: idealistic arguments and pragmatic arguments." Idealistic rhetoric emphasizes "principles of definition and argues that auditors should comply with those principles." Pragmatic rhetoric, on the other hand, consists of arguments based on cause and effect or consequence relationships. In American political discourse, the dual themes of idealism and pragmatism have been particularly important. The practical part of Bostdorff and Goldzwig's study focuses on the case of John F. Kennedy and his rhetoric on Vietnam.

Lakoff (2001), in addition to analyzing the possible causes of the attacks, examines the "metaphors of terror" emerging as a result of the 9/11 attacks. These include the metaphors of <u>buildings as humans</u>, <u>towers as symbols of phallic power</u>, <u>society as a building</u>, <u>things that perpetuate</u> over time as "standing," <u>the plane penetration of the towers</u> as <u>sexual penetration</u> and <u>buildings as temples</u> — the World Trade Center as a temple of capitalism. Docherty (2001) expands the list of war metaphors associated with the attacks on America to include: <u>the attacks as a crime</u> and <u>a natural disaster</u>. The metaphors that describe the effects of the attacks are subdivided into biological (America has been <u>injured</u>), educational (Americans have <u>learned lessons</u>) and chemical (a <u>chain reaction</u> has been set off).

An interesting approach to the issue is that taken by Douglas (2001). Assuming an analogy between the attacks on the US and the reactions thereto, on the one hand, and the tragedy of Oedipus, on the other, Douglas addresses the role of "American hubris, Americans' ignorance of why we are so hated in other parts of the world, and the media's role in perpetuating that blindness about our government's often brutal actions and their tragic repercussions." Reunions (2004a) finds other Oedipal undertones in Bush's post 9/11 speeches: "One doesn't need to be Freud or Fellini to understand Bush-the-Son's assertion that *his* war will be bigger and longer than his father's." Bush is seen here not only as blinded by his media, but also jealous of his father.

Cline (2002) provides an overall characterization of the main stylistic features of the speech, not all of which are relevant to the present analysis, in addition to comments on some presuppositions, and pathetic and ethical aspects of the speech. Cline argues that "[T]his speech may be remembered as Bush's finest," that "it relies on well-crafted emotional imagery and moral indignation without Bush's typical overuse of simple, rhythmic antithesis" and that his aim in this speech was "to reassure the American people, prepare them for war, and set the government to the task of fighting terrorism under his leadership."

The studies reviewed above take a predominantly Western/American attitude to the issue. With the exception of Douglas (2001), they fail, in my view, to relate the attacks to American policies in the Middle East and, with the exception of Lakoff (2001), to "the cultures of despair" in many parts of the world. It is quite

legitimate, however, to compare and contrast the present speech to the speeches of Bush the father on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and those of Kennedy on Vietnam. Although this is not one of the objectives of the present study, it is important to remember at the outset that justification of military action is a major theme in the three cases. Another is the legitimization of the causes of this action and the delegitimization of the opposing causes. One tool for performing these functions is the use of metaphors as Lakoff (1991 and 2001, WWW) shows.

Greco (2003) examines how accommodation, the process by which new presuppositions are introduced into the speakers' common ground may be exploited in manipulative discourses (230). One example is of a political candidate who is asked by a journalist during a television debate: *"Do you regret having been unfair to your political opponents?* If the politician answered the question directly, s/he would admit his/ her "unfairness" — s/he would *accommodate* it. Otherwise, s/he should challenge the question itself — for instance, by saying: "But I have never been unfair to my opponents!" (227). Another is Frege's classic "the will of the people", presupposing that there is "a people" and that it has a "will" (218). Presuppositions, Greco argues, can be challenged in everyday conversation; the danger is when they cannot.

In addition to a comprehensive model of PDA, Chilton (2004) offers many analyses of political texts, including a section on what Bush (14 September 2001) and Bin Laden (7 October 2001) "presume people presume about religion" (175–180). The thrust of Chilton's investigations of presuppositions, among other forms of implicitness, as well as other perspectives on the phenomenon, is that presupposition is not only a means of "packaging information" (Chilton, 2004: 64), but also of doing ideological and political work, of making assumptions which pass unchallenged or rejected, of achieving hegemony through, among other things, universalization (Fairclough, 2003: 58) of what is assumed to be true and/ or good.

What the partial review above reveals is, among other things, that presuppositions, like metaphors, can stigmatize, stereotype, exclude, silence opposition; they can distract and call others names; they can fore-, and background certain issues to the best interest of the speaker/writer; they can preclude argument, establish territories and draw ideological boundaries; they require acceptance as a precondition for participation in the discourse.

2.5.2 *Sociopolitical Framework*

One important theory informing the present analysis of Bush's speech can be found in the work of Max Weber. In his categorization of "the systems of domination," Weber identifies three types of authority: Traditional Authority, Rational-legal Authority and Charismatic Authority. Rational legal authority is based on impersonal, legally-established rules. This type of authority characterizes social

relations in "modern" societies. Traditional authority often dominates "pre-modern" societies and may be seen as based on the belief in the sacredness of tradition. Unlike rational-legal authority, traditional authority follows a hereditary line and is based on "long-established customs and traditions" that "do not need to be justified, because they reflect the way things have always been." Finally, charismatic authority rests on "the power of an individual's personality," on his/her "charisma," his/her ability "to make direct and personal appeal to followers as a kind of hero or saint" (Heywood, 1997: 193–195).

Presidential authority in the US is presumably rational-legal. One consequence of this is that US presidents are expected to consult with representatives of their people and to gauge potential costs and benefits before taking decisions, especially those that have a large-scale impact on their society. Actions and decisions must be justified and presupposition (for instance of shared values and attitudes) may serve this end.

It also appears that another set of ideas that are taken for granted or implicitly appealed to may be Just War Theory, as suggested by Orend (2000). The theory addresses the rules of *jus ad bellum, jus in bello* and *jus post bellum* (justice before, in and after war). Since political leaders are the ones who wage wars, setting their armed forces in motion, they are to be held accountable to *jus ad bellum* principles. If they fail in that responsibility, then they commit war crimes "against peace." What constitutes a just or unjust resort to armed force is disclosed to us by the rules of *jus ad bellum*. Just war theory contends that, for any resort to war to be justified, a political community, or state, must fulfill each and every one of the following six requirements: a just cause, a right intention, a proper authority and public declaration, a proof that war is the last resort, a probability of success, a sense of proportionality — a sense that the goods and benefits resulting from war would make up for the costs and the damages.

3.   Methodology

A number of major presuppositions identified in the speech are thematically grouped in the Analysis section below. Some examples of presupposition triggers or inducers are also presented. There is no separate section for propaganda devices. They are referred to in the relevant parts of the Discussion and Comments. Identification and discussion of the ideological meanings of presuppositions, and how they reinforce the use of propaganda devices, within the context of the speech and with a view of its strategic functions and its generic features, is the major objective of the present study. Not all presuppositions in the speech are listed. The comments on the presuppositions are predominantly qualitative, taking into

account many metatexts and paratexts that comment on, contradict, or overlap with the reception of the speech in Western and Arab media.

4.   Analysis

Below a thematic categorization of the major presuppositions identified in the speech is provided. Next, there is a sample of presupposition triggers or inducers.

4.1 Thematic Grouping of Presuppositions in the Speech

4.1.1   *Tragedy*

There was a tragedy; the attacks were on thousands of civilians; America is the Patient (to use terminology from participant role semantics) of the attacks, lacking agency; there is a normal course of events from which the attacks on the US were an obvious departure; the country was deaf to danger because there had been no danger whatsoever; an external force or imperative is awakening the country, calling it to defend freedom; freedom (the USA's freedom) is in danger; and so forth.

4.1.2   *Immediate Response*

Passengers demonstrated courage and rushed terrorists to save others on the ground; rescuers demonstrated endurance and worked past exhaustion; the state of the Union may be illustrated by this endurance; a loving and giving people (US Americans) existed, demonstrated decency and made the grief of strangers their own; those people demonstrated friendship and leadership and provided services to their country; Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of the Capitol and sang "God bless America"; their joining together is "touching."

4.1.3   *Fear*

Many American citizens have fears that night; there is a continuing threat; those challenges are somehow unprecedented as well as unexpected; this is an emergency; the US airlines used to be flying; there is stability in the US; there is terror at home — in America — and the law enforcement already has some tools which are not adequate; terrorists have plans; they are likely to act and strike; there are struggles ahead and there are dangers to face; it is a struggle for freedom and security for the American people; Americans need protection; those responsibilities affect homeland security; terrorism is a threat to their — Americans' — way of life; terrorism grows somewhere; it is there; it is moving; America's freedom is at stake.

4.1.4   *US/Utopia*

America has values; the audience are aware of these values; Americans have principles; they have other responsibilities; they can live on these principles; the World Trade Center is a symbol of American prosperity; America is prosperous; American prosperity is not rootless; Americans are hard working, creative and business-oriented; there are true strengths of the American economy; the US is great; the US is the symbol of freedom and justice; its enemies represent fear and cruelty; the government in that chamber is democratically elected; America is a country of freedoms — freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom to vote and assemble and disagree; America is not fearful; America has friends and is involved in world affairs.

4.1.5   *Terrorism*

They (the Bush administration) gathered evidence; there is evidence for the accusation of al Qaeda; the attackers are terrorists; those who attacked America are enemies of freedom, their attacks are acts of war; the attacks represent a dark threat of violence to US people and their future; his/their country has been wounded and some people, known to him, inflicted the wound; there are people who commit evil in the name of Allah; the organizations belong to terrorists; members of al Qaeda are murderers; "the murderers" bombed the two American embassies and the USS Cole; the mafia has to do with crime; more importantly, there is a ground for the analogy between al Qaeda and the mafia; remaking the world could be regarded as an identifiable goal that some people plan to attain; the beliefs of the members of al Qaeda are radical; there are fringe forms of Islamic extremism; there exists something that might be called "Islamic extremism"; the terrorists have a directive; this (al Qaeda) is an identifiable group and has a leader; there are other organizations in different countries that have to do with bin Laden; and so forth.

4.1.6   *Islam is not Bad*

Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics have rejected this fringe form of extremism; the teachings of Islam are peaceful; America has many Muslim and Arab friends; the US did not use to regard as hostile regimes nations that turned out to be havens of terrorism.

4.1.7   *US Authority*

Those leaders are/should be responsible to the US; the US does not have (full) access to those terrorist camps; the US should have access to these camps; the US has the right to have access to those camps; there is a predetermined fate awaiting (for) the terrorists; the US has the felicity conditions necessary for not only commanding Taliban, but also insisting that Taliban must obey the commands.

4.1.8 *World-wide Support and Sympathy*

Flags were unfurled, candles were lit, blood was given/donated and prayers were said in English, Hebrew and Arabic; these symbolic activities indicate support and sympathy; one entity — the entire world — existed and saw for itself the Union of Americans; the world outpoured its support for the US; the sounds of their (American) National Anthem played at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris, and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate; these are tokens of support; South Korean children gathered to pray outside the US embassy in Seoul; the prayers of sympathy were offered at a mosque in Cairo; there were moments of silence and days of mourning in Australia and Africa and Latin America; and so forth.

4.1.9 *Retaliation*

Americans will either bring justice to their enemies or bring their enemies to justice; justice is not yet done; punishing the "enemies" — the terrorists led by bin Laden — for the grief and anger that Americans felt is justice; Americans will fight and will win the war; there is a war; Americans have many resources at their command; there was a war against Iraq; that war ended with a decisive liberation an a swift conclusion; there was an air war on Kosovo, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat; Americans will make a response; the response involves instant retaliation and isolated strikes; Americans have seen battles and campaigns; and so forth.

4.2 Some presupposition triggers

– "In the normal course of events" >> [**there is a normal course of events from which the attacks on the US is an obvious departure**], "Presidents come to this chamber to report on the state of the Union" >> [**this chamber and the union exist**] (existential, triggered by the definite article and the demonstrative).
– "We have seen it in the courage of passengers, who rushed terrorists to save others on the ground — passengers like an exceptional man named Todd Beamer" >> [**passengers, including Todd Beamer, demonstrated courage and rushed terrorists to save others on the ground; the attackers were terrorists**] (definite article and relative clause).
– "We have seen the unfurling of flags, the lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayers — in English, Hebrew, and Arabic" >> [**flags were unfurled, candles were lit, blood was given/donated and prayers were said in English, Hebrew and Arabic; these symbolic activities indicate support and sympathy**] (definite article followed by nominalizations).

–   "Al Qaeda is to terror what <u>the</u> mafia is to crime" >> [**the mafia has to do with crime; more importantly, there is a ground for the analogy between al Qaeda and the mafia**] (comparison and definite article) .
–   "The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism" >> [**there are fringe forms of Islamic extremism**] "that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics" >> [**Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics have rejected this fringe form of extremism**] (prepositional phrase and relative clause).
–   "And tonight, the United States of America makes the following <u>demands</u> on <u>the</u> Taliban" >> [**Bush has the felicity conditions necessary for talking on behalf of the US; the US, represented in Bush, has the felicity conditions necessary for making demands on the Taliban regime**] (definite article; pragmatic: assuming felicity conditions necessary for commanding).
–   "<u>The</u> enemy of America" >> [**there is an enemy of America**] "is not <u>our</u> many Muslim friends" >> [**America has many Muslim friends**]; "it is not <u>our</u> many Arab friends" >> [**America has many Arab friends**]. "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government <u>that</u> supports them" >> [**there is a radical network of terrorists and there are countries that support them**] (definite article, possessive ("our") and relative clause).

5.   Discussion

5.1   Presuppositions and propaganda devices

The thematic grouping of presuppositions, though simplified, permits certain observations. The first theme sets the stage for the cultivation of fear which looms large later in the speech. It also sets the stage for a depiction of terror. The more horrible the depiction of the "tragedy," the "harm," the "loss" and the "danger," the more exceptional the immediate response to the attacks is perceived, the more enduring the fear and the more justifiable the retaliation of the US on the "terrorists." Moreover, the first theme institutes a dichotomy between life and death, so to speak: a "normal course" interrupted, a "peaceful" life attacked, "possibilities and hopes" killed.

At least two propaganda devices are activated in the first two presupposition themes: fear and plain folks. The US has been "awakened" to danger and has been invited to answer the "calling" to fight terror and fear. To mitigate fear, at least temporarily, Bush resorts to popular ("plain folks") appeal, using such emotive as "loving," "giving," hopes," "made the grief of strangers their own" and "peaceful morning" and the humanization of the leadership.

The propaganda device of evoking fear is perhaps the most influential in the speech. That is why it is singled out as the third presupposition theme. A politics of fear is established throughout, fear of terror and fear of war. The US has become a "Fear's Empire" (Barber 2003, 2004). Terror is everywhere inside and outside, the US is no longer "immune," the challenges are "unprecedented," defense "tools" are "not adequate," terrorists have "plans," they may attack and "strike" any time, Americans need protection and lack security and their freedom is at stake. The US utopia — theme four — is in jeopardy. Its values and principles of hard work, creativity and business-orientedness, its symbols of prosperity, its freedoms, democracy and justice are all under attack. This description is also a good occasion for the unspecified abstractions ("glittering generalities") such as "freedom," "democracy" and "justice." In a different context, the presuppositions under this theme may be regarded as informative, rather than ideological, and the generalities may pass unnoticed. Yet, juxtaposed with terror and terror-harboring countries, they become ideological and propagandistic.

The manufacturing of an enemy, and the establishment of an opposition, is necessary for a war to be waged. This is where the dialectic of life against death, of freedom against fear, is most persuasively manipulated — in the opposition between the US utopia and the terrorists' dystopia. The representation of the dystopia, the presupposition theme **4.1.5**, is an opportunity for the creation of a distant, fearful, terrorist, uncivilized enemy of freedom. The creation is carried out through the many presuppositions already identified. Another tool for the creation of an enemy is the use of negative generalities, most notably, "terror" and its derivatives "terrorist" and "terrorism," which recur in the speech more than twice as often as the term "freedom". As has been widely observed, the US only started to talk of bin Laden as a terrorist and Taliban as a terrorist regime when they began to attack and threaten American targets.

Another device used for the creation and "demonization" of an enemy is historical transfer. Bin Laden is linked to fascist rulers such as Hitler, Taliban to "fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism" and al Qaeda to the mafia — "Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime." Later, Bush remind Americans of 9/11, as an event that elicits emotions of fear and hatred toward their perpetrator, and transfers this emotional response from bin Laden to Saddam, thereby linking the latter with terrorism, and predicting the same destiny "in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." Thus, bin Laden becomes a source and a target of the transfer of negative attributes. In addition to "terrorist," he and the movement he leads are described in terms that conventionally carry negative value: e.g. "radical," "fringe," "murderous," "evil."

It may then be argued that the problem is not simply a war on terror, but a war of definitions. The US has the authority to disseminate its own vision of reality and

its own definition of terror, freedom, democracy and justice. Bush has, or assumes, the felicity conditions necessary for speaking on behalf of the US, thus instantiating the metaphor of "state as a person." In similar fashion, the speech contains numerous cases of argumentation in the form of enthymemes, i.e., statements base on questionable premises that are merely assumed (Lye, 1997).

The US also has the sympathy and support of the world; at least, this is what Bush presupposes all through his speech (4.1.8). In fact, world-wide support is not only presupposed, but also represented as a moral obligation and a vital safe-protection measure for each country. "This is not, however, just America's fight," "And what is at stake is not just America's freedom," "This is the world's fight," "This is civilization's fight," "This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom." Claiming world support and sympathy, talking on behalf of Americans either with "I" or a corporate "we" (cf. Fowler and Kress, 1979) and talking on behalf of the world are crucial to establishing a consensus — "a powerful political move where unanimity is presupposed, suggested or claimed" (van Dijk, 1998b) — over Bush's plans of retaliation.

Those who support the "cause" and respond to the "calling" are not only euphemistically associated with appealing generalities — "pluralism, progress, tolerance and freedom" — but also promised an inevitable victory: "But this country will define our times, not be defined by them," "As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world," "The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain." This is the carrot. There is also a stick: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Later in the un-ending war on terror, an "axis of evil" and "evil doers" will be coined by Bush to label disobedient countries and dictators such as Saddam Hussein. "Regime change" will be euphemistically used to refer to ousting dictators, "thugs" and "theocrats" and "rogue states" to stigmatize governments that represent a threat to their neighbors and to the entire world, "outlaw nations," as it were.

The final presupposition theme in the speech is this: everything is ready for action, for retaliation. The US is resolved to punish the terrorists. There is an enemy, a cause and a calling. The enemy is brutal enough to be "hunted down" and the world has already demonstrated sympathy and support of the cause, although it is not yet "rallied" to this cause. The retaliation theme is a chance for still more glittering generalities: "justice" (qualified once with "patient") "liberty" and "violence." It is also a chance for assuring Americans of winning their war against terror. They have their resources and their experiences with wars. Moreover, in the war between freedom and fear, between justice and cruelty, "God is not neutral".

5.2 Strategic functions and beyond

5.2.1 *Us against Them*

The speech, in effect, establishes a division between two kernels, one utopic and the other dystopic. (The term "utopic kernel" is taken from Lye 1997.) The utopic kernel is America: the land of freedom, democracy, progress and pluralism; the land of "hard work, and creativity, and enterprise"; a country where different religions and ethnicities are equally respected; a country that donates and tolerates. The dystopic kernel seems to be everything that America is not: terrorist gangs, terrorism-harboring regimes, radical beliefs, evil and destruction and violence, male-dominated, theocratic, dogmatic and totalitarian communities. The two kernels are at war and Bush is so sure that God is on his side. Civilized nations have to make the choice: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."

In establishing the division, Bush uses two modes of ideological operation — unification and fragmentation. Frequent references are made to the Union, American communities, American people and the different sectors and parties in the US being "joined together." Unification also operates at the level of the 'civilized world' as well as the NATO. The Islamic world, on the other hand, is pregnant with internal divisions: "a fringe form of Muslim extremism" against "the vast majority of Muslim clerics," existing governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia threatened by "loosely affiliated" 'Muslim' terrorists, who "hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction," donors against receivers. The Muslim world is fragmented both ideologically and politically. Simple logic: unity is bound to be rewarded with victory and dominance. "We" will defeat "them."

The "them" in Bush's pronominal world also includes the brutalized Afghani people, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose "moderate" governments are threatened by al Qaeda, sympathetic countries and individuals everywhere, Britain being the most sincere and most intimate, Americans, wondering, suffering, yet showing courage and decency, cooperative and understanding Congress members, Democrats and Republicans, a victimized Israel and other Jews and Christians jeopardized by al Qaeda, a mainstream Muslim community that rejects the ideals and practices of al Qaeda and a civilized world required to rally to the side of the US.

At the core of the "us" of the speech is a determined, patriotic, rational "I", the President who understands the basics of Islam and the situation in Afghanistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who speaks directly to Muslims and is perceptive of the peaceful nature of Islam, a leader who resorts to God, praying for wisdom and protection of his country. His prayers may not be legitimating from the viewpoint of a rationalist American, but they are very important in the context of fighting "terrorists" who are believed to be mostly Muslims. Surrounding him is a decent and loving country, a country living on and for the principles of freedom, democracy

and pluralism, a country that has not been paralyzed by fear and has not turned a hair in the face of danger. It is, moreover, a country blessed by God.

5.2.2 *Bush's fundamentalism*

Indeed, references to God are not difficult to find in the speech: the US is represented as having a mission and a special calling: "… in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment." Moreover, America's battle is represented as one between good and evil, light and darkness: "On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country…" and "Our nation — this generation — will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our future." In manufacturing an enemy, Bush, however, is cautious not to antagonize the entire Muslim world, perhaps because of the Muslim community in the US and his alliances with some Muslim states (*Cf.* Maddox 2003). Bush, at least ostensibly, does not fall in the trap of the "Clash of Civilizations" (Huntington 1993). Yet the clash is there and the call to arms is there also. In fact, it is not represented as a clash of civilization, but a clash between civilization and the lack thereof.

Bush's stark contrast between the righteousness of his cause and the evil of his enemies' presents a "narrow and judgmental version of Christianity," propounded in a way very similar to "the rhetoric of the terrorists themselves". His fundamentalist Christianity draws on the retributive justice of the Old Testament, and neglects the New Testament "trajectory of suffering." (Maddox 2003: 417–419). It is in this sense that Bush appears a fundamentalist in this speech.

5.2.3 *Idealism and pragmatism*

This speech belongs to a genre of American political speeches that often represent a tension between idealism and pragmatism. Bush speaks of the values of American society, its principles and the necessity of living by those principles. He also speaks of the US as the land of freedoms, progress, democracy and pluralism, as the source of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, of his and Americans' respect for the Afghani people, for Islam and Muslims and he speaks of his appreciation of the peacefulness of Islamic teachings. This may be considered am idealist tendency in American discourse.

The other side of the coin is pragmatism. Bush, on behalf of the US, is ready to do everything, to "hunt down" bin Laden and his group and the regime that supports them: "We will direct every resource at our command." America's response to the attacks will involve "far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes." It will be merciless and immoral, if necessary: "We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest." The US will take all possible defensive: "improve air safely," "dramatically expand the number of air marshals," "take new measures to prevent

hijacking," "promote stability and keep our airlines flying," "give law enforcement the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home," "strengthen our intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act, and find them before they strike."

Simultaneously, we find a strong tendency toward self-glorification. The US president is determined that his country will "define our times, not be defined by them," and he is confident that as long as the US is "determined and strong" "this will not be an age of terror*;* this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world." Yet, America is not "unfair": "No one should be singled out for unfair treatment or unkind words because of their ethnic background or religious faith." Its war on terror is a war for freedom and justice, a war for its principles. It has no intention of meeting violence with "unfair treatment" or "unkind words": "Fellow citizens, we'll meet violence with patient justice." What "patient justice" means for Bush remains unclear, or perhaps, simply presupposed.

6.   Concluding remarks

The "Greek drama" continues. The US bombed Afghanistan and is still hunting down bin Laden. Educators and psychologists, on the other hand, have been finding ways of helping people in America to readjust after the 9/11 trauma. Yet, terror has not decreased substantially, the "axis of evil" is expanding to include new countries and new groups and the image of the US, the omniscient, omnipotent arbiter and leader of the world, seems to be worse now than it used to be before 9/11. The war on terror does not seem to have ended and does not seem to have eliminated terror either.

Bush's speech instantiates many strategic functions characteristic of political speeches in general: coercion, dissimulation, (de)legitimation, resistance, protest and opposition, consensus and populism. It also exemplifies the tension, characteristic of American political speeches in particular, between idealism and pragmatism. These functions and ideological operations are performed, at least partly, through presuppositions and propaganda devices. It may be argued that the speech is coercive in the sense of making a number of assumptions, many of which would be controversial, and which are difficult to challenge b hearers. The speech is dissimulating, in the sense of diverting attention from troublesome and controversial issues, emphasizing the merits of the US and the demerits and maladies of Taliban and al Qaeda and under-representing or mis-representing the Arab and Muslim world. The speech also establishes a distinction between a supposedly free, just and developed (utopic) *us* and a dictatorial, illegitimate, terrorist and uncivilized (dystopic) *them*.

Power relations manifest themselves in the use of direct commands, threats and confrontational statements. In talking about his country, its leadership, integrity and its state of the Union, Bush seems to contribute to "the American messianic myth" (Cline 2002). He represents himself as a savior of his country and of the entire free world. The enemies are constructed as huntable animals, as it were, or at best, irrational, brutal and evil humans.

However, the speech contains many hedging propositions that soften the overall confrontational tone. Thus, Bush asserts that his war is not against Islam but against violent Islamic "terrorists", that there will be no single enemy, that the battles will be only partially military and that the US does not intend to conquer or hold any of the countries involved. The contradiction remains — a contradiction between hegemony and dialogue. Hegemony implies that some countries are responsible to others, that some countries are "more equal" than others. These are obviously not among the principles or ideal practices of freedom, justice and equality.

Acknowledgements

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Media-ted political oratory following terrorist events

International political responses to the 2005 London bombing

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Using a computer-assisted content analysis, this study analyzes a 32,000 word corpus drawn from mediated political statements made in response to the July 2005 London bombing. This grounded research led to a focus on the deontic nature of these statements, and also revealed a relative absence of condoling. Although condemnatory, statements did not specifically attribute the "evil" to particular people. Particularly mindful of Widdowson's (2004) distinction between analysis (text) and interpretation (discourse), the paper first identifies the textual features, but then "hermeneutically" interprets their meaning within a wider context of international political discourse. The paper concludes that the statements performed a positive epideictic purpose, although it tended to occlude the compassionate element of public grieving.

Keywords: condemnation; condolence; deontic modality; discourse; epideictic rhetoric; media genres; political oratory; should; terrorism

Introduction

On Thursday July 7, 2005, bombs were detonated on three trains and one bus in London, killing over 50 civilians. In response, news media reported not only the details of the terrorist attack, but also political responses within the UK and worldwide. Using linguistic analysis and interpretation, this paper describes the responses from politicians and officials that were reported in worldwide major electronic and press news outlets as collected in the electronic source, *Factiva* (Reuters and Dow Jones Interactive 2005). From this grounded method, we have identified a number of characteristics with which we tentatively propose to describe an

emergent genre of discourse: the media-disseminated [media-ted] political oratory following terrorist events.

Discourse, Genre, and Political Oratory

The notion of a genre of discourse might seem an awkward concept. We understand discourse as a comprehensive notion that determines the epistemic boundaries and interpersonal relations of any utterance (Foucault 1972, 1981; Halliday 1978). Genre is understood in the Bakhtinian sense of a secondary or complex genre: of similar thematic content, style and compositional structure (Bakhtin 1994a; Gardiner 1992: 81). In this way, a genre is a replicable textual instantiation of discourse.

Epideictic rhetoric evolved from speeches given in the panegyris (Rollins 2005), although we acknowledge that these were originally intended as inspirational speeches designed to encourage the audience to emulate noble deeds. Nonetheless, we believe that the Greek form of the panegyris, which later incorporated the funeral oration, is sufficiently homologous to contemporary political utterances spoken at the death of people killed in a politically motivated attack. Aristotle privileged forensic and political forms, because he considered audiences of this rhetoric to be judges (*kritca*) rather than as spectators (*theoroi*) of epideictic rhetoric. On the other hand, Plato and Isocrates saw epideictic rhetoric as reinforcing civic values and promoting social cohesion (Rollins 2005: 8; see also Vickers 1988: 55). The temporal element of these forms of rhetoric also needs to be considered. That is, Aristotlean epideictic rhetoric deals with the present while deliberative, or political, rhetoric deals with the future. Nonetheless, we use Rollins' (2005) review of a number of rhetoric theorists, namely, Gonsigny, Loraux, Ochs, Perelman and Olbrechts, Vickers, and Walker, who see no clear-cut division between epideictic's presence and deliberative's future orientation. These theorists emphasise the strength of epideictic rhetoric that enables its hearers to "reach communicative resolutions through appeals to shared values" (Rollins 2005: 9). Consequently, we see the political rhetoric in this paper's corpus characterized by epideictic intention, but also time-oriented towards the future.

Methodology

Data Gathering

The data come from a 32,000 word corpus derived from 'political' announcements about the London bombings as disseminated by the *Factiva* database, which encompasses more than 8,000 news sources including newspapers, (Dow Jones and

Reuters) newswires, radio and television transcripts, and news websites. In *Factiva*, we used the search terms *London* and *terrorism* to find either direct political quotations or journalistic paraphrasing of politicians' words. These were gathered to the point of content saturation, which is when no new stories can be found that report new political comments.

We were careful not to use text from the same report more than once, or different news events that effectively repeated the same words. The time range of nine days (7 to 15 July, 2005) was sufficient to cover the intense initial reaction to the bombing. This yielded 10,449 stories during that period which marked the point of content saturation. Only those reports directly attributed to politicians, their representatives (spokespersons), or those with apparent authority to make comment such as politically motivated public servants, were included. All these comments constitute political responses. This required us to eliminate texts by spokespersons who, because of traditional separation-of-powers doctrines, are not authorized to make 'political' statements. Words representing commentary of any type by journalists or spokespersons other than politicians and officials were also discarded. For example, eliminated were situational statements from the corpus such as *Fifty-one bodies have been removed from the scenes of the bombings…* and *As authorities in London continue to hunt those responsible for last week's horror attacks….* Details that were considered peripheral to these news reports have also been removed from the text. For example, a statement such as *Prime Minister, Tony Blair's Thursday briefing to reporters told them…* has been replaced by *Tony Blair said*, and instead of using *Townsend told 'Fox News Sunday' that…,* we use *Townsend said…*. Titular descriptions have been reduced to the minimum necessary, such as *Congresswoman Jane Harman*, or *Foreign Minister Alexander Downer*.

Method

Using Leximancer in Grounded Research

Leximancer is particularly suitable for grounded research which requires predetermined concepts to be minimized so that analysis and interpretation are not overly influenced or biased (cf. Glaser and Strauss 1967: 2–6). Although we acknowledge that fully grounded research is never really possible (Rahaman and Lawrence 2001: 154), we did not bring to this paper's corpus any *a priori* assumptions about what politicians would say. However, such assumptions should not be confused with what Glaser (1978: 78) himself calls the immanent "pre-emergent analytic thinking" that underlies most social research.

Leximancer has the capacity to overcome potential bias because it mathematically limits the human element in its internal system of data analysis and display (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 276). Its bootstrapping technique helps researchers to avoid fixating on "particular anecdotal evidence that may be atypical or erroneous" (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 262), by reducing expectation bias. Even though one can hand-seed to encode concepts from one's textual corpus, researcher influence is limited because Leximancer builds these concepts without the need of an external lexicographic reference. In other words, this conceptualizing is derived from Leximancer's unique thesaurus that is generated exclusively from the textual resources of individual corpora under analysis. This distinguishes Leximancer from methods of corpus linguistics that rely on already established lexicographic references in determining their corpora's concordances and collocations (Sinclair 1991: 41–2).

Leximancer is best described as a computer-assisted, content analysis tool, as it follows the conventions of content analysis by codifying text into various groups or categories depending on selected criteria (Krippendorff 2004: 19). Leximancer recognizes that, even though "concepts" are known to correlate with "human learning and performance…they are still *textual* concepts" [author's italics], which means that correlation with mental states is somewhat problematic (Smith and Humphries 2006: 263). Therefore, within its analysis, Leximancer caters for the "polysemic character of texts" in that it formulates inclusive concepts "located in determinate semantic and discursive fields" (López 2003: 143). Users of Leximancer, however, do have the option of changing parameter settings to suit their analytic aims irrespective of their nature or theoretical basis.

The advantages of Leximancer's computer-based content analysis are significant in offering the meaning potential in text for human interpretation. Its semantic-mapping capacity allows content analysis of text corpora of any size. This is broadly achieved through four steps (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 262):

1. From a corpus, it derives a "ranked list of important lexical terms based on word frequency and co-occurrence usage".
2. Then, from this ranked list of terms, it statistically develops a thesaurus comprised of a set of classifiers, known as 'concepts'. This thesaurus is developed from within individual corpora with no need of a prior or external dictionary.
3. Leximancer then classifies the corpus text over three-sentence segments to produce a "concept index into the text and a concept co-occurrence matrix".
4. Finally, this relative frequency of concept co-occurrence is used to calculate an asymmetrical co-occurrence matrix which, in turn, algorithmically produces a two-dimensional concept map. This map also includes a display of themes or parent concepts, as a classificatory show of concept connectedness, which

adds a semantic hierarchy to the network of concepts (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 267).

Without any intervention from users, these four steps in Leximancer entail a process of automatic concept selection (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 262). The most common method of using Leximancer is to begin with this option and then hand-seed concepts. Hand-seeding means redefining the analysis by deleting concepts with low semantic content, while merging concepts and frequently occurring words to encode new concepts, in order to reflect the research focus (Smith 2006). This is demonstrated in *Analysis,* below.

Before discussing how meaning is negotiated in this paper, we distinguish between co-occurrence and collocation. In Leximancer, word co-occurrence approximates 'collocation', although the latter's application can vary from one researcher to the next (Pearce 2006). Acknowledging this variation, we adopt Leximancer's usage of the term 'co-occurrence', because its analysis classifies text in segments of (defaulting to) three sentences. Collocation in linguistics usually applies to units ranging from two words to whole sentences (Lennon 1998: 15), but seldom more.

Meaning Negotiation: Text/Discourse and Analysis/Interpretation

Widdowson (2004: 20) distinguishes between analysis and interpretation. For him, analysis constitutes the "process of identifying what semantic features are manifested in a text", while interpretation "involves recognizing how a text functions as discourse by discriminating which, and how, these features are pragmatically activated" (Widdowson 2004: 20). Because Leximancer acknowledges that text cannot be dissociated from context in assessing people's mental concepts (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 265), it is used only for text analysis which provides the resource for contextualization and thus interpretation at the discourse level. Researchers can use Leximancer's data mining facility to look beyond its derived concepts to consider the context in which they appear. This course from text to context, in Widdowson's (2004: 20) terms, takes research from analysis to interpretation. This analysis-interpretation distinction thus allays Widdowson's (2000: 7) concern that some linguistics-based research struggles to "account for the complex interplay of linguistic and contextual factors". In this study, we use this approach to describe the discourse under analysis, media-ted political responses to terrorist attacks.

Analysis Validity

Leximancer analysis achieves the validity much sought after by qualitative researchers (Bryman 2001: 70, 75; Hoff and Witt 2000: 146). This is because Leximancer

has been successfully tested for "face validity, stability (sampling of members), and reproducibility including structural validity (sampling of representatives), and predictive validity" (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 277). Specifically, internal reproducibility is achieved at the point of attention to the "similarity in concept network patterns" that is displayed in the stochastic concept map (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 268). The calculations of Leximancer's concept maps draw from other techniques of statistics such as corpus linguistics, computational linguistics, and psycholinguistics (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 265). Beyond these internal measures, Leximancer also accounts for "correlative validity", namely, comparisons with other (external) analyses (Smith and Humphreys 2006: 277).

Analysis

As stated above, we begin with a lexical analysis. This process is iterative in that successive adjustments were made to the automatically derived concepts by eliminating and seeding words (see Table 1). We then looked more closely at the grammatical concept of deontic modality.

Concept Mapping

The initial Leximancer analysis revealed 37 concepts. However, as some were unrelated to this paper's search for political intention, they were eliminated. By intention, we simply mean the human property of mind tied to "those mental acts which lead to, guide and accompany actions" (Simons 2001: 16). Intention is important to this paper because discourse, as the "pragmatic process of meaning negotiation", becomes manifest at the "convergence of intention and interpretation" (Widdowson 2004: 8 12). Consequently, we hand-seeded a number of concepts for elimination, for three reasons.

1. deleting those considered peripheral;
2. merging those that are expressed separately but signify similarly (e.g., *bombing* and *attack*);
3. encoding certain concepts that can be fully represented only when merged with their various other forms of expression (these are taken from Leximancer's frequently occurring words listing, e.g., *condolence* and *suffering*) .

Table 1 provides the seeding changes (deletions, mergers, and encodings) and the rationale for each. As well, the word *must* was removed from the stopwords, which are those frequently occurring words arbitrarily designated by Leximancer as having little lexical meaning. This was done because the deontic modality of *must* is

Table 1. Hand-seedings and Rationale

Changes	Rationale
Deleting	
acts	Only expressed as *acts of terrorism* or *terror*, or as *terrorists acts* or in some other ways in the context of terrorism.
added, *think*, *told*,	Only used as journalistic alternatives to *said* or *said to*. Furthermore, these words were not used by politicians.
Britain, *British*, *London*	The texts refer only to the specific British (London) terrorism of 7 July 2005.
people	Generalizes victims, citizens (young or old), or perpetrators.
Time concepts like *Thursday*, *today*, *week*, *year*, *yesterday*	Such reportage detail, typical of traditional journalistic practice (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 60), was unnecessary.
Generic term *time*[1]	Mainly used generally to denote the past or present or, for example, peripherally in expressions such as *at the same time* instead of *also*.
Merging	
attack, *attacks*, *and bombings*.	Alternative expressions of the same events.
country and *countries, leader* and *leaders*	Only mentioned in a general context.
Encoding	
Encoded concept of *condemnation* by combining it with the lemma, *condemn*, and its other verb forms, *condemns, condemned*, & *condemning*	This concept appeared less strong at first until analysis of the thesis found strong representation in different forms of the root concept.
Encoded concept of *condolence* by combining *condolence* with *sympathy, compassion, sorrow, and regret*	To test the conventional *condolence* theme in the communicative genre repertoires of politicians.

1: More specific usage of "time" came from politicians in estimations of how long both new anti-terrorism measures and perpetrator apprehension would take.

2. Table 1 shows examples of hand-seeding word forms to produce representative word forms, and thus allow concepts to emerge. This is not possible with *must* and its phrasal equivalent *have to* because Leximancer does not have the capacity to deal with phrases. Therefore, we replaced all relevant deontic usages *of have to* with *must* because they are interchangeable without semantic difference in the deontic sense (Perkins 1983: 54).

3. We also tested the phrasal equivalents of *should* but they did not appear in the corpus.

likely to underlie much of the intention expressed by politicians, particularly in times such as the London bombings (discussed below). These changes enhanced the relevance of the concept map.

After these changes, a second iteration of the corpus was formulated and mapped using Leximancer extraction (see Figure 1). A face-value examination points to the emergence of certain terrains on the map that indicate the general

Figure 1. Concept Map of Media-ted Political Commentary: July 7–15, 2005

compatibility of concepts in that terrain (the location of the quadrant in N, S, E, or W is immaterial; it is the proximity of concepts that matters). For example, *terrorism* and *attacks* are understandably central to the text and closely relate to *terrorist* concerns of each *country*. *Government* officials (*Blair*, *leaders*, *minister*) are peripherally in the right terrain concerned predominantly with the *attacks,* although *Blair* obviously is the leader most concerned with UK *security measures*. Also peripheral is *police,* who are understandably also concerned with *security* and other more locally based *intelligence*. In a sense, the lexicon of these representations is largely operational. This is quite separate from the themes of the top terrain of the map which, at face value, interconnect with issues of how/why the *world* and its *leaders*, *must* take steps so that the *world condemns*, and (*should*) *fight* this 'war' on, *terrorism*. Because Leximancer analyses *Iraq* (bottom left quadrant) as insignificant to the corpus (see *Interpretation*, below), it shows as a weak concept with little concept co-occurrence.

This hand-seeded concept map in Figure 1 displays 15 themes (identified as circles):

> *terrorism, attacks, country, terrorist, security, should, must, condemnation, leaders, minister, police, world, government, Iraq,* and *Blair.*

These themes are not as important as the 22 concepts (identified as dots) that they organize, which appear at 100% Leximancer exposure (this entails allowing Leximancer to display its full range of concepts, strong and weak, on the concept map; it defaults to a 50% strength concept exposure so as to focus on the strongest ones). The 22 concepts are:

> *terrorism, attacks, country, terrorist, security, should, must, condemnation, leaders, minister, police, world, government, Blair, Iraq, condolence, fight, work, terror, terrorists, measures,* and *intelligence.*

However, we have selected only five of these concepts: *condolence* and *condemnation*; *must* and *should*; and *work*. The reason for this is that these are the only concepts of the 22 that are generic to an epideictic form of political oratory. This form of utterance is intended to be inspirational. This is done, as we have stated, by calling upon the audience to resolve the crisis through shared values and by directing them to a better future. Choosing concepts according to our research focus, irrespective of their strength, accords with a wealth of scholarship that ranks implicit and weakly represented concepts of meaning potential equally with those that are explicit and strongly represented in that domain (Dewey 1938: 60; Margaroni 2005: 86).

Many of the 22 concepts (e.g., the most prominent, *attacks* and *terrorism*) obviously emerge because they are central to news reportage, or statements of media "fact". Eliminating these in our hermeneutic process left us with just five pivotal concepts, four of which are in related pairs, which we decided either underscore political oratory or are crucial in expressing it: *condemn/condolence*; and those of deontic modality, *should/must*. As well, we retained *work* from Leximancer's analysis despite its minor frequency and co-occurrence status (only 43 instances, including its word forms, *worked* and particularly, *working*). This choice was made iteratively following the assumption that *work* would appear primarily as a reportage noun as the venue of Londoners' day-to-day activities. However, data-mining in the analysis (see below) showed otherwise. Before describing these selected concepts more fully, it is crucial to re-emphasize the distinction between word frequency and concept occurrence in Leximancer. Even though a word like *work* may appear 43 times in this corpus compared to 22 instances of *condolence*, this does not make it twice as strong conceptually because Leximancer's analysis is based on an internally derived thesaurus. As will be seen below, *work* may be more polysemic, but *condolence* is more intricately expressed linguistically, meaning that the latter will co-occur and thus be conceptualized more widely within a corpus.

Condemnation and Condolence

Two user-defined concepts, *condemnation* and *condolence,* were identified to compare the relative strength of the two notions as expressions of affect and judgment by politicians (explained further in Interpretation, below). We approached the interpretation of this paper's corpus expecting the conventional practice of politicians to express *condolence* in times of disaster and human loss (cf. Boucher 1998; Evans 2002; Wittad 2002), and to condemn the perpetrators. However, *condolence* was represented weakly. We argue that this concept's under-representation could be a significant characteristic of this genre. On the other hand, *condemnation* was strong (appearing at the 54th percentage point in the concept map).

Of the 59 word-form instances of *condemnation*, the Goal (cf. Halliday 1994: 34) was *terrorism* or *acts of terror* (20), *attacks* (20), *bombs* or *blasts* (14), *media* (3), and *crime* or *criminal act* (2). Typical of these instances are:

A. Azerbaijan resolutely condemns terrorism in all its forms and believes that it is necessary to wage a joint fight against this terrible evil," said the message sent to Queen Elizabeth II.

B. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder condemned Thursday's "perfidious attacks" in London and stressed the importance of fighting terrorism "with all the means at our disposal."

C. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf condemned a series of deadly bombings in London Thursday, offering condolences for the loss of lives and calling for a joint fight against terrorism, the Foreign Ministry said.

D. "Bangladesh strongly condemns this mindless criminal act against innocent people."

Significant in this analysis of condemnatory statements is their lack of specificity about the likely perpetrator. The act itself was condemned. That the bombing was a terrorist act seems to be slightly diminished by this emphasis. However, there was a degree of linkage in some of the statements. In the following, *blasts* is explicitly reformulated as *acts of terrorism*:

E. South Africa on Thursday condemned the series of blasts that hit London, leaving at least two dead and scores injured, calling it an "act of terrorism" and a "heinous deed". "Clearly these constitute acts of terrorism and must be condemned in the strongest terms and without equivocation by the international community," Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said in a statement.

On the other hand, *condolence* was comparatively weak: it did not appear until the 97th percentage point in Leximancer's concept map. In the entire corpus, the

condolence concept was used either in singular or plural forms only 22 times. Even if combined with (close) synonyms, *sympathy* (8 times), *compassion* (3), *sorrow* (3), and *regret* (2), the concept still displayed weakly. Similar words like *commiseration*, *pity*, or *consideration* were not used at all by politicians and officials. It is noted that two of the public statements that actually expressed *condolence* were from Ireland which, as a country previously associated with the IRA terrorist bombings in the UK, was understandably likely to react with sensitivity. For example, Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister), Mary Harney, offered *my deepest sympathy and solidarity to the families of the bereaved and to all the injured*. Another came from Green Party leader, Trevor Sargent, expressing *our solidarity with the victims and all those bereaved, injured and traumatised by the unpalatable cruelty of these explosions*. As well, US Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, stated:

> F. From all of us on the Homeland Security Committee, we wish the very best for the people of London, and especially the families of the dead and wounded. We share in your grief, and we pray for the speedy recovery of the survivors.

Chancellor, Gordon Brown, mixed condolence with epideictic resolve:

> G. While buses and buildings can be destroyed, our values are indestructible. While hearts are broken, hope is unbreakable. Every generation is tested with the problems and dilemmas of the time and each era calls on great men and women to come forward and it is they who determine the character of an age.

Grammatical Analysis: Deontic Modality

Should and *must* are grammatically related insofar as they are both modal verbs. Modality is a concept shared by linguistics and formal logic. The logician, G. H. von Wright's (1951) seminal paper divides modal concepts into alethic, epistemic, deontic, and existential. However, we are concerned only with deontic modality because it modalizes the lexical verbs of political statements and, therefore, the degree of judgment and obligation. The modal verbs *should* and *must,* and *may* and *might* express epistemic modality (knowledge and belief) as well as the deontic form expressing permission and obligation (Groefsema 1995: 53). But, because of our specific interest in the deontic within intention, we left *may,* and *might* in the stopwords because they both appeared infrequently in the corpus (23 and 9 times respectively). Because these examples represented predominantly epistemic rather than deontic modality (20 to 3 and 8 to 1 respectively), *may* and *might* were relatively unimportant in this analysis.

   Must After taking the abovementioned step of replacing *have to* with its singular equivalent *must*, its conceptualization is set out in Table 2 to demonstrate

Table 2. Instances of *Must*

Motifs (*Must*)	*Must* (n=74, including those combined with *have to*)
…do everything possible;…win; they…not succeed;…confront evil/extremism,	23
Intensify efforts, be on alert, be ready, vigilant	15
Join forces; unify; cooperation	11
Continue determined fight; increase/strengthen resolve; stand firm	9
Larger agenda (i.e., Gleneagles) must continue	5
Political agenda	3
Maintain our way of life	3
Iraq	3
Must solve the crime	1
Condemn	1

its strong role in expressing political intention. *Must* as a deontic modal verb occurred 74 times (there are another 10 occurrences as epistemic modality).

Of the 74 instances of *must* modality, only once does it combine with *condemn* as a collocation, when the South African Foreign Minister said:

H. these constitute acts of terrorism… [that] must be condemned in the strongest terms.

Although their word collocation was singular, their concept co-occurrence (within three sentences of each other) was quite high. This can be seen on the map in Figure 1 which places *must* and *condemnation* close to each other. This means that the concepts are strongly semantically related. That is, following the condemnation of a past action, the politicians then point to the future using *must* as a "compulsive modality" (see Strang 1968: 165) inspiring the international "community" to a better future. This is evident in the following:

I. The [Colombian] foreign minister said that "we received this news with great sorrow". Colombia's solidarity with the British people is "total", as is the condemnation of "any form of terrorism", she said. "We must join forces against terrorism.

This deontic call to future action is practically devoid of retributive impulses. Instead they call for vigilance, resolution, and unity. The strongest use of *must* modality is to insist on winning a battle against terrorism.

J. The G-8 leaders are in agreement that the international community must do everything to combat terrorism together with all the means at our disposal, he added. (German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder)

K.   The attacks were a direct challenge to an emerging unity of approach, and the attackers must not be allowed succeed. (Mr Kenny, US Ambassador to Ireland)

L.   It is because of this that terrorism may not become a fixture in any country. We must fight it with all the means we have available. (Janez Drnovŝek, President, Slovenia)

The only instance of *must* being related to evil is in a statement by a Muslim Labour MP in the British parliament, Shahid Malik:

M.   Condemnation is not enough and British Muslims must, and I believe are prepared to, confront the voices of evil head on.

The need for vigilance is evident in:

N.   …but it is an issue of international concern and all countries must be vigilant in fighting these barbaric acts. (Alfred Mutua, Kenyan Government Spokesman)

as is the need for opponents of terrorism to maintain and strengthen their resolve:

O.   The terrorist attacks in London must strengthen the resolve of the global society to wage an uncompromising battle against the terrorism. (Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov)

An important feature evident is the need for cooperation and unity among nations opposing such political tactics [because must lacks a past tense phrasal equivalent, we retained *had to* in this example]:

P.   Europe had to work together to fight terrorism which posed a threat to the whole continent. (Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende)

Should   Must marks "compulsive modality" (cf. Strang 1968: 165) that expresses strong obligation and certitude (Rahimian 1999: 157). By contrast, *should* marks "tentative modality" (Larreya 2003: 36). *Should* appeared in the corpus 72 times, which is similar to 74 for *must*. However, half of *should* examples were eliminated from our analysis for two reasons. Information peripheral to the London bombings, usually relating to domestic issues, was eliminated, for example:

Q.   [border protection] should not come at the cost of migrant immigrants who come to the US to find work. (Michael Chertoff, US Homeland Secretary)

The other reason for exclusion occurred where *should* expressed epistemic modality, as in:

> R. Muslims living in their adopted countries should contribute meaningfully to the success… (Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi)

The 39 usable instances of *should* as deontic modality that are considered directly relevant to political oratory that is resolute, collaborative, and future-oriented were categorized into six motifs:

a. Promoting Practical Political Action (17 instances)
b. Solidarity, Collaboration, and Cooperation (11)
c. Condemnation and Punishment (6)
d. Desire to Maintain Normal Liberties and Freedom (3)
e. Supporting Moderate Muslims (2)

The rhetorical purpose of solidarity and collaboration evident in the *must* log is stronger here, as is the element of condemnation. However, what is evident in this log of words is the importance of promoting a particular political objective, and the relative weakness of the cautionary statements in support of civil liberty and freedom. It is worth noting that three weeks later, on 22 July 2005, an innocent man was shot dead by police at Stockwell, a London underground station because he "refused to obey an order" (BBC News 2005, July 22). These motifs are now considered more closely.

Promoting Practical Political Action

There were 13 instances of this motif promoting practical political action related to terrorism. In some cases, these were politically partisan statements in the sense that the cause advocated was contested politically in the democratic process. For example, President, George W. Bush, stated

> S. The terrorist threats against us will not expire at the end of this year, and neither should the protections of the Patriot Act.

The Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, said

> T. We should pay greater attention to the problem of extraditing terrorists at the request of the states concerned.

Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, advocated a national identity card system:

> U. We haven't made a decision to have an ID card in this country but it should properly be on the table.

Even the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, used the occasion to argue that

V. The deadly London attacks should spur world leaders to revive long-stalled talks to craft a convention against terrorism.

Britain's UN Ambassador, Emyr Jones Parry, said that

W. leaders should at least agree that any acts targeting civilians be defined as terrorism.

A subset of this rhetorical purpose is the call for practical action (4 instances). For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says

X. Terrorists cannot be given refuge…and none of the terrorists or those who harbour them should be given refuge in any civilised country.

Russian Federation Council's Committee for International Affairs, Mikhail Margelov, says

Y. Countries should abandon the policy of double standards, clearly define the terrorist threat and combine their intelligence and skills to fight this problem.

Solidarity, Collaboration, Cooperation

As stated above, the motif of solidarity is relatively strongly associated with this deontic modal. For example, Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, says

Z. The world should establish a joint platform to fight terrorism, which, he argued, is a common responsibility of all countries.

Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, says that the London bombings

AA have demonstrably made it evident that all of us should work together to evolve a collective strategy to free the world from this scourge.

Bangladesh Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, states

BB. This tragic event should strengthen the resolve of our nations to work together in fighting the menace of terrorism.

Condemnation and Punishment

The motif encompassing condemnation and punishment occurred relatively seldom in the deontic modality aspect of the corpus. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement is typical:

CC. We vehemently condemn committed criminal actions. Clients and performers of these acts of terror should be found and punished as soon as possible.

Desire to Maintain Normal Liberties and Freedom

A minor motif is that normal liberties should be maintained:

DD. The recent terrorist attacks have underscored the need for political leaders to join efforts, as they did in their joint fight against fascism…We should not restrict civil freedoms. (Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov)

Related to this sense of normalcy was a mood of defiance towards the bombers as statements were made urging that life go on unaffected by the bombing:

EE. I think whatever it is, they should go wherever they want to go. We should not prevent them. (Malay Foreign Minister, Syed Hamid Albar)

Supporting Moderate Muslims

There were two deontic instances related to a desire by British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to incorporate Muslims. This feature is further developed in the next section.

Work

Contrary to our expectations, *work* did not appear often as a reportage noun of everyday life in London (4 times). Also rare were other noun forms, e.g., *work* of terrorism, intelligence or governments (9). However, *work* was used predominantly in verb forms to denote that governments should collaborate: world governments *working* against terrorism (11 times); terrorists *work* against humanity (2); security measures had *worked* (1); while most were coupled with the adverb *together* (11), for example:

FF. All countries must work together against terrorism." (British Prime Minister, Tony Blair)

Of the other five instances, two signified similarly, asking governments to work for a common goal against terrorism, even to the point of crossing political boundaries. The minor motif of normalcy is worthy of mention here as we approach interpretation in this paper. That is, there is in the statement

GG.   The men, women, and children of England will continue to work, learn, and help others…[despite] these cowardly attacks on innocent civilians. (British House Homeland Security Committee Chairman, Christopher Cox)

an encouragement towards returning to everyday life. Although not specifically using the word, *work*, Blair's two attempts to advance national unity and the nature of "real" Britain, both drew from this normalcy motif. He called for supporting *the moderate and true voice of Islam* by *root[ing] out extremists*. However, as we show in our interpretation of this corpus, these types of statement, pointing away from the political agenda, are unusual.

Interpretation

International public political discourse has two significant intentions. First, it seeks to give meaning to circumstances affecting citizens' lives within the framework of political values and beliefs ordered by the normative procedures that collectively legitimate the international conduct of 'good' nations (Reus-Smit 1997: 567). A secondary intention for politicians is to show national voters that their ideas are appropriate, thereby securing public appeal and commitment (Williams 1995: 129). Notwithstanding that much of this discourse is grey rhetoric — a form of vacuous talk and other language games that masquerade as meaning-making (Waddell and McKenna 2005: 2) — significant events, such as economic turmoil, natural disasters, and terrorist incidents, provide political leaders with a rare opportunity to declare their values and proposed actions to a world audience. Despite the scepticism about political rhetoric being 'hot air', on occasions such as the London bombings, public political statements form an important part of the meaning-making generated by media who, often limited to journalistic speculation, provide a mixture of 'fact', hope, and human interest perspectives (Taylor 2000: 33). In other words, even though this paper is not researching journalistic commentary, we argue that public political discourse plays an important role in shaping the discursive space for a public response to such horrible events. This was evident after the 9/11 bombings when US President, George W. Bush's first public response, referring to the terrorists as "folks", was seen as ineffectual. He later referred to them as "evildoers" (Altheide 2004: 294), thematizing the US approach to international relations thenceforth (the "axis of evil" speech occurred four months later). Similarly, when New York Mayor, Rudi Giuliani, rejected a ten million dollar donation from a Saudi prince whom he regarded as critical of America (Chetwynd 2001), he further limited the discursive boundaries for discussing the 9/11 incident.

Our analysis reveals some defining characteristics of public political discourse that accompanied the London bombings, and which are noticeably different to the US post-9/11 response. While these characteristics cannot yet be treated as generalizable, they do provide a set of descriptors by which other responses to terrorist events can be compared. Of particular interest is the political use of deontic modality. Political leaders, when reacting to media inquiry into their handling of contentious world events, tend to use both categorical assertions and modalized, or more abstract, responses (Montgomery 2006). What follows are examples of these modality choices that attempt to promise a positive turn that sets human obligations to be fulfilled at some time in the future (Hoye 1997: 43). The two most significant findings are the role of deontic modality and the speakers' orientation to the concepts of *condemn* and *condolence*.

Deontic Modality: Should and Must   As well as anticipating future action, deontic modality seeks human action, but also seeks commitment to bringing that action about (Bandura 2001: 6). Epideictic rhetoric seeks a collective response by the public by asserting that certain civic values remain intact so that social cohesion is maintained in the face of terrorist attack. In other words, epideictic utterances are motivated by collective intention. Collective intention is distinctive because it is practiced and communicated according to an international discourse determined by constitutive rules that decide how political leaders act and behave (Ruggie 1998: 871). The grounded analysis of our corpus identifies *must* and *should*, and the minor concept *work* as important concepts in developing this collective intention. In fact, their deontic purpose led us to consider the epideictic role they play in such political statements.

Abstractness   Another significant characteristic of this corpus is the absence of specific references, even to *Muslim extremism*, with the focus being on *terror* and *terrorism*, these days, both abstract, international terms (see Ackerman 2004; Klusmeyer and Suhrke 2002: 35). This abstract focus by politicians on the action (the instance of terrorism) rather than on those who may be implicated by association suggests a high degree of restraint, which are features of rhetorical nobility and diplomacy. This led to abstract nominals such as *forces of evil* or the neutral term, *the attacker*s being deployed rather than more specific nominals. The *should* and *must* deontics were distinctively directed to solidarity and cooperation, or working together. In this sense, the effect of the bombing — in public discourse at least — was to unify rather than divide, another ennobling feature of the discourse.

Virtue and Vice   The deontic nature of this modality is important, we claim, because of the way that politicians attempt to persuade citizens to settle on a moral position because it is desired and just (Whetstone 2003: 345). This morality underlay Aristotle's conception of the epideictic speaker who was "concerned with virtue and vice, praising the one and censuring the other" (Aristotle 1991: Ch 9,

1366b). The most obvious virtues in this instance are courage, magnificence and prudence, but particularly courage, which Aristotle defines as that which disposes people "to do noble deeds in situations of danger, in accordance with the law and in obedience to its commands" (Aristotle 1991: Ch 9, 1366b).

International Political Agendas   Underlying these epideictic calls are various international agendas, particularly since the US and UK governments have so clearly established themselves as leading the "fight against terrorism" and are committed to the Second Iraq War. However, other countries such as Russia and Spain have been victims of separatist terrorist violence, unrelated to the Muslim-based jihad. These countries and other countries clearly needed, in this instance, to position themselves in a way that did not necessarily indicate support for the UK government's involvement in the Iraq war. Significantly, the only reference to Iraq in this log of statements is uttered by Charles Kennedy, the Leader of the UK Liberal Democrats:

> HH.   We **must recognise** the occupation of Iraq by the multinational force itself contributes to the insurgency and attracts those from abroad who see the opportunity to spread violent fundamentalism.

National Agendas   However, a less noble characteristic of the statements is the high incidence of promoting contestable national agendas. In some instances, such as George W. Bush's advocacy for the *Patriot Act* or the Australian Prime Minister introducing the possibility of an identity card, these were plainly partisan, and so were unworthy and inappropriate because they were inconsistent with the tenor of global discourse. Perhaps less culpable were politically driven calls for international agencies to work better together.

Condemnation and Condolence

The relative lexical weakness of *condolence* is surprising given the usual practice that politicians epideictically prioritize their condoling with victims (see above), particularly considering the widespread contemporary world focus on terrorism. This weakness contrasts with the relative lexical strength of *condemn*. The contrast, when considered using the linguistic concept of evaluation, provides a useful characteristic of this form of discourse. Evaluation is "the speaker's … attitude or stance towards, … the entities or propositions that he or she is talking about" (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 5, 14), and is lexically, grammatically, and textually realized. Martin (2000) and Martin and Rose (2003: 22, 25) similarly identify appraisal as a system of interpersonal meanings revealing attitude about affect (feelings), judgement (character), and appreciation (value) that are lexically and grammatically realized. Our analysis in this instance comprises lexical presence and absence.

The relative absence of condolence and the relative strength of condemnation renders the discourse as primarily evaluative as speakers clearly render the bombing as an unspeakably evil act. This, for most of us, is uncontentious and shared. However, the relative weakness of affect is worth noting. That is, there is relatively little said about the sadness of lost lives and horrible injuries. In a sense, the victims and their loved ones are not, we would say, sufficiently mourned. There is little time set aside in these early stages for 'the world' to share this grief (such events in the public domain are often much later and appropriately ordered). The epideictic function of defining virtue and vice overwhelms the function of mourning.

Conclusions

As happened in the ancient Greek agora, citizens, even postmodern ones, look to their leaders to provide meaning, that is, give sense to, significant events, especially in times of crisis and grief. After the London bombings, global media assisted this process as it went beyond mere reportage to provide statements by world leaders. Our analysis has shown that there was, surprisingly, a relative absence of mourning for the lives of those who died. The statements did epideictically provide deontic counsel about what must and should happen, although some leaders used this to promote partisan political causes. While there was a clear statement of good and evil, the tone was not shrill; indeed, there seemed a clear intention to avoid specific prejudicial statements about who was responsible. Consequently, we would argue that a potentially new journalistic genre is evident in these characteristics. As Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer (2001) point out, genres are "ways of acting and interacting in their specifically semiotic aspect; they are ways of regulating (inter) action". In the semiotic order — a specific configuration of genres, discourses and styles, which constitutes the semiotic moment of a network of social practices — genres, by definition, emerge slowly given that they are relatively stable. Given this, and our rejection of Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer's claim that the relationship between genres, discourses and styles is dialectical, we adopt Bakhtin's (1994b) argument that a complex heteroglossia emerges through dialogic encounters of discourse participants. We have identified particular characteristics of the mediated messages of world leaders, which condemned the action while calling for a shared resolve to maintain civic values. We would suggest, however, that national leaders collectively could have allowed more time to speak to those who wept for the ones they love.

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Investigating language and ideology

A presentation of the ideological square
and transitivity in the editorials of
three Kenyan newspapers

Peter M. Matu and Hendrik Johannes Lubbe

This article examines the application of two approaches from discourse analysis, that is, the ideological square from Critical Discourse Analysis and transitivity which is a component of Systemic Functional Grammar in the analysis of data extracted from the Kenyan print media. These two approaches are used to illustrate how different newspapers' editorials portrayed various political groups in the run — up to the general elections in 1997 in Kenya. Thus attempts are made to show the role of newspapers editorials in articulating conflicting ideological positions in election reporting. In this paper an analysis is provided on how the Kenya print media represented and constructed political parties in the 1997 elections. The aim of this representation and construction is to show how political groups in the sense of us vs them and the representational processes of transitivity construct ideological discourse. The paper further illustrates how the concepts of ideological square and transitivity assist in making overt the mediation processes and practices that are generally, covertly, often unconsciously used in the construction and evaluation of participants in a political process.

Keywords: Ideology, Ideological square, transitivity, editorials, Kenya

Introduction

This article explores the application of two theoretical tools, viz. the ideological square from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and transitivity from Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) in the analysis of discursive patterns in print media. The data under study comprises extracts of editorials from the reportage of the run-up to the 1997 general elections in the Kenyan print media (cf. Matu 2003).

The analysis of editorials in this article is broadly hinged on the operational definition of ideology as conceptualized by Van Dijk (1995), who states that ideologies are basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents self-definition of a group. Besides their social function of sustaining the interests of groups, ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (attitudes knowledge) of the group, and this indirectly monitor the group-related social practices and hence also the text and talk of its members (Van Dijk,1995: 248). This operational definition would help us unravel the function of editorials as representations of the ideologies of social groups in the context of newspaper reporting.

The analysis aims to identify and explain how ideology is realized and conveyed through language use in the editorials of three Kenyan newspapers, viz. the *Daily Nation*, the *East African Standard* and the *Kenya Times*. The present study, drawing on the work of Halliday (1985) and Oktar (2001) among others, intends to exemplify the symbiotic relation between language and ideology with an aim to show how social groups (*us* vs. *them or we* vs. *they*) and the representational processes of transitivity are presented in newspaper discourse, and how ideological discourse is constructed to juxtapose different political players or participants in a political process. Thus, the focus in this study is specifically pegged to the four moves of the ideological square and to the ideational meaning which is realized in transitivity to show that linguistic choices play a fundamental role in the propagation and perpetuation of implicit and dominant ideologies, and that there are certain ideological differences that are conveyed either tacitly or overtly in newspaper reporting.

The article is divided into four sections. The first section situates the study within Kenya by providing a political background of the country and a brief history of the three newspapers under investigation. The next two sections briefly outline the two theoretical tools applied, namely the ideological square from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and transitivity from Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), followed in each case by an analysis of the data. The last section offers concluding remarks about the association between language and ideology.

Political background

Kenya attained its independence on 12 December 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as the first president of the country. In the years preceding independence, there were two main political parties, namely the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The two parties merged into one, viz.

KANU, immediately after independence (Foeken and Dietz 2000, Ogot 1995b). Oginga Odinga, Kenya's first Vice President, dissatisfied by KANU's policies, formed an opposition party, the Kenya's Peoples Union (KPU) in 1966. The KPU was banned by the Kenyatta government in 1969, and its leaders were sentenced to jail. In effect, Kenya became a *de facto* one party state (Ogot 1995b, Wanyande 1995, Ajulu 1997, Foeken and Dietz 2000).

President Kenyatta died in August 1978 and was succeeded by the Vice President Daniel Arap Moi. During Moi's presidency Kenya remained a *de facto* one party state until 1982. In 1982, the Parliament amended the Constitution, inserting a section (2a) that recognized KANU as the only political party, thus making Kenya a *de jure* one party state (Ogot 1995a, Ogot 1995b). Despite the constitutional amendment, opposition to Moi's rule never withered. Political pluralism had wide support in Kenya, contrary to what KANU was saying. More Kenyans began to speak openly and defiantly against the state. Oginga Odinga launched another political movement in August 1991. He teamed up with five other veteran politicians to form the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), a pressure group whose main objective was to fight for the restoration of democracy and human rights in Kenya (Ogot 1995b, Ajulu 1997). KANU succumbed to the citizens' demands, and in 1991 the Parliament amended the Constitution repealing Section 2a, making Kenya a *de jure* multi-party state (Ogot 1995b, Ajulu 1997, Rutten 2000).

On 29 December 1992 the civic, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in a multi-party system. KANU emerged the winner. Exactly five years after the 1992 elections, the next elections were held in 1997. There were various registered political parties that participated in the 1997 elections, namely KANU, FORD-Kenya, FORD-Asili, FORD-People, Democratic Party, the National Development Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Kenya Social Congress and the Kenya National Democratic Alliance, among others.

By the 1997 elections there were three daily newspapers in circulation in Kenya: the *Daily Nation*, the *East African Standard* and the *Kenya Times*. All three newspapers were written in English. The *Daily Nation* is partly owned by His Highness Aga Khan, who holds 45% of the shares while the Kenyan public owns 55% of them. The *Daily Nation* is considered by the majority of Kenyans to be objective in its reporting. It is also the largest circulating daily in the country. The *East African Standard* is the second largest circulating newspaper in the country. It was formerly owned by the London-Rhodesia (LONRHO) Company but was later sold to an international investor who happened to be a member of the ruling party, KANU. In its reporting, this paper is inclined towards the ruling party. The *Kenya Times* was founded by KANU as party paper in 1983. The paper articulates the government's position on all issues. It is also considered to be the "mouth-piece" of the ruling party (by 1997).

Framework for analysis

The study is guided by Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG). These frameworks present certain theoretical constructs that work in combination to unravel the ideologies presented in the discourse patterns used by the three newspapers. In view of descriptive considerations they will be discussed separately. In the next two subsections, the approach of each of these two frameworks will be briefly outlined, followed in each case by an analysis of the data.

The data was obtained from selected editorials commenting on the run-up (November and December) to the 1997 general elections in Kenya. Editorials, representing the policy of the paper, have a prominent function in the expression and construction of public opinion, and they display the newspapers' ideological positions. Twenty editorials constitute the data for this study, that is eight from the *Daily Nation* which includes the *Sunday Nation* (November 2, 9, 16, 18, 20, December 14, 19, 29), eight from the *Kenyan Times* (November 7, 12, 15, 18, 21, December 9, 11, 14) and four in the *Standard* (November 16, 27, December 4, 7).

CDA and the ideological square

CDA is a theoretical approach that is often used to investigate issues of power, ideology and domination in speech, in general, and texts, in particular. This approach is informed by several philosophical propositions. These include: the Bakhtin/Voloshinov circle (Mesthrie 2000), Marxism (Van Dijk 1993, Hammersley 1997), the Frankfurt School in the 1930s, Decisionism (Hammersley 1997) and the universal pragmatics of Habermas (Hammersley 1997, Menz 1989).

Linguistics in the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by structural and generative grammars. These grammars concentrated on formal systems, which to a large extent ignored language users and contexts. Around this period, pragmatics was developed in the context of speech acts, but the pragmatic approach remained philosophical and abstract. Within this period, text linguistics and discourse analysis became an item for research and focused on language use and communication. However, text linguistics and discourse analysis were too close to grammar and logic in terms of methodologies and therefore ignored the relevant properties of social contexts.

Sociolinguistics emerged to address the methodology deficiencies in text linguistics. Sociolinguists deviated from pragmatics and incorporated the analysis of actual language in the social context. Much of the sociolinguistic research relied on context dependent variations in language use such as sound structure, syntax,

lexis, style, narratives or other discourse genres. In addition to that, sociolinguistics provided an examination of the role of race, class and gender in language use and the resulting social inequalities and oppression. Most of this research was pegged on dialectal and sociolectal variation.

The aforementioned approaches developed crucial tools in language analysis, but their social orientation remained unidimensional, because most of these studies were purely descriptive and a critical dimension was lacking. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of critical linguistics and discourse analysis. These two approaches dwelt on a critical analysis of relevant structural problems in society and culture. The critical approach is said to utilize a complex cluster of structural relationships differently categorized as power, dominance, exploitation, manipulation or oppression. The critical approach also concentrated on the major reproduction force of power and ideology, that is the media among others. The reproduction of power, ideology and dominance can be attested from macro through micro-structure of social organization and interaction. The task of critical linguistics and discourse analysis is therefore to analyze this power structure showing the role of language and discourse in the development of maintenance and reproduction of that system (Van Dijk 1987: 15–24).

The study of the portrayal of ideology in media texts has received detailed attention in Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fowler 1991, Hodge and Kress 1993, Fairclough 1995, Van Dijk 1997, Thetela 2001, Oktar 2001). Studies of the presence of ideology in the print media have also benefited greatly from social identity theory (Tajfel 1978, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Oktar 2001). Although the primary theoretical tool used in this article, that is the ideological square, has its origin in social psychology and particularly in social identity theory, it has been incorporated and used in analyzing text and talk (Van Dijk 1997, Oktar 2001).

The concept *ideological square* will be discussed in line with what has been presented primarily by Oktar (2001). Oktar (2001: 317) observes that in addition to linguistic analysis of given discourses, aspects of social identity theory should be incorporated in exposing the ideologically-based contextual strategy of juxtaposing positive presentation of the self and negative presentation of the other in the text structure, thereby serving as a site of hegemonic struggle.

Social identity theory acknowledges the hierarchical structuring of society into different social groups that stand in unequal power relations to one another. Social categories provide members with a social identity, i.e. a definition of who one is and a description and evaluation of what that identity entails. Social identities, therefore, do not only describe members, but also prescribe appropriate behaviors for them.

One of the recent developments in social identify theory is the concept of self-categorization (Oktar 2001: 318). Self-categorization holds that in society

people categorize one another to the comparative and normative fit of the categories within a context. The level of social categorization that maximizes within category similarities and between category differences can be used in any particular context. The application of categorizations is determined by people's goals and motivations. The categorization constructs intergroup relations. As a result, the categorization of people into groups involves self-concept. Ingroup bias is necessitated by motivation to enhance one's self-esteem through social comparisons. Bias and self-esteem is achieved through a process that makes the ingroup positively distinctive from the outgroup on valued dimensions (Oktar 2001: 318).

Within intergroup contexts, people construct a contextually appropriate representation of the defining features of each group. In this kind of construction there is a tendency to keep a minimum intra- or ingroup differences, and to exaggerate inter- or outgroup differences. Thus the similarity of the ingroup and the differences of the outgroup are accentuated. Stereotypes thus formed about ingroup tend to be positive, while those of the outgroup tend to be negative. Generally, stereotyping justifies or rationalizes existing negative attitudes towards social groups and social conditions in which one group is systematically treated more favourably than another. Stereotypes are therefore incorporated into the ideology of a social group, and the stereotypes are reflected in the language of the culture.

In social identity theory, the concept *bias* incorporates cognitive and motivational factors. Bias is achieved cognitively if the individual classifies the social world into two distinct social categories that separate the self from the others, i.e. as *us* vs. *them*. This categorization helps people to define the world by using themselves as the frame of reference. Since positive self-esteem emerges from the social categories to which individuals belong, the ingroup is viewed as superior to the outgroup. The attitudes of holding one group favorably or unfavorably are determined by ideologies. In general terms, ideologies represent problems and conflicts between social groups. The representation creates an intergroup polarization between social groups showing the outgroup as representatives involved in a social conflict.

Group polarization arises from people's tendencies to infer, from the initial group position, what is a socio-culturally valued pole of an attitudinal dimension, and then publicly espouse that pole more strongly to gain approval. Additionally, members of an initially extreme group generate and conform through self-categorization to an ingroup norm that is subjectively polarized to differentiate ingroup from non-ingroup. Ideologically, the polarization schema defined by the opposition between *us* and *them* suggests that the social group constructs an ideological image of themselves and others in such a way that generally *we* are presented positively whereas *they* are represented negatively.

The strategy that constructs discourse for ideological communication consists of four moves (Oktar 2001: 319): (1) express/emphasize information that is positive

about *us*; (2) express/emphasize information that is negative about *them*; (3) suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about *them*; and (4) suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about *us*. These four moves constitute the 'ideological square' which performs a specific role in the contextual strategy of positive self-presentation and its outgroup counterpart, negative presentation of the other. These presentations are a crucial property of ideology and are said to focus on participants as social groups.

The concept of the ideological square is present in political topics (Van Dijk 1997) since these topics always feature evaluations. Politically- and ideologically-based opinions and attitudes come into play in the descriptions and references to politicians, public figures and organizations. Evaluations are always polarized. Whereas *we* are democratic, *they* are not, and whereas *our* soldiers, or those who share our cause, are freedom fighters, those of the *others* are terrorists. In the same vein, *our* policies and political decisions are always beneficial to the country, whereas those of the *others* are not. Likewise, the standpoints of our group are represented as altruistic while those of the opponents as egoistic (Van Dijk 1997: 29–30).

Syntax also plays a role in the realization of the ideological square. Syntactic processes such as topicalization may, by fronting a word, draw special attention to such a word in order to emphasize *our* good things and *their* bad ones. Active sentences will associate responsible agency with (topical) syntactic subjects, whereas passive sentences will focus on objects (e.g., victims) of such actions and defocus the responsible agency by putting agents last in prepositional phrases, or leaving it implicit, as in the well known headlines: *Police killed demonstrators* vs. *Demonstrators killed by police* vs. *Demonstrators killed*. Thus syntactic structures play the same role as semantic structures in placing more or less emphasis, in focusing or giving more prominence to specific words, phrases or clauses. Highlighting or giving prominence to certain aspects of language semantically or syntactically contributes to corresponding semantic stress on specific meanings. This is a function of political interests and allegiances of the speaker or writer (Van Dijk 1997: 34).

The analyzed data exhibits the two social groups in line with the ideological square framework, namely KANU and the Opposition. These two social groups are polarized or contrasted in the Kenyan media. The *Kenya Times* and *East African Standard* presents KANU as the ingroup, while the Opposition is presented as the outgroup. The *Daily Nation*, on the other hand, takes a different stance. There are times in reportage when it views KANU as the ingroup and the opposition as the outgroup, and other times when it represents the Opposition as the ingroup and KANU as the outgroup.

From the Kenya Times:

1. KANU delegates meeting a month after a similar conference last month (*sic*), will provide a forum to point out the way forward for the party which has held us together for the last 34 years. (*7 November 1997*)
2. KANU leaders meet at Kasarani today as a united group that is serious about its work commitment and leadership vision — a party with no time for trivialities and untouched by senseless wrangles. (*7 November 1997*)
3. […] maintain their unwavering support for the party, which is the only one with a national outlook and accommodates the interests of all Kenyans. (*7 November 1997*)
4. President Moi has many human qualities [which] mark him out among his political rivals, colleagues and contemporaries, both in Kenya and other parts of the world. He is kind, generous, forgiving, patient, tolerant, accessible and outgoing. (*21 November 1997*)
5. Above all, he is humble, God-fearing and very human. These qualities add up to a sound and stable character full of self-discipline, the kind of discipline few leaders of our time can command. (*21 November 1997*)

In line with the theory of ideological square the *Kenya Times* encourages voters to be members of the ingroup, to become part of *us*, by highlighting the positive characteristics of KANU, its leader, and its supporters, inter alia a proud history (*held us together for the last 34 years* (1)), a united group (2), a dedicated and visionary party (*serious about its work commitment and leadership vision* (2)), a national party (*only one with a national outlook* (3)), a leader with outstanding personality qualities (*kind, generous, forgiving, patient, tolerant, accessible and outgoing* (4)), a leader with high moral qualities (*sound and stable character full of self-discipline* (5)).

The outgroup, the Opposition and their leaders are presented differently. They are characterized as not dedicated and visionary (*trivialities* and *senseless wrangles* (2)), not a national party (*KANU is the **only** party with a national outlook which accommodates the interests of **all** voters* (3)), and it would be difficult for their leaders to match the positive traits of President Moi (*discipline few leaders of our time can command* (5)). The juxtaposition of KANU and the Opposition by the *Kenya Times* in highlighting the positive values of the former while giving prominence to the negative attributes of the latter fits well within Move 1 of the ideological square in that there is emphasis on information that is positive about *us* (i.e. KANU).

In the same vein, this argumentation succinctly captures Move 2 of the ideological square which generally is reflected in expressing information that is negative about *them* (i.e. Opposition). In the whole of this scenario it is assumed that Move 3 and 4 are also realized underlyingly in the sense that by expressing

information that is positive about *us*-KANU (Move 1) one is implicitly suppressing information that is negative about *us*-KANU (Move 4). Likewise, by expressing information that is negative about *them*-Opposition (Move 2) one is definitely de-emphasizing information that is positive about *them*-Opposition (Move 3).

The *East African Standard* likewise emphasized *their*, the Opposition's bad actions to achieve the overall strategy of negative other presentation, as the following extract shows:

6. The "national appeal" condition is important because we are looking for a president of Kenya — to lead the 42 tribes across eight provinces which means any candidate with a record of playing to the tribe and partiality will lose the race. (*4 December 1997*)

In (6), KANU is, as was the case in the *Kenya Times*, positively portrayed as a national party (*the "national appeal" condition*), in contrast to the Opposition who only enhance the interests of certain groups. The words *tribe* and *playing to the tribe* are deliberately chosen to denigrate the Opposition. The adjective *tribal* is defined by the *New Oxford English Dictionary* (Pearsall 1998) as "derogatory" and clearly has pejorative connotations. The *East African Standard* shares the same kind of reasoning and opinion as the *Kenya Times* on the two parties with respect to the ideological square framework. The positive portrayal of KANU in *East African Standard* as a national party is a classic case of Move 1 where emphasis is on information that is positive about *us*-KANU. The applicability of Move 1 in this context automatically yields Move 4 where there is suppression of information that is negative about *us*-KANU. In highlighting KANU's positive attributes it definitely follows that their bad actions are not revealed.

Contrastively, Move 2 which expresses information that is negative about *them* (Opposition) is reserved for the Opposition who are depicted as a tribal entity. In utilising Move 2 to describe the Opposition coincidentally leads us to Move 3 which requires one to de-emphasize information that is positive about *them*. In deriding the Opposition as tribal the editor is actually suppressing any positive attribute that the Opposition may have.

From the foregoing discussion it can be argued that the two newspapers construct KANU as an entity or a social group with positive values. The construction creates positive stereotypes about the party and its leader. On the other hand, the Opposition is assigned negative values thereby creating negative stereotypes. The construction of this distinction is in accordance with the ideologies underlying the newspapers' policies and can be contextualized within the ideological square framework.

The *Daily Nation* differs from the *Kenya Times* and the *East African Standard* in its construction of social groups. Consider the following extracts:

7. But then even though Kanu [KANU] is a political party, it would not be very good to have its leader, who is also the Head of State, called something other than President. Now come the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1991, other parties could not have their leaders titled president, but Kanu's [KANU's] leader retained the prestigious title. Even after Attorney-General Amos Wako did say that Kanu [KANU] would have to change, this was not to happen yet. (*9 November 1997*)

8. The question is not out of the ordinary because on the three issues of nepotism, tribalism and sectionalism, for example, President Moi must face the fact that their existence, 34 years after independence, indicates that his and the Kenyatta administrations are culpable. (*14 December 1997*)

9. Even the presidential campaigns are hardly visible. It is obviously tough going for many hopefuls, and even the usually well-heeled Kanu [KANU] has landed on hard times. The explanation is not hard to isolate — the easy-come, easy-go money most Kanu [KANU] candidates acquired illegally by looting public coffers is no more. (*19 December 1997*)

10. The people who are planning to disrupt the poll argue that it is pre-rigged or it will be rigged. We would like to challenge these people to come out clearly and expose the various ways that have been put in place as a vote-cheating mechanism […] It is folly also to claim that a poll has been rigged and not to show how this happened […]. (16 *November 1997*)

11. Our view is that Kenyans should be told what the platform of the opposition parties are. It is these platforms that should tell Kenyans where Kanu [KANU] has failed, why it failed and how the opposition party or parties that get to power will address and redress these failures. (*20 November 1997*)

Although the ideological square framework presents a situation where one group is favored while the other one is disfavored, the *Daily* Nation goes against this norm by evaluating both parties in terms of their negative and positive values. The *Daily Nation* presents a balanced perspective in so far as it evaluates both social groups (KANU and the Opposition) negatively and positively in different instances. In (7), KANU is depicted as a party that flouts the law or has no respect for the rule of law by calling its leader "president", which is against the Constitution of Kenya. KANU is also evaluated negatively in (8) as a party that promotes nepotism, tribalism and sectionalism. KANU's "corrupt" nature is articulated in (9) where members of the party are believed to loot public funds thereby explaining why the money used in previous elections is described as *easy-come, easy-go*.

The Opposition is also not spared from negative evaluation. The pre-poll rigging allegations in (10) were made by certain Opposition groups (which become clear on reading other reports). The editor is therefore challenging the responsible

Opposition groups to provide tangible evidence instead of making wild allegations that cannot be proved. In (11), the editorial suggests that the Opposition has no agenda, and that is why they are being challenged to state what their platforms are (*Kenyans should be told what the platform of the opposition parties are*).

Systemic Functional Grammar and transitivity

The use of the ideological square to analyze the data is combined with another theoretical construct, viz. *transitivity*. This construct finds its roots in Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) (Kress 1976, Halliday 1985, Simpson 1993). Halliday's SFG has played a significant role in the development of CDA in the sense that CDA benefits from his method of analysis (cf. Fowler and Kress 1979; Trew 1979; Kress 1990 and Fowler 1991). Transitivity is a fundamental and powerful semantic concept and generally refers to how meaning is represented in the clause. It plays a role in showing how speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience of the world around them. Since transitivity is concerned with the transmission of ideas, it is considered to fall within the realm of the ideational function of language (Fowler 1991: 70, Simpson 1993: 88).

Linguistically, transitivity is concerned with propositional meanings and functions of syntactic elements. The representations that can be attested within a transitivity model are said to signal bias, manipulation and ideology in discourse. Coincidentally, a large amount of the social impact of the media has to do with how the media selectively represents states of being, actions, events and situations concerning a given society.

Halliday's use of the concept *transitivity* differs from the way it is used in traditional grammar where the syntactic distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs (i.e. depending on whether they take an object or not) is considered. This syntactic distinction oversimplifies or neglects some important differences of meaning in the various types of verbs and, therefore, the various types of clauses. The differences concern the process the verb designates: *kick* designates an action which has an effect on another entity, for example *the ball*; *ran*, on the other hand, refers to an action which affects only the actor(s). The sentences *Jane is tall* and *Peter meditates* have different encodings. In the former sentence, there is no action but a description of a physical state, while in the latter there is reference to a mental process, not a physical action.

It emerges that there are many more distinctions of meaning behind transitivity than the simple distinction expressed by transitive versus intransitive. Central to Halliday's use of the concept is his view that transitivity is the foundation of

representation; it is the way the clause is used to analyze events and situations as being of certain types. Transitivity also has the facility to analyze the same event in different ways, one which is used often in newspaper analysis (Fowler (1991: 70–71). Since transitivity makes options available, some possibilities are always suppressed, so the choice a speaker makes or the choice made by the discourse indicates that the speaker's point of view is ideologically significant. Newspapers provide abundant examples of the ideological significance of transitivity.

In transitivity, different processes are distinguished according to whether they represent actions, speech, states of mind or states of being, inter alia material processes (processes of doing), relational processes (processes of being), verbalization processes (processes of saying), and mental processes (process of sensing). The function of only the first two mentioned processes in the data will be analyzed.

Material processes express the notion that some entity 'does' something, that which may be done 'to' some other entity (Halliday 1985: 103). Material processes have two inherent participant roles associated with them. The first is the *actor*, an obligatory element expressed in a clause that represents the 'doer' of the process. The second is an optional *goal* that represents the person or entity affected by the process (Simpson 1993: 89).

The material processes of transitivity are attested in the editorials of all three newspapers. Differences in reporting among the *Kenya Times* and the *East African Standard*, on the one hand, and the *Daily Nation*, on the other, are noted and analyzed below. The contrasting styles of reporting in the editorials through material processes of transitivity may be attributed to each newspaper's ideology.

From the East African Standard:

12. Kenya's business community endorsed its commitment to a peaceful election and political future […]. A two-hour luncheon helped to raise a record Shs 100 million … to help Kanu's [KANU's] presidential campaign. (*7 December 1997)*

Through one of the processes of transitivity (material) a positive image is portrayed in this example. The *actor* role is occupied by a group referred to as *Kenya's business community* who are engaged in a process (*endorsing*) to achieve a certain goal (*a peaceful election and political future*). The business community, however, were attending a KANU luncheon. Thus, the statement in the editorial through the process of transitivity implicitly suggests that is only KANU that can assure Kenyans a peaceful election and a political future.

From the Kenya Times:

13. The delegates meeting will be reinforcing KANU's credentials as a democratic apparatus that has managed to withstand the onslaught by a tribal-based opposition. (*7 November 1997*)
14. Indeed for the last one and a half years some churches have been preaching against KANU, the ruling party, and urging voters to vote for certain opposition parties. (*18 November 1997*)
15. Democratic Party supporters also engaged in a fray with Paul Muite's Safina in Nyeri District […]. (*9 December 1997*)
16. […] irate Ford Kenya supporters subjected the Ford Asili presidential candidate Martin Shikuku to a heckling episode that degenerated into physical combat. (*9 December 1997*)

In (13), through the material processes of transitivity, *[t]he delegates meeting* is the actor/event which foregrounds KANU's positive credentials through the process *will be reinforcing*. The process further enhances KANU's positive image as a democratic and national party, which is opposed *by a tribal-based opposition*. The transitivity process also supports one of the moves of the ideological square where there is emphasis on information that is negative about *them* i.e. they are tribal-based (the Opposition). Thus KANU's positive credentials are actually enhanced through the transitivity model as specified in the material processes

Material processes from the transitivity model are also used by the *Kenya Times* to seek and attract sympathy for the ruling party in (14). Here the churches in terms of material processes are presented as participants (agents/actors) in a process (*have been preaching against*) affecting KANU (the goal/target). KANU is presented as a victim suffering the action of the churches (*urging voters to vote for certain opposition parties*). The material process in transitivity in this case is intended to pit one participant (the church) against another (KANU) so that the reader will sympathize with KANU. Transitivity through material processes also establishes an ideological square of *they* vs. *us*. *They* (the churches) are against *us* (KANU) and therefore they are *urging voters to vote for certain opposition parties*. (15) and (16) portray and stereotype certain opposition parties as a group of people who revel in violence. The Democratic Party and Ford Kenya supporters are in transitivity terms viewed as active participants in processes (*engaged*, *subjected*) that affect supporters of the concerned parties negatively.

Contrary to the reporting in the *Kenya Times* and the *East African Standard* the *Daily Nation* presents a more balanced perspective of the events.

From the Daily Nation:

17. The reason we are saying this is that so far not a single opposition presidential aspirant, for example, has taken on President Moi and Kanu [KANU] on the current manifesto and the previous one and pointed out the difference between them. Conversely, Kanu [KANU] does not bother to point out what it promised in its 1992 election manifesto and what it achieved. (*20 November 1997*)

18. Kanu [KANU] candidates have been preaching the gospel of continuity while those from the opposition have been trying to sell the idea of change. (*29 December 1997*)

19. The phase when public coffers were looted to fund elections and buy victory is over. (*19 December 1997*)

In (17), material processes of transitivity are used to highlight the faults of both the governing party KANU and the Opposition parties by showing that none is selling its policies to the electorate. In the one case the *actor* role is occupied by *not a single opposition presidential aspirant* who are (not) engaged in a process, viz. *has taken on* (the President) to achieve the goal (*pointed out the difference between them*). Conversely, the *actor* role is occupied by KANU who are likewise not engaged in a process (*does not bother*) to achieve the goal (*point out what it promised… and what it achieved*). Thus the process of transitivity realised in material processes brings to the fore the negative evaluation of the *actor* and the *goal*.

The contrast in (18) is also meant to highlight the mainstay of each side. Thus KANU candidates in transitivity terminology are actors in a process (*have been preaching*) to achieve a certain goal (*continuity*), while the opposition also occupies an actor position in a process (*sell*) that aims to achieve a goal (*change*). In (19), a material process of transitivity is applied which seems to highlight the paper's objectivity. The objectivity is attested to the fact that the sentence is in the passive whereby KANU's identity is concealed.

In comparison to material processes, the transitivity relational processes express processes of *being*. According to Kress (1976:167) relational processes of transitivity are found in clauses in which the 'process' takes the form of a relation between two participating entities, or between one participating entity and an attribute, but without suggesting that one participant affects the other in any way (Simpson 1993:91). Both material and relational processes of transitivity may have the verb *be* which tends to obscure the difference between them. The main relational processes in transitivity may be categorized as (a) intensive, expressing 'X is a' relationship (*Mary is wise*), (b) possessive, expressing 'X has a' relationship (*Mary has a violin*), or (c) circumstantial, expressing 'X is at/on a' relationship (*Mary is at home*).

Transitivity relational processes are depicted in the editorials of the *Daily Nation* and the *Kenya Times* as shown below:

From the Daily Nation:

20. We think it is folly for anyone to refuse to register as a voter, claiming that the election has already been stolen and then threaten to disrupt it. It is folly also to claim that a poll has been rigged and not to show how this has happened […]. (*16 November 1997*)

21. The view from across the political aisle is simply that Kanu [KANU] has been in power for the past 34 years and what is there is (*sic*) to show for it? (*29 December 1997*)

The relational processes of transitivity as applied in the *Daily Nation* in (20) and (21) spare neither the Opposition nor KANU from vilification. In (20), the *Daily Nation* hits out (*it is folly*) at the Opposition for claiming that the poll has been rigged without providing evidence, and in (21) KANU is vilified for mismanaging the economy (*there is [nothing] to show*).

From the Kenya Times:

22. […] the president has no equal in mastery of local politics […] above all, he is humble, God-fearing and very human. (*21 November 1997*)

23. A vote for the only truly national political party, KANU, is the best way to nurture democracy and elevate the Kenyan nation to a new level. (*11 December 1997*)

24. Opposition parties have now become purely tribal. (*15 November 1997*)

The *Kenya Times* successfully utilizes the relational process of transitivity to propagate, in accordance with the ideological square, positive self-presentation (KANU) and negative presentation of the other (Opposition parties). Examples of the transitivity relational process that emphasize information resulting in a positive image of the ruling party and its leader are found in (22), *he is humble* and (23), *a vote … is the best way*. In (24), *their* (Opposition) bad qualities are emphasized through the relational process (*opposition parties have now become purely tribal*).

Conclusion

On the basis of the data analysis presented here, it may be concluded that the *Kenya Times* and the *East African Standard* are biased or ideologically inclined towards KANU. This conclusion is drawn on the basis that these newspapers outline only the positive values of KANU (*our good qualities*) while outlining the negative

attributes of the Opposition (*their bad qualities*). The *Daily Nation*, on the other hand, presents itself as more independent and therefore, balanced in its report-ing. It does not show inclination either to the ruling party or the Opposition but, instead, highlights the ills of both groups. The conflicting ideological conditions are realized through the linguistic strategies of the four moves of the ideological square and the representational processes of transitivity.

The focus of this article was to highlight the relevance and applicability of CDA and SFG and their respective theoretical constructs, namely, the ideological square and transitivity, in unearthing ideologies in political discourse and in this article, ideological differences among the editorials of the three newspapers in par-ticular. Such an eclectic approach provides an indepth analysis and understanding of political discourses and other discourses in various sociocultural contexts.

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What does 'we' mean?

National deixis in the media*

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The contextual nature of deictic expressions, including the personal pronoun 'we', is a given to linguists, but has only recently caught the interest of sociologists. The following article, firmly grounded in sociology, attempts to introduce some linguistic concepts while looking at the role of the personal pronoun 'we' in the discursive construction of national identities in the media. Focusing on Scotland, and looking at media language in the context of constitutional change in the United Kingdom, the article shows how different category relations are created through the ambiguous and under-specified use of deictic expressions. Scotland provides an interesting case study for such analysis, as references to the 'nation' during the 20th century have been ambiguous, sometimes referring to Scotland, sometimes to Britain. Consequently, the media/nation relationship has been contested, and this is reflected in media language. The paper introduces the concept of a *wandering 'we'* to describe the shifting reference point of the deictic expressions and situates this phenomenon in the wider nationalism literature. By doing this, the article revisits some of the notions introduced by Billig in his *Banal Nationalism*.

Keywords: deictic expressions, personal pronoun 'we', national identity, print media, banal nationalism, Scotland

1. Introduction

'Banal nationalism' has been one of the most popular concepts entering the scholarly discussion of nationalism and national identity during the last decade. Different from the more-researched 'hot nationalism' because of its 'reassuring normality', Billig introduced it as "the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced" (Billig 1995: 6–8). This takes the form of "continual 'flagging', or reminding, of nationhood" through everyday discourse[1] (Billig 1995: 6–8). In order to illustrate banal nationalism, Billig used the metonymic image

of an unnoticed national flag hanging quietly outside a public building, like US post office, as opposed to the fervent and passionate nationalist flag-waving of Serbian ethnic cleansers and other such 'hot nationalists'. According to Billig, national identity is found and sustained "in the embodied habits of social life" (1995: 8), including everyday language. In order to remind nationals about their national identity, "banal words, jingling in the ears of the citizens, or passing before their eyes, are required". Such nationalism

> "operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in so doing, enhabit them. Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but rarely conscious, reminders of the homeland, making 'our' national identity unforgettable." (Billig 1995: 93)

Among these small words is the deictic expression 'we', the focus of this article. The personal pronoun 'we' "appears to be of utmost importance in the discourses about nations and national identities" (de Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999: 163), and has received increased attention in (national) identity studies. For example, Ricento (2003) has focused on the varied and skilful use of 'we', including metonymical and synecdochical use, in political speeches of early twentieth century 'Americanisers'; Carbó (1997) analyses the rhetorical use of pronouns in the speeches of various Mexican political leaders; Íñigo-Mora (2004) focuses on the use of 'we' in the British Parliamentary community. Nationalism and identity scholars are keen to understand "how the national 'we' is constructed and what is meant by such construction" (Billig 1995: 70).

Understanding the use of national deictic expressions can be enlightening. Riggins (1997: 8) suggests that inclusive and exclusive pronouns are "most revealing of the boundaries separating Self and Other" — one important aspect of national identity formation and maintenance. But while 'we' helps to draw clear distinction between members and non-members, between *us* and *them*, the deictic expression 'we' can be also used to make this border diffuse. Especially in political speeches, writes Fairclough (2000: 35), "there is a constant ambivalence and slippage between exclusive and inclusive 'we'". The scope of the deictic 'we' varies depending on the purpose and particular rhetorical point the speaker is trying to make, making the pronominal plural one of the most useful tools of persuasion for politicians and the media (Riggins 1997: 8; Íñigo-Mora 2004: 37), and of interest to the students of banal nationalism.

2. Deictic expression 'we' in the media

According to Billig (1995: 94), newspapers act in national terms and "the deixis of homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers". Fowler (1991) suggests an existence of so-called 'implied consensus', a special conjunction of the newspaper and its readership whenever the deictic expression 'we' is printed, and read, in the newspaper. Moreover, such "national deictic 'context-setting' dialogically anticipates an instantaneous acceptance of speaker-listener unanimity" (Law 2001: 301). In this article, I problematise whether such a unanimity and consensus exist between the speaker and the listener, or between the newspaper and its readership, using a sample from Scottish media as an example.

Although the deictic expression 'we' is often used in nationalist discourse, Brookes writes that

> "it would be wrong to suggest that whenever the words 'we' or 'us' are used in newspaper editorials it is the nation that is being automatically denoted. Indeed, most often the use of 'we' and 'us' was not explicitly linked to the nation *within* the text itself". (1999: 255)

My findings, discussed later, support this notion. Although I am focusing on leader articles discussing Scottish nationalism and identity in general, and devolution in Scotland in particular, in many occasions the 'we' does not even aim to be national. Somewhat contradictorily then, Brookes suggests that whatever the substantive use of the 'we', it can and should always be *interpreted* as national. He writes that even if "these articles do not themselves make explicit reference to national identity, they appear in the context of newspapers which have a shared cultural agenda which is assumed to be national" (Brookes 1999: 256). It follows that even though not all 'we's in a text are explicitly 'national' in their nature, they could be read as such. This is especially so when the newspapers in question claim to be 'national newspapers':

> "National newspapers by definition are nationally distributed,[2] and although there may be differences of age, gender, region, social class and ethnicity even within the readership of individual titles, the *limit* is that of nation. So it is within these contexts that the 'we' and 'us' in these articles can be understood as referring to the nation". (Brookes 1999: 256)

Furthermore, as with the imagined community in general, the 'we' is limited in its imagining, as "the group referred to by 'we' continues indefinitely until it reaches the boundary formed by another group marked by 'they'" (Carbó 1997: 95). This argument of the 'national limit' can be contested in both directions though. First of all, the limit is often less than nation (for example, I will talk about the

exclusive newspaper 'we' later). It can also encompass a unit larger than nation. One case study of Austrian media discourse showed that 'we' can refer to sub-national groups, as well as supranational groups — e.g. 'Europeans' or a more abstract 'world community'; concluding that the "prevailing implication, however, of 'we' remains the national collective of 'the Austrians'" (de Cillia et al. 1999: 164). Sub- and supranational references exist, if to a lesser degree, even in texts mainly concerned with the question of nations and national identities.

However, a further question arises from Brookes' clarification about the use of personal pronoun 'we' in the media. Brookes claims that the shared cultural agenda of newspapers is "assumed to be national", along the same line as Billig's claim that "all the papers, whether tabloid or quality, and whether left- or right-wing, address their readers as members of the nation" (Billig 1995:11). But can we be sure of this? When Brookes states that the *limit* of individual newspapers is "that of nation", and Billig talks about a national audience, what does 'nation' mean? Both authors rely on the unproblematic definition of the 'nation', which is, however, rather rare in nationalism studies. Take Scotland, for example. What the (Scottish) nation is, is contentious, but indubitably people in Scotland see Scotland as a nation, while not denying that Britain may be a nation too (see McCrone 2001: 47–52). It is not surprising then, that during the twentieth century, "the references to the nation have been consistently ambiguous", sometimes referring to Scotland, sometimes to Britain (Connell 2003: 188–189). Consequently, "the relation between the media and the nation in Scotland has remained peculiarly contested" (ibid.). The very limit of the nation is often contested when used in the media. For the purpose of this article, I understand Britain as a state, Scotland (and thus also England and Wales) as sub-state nations.

3.   Data, methodology and the case study

My research focuses on the discursive construction of national identity in Scottish broadsheets during the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda. The data corpus consists of 110 leader articles from *The (Glasgow) Herald* and *The Scotsman,* both of which describe themselves as Scottish national newspapers.

Billig suggests that newspapers routinely "claim to stand in the eye of the country", and they particularly do this in their opinion columns and leader articles by using "the nationalised syntax of hegemony, simultaneously speaking to and for the nation" (1995: 114–115). This makes leader articles particularly interesting for the study of expressions of banal nationalism. Leader articles matter for two main reasons. Firstly, they have a prominent role "in the expression and construction of public opinion", and analysing editorials helps us "trace the formulation

of opinions and the expression of ideologies" which have "persuasive, political, social, and cultural functions" (van Dijk 1993: 265–266). Secondly, as leader articles can be taken as proxies for the rest of the newspaper (Althaus et al. 2001), the ideologies and opinions expressed in leader articles often trickle down to other sections of newspapers.

This particular paper focuses on a time period limited to a month before and a month after the referenda dates, covering most of the devolution debate in the media. The Scottish devolution referenda on March 1, 1979 and September 11, 1997 provide useful 'critical discourse moments' (Chilton 1987), as they were part of a major constitutional change that problematised national identity. David Mc-Crone writes that

> "Quite suddenly, identity politics are back on the agenda, for, in Mercer's words, 'identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty' (1990: 43). This problematising process makes it much easier to see how people are involved in 'personalising' national identity". (McCrone 2001: 153)

During such moments of crisis, identity-construction becomes more explicit not only on the personal level, but also in the media. The concepts of 'the nation', nationness and national sentiments are "cast up for discussion and become a generalised point of focus" (McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004: 46). Intense national 'navel-gazing' occurs: "The last years of the twentieth century have propelled the Scots into uncharted territory. Such moments are bound to provoke self-contemplation and a gazing into, in Ernest Gellner's phrase, the historical 'navel' of the nation" (Rosie 2004: 148). The Scottish media were actively involved in devolution campaigns in Scotland, and their analysis gives an insight into how identity is used to mobilise people either for or against devolution in Scotland. Using Scotland's devolution referenda debates as a case study also allows us to revisit some of the claims made by Billig in his *Banal Nationalism.*

Analysis of the collected data was guided by the discourse-historical method (de Cillia et al. 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999). This approach uses three interwoven dimensions of analysis: topics, rhetorical strategies, and linguistic means of realisation. They focus on three aspects of linguistic means of realisation: (1) personal references (including anthroponymic generic terms, personal pronouns, quantifiers), (2) spatial references (toponyms/geonyms, adverbs of place, spatial reference through persons, by means of prepositional phrases such as 'with us', 'with them'), (3) temporal references (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, temporal conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, semi-prefixes with temporal meaning) (Wodak et al. 1999: 9). In this article, I will discuss one particular linguistic means of realisation in my data, although the original

research (Petersoo 2005) also deals with various *topoi* and rhetorical strategies in the Scottish media.

4. The deictic expression 'we' in the Scottish media

Scottish media provide a useful case study for the analysis of national 'we'. As mentioned, the media/nation nexus in Scotland has been ambiguous, and this is reflected in media discourse. However, until now "the extent to which Scottish newspapers are capable of engendering a sense of Scottishness due to a tendency to address their readership as Scottish has never been thoroughly examined" (Connell 2003: 188). This article aims to overcome one small aspect of this gap by looking at the ways how Scottish newspapers address their readers. By focusing on the use of 'small crucial words', the article tries to understand what kind of 'we's the Scottish newspapers are banally flagging in their texts; which 'nation' they are discursively constructing. Scotland and its media are a fascinating and suitable test case for seeing how banal nationalism works for many reasons; these include the important role that leader articles play as the condensed corporate mission statement of the newspapers; the fact the newspapers in question — *The Herald* and *The Scotsman* — both describe themselves as Scottish *national* broadsheets and thus position themselves in the eye of the nation; the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda were times of important national navel-gazing, as the future of 'our' Scottish nation was at stake. If one could ever expect the deictic language to be non-problematically national, then this should be the time and place.

This article challenges the concept of banal nationalism by looking at the kind of 'we's that can be found in the Scottish national broadsheets. The deictic expression 'we' can have very different references in different contexts. Linguists distinguish various 'we's based on their addressee and speaker exclusivity or inclusivity. De Cillia et al. (1999: 164) write that "the first-person plural pronoun 'we' is the most complex among its type and can encompass all other personal pronouns", suggesting a referential matrix of seven different types of 'we'. Based on the suggestions of Wodak et al. (1999), de Cillia et al. (1999), and Íñigo-Mora (2004), I distinguish between three main different uses of 'we' in my data. These are:

– Exclusive *newspaper* '*we*' — the speaker-inclusive, addressee-exclusive 'we', where the 'we' denotes the newspaper.
– Inclusive *Scottish* '*we*' — the speaker- and addressee-inclusive 'we', where the 'we' refers to the newspaper *and* its readers in Scotland, i.e. the 'we' is used metonymically as a replacement for Scotland.
– All-inclusive *British* '*we*' — as previous, but the 'we' is referring to Britain.

In the following section, I will analyse these three uses of 'we' in my data corpus. I will thereafter introduce the concept of the *wandering 'we'*, which is especially interesting for the discussion of banal nationalism.

4.1 Exclusive newspaper 'we'

Not encompassing its readers, the newspaper 'we' is usually just informative, telling the reader what the newspaper has done or believes in. This type of distancing 'we' is not necessarily national. Often the deictic expression 'we' is quite explicitly addressee-exclusive and self-referential. Here are few examples of the exclusive newspaper 'we':[3]

> (Example 1)
> <u>Scotland's choice</u>
> … in the course of the next three-and-a-half weeks *we* shall sum up *our* various arguments for supporting the establishment of the Assembly. … Today *we* shall consider the Scotland Act as the first of many desirable, and overdue, aspects of parliamentary and constitutional reform which Britain needs. (*Scotsman* 5 February 1979)

> (Example 2)
> <u>The real decision we face</u>
> … The Herald is very clear about its editorial stance in the debate to come. *We* will argue as vigorously and persuasively as *we* can for a double Yes vote. *We* will do that because *we* believe the time is long overdue for Scotland to take a decisively greater measure of responsibility for shaping its own future than it has in the past. (*Herald* 20 August 1997)

> (Example 3)
> <u>A worthy and lively debate: All worries of apathy have been dispelled</u>
> … Today, *we* hope for a double Yes vote from an informed and involved nation. Tomorrow, and in the days to come, *we* hope and expect your involvement and participation in *our* pages to continue. (*Herald* 11 September 1997)

In all the above extracts, the newspaper is the actor, who believes, considers, sums up, thinks and offers — the reader is a recipient at the other end, there to receive and accept the information. It would be difficult to claim that the 'we' in above extracts is necessarily to be interpreted as 'national', and whether or not they should be understood as *read* in a national context is debatable. There is no obvious invitation to partake in the imagining of 'us'; the 'we' does not try to encompass Scottishness. Indeed, in the second extract Scotland is described as 'it', and a

distinction is drawn between the newspaper and its (Scottish national) readership in the third extract ('we' the newspaper *versus* 'you' the readers).

4.2 Inclusive Scottish 'we'

The inclusive Scottish 'we' is the most common one in the Scottish national media, and this supports the banal nationalism thesis. To illustrate the inclusive Scottish 'we', consider the following extract from the *Scotsman*:

> (Example 4)
> <u>Why we must vote Yes</u>
> Let *us* take as a premise that it is desirable to sustain the unity of the United Kingdom. Indeed, *our* close and cousinly links with the English, *our* affection for *them* and respect for *their* culture, the degree of domestic, social and economic intercourse between *us* — these facts make separatism […] unthinkable. (*Scotsman* 23 February 1979)

This extract is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is clearly addressee-inclusive and imagines its readers as Scottish — although not explicitly mentioning Scotland itself. Here we have the 'implied consensus' between the newspaper and its readers, as suggested by Fowler. Through a subtle use of 'we' (or 'our' in this extract), the newspaper creates a sense of *we*-ness between itself and its readers. Secondly, the *Scotsman* is addressing its readers as Scottish, and is doing that in a clear Self/Other dialectic with 'our cousins, the English'.[4] Thirdly, a kinship metaphor is used, invoking an image of a national extended family, where two cousins, England and Scotland, live happily together. Occasional bickering may occur, but the two 'cousins' still belong together. And lastly, in paragraphs that follow, this very same Scottish 'we' starts wandering. I will return to this point later.

The following extract from the *Herald* in 1997 is another example of how the reality of a national 'us' is taken for granted, how the sense of national unity is presented as something unproblematic and real:

> (Example 5)
> <u>The real decision we face</u>
> … No one doubts — from the stands at Murrayfield or Hampden to the pages of Trainspotting, from the echoing footfalls of the legal fraternity in Parliament House to the interactions of children and teachers in schools across the land, from fishing boat to computer assembly line — that there is something *we* call Scottish about what goes on *here* and a place called Scotland which gives meaning to *our* lives. *We* are now being asked to choose how that sense of identity should be nurtured in a new millennium. (*Herald* 20 August 1997)

The extract is full of various national deictic expressions ("the land", "here", "a place"), and confidently claims that "no one doubts" the existence of Scotland — begging the question of who is this "no one" (or actually not — the text implies there is a consensus among the readers about this "no one", that it is self-evident to the readers). Like most modern societies, "Scotland is a country of enormous heterogeneity in almost every significant social respect" (Cohen 1996: 805). Nevertheless, this heterogeneity is presented as homogeneity, and regardless of actual differences, "the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 1991:6–7). By putting Murrayfield's rugby and Hampden's football fans, Trainspotting's drug addicts, Edinburgh lawyers, children, teachers, fishermen etc. across Scotland all together into one sentence, the extract suggests that Scotland is one big national family, a thriving imagined community. Scotland is imagined as a unity, and it is assumed that all those different groups of people agree on the single definition of Scottishness. This is achieved by using the personal pronoun 'we' to designate a nation and thus "replacing differences in origin, confession, class and life-style?" (de Cillia et al. 1999: 164), which certainly are deep between the social groups listed in the extract. The homogeneous ingroup, *homo Scotus*, is constructed discursively. Whether this homogeneous ingroup exists in the 'real' world or not, is not important — debates about Scottish national identity take nationness as given.

4.3   The all-inclusive British 'we'

Although usually the deictic expression 'we' is used to mean 'us, the Scots', Scottish newspapers do not always address their readers as Scottish. Sometimes the 'we' is imagined as a much wider community, although still *limited* in Anderson's (1991) sense, encompassing the whole of the UK. This is not surprising, as Scottish and British identities co-exist in Scotland quite easily. That the British 'we' is evoked while arguing for devolution in Scotland is maybe also not surprising, considering that Scotland was seeking more autonomy *within* the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom (see Kiely et al. 2005 for a further discussion on dual Scottish/British identities).

   The British 'we' was especially common for a period in the midst of the 1997 referendum campaign. The sudden and shocking death of Princess Diana in August 1997 became the main talking point of the media for a short while. However, while the devolution referendum still remained an important and topical issue in the Scottish media, the death of Princess Diana 'widened' the scope of the 'we' from the Scottish to the British 'we'. Here is just one example:

(Example 6)

<u>Well-served by the system</u>

… It is reasonable to assume that the world will not end on Saturday as Diana, Princess of Wales is interred but there must be many people who wonder, in the light of the display of public emotion over her death, what has happened to *our* country and where *we* go from here. This is a uniquely difficult question to address. It is unlikely, as <u>*we*</u> said yesterday, that there has been a sea-change in the nation from the sort of people who bear emotion stoically to those who are able to display it publicly; from stiff upper lip to trembling lower lip.

[…]

Yet it is important that *we* recognise that in Britain *we* have a good and decent system which has served *us* well. Governments come and go peacefully, *our* democracy has an admirable 70% plus turnout at general elections and, yes, *we* are capable of creative and fruitful change, as in the proposals for devolution, if only *we* will have the courage and foresight to grasp them. *We* have a unique combination of sensible stability and evolutionary reform which serves *us* well. (*Herald* 5 September 1997)

There are three occurrences of the personal pronoun 'we' in the first paragraph of example 6. Although Britain is not explicitly mentioned in the first paragraph, it is to be understood as British — after all, Princess Diana was a British royal figure and is evoked here as a symbol of national unity (Shone 2001: 323). Thus the first two pronouns are clearly evoking the British 'country'. The spatial reference "here" — another crucial small world — is also pointing to Britain in this context. In the light of these British 'we's, the "nation" in the last sentence is also to be understood as British, whereas the underlined "<u>we</u>" is addressee-exclusive, referring to the newspaper itself. The second paragraph is saturated with deictic expression 'we', all of which can be described as British again. In the first sentence, the Britishness of the "we" is actually flagged. The references to "our" government and democracy are British, as are the other elements of the discussion (general elections, political change, etc.). Although Britishness is flagged only in the first sentence of the paragraph, it is continuously invoked by using the personal pronoun 'we'. The first paragraph has framed the article in British terms and that defines the whole article. It is here that banal *British* nationalism is working exactly as Billig (1995) suggested.

4.4 The wandering 'we'

However, echoing the ambiguity of national references in Scotland, the use of the deictic expression 'we' in the Scottish broadsheets is much more complex than Billig allows for. I would, therefore, like to introduce the concept of a *wander-*

ing 'we'. Riggins notes the contradictory use of 'we' that occasionally occur within phrases and sentences (1997: 8). A *wandering 'we'* represents such a contradictory use of the deictic expression 'we'. It is not a single type of 'we', but rather a particular usage that can be traced only within a paragraph or whole article.

I have previously shown that the deictic expression 'we' can have different referents. One could expect that if an article is trying to appeal to its readers' Scottishness or Britishness, or to put it crudely, if an article tries to make rhetorically a Scottish point or a British point, it would use the deictic expressions consequently and consistently. But this appears not to be the case. Often the deictic expression 'we' keeps wandering between the newspaper 'we', Scottish 'we' and British 'we'. That is, the 'we' 'wanders' between addressee-exclusive, addressee-inclusive and all-inclusive 'we'. This wandering of '*we*'s makes the question *Who are we?* rather difficult to answer, and raises the question whether the readers can really be expected to (unconsciously and easily) recognise their national selves in the media then, as suggested by Billig.

There are many ways 'we' can wander. Sometimes 'we' wanders between various forms of inclusiveness — from an exclusive newspaper 'we' to an inclusive Scottish 'we' and/or to an all-inclusive British 'we' — or, indeed, *vice versa*. Sometimes the 'we' wanders spatially — at one moment, the 'we' becomes 'them', or 'they' become 'us'. Here is an example from the *Herald*, showing a case of the pronominal plural wandering between 'we' and 'they':

> (Example 7)
> <u>Scotland must give a decisive answer today</u>
> … Above all, *we* must give a clear message to the world today. That means that a high turnout is vital. The Scottish question has dominated British politics for the past five years and it would reflect poorly on the Scots if *they* failed to respond to the challenge which the referendum represents.
> (*Glasgow Herald* 1 March 1979)

One of the possible explanations why the *Herald* wrote "Scots … they" and not "it would reflect poorly on the Scots if *we* failed to respond…", is that the pro-devolution paper wanted to distance itself from those disappointing Scots who might vote 'No' at the 1979 referendum.[5] This would be a case of internal othering in a situation where the *(Glasgow) Herald* supports Scottish devolution, and other right-minded and relevant people (included in the generic 'we') can be expected to do the same. If they do not, they are denied a membership of 'us', and become the Other, although internal to the imagined Scottish national community. Such othering is performed in a very subtle way by using an inclusive 'we' followed by a distancing 'they'.

Another example in which the personal deictic expression shifts between 'us' and 'them' is from the last devolution referendum date:

(Example 8)

<u>The rebirth of a nation</u>

… A day to seize opportunity

Carpe diem, says the old Latin tag. This morning *we* might prefer a sturdier, native injunction. Perhaps it is time now to say that Scots should rise from *their* backsides and prove that *they* have meant everything *they* have said. This day, over all others, brings with it the opportunity to say what sort of nation *we* mean to be. The alternative is clear, familiar and failed. It offers few hopes of real progress. It offers nothing for *our* self-esteem. Though *we* are to choose, it seems to this newspaper that there is no choice if Scotland is to regain belief in itself. (*Scotsman* 11 September 1997)

Curiously, the Scottish 'we' in the second sentence turns into a Scottish 'they' in the third sentence. The triple Scottish "they" then is followed by a Scottish 'we' again — which goes through mild distancing again by the end, when Scotland becomes "it". Note also the use of the demonstrative "this" throughout the extract — temporal references "this morning", "this day, over all others" assume that all the readers understand (and agree with) the importance of the devolution referendum.

The following extract from the *Scotsman* was referred to earlier, and paragraph two was partially reproduced already.[6] It is a revealing case of how the story of small crucial words is much more complicated than it initially seems. It is not just *we-politicians* and *we-the* [national-equals-British] *people* story, as in the discourse of New Labour studied by Fairclough (2000: 35), it is *we-politicians-and-all-different-kind-of-peoples* story. I have numbered the paragraphs in the following extensive extract for the ease of discussion.

(Example 9)

<u>Why we must vote Yes</u>

[1] In the last few weeks *we* have set out some of the areas in which the Assembly will be able to provide a new and much-missed dimension to Scottish life. The Assembly is not expensive; it is cheap at the price. …

[2] But the 'good government' argument applies with some though not as much force to the regions of England, and does not entirely explain why Scotland needs the Assembly so badly. Let *us* take as a premise that it is desirable to sustain the unity of the United Kingdom. Indeed, *our* close and cousinly links with the English, *our* affection for them and respect for their culture, the degree of domestic, social and economic intercourse between us — these facts make separatism (a pejorative word for independence) unthinkable. Now all the pressures which produced a surge of SNP political support are at work again in *our* political system.

[3] *We* have no written Constitution. As a nation *we* may have a temperamental aversion to anything too rigid and restrictive. *We* also have

a distaste for systematic constitutional change, though *we* are perfectly capable of writing constitutions for other people, sometimes, as in the case of West Germany, with considerable success. Therefore *we* must take *our* opportunities of reform as they arise, and thank *our* stars that *our* society is sufficiently mature and stable to produce change without violence.

[4] Thus the Assembly offers more democratic control and helps sustain unity in diversity. It opens avenues to peaceful change. It begins the renewal of *our* democratic institutions. But the final argument is psychological and perhaps emotional. The lack of national democratic institutions has grievously sapped Scottish self-belief. Standardising forces have eroded the external signs of *our* nationhood, speech, custom and dress, and left *us* confused and adrift. The deferential philosophy of dependence on English largesse attacks the qualities of enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which *we* once took pride. Dependence is in any case something of a myth, though a powerful one. There is hardly an area of Scottish life that cannot be uplifted and quickened by an Assembly.

[5] Of course, the institution will be neutral, in the sense that *we* can use it for good or ill. Once *we* have won the Assembly, *we* have another fight on *our* hands to ensure that *we* make the most of it. But the pessimism of the No camp is really not justified. As a nation *we* have produced a long line of administrators of the highest calibre. *We* have an experienced Civil Service. *We* have a legal system rooted in a distinctive tradition. *Our* Labour movement, so often portrayed as a sinister and threatening monster, is strongly influenced by its Christian traditions. And *our* religious history, in which presbyterianism imbued almost every area of life, has left *us* with an ingrained belief in democratic principles. The Assembly is the first stage in the journey towards a place for Scotland in the modern world, a small country living in close intercourse with *its* cousin England; and it is a step from which *we* must not shrink. (*Scotsman* 23 February 1979)

Within these five paragraphs from a rather lengthy leader article *Why we must vote Yes*, the 'we' manages to be exclusive, inclusive and all-inclusive, or newspaper, Scottish and British. In the first paragraph, it is the newspaper 'we'. In paragraphs two to five, it is a national 'we'. But which nation is being invoked in those extracts is shifting and debatable. Paragraph two is using Scotland as its referent — exemplified in a Self/Other dialectic with the English, "our close cousins", as discussed earlier. The last 'we' in that paragraph is ambiguous and can be understood both as Scottish or British. The personal deixes 'we' in paragraphs four and five are also clearly Scottish. There are references to "our nationhood", "our confused and adrift state", "our former pride" — themes regularly invoked in the Scottish media — in paragraph four; and Scottishness is explicitly flagged throughout the paragraph —

"Scottish self-belief", "Scottish life". In the last paragraph alone, there are twelve 'we's, all of which can again be described as Scottish. Although the Scottishness of that 'we' is only emphasised at the end of the paragraph, the Scottishness is unchallenged and undeniable. There is an awkward wandering at the last sentence though, when Scotland is suddenly described as "it", followed by a Scottish 'we' at the end.

Sandwiched between all those Scottish 'we's in paragraphs two, four, and five is paragraph three, containing references to the lack of a written constitution and being able to write constitutions for other people. Although neither Scotland nor the United Kingdom have written Constitutions, the 'we' in question is a British, not just Scottish one. Thus, unless it is suggested that the Scots wrote the West German constitution (note the intermittent use of *nation* and *people* — 'we' are a nation, '*they*' are a people — possibly a hint of superiority here?), the fourth 'we' and by implication the others too are at least a British/UK 'we' (in the specific case of West Germany, it could even be imagined as an "Allied 'we'"). The language used in the example is very essentialist, describing 'us' as having "temperamental aversion" and "a distaste", being "sufficiently mature" and "perfectly capable" — these are presented as inherent to the non-mentioned British 'we'.

And even then, the last sentence of that paragraph could be interpreted as the Scottish 'we', as it is only Scottish voters who will have a say in the proposed constitutional reform. Thus *within* one leader article discussing Scottish devolution, the crucial small word 'we' takes on various references. The wandering of 'we' makes the overall picture quite confusing and complex, and questions the banal and routine nationalising 'work' the personal pronoun 'we' is supposedly doing.

5.   Conclusion

Billig suggests that newspapers engage in banal flagging of nationhood, and that readers unconsciously pick up the 'national' references hidden behind the small words of 'we', 'here' etc. In the speeches of politicians and in the media, there is usually no "ambiguity about which nation/country *this* is" that the politician or article refers to (Billig 1995: 107). At least in the case of Scotland, the situation is not as simple, uncomplicated and clear. As we can see from looking at the use of the deictic 'we', the national frame of reference in the Scottish media varies heavily depending on the context and topic. This is not new, but since the national 'we' can have several different referents in Scotland, a concept of a singular national media 'we' that is easily recognised and adopted seems misguided in this case. Most of the time, writes Íñigo-Mora, "it is the addressee, who has to decide who is included in the reference of the pronoun" and who is excluded (2004: 35). Far from just

adopting a national 'we' banally and unconsciously, readers may need to work on the different array of 'we's that they confront in the newspaper, and bring in some interpretative knowledge in order to recognise the particular national 'we' invoked in the particular article. And even more so, on many occasions the readers have to cope with a wandering 'we' within the same article. There is no simple and banal national 'we' in the media, but a kaleidoscope of different 'we's. The deictic pointing of the 'we' is not so clearly pointed after all. Exploration of my data indicates that similar contextual variations happen with other deictic notions in the Scottish media, like 'nation', 'people', 'history', etc.

It is possible that this wandering of 'we's can be expected under the circumstances, that this is the very nature of nationalist and patriotic discourse in the media. Indeed, as mentioned already, one of the rhetorical uses of the personal deictic expression 'we' is its very lack of specificity. It can be used by politicians — and journalists — when they cannot be sure who their audiences are — or when they do not want their audiences to be sure about the latter. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that this obscurity and fluidity of 'we' is the very reason it is employed in the media in the first place. The 'we' can simultaneously represent one or several different (national) categories to different readers. By doing so, the 'we' can facilitate shifts between different national categories and create very different Self/Other dialectics. What does 'we' really mean in any particular case remains open for speculation and interpretation, and whether the 'we' always perform a nationalising role is also questionable. Indeed, in order to know if and what kind of nationalising role the deictic expression plays, it would be necessary to study how people actually do understand and interpret such 'we's. Whether or not a reader chooses to imagine his or her respective *national* community as the reference of the pronoun 'we', is one of the tasks of a future research into banal nationalism.

Notes

1. I define 'discourse' broadly to refer to a particular way of representing certain aspects of the world through verbal or visual texts (see Fairclough 2003).

I define 'discourse' broadly to refer to a particular way of representing certain aspects of the world through verbal or visual texts (see Fairclough 2003).

2. For a critique of the claim that national newspapers by definition are nationally distributed, see Seymour-Ure (1996), Tunstall (1996), Rosie, Petersoo, MacInnes, Condor and Kennedy (2006).

3. The deictic expressions relevant for the discussion in each extract have been highlighted in bold.

4. For a more detailed discussion on the Self/Other dialectic in national identity construction in Scotland, see Petersoo (2005; 2007).

5. Eventually, some 52% of people voted 'Yes' but this did not satisfy the 40% rule (according to the Cunningham agreement, 40% of the whole electorate had to be in favour of devolution).

6. This extract has been also briefly discussed in Rosie, MacInnes, Petersoo, Condor and Kennedy (2004).

7. The 1949 German Constitution (the Basic Law or 'Grundgesetz') was drafted by US, British and French constitutional lawyers. The Germans only had a consultative role in the making of their new constitution.

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The political potential of multi-accentuality in the exhibition title 'gastarbajteri'

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This article explores the multi-accentuality of the sign 'gastarbajteri', used as title word in an exhibition on labour migration that took place in Vienna, Austria, in 2004. Based on an ethnographic study of the exhibition, it addresses a variety of readings of this word, both at the level of production and reception. The analysis of texts shows, firstly, the divergent rationales of the two agents who cooperated as exhibition producers, the minority NGO who wished to signal self- empowerment of migrants on the hand and the city museum who aimed at selling the exhibition to a mainstream audience on the other hand. Secondly, it juxtaposes them with the plurality of readings by its recipients, which range from the recognition of an appeal to migrants via the mis-reading as 'guestworker' and its upvaluation through to an insider-perspective based on the knowledge of the word's connotations in the former Yugoslavia.

Keywords: exhibition title, guestworker, multi-accentuality, labour migration, stylistic device

This paper investigates the multi-accentuality of the term 'gastarbajteri' in the title of a recent exhibition on 40 years of labour migration in Austria. We will show that the choice of this term accommodated both hegemonic (commercial) and counter-hegemonic (political) interests and positions in the promotion of the exhibition content. The exhibition itself constituted the attempt of a non-governmental minority organization to provide an alternative, emancipatory representation of labour migration, which focused on legal, social, economic and political contexts and centred the perspective of migrants. The centrally located Vienna Museum featured as the host and cooperation partner of the NGO in this project. The data upon which the analysis is based stems from the European research project *Changing City Spaces,*[1] which addressed diversity policies in the context of transnational migration and cultural production. The exhibition *Gastarbajteri. 40 Years of Labour Migration*, on display in Vienna from 22 January to 11 April 2004,

was one of the case studies in this project. The collected data consists of original texts on display in the exhibition as well as texts collected during the time of the exhibition (in particular recordings of guided tours with school classes) and the guestbook, at the level of secondary sources, of interviews with several members of the exhibition team and with exhibition visitors. The relation of the data to both the production and the reception of the exhibition allows us to analyze, on the one hand, the dimension of intentions underlying the choice of the title and, on the other hand, the dimension of its readings by the recipients.

The article starts by addressing the wider social and political context and history of the exhibition project, and its institutional context. The second section will explore the title- word of the exhibition -'guestworker' ('Gastarbeiter'), its predecessors and successors in the discourse on labour migrants in Austria. Following on from there, we will distinguish between two sets of intentions underlying the title choice on behalf of the exhibition producers. The fourth section consists of an analysis of different readings of the title by exhibition visitors, which we will use to show that the reception of the word 'gastarbajteri' goes beyond the intended meanings on the production level.

1. Background of the exhibition 'gastarbajteri. 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration'

1.1 Social and political contexts of labour migration in Austria

The exhibition on the history of so-called 'guestworker' migration to Austria originated from the idea of a former labour migrant from Turkey, who approached the Vienna-based NGO Initiative Minorities for support in realizing this project. The particular form of labour migration associated with the term 'guestworker' had started in Austria in the 1960s. While recruitment and migration started somewhat earlier, the treaty between the Austrian and the Turkish Republic on the recruitment of Turkish workers for temporary employment in Austria and the official opening of a recruitment office in Istanbul date back to 1964. This bilateral treaty was preceded by a similar agreement with Spain in 1962, which did not succeed in practice however, and followed by a treaty with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1966. All of these agreements were aimed at bridging the period of economic boom and the concurring shortage of labour in Austria in the 1960s through the temporary import of 'foreign' labour until the Austrian labour market and economy would be self-sufficient again.

More significant in numbers than the labour migration arranged through the recruitment offices, was the labour migration that occurred in the following years under the label of 'tourist employment'. Based on family and wider social networks,

many migrants travelled to Austria as tourists and found employment there, which was then legalised retrospectively. The flexible handling of 'alien employment' by Austrian authorities changed as a consequence of the economic downturn, the demise in labour demand and growing Trade Union pressure in 1973 and 1974, exactly at a time where family migration set in at a larger scale. Based on the so-called 'rotation principle', labour migrants could easily be discharged when no longer needed. Furthermore, facilitated by the interdependent granting of residency and labour permits, migrants' dependence on their employers increased without gaining a better right to stay in Austria. Austrian federal politics and legislation became by and large more restrictive towards labour migration, and migration policies overall were guided by a concern with strictly controlling and reducing immigration (König and Stadler 2003). Contrary to Austria's history as a *de facto* immigration country, Austrian governments have persistently refused to acknowledge this status, as can be seen in the continued legal and socio-economic discrimination against the country's migrant populations and their descendants. According to recent estimates, about one quarter of the population of Vienna today has parents or grandparents born abroad, with the largest shares from one of the former 'guest-worker' countries, namely the former Yugoslavia and Turkey (Waldrauch and Sohler 2004: 153).

From the late 1960s onwards, migrants had formed various organisations in Austria, catering for a variety of needs and interests that the Austrian host society could not or did not provide but was partly ready to support. This was the case of the associations of (then) Yugoslav migrants which received support from the Austrian Chamber of Workers and Trade Unions (Bratić 2003). In addition to these examples of self-organisation, various organisations were formed partly from public, partly from third sector agencies, to represent, lobby and cater for the rights and interests of (labour) migrants, offering assistance in legal and social matters, from the early 1980s onwards. The association Initiative Minderheiten (Initiative Minorities), which organised the exhibition under discussion in this article, came into existence in the year 1991, proclaimed 'Year of Minorities'. Initiative Minorities understands itself as a platform, a network of organisations and individuals, whose aim is to form minority alliances in order to realize socio-political objectives in a self-empowering way.

A particular more recent political context of the exhibition project is the political turn in the Austrian federal government in February 2000, which marked the start of a coalition between the Austrian conservative party ÖVP and the right-wing 'Freedom party' FPÖ. Legal changes under this government regarding the employment of migrants include, amongst others: a further restriction of new immigration, the abolishment of a quota for less than highly skilled workers and a concurrent expansion of seasonal employment, which facilitates the temporary

employment of 'commuters' without granting them any further rights such as residency, family reunion or equal social rights (König and Stadler 2003). Since the change of government in 2000, many of the abovementioned minority organisations and activists, including Initiative Minorities, have joined forces with various cultural initiatives and artists to express their dissent with the new government and its policies. The third sector and particularly the cultural field in the non-public, non-commercial sphere underwent a period of (re)politicisation. It was in this political climate that the exhibition project took shape in the years 2001 until 2004.

1.2 An NGO's 'counter- narrative' at display in a city museum

The principal objective and interest of Initiative Minorities was to inscribe the 40 year-long history of state-commissioned labour migration to Austria into the host society's memory as a 'counter-narrative'. This story was not intended to be narrated in a linear fashion, yet should include different also contradictory narratives that remained unaddressed in ruling representations of 'guestworker migration' and its subjects, the so-called 'guestworkers'. Principal aims of the exhibition team that followed from an extended period of collective reflection and discussion pertained to the inversion of ruling forms and structures of representation, both in terms of the authorship and the content of representations.

This meant, firstly, that the exhibition was aimed to represent the perspectives of migrants as opposed to the practice of showing non-migrant perspectives *on* migrants, an ongoing prevalent practice in different contexts of knowledge production, including academic migration research in Austria. A direct consequence of this concern was the composition of the exhibition team, made up by migrants and non-migrants from different professional and migratory backgrounds. Secondly, negative stereotypical images should be deconstructed, instead of being simply replaced by positive images. Representations of migrants from Eastern and South Eastern European countries and their descendants in the media and in political discourse have been characterised overall by ethnicisation, criminalisation and/or victimisation. A rupture of common representation practices was attempted, for example, through the inclusion of documents — oral and written — that do not form part of general knowledge on 'guestworker' migration; for example, the contradictions between promises the recruitment office made to the recruited workers and the workers' actual working and living conditions.

Thirdly, rather than telling the story of labour migration as a monolithic objective history, many different stories were told by different authors about various aspects of labour migration. Eleven stations addressed different administrative, legal, economic, social and political aspects, each focusing on a specific place at a specific time, from the actual recruitment procedure via working and living

conditions to return migration, self-organisation in migrants' associations in Austria to the building of an Islamic cemetery in Vienna. Finally, instead of focusing the exhibition on migrants as individuals and thereby individualising many negative issues, the exhibition makers aimed at revealing structures that underlay and still underlie the processes and consequences of labour migration.

The exhibition took place in the Vienna Museum, one of the 'major' established museums in the centre of Vienna. The museum defines itself as an urban all-purpose museum with a clear focus on the history of the city (www.wienmuseum. at). At the time of the exhibition up to now, the museum underwent a phase of restructuring from a publicly subsidised cultural institution of the city of Vienna into an at least partly commercially run enterprise. Its director aimed to transform the museum into a space that should not only fulfil a representational function for the city, but it should also be "a place of remembering", also for its inhabitants, "with their diverse biographies" (interview with the director). The challenge the museum was facing related to expectations towards its transformation accompanied with its increased space for action in relation to the city of Vienna. In the specific case under discussion, the museum perceived the exhibition on migration as a chance to develop 'new' audiences, particularly a younger, urban clientele. The resulting cooperation between the third sector initiative and the established cultural institution was novel for both sides and therefore subject to a process of negotiation and learning.

In this paper we will concentrate on one particular element of this process, namely the process of respectively agreeing on the exhibition title "gastarbajteri — 40 Jahre Arbeitsmigration". As we will demonstrate, this title was simultaneously intended primarily as a political resource by the Initiative Minorities and considered a marketable label by the museum.

2.   A brief history of the word 'Gastarbeiter'

Since the early 1990s, the history of migrant movements and particularly of labour migration has been at the centre of a number of exhibitions in several European cities. Recent examples of their titles, mainly in German speaking countries, are: '*Migrationsgeschichte(n)*' (Migration stories) at the Museum of European Cultures/Museum europäischer Kulturen in Berlin, '*Geteile Welten*' (Shared Worlds) in Hamburg, '*Da und Fort. Leben in zwei Welten*' (Here and gone. Living in two Worlds), '*Fremde Heimat*' (<u>Foreign/Alien</u> Homeland) in Köln, '*Hiergeblieben*' (Stayed Here) in Hannover, '*Bewegliche Habe. Zur Ethnographie der Migration*' (Mobile Belongings. The Ethnography of Migration) at Schloss Hohentübingen, '*migration.eine zeitreise nach europa*' (migration. time travelling to Europe) at the

Museum for the World of Industrial Work/ Museum für Industrielle Arbeitswelt in Steyr, 'The Peopling of London' (1993) at the Museum of London. The last served as inspiration for the exhibition '*Wir. Zur Geschichte der Zuwanderung in Wien*' (Us. About the History of Migration to Vienna) at the Historic Museum of Vienna (Mattl and Payer 2004). Most of these titles express the theme of 'living in two worlds' with respect to travelling. Only the two last mentioned exhibition titles put the 'multicultural' of the city into the foreground. Labour migration is viewed as a part of the immigration history, as a characteristic of the city.

For the exhibition in the Vienna Museum in 2004, the museum management wanted to find a title that would reflect the aspired paradigm change from a politics of multiculturalism and integration to that of 'cultural diversity' politics, which the city of Vienna had recently proclaimed. Packaged as a re-orientation towards cities with a longer history of multiculturalist policies, this transformation seemed to mark a turn away from integration measures targeted by specific agencies to migrant groups, towards a 'mainstreaming' of minority concerns across all fields of urban government. However, at the time of the discussed research and with concrete measures still outstanding, many third sector agents in Vienna suspected the new brand of 'cultural diversity' to veil the withdrawal of existing support for third sector agencies in the field of antiracism and migrant activism.

Before addressing in more detail the process of finding a title and its underlying considerations, this section will draw a brief sketch of the history of the term 'gastarbeiter', based on some of the documents on display in the exhibition. A number of these documents, such as notifications of administrative posts, letters of recruiting entrepreneurs, newspaper extracts etc., illustrate the shift in terminology from 'alien worker' ('*Fremdarbeiter*') via 'guestworker' ('*Gastarbeiter*') to 'foreigner' ('*Ausländer*').

2.1 From 'alien worker' ('*Fremdarbeiter*') to 'guest worker' ('*Gastarbeiter*')

To name the first example, a certificate issued by the regional labour market office Lower Austria "on the securing of alien workers within the framework of the alien worker agreement" *('über die Sicherstellung von Fremdarbeitern im Rahmen der Fremdarbeitervereinbarung')* from the year 1964 — referred exclusively to 'alien workers', in line with many other documents from that period. The Austrian recruitment office in Turkey used terms such as 'transport of Turks' ('*Türkentransporte*'), 'selection documents' ('*Selektionsunterlagen*') and allocation of quota ('*Zustellungen von Kontingenten*') in its correspondence. The exhibition documented, furthermore, the practice of medical examinations such as dental checkups, which former 'guestworkers' described as extremely humiliating. At least the terminology

recalls the context of the forced recruitment of so-called 'civil workers of alien cultures' *('fremdvölkischer Zivilarbeiter*') under National Socialism.

As the exhibited letter of a Carinthian furniture company[2] illustrates, xenophobic attitudes could be openly expressed in the context of foreign labour recruitment:

(1)   "Due to an extreme lack of manpower and contrary to my previous antipathy against Turkish alien workers, I am forced to ask you today to allocate me unconditionally and as soon as possible three to five Turks for my furniture company."

'*Aufgrund äußersten Arbeitskräftemangels muß ich Sie heute, entgegen meiner bisherigen Abneigung gegen türkische Fremdarbeiter ersuchen, mir unbedingt und möglichst bald drei bis fünf Türken für meine Möbelfabrik zuzuteilen.*'

Towards the end of the 1960s, public discourse shifted from 'alien worker' ('*Fremdarbeiter*') to 'guestworker' ('*Gastarbeiter*'). This shift was caused by the intention to coin a positive term that was apt to counteract the (prevailing) hostile attitude towards migrants. Not only representatives of the private economy, but also the media circulated a more positive image of the 'guestworkers'. Several of the documents on display in the exhibition dating back to the early 1970s speak of 'guestworker quota' ('*Gastarbeiterkontingent*') or the 'guestworker problem' ('*Gastarbeiterproblem*') — whereby the newly coined euphemism was already turned into devaluation. In a mail out of the industry press service from the year 1970, the terminology switches between 'foreign labour' and 'guestworkers'. In the early 1970s, the term 'guestworker route' ('*Gastarbeiterroute*') emerged as a label for the trans-European transportation routes, especially between Germany via Austria to former Yugoslavia, which labour migrants used when commuting between their country of origin and their host country. Beyond its euphemistic and paradoxical character — guests are generally not expected to work — the term 'Gastarbeiter' signalled the underlying politics of this very labour recruitment scheme, above all its focus on the temporary character of employment. Migrant workers were assumed to return to their country of origin after earning a comparatively higher salary for a limited amount of time. Those conceiving and propagating the scheme had definitely *not* envisaged the long-term settlement of these workers and certainly not of their kin. Rapid rotation was the basic principle of this form of labour exploitation, which did not leave room for individually different life-planning options.

2.2 From 'guestworker' ('*Gastarbeiter*') to 'foreigner' ('*Ausländer*') and 'migrant' ('*Migrant*')

The term 'foreigner' entered the normative legal discourse first. In 1976, the Alien Employment Bill ('*Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz*') superseded the German ordinance (*Reichsverordnung*), which had been adopted into the Austrian legislation. According to this legislative act, the recruited workers could only stay in Austria as long as they were needed, whereby the status of the 'guestworker' was also legally fixed. The term 'foreigner' clearly highlighted the lack of Austrian citizenship in the judicial discourse, similar to the term 'alien', which found its entry into legislation via the Alien Bill ('*Fremdengesetz*') and the Alien Police ('*Fremdenpolizei*'). None of these legislative acts showed the term 'immigrant', nor did the discourse of the progressive Left itself concerned with political correctness, which soon preferred the term 'migrant' (Cinar 2004).

This discursive preference of the 'progressive Left' for the term 'migrant' pertains to it not categorising its referent in terms of a legal status generally ascribed by authorities or in any other terms conferred by another party, such as 'asylum seeker', 'economic refugee', 'political refugee', 'alien passport-holder' etc. It does not, therefore, define the subject denoted as 'migrant' in terms of her or his rights or lack of rights, or in terms of her or his length of stay. Furthermore, it does without linguistically marking its referents as 'outsiders' and as people that are not belonging, which alternative terms such as 'foreigner' and 'alien' do.

The word 'migrant' appeared since the 1980s alongside the word 'minorities' in the names of various institutions in Austria. This coincided with the arrival of political refugees following the Coup d'Etat in Turkey in 1980. To name some examples, the Advice Centre for Migrants in Labour Market Matters ('*Arbeitsmarktpolitisches Beratungszentrum für MigrantInnen*') was founded in 1983, the Education, Advice and Therapy Centre for Female Migrants ('*Bildungs-, Beratungs- und Therapiezentrum für Migrantinnen*') in 1984, the Central Editorial Office for Minority Matters (*Zentrale Minderheitenredaktion)* of the Austrian Federal Broadcasting Corporation *(ORF)*, who has been broadcasting the programme 'Homeland Foreign Homeland'('*Heimat Fremde Heimat*') since then. The association Initiative Minorities, founded in 1991, unites regional minorities who are constitutionally recognised as ethnic minorities with their own cultural rights in Austria, as well as migrants and other social minorities in one organisation. In the same period, a shift occurred from 'guestworker' ('*Gastarbeiter*') to 'foreigner' ('*Ausländer*'). The latter term was popularised when the right wing 'Freedom party (FPÖ) initiated a populist 'Foreigner referendum' ('*Ausländervolksbegehren*') in 1993.

Based on the consideration of this briefly sketched history of the different terms, the exhibition 'gastarbajteri. 40 years of labour migration' spoke deliberately

and consistently of 'migrants' ('*MigrantInnen*'), not merely to highlight its character as a counter-narrative, but also to incite reflection on the meaning of these terms (Böse 2005).

3.   'gastarbajteri' — Two varieties of irony at the level of production

3.1   Irony as a subversive form of self-empowerment

The increasingly negative connotation of the terms 'guestworker' and 'foreigner', both clear expressions of a 'non-alien majority perspective', formed the background of the title search for the exhibition at the Vienna Museum. The provisional title 'A long time in Austria — 40 years of labour migration' appeared too clumsy and too vague to all participants at the production level. Based on its political agenda of disrupting ethnicising and culturalising representations, the Initiative Minorities was keen to avoid any such formulations. Similar to designing a news title, the challenge consisted in finding a brief and concise formulation that would catch attention, offer a high factor of intelligibility and provoke a plurality of possible associations. This demanded, therefore, a formal and semantically elliptic phrase. When a member of the Initiative Minority team introduced the term 'gastarbajteri' into the title discussion, the idea was embraced initially mainly by the museum, but finally also by the Initiative Minorities team itself. For the NGO, the word 'gastarbajteri' embodied the sought-after change of perspective, that is from a majority perspective to that of a migrant perspective. As co-curator and Initiative Minorities manager, Cornelia Kogoj (2004, 83, our translation) explained in her contribution to the exhibition publication: "The Serbo-Croatian loanword "gastarbajteri" was used in former Yugoslavia as a label for labour migrants, who went to Germany since the 1950s and also to Austria since 1964." For a number of reasons, this term seemed more appropriate to the exhibition team than that of 'migrants', commonly used in the sector as discussed above.

On the one hand, 'gastarbajteri' signalled the adoption of a word from the Serbo-Croatian, respectively Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian colloquial language, a language that is spoken by roughly 10% of Vienna's population, in addition to German. On the other hand, a recognisable, yet transformed and re-interpreted sign was to enter the public sphere. We can identify a deliberate inversion of perspective here which, according to Kallmeyer (2001: 401, our translation), "seeks to replace the definedness by others through self-definedness and thereby override the dependency of self-definitions from others and reverse this relationship of dependency if necessary in a demonstrative manner."

Particular local manifestations of this discursive strategy in Austria are the youth organisation *TuschuschInnen Power* whose name refers to the ethnic slur 'Tschusch', or the organisation *Kanak Attak* in Germany. Another Austrian example is the popular, Vienna-based band *Tschuschenkapelle*, whose name symbolises likewise the self-determined adoption of a swearword. The origin of the word 'Tschusch' has not been resolved definitely, yet its usage has been traced back to the period of the Danube Monarchy, initially as a derogatory term for non-German speaking residents in Vienna and in Carinthia. More recently, the term has been used as a swear word towards migrants. (Priestly 1996)

The ironic character of this self-denomination is contained in the inversion of perspectives together with its emphasis on the experience of — also verbally performed — discrimination. As Noetzel writes in his reflections on "Irony between a discourse on virtues, a political category and social constructivism", irony is (used in politics) as a means of "learning to live with the foreign … It renounces the expelling of distance and has negative connotations particularly in cultures that hope for the reconciliation of the incompatible through community." (2003: 12, our translation)

Following Wilson and Sperber, relevance theory views irony as a representation of an utterance or an echo-like allusion to an utterance that has an obviously derisive character. Verbal irony is thus always interpretive and expressive of a distanciation from referenced opinions or attitudes. In this sense, 'gastarbajteri' is an ironic echo of the categorising word 'guestworker' (*'Gastarbeiter'*) or, speaking with Bakhtin, "a word which has disengaged from 'authority' in the course of a long and complex emancipation, which has chased authority out of itself aided by the antibodies of parody" ('*un mot qui, au cours d'une longue et complexe émancipation, s'est démarqué de l'autorité', l'a chassée hors de lui-même à l'aide 'des anticorps de la parodie'*) (Bakhtin 2003: 138).

The ironic utterance comprehends both the 'onlooker's look' and her or his distanciation from the latter; it hence bears a dialogic character. By distancing from and disqualifying the derogatory term, the ironic inversion questions the act of ascribing an identity per se, the act of categorising ethnic and social groups. Feridun Zaimoglu clearly voices this in his text *Kanaksprak* (1997: 12, our translation): "… the Kanaks search no cultural anchoring. They neither want to help themselves in the supermarket of identities nor do they want to merge in a herd of exiles. They have their own inner imprint and very clear ideas of self-determination. They form the actual Generation X, who was denied individuation and onthogenesis."

A number of authors (Giora 1998 provides an overview) have highlighted that irony is being employed as subversive strategy of self-empowerment. In the case of a reversal of perspectives, labels created by 'others' are turned into self-

descriptions, negative ascriptions are turned into positive ones, clear- cut contents become ambiguous (Ha 2004: 201).

The very ambiguity of the term made some members of the NGO team sceptical in hindsight as to the message they had sent out. In response to the re-emergence of the outdated term 'Gastarbeiter' in the media commentary on the exhibition, some members of the team even considered a public clarification that "gastarbajteri does not equal Gastarbeiter".

3.2 Irony as eye-catching signifier

On behalf of the museum, the title word 'gastarbajteri' found approval for very different reasons, as is illustrated in the following extract of our interview with the director of the Vienna Museum, Wolfgang Kos:

(2) "A minimum amount of distinction is needed in public communication, I need a buzz word. It must tell what this is about, I also need something inventive. The word gastarbajteri was all of that and it was also a stroke of luck, it was a very correct term at the same time. … You kill two birds with one stone. And this is a stroke of luck." (interview with W. Kos 2004)
'Es braucht ein Mindestmaß an Markanz in der Kommunikation, ich brauch ein Reizwort. Das muss sagen, worum es geht, ich brauch auch was Originelles. Das Wort gastarbajteri war das genau/ und es war auch ein Glücksfall, es war zugleich ein sehr korrekter Begriff. (…) Es ist doppelt gemoppelt und das ist schon ein Glücksfall.'

(3) "… this title (became) quickly an apt sign for an essential part of this theme — for that cultural hybridity that is typical of and indispensable for shifting identities". (Kos 2004: 14–15)
'… dieser Titel (wurde) schnell zu einem tauglichen Zeichen für etwas Wesentliches dieses Themas — für jene kulturelle Hybridität, die typisch und unabdingbar ist für pendelnde Identitäten.'

The title had to correspond to the criteria of strategic marketing: it had to be short and concise, and it had to be 'smart'. It should communicate a certain way of life, in this case through the signifier hybridity, as an expression of multicultural trendiness. 'Broken' German and code-mixing hold a considerable value in the symbolic economy, as Androutsopoulos (2001) and Kotthoff (2004) have described. Helping oneself from subcultural codes is common in advertising and in the media. In contrast to commercial enterprises, however, which can afford breaking taboos in order to draw attention, the museum has to respect political correctness, as the director of the Vienna Museum claimed. According to the museum's perspective, the word 'gastarbajteri' offered the advantage of easy recognition through establishing

a direct association with the familiar word 'Gastarbeiter', yet without being tainted by its derogatory connotations. This matters to the museum director, as the following interview extract illustrates:

(4) "Of course they say 'guestworker' in general parlance. If one deals carefully with what one is saying, what is meant, a term like guestworker is not possible. I cannot operate with the term in an official exhibition project. In a written text I can say, the so-called guestworkers. And then I also have to use the gender-aware expression. Here I am getting in a communication strategic no man's land." (Interview with W. Kos)
'Natürlich heißt es im schlampigen Sprachgebrauch 'Gastarbeiter'. Wenn man genau damit umgeht, was man sagt, was gemeint ist, ist so ein Begriff wie Gastarbeiter nicht möglich. Ich kann nicht in einem offiziellen/ in einem Ausstellungsprojekt mit dem Begriff Gastarbeiter operieren. In einem schriftlichen Text kann ich sagen, die sogenannten Gastarbeiter. Und dann muss ich ja Gastarbeiterinnen auch schreiben. Hier komme ich in ein kommunikationsstrategisches Niemandsland.'

The use of the recognisable but modified term, which is presumably understood as a *self*-definition, is conceived as politically correct by the museum. In the museum director's view, 'Gastarbajteri' carries an ironic connotation. However, it is the postmodern variant of irony, which comes along with a rather arbitrary use of quotations (see Colebrook 2004, Rorty 1989). In this variation of irony, it is not the origin of the quotation that matters, but its appearance as a reference as such. Moreover this form of quotation lacks any claim of self-empowerment, the quotation rather serves as eye-catcher. They work as a free-floating signifier without a signified, which endows the museum with distinction gains (Bourdieu 1982).

The exhibition title 'gastarbajteri' satisfies two different intentions. As an ironic, ironicising and marked inversion of perspective it serves as a political resource, in its eye-catching form as a marketing label. Volosinov (1973: 20) speaks of the multi- accentuality of the sign, and observes the presence of conflicts and contradictions in signs that embody competing voices and interests. Dialogic and pluralistic codes stand for contradictions, resistances and negotiations in a group. This multi- accentuality is embodied in the word 'gastarbajteri'.

4.   Recipients perspectives from politics to business and beyond

We will now turn to different readings of the title, following our understanding that style is constructed in the interaction of text and recipient. Following from this, every style choice establishes a particular identification offer to the recipients

(Hinnenkamp and Selting 1989). The data upon which the observations in this section are based consists of short interviews, which we conducted with exhibition visitors at the point of them leaving the exhibition; a guestbook, which was open to entries in the course of the exhibition, partly turning into an interactive platform with cross-referencing entries; finally recordings of some of the many events that had been organised as accompanying programme of the exhibition.

Looking at the reception of the exhibition title, we can find both meanings again — those we have identified at the level of production in the previous section. On the one hand, the term 'gastarbajteri' is perceived as a political resource, based on its inherent change of perspective, and its ironic distance signals the omission of identity ascriptions. On the other hand, the title is viewed as a commodity, because it catches attention, is provocative and disturbing, and it addresses furthermore a particular group of recipients by using a word from their code, perceived as 'foreign' by the German-speaking majority population. According to a third and least frequently observed reading, the term is perceived as an ironic quotation that signals both a political position *and* commodification.

4.1 Reception of 'gastarbajteri' as a political resource

The interpretation of the title as a political resource could be identified among both migrants and majority Austrians, respectively those considering themselves as such. Especially migrants from former Yugoslavia appreciated the term, not least because of its de-ethnicising and de-nationalisng character/effect. The guestbook shows a number of entries that refer directly to the war on the territory of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and its accompanying ethnicistion processes, that distance themselves from nationalistic attitudes and choose the term 'gastarbajteri' in order to avoid national identity ascriptions. To name an example, one entry was signed as follows:

(5) *"Pozdrav za sve gastarbajtere!*
Od Mileta, Dane Marinkovića, Mede i Mila!"
('A greeting to all gastarbajteri! From Mile, Dana Marinković, Meda und Milo!')

In a similar vein, 'gastarbajteri' is opposed to the earlier mentioned, ethnicising swearword 'Tschusch,' which is addressed to migrants in contemporary Austria. One can find, for example, the following self-confident statement in the guestbook:

(6) "I am not a *Tschusch*, but a gastarbajter"
'Ich bin kein Tschusch, sondern Gastarbajter.'

The word 'gastarbajteri' is being used as a positively connoted self-designation, which postulates recognition for a social group, characterised by a partly shared history. This positive connotation is sometimes conferred to the word 'guestworker' ('*Gastarbeiter*'). This becomes obvious in the following quotations from the guestbook:

(7)   "Thank you very much for the great exhibition! As a guestworker's child I am proud of my parents and grandparents, who have achieved a lot! Now as an independent business woman I will stand up for minorities and hope that there is even more tolerance to come in this country. Thank you!"
Vielen Dank für die großartige Ausstellung! Ich als Gastarbeiterkind bin stolz auf meine Eltern und Großeltern, die vieles geleistet haben! Heute als selbständige Geschäftsfrau werde ich mich für Minderheiten einsetzen und hoffe, dass es noch mehr Toleranz in diesem Land geben wird. Danke!'

(8)   "A very beautiful portfolio of the past of numerous 'gastarbajter' and a hommage to the hard life in a foreign country. … Melita, Ranko"
'Ein sehr schönes Portfolio der Vergangenheit zahlreicher „Gastarbajter" und eine Hommage an das schwere Leben in einem fremden Land. (…) Melita, Ranko'

The change of perspective that signals the revaluation of the group of gastarbajteri on the production side and is favoured on the reception side, is recognised by former gastarbajteri, by migrants and majority Austrians alike.

A second variant of the title-reception as a political resource could be observed with those visitors who viewed the use of the term as ironic. In this case, irony was perceived in the act of appropriation of a negatively connoted term and the inversion of its meaning. The ironic reading of 'gastarbajteri' as a political resource is partly accompanied by the understanding that the term is transformed into a marketable commodity, as it is 'smarter' than that of 'migrant', as one of the interviewed exhibition visitors formulated.

(9)   "When I heard — through the exhibition itself or maybe they said at the opening where this comes from — where ('gastarbajteri') comes from, I actually liked it a lot, this borrowing from German in Serbo-Croatian. And the way it is, one can't say guestworker, firstly this is outdated, secondly banal, also banal in terms of the prejudices it evokes. Like this it has a slightly alienating effect. One obviously understands the word (gastarbajteri), first one wonders about the ending, the morphology of the word. Yes, I think, it is alright to not say guestworkers, but labour migrants, as they now say, is a bit boring. So this is just smart."

> *'Ja, also nachdem ich erfahren hab — eh durch die Ausstellung oder bei*
> *der Eröffnung haben sie es glaub ich gesagt, woher das kommt, hat mit*
> *das eigentlich sehr gut gefallen, dieses Lehnwort aus dem Deutschen im*
> *Serbokroatischen. Und ist ja so, Gastarbeiter kann man nicht sagen, das ist*
> *erstens passé, zweitens abgedroschen, auch abgedroschen in dem Sinn, dass alle*
> *möglichen Bilder ablaufen, im Sinn von Vorurteilen. So hat es einen ein bisserl*
> *verfremdenden Aspekt. Man versteht das Wort (gastarbajteri) logischerweise,*
> *man wundert sich zuerst einmal über die Endung, über die Morphologie des*
> *Wortes. Ja i denk mir, das ist in Ordnung, wenn man Gastarbeiter net sagt,*
> *sondern Arbeitsmigranten, wie man heut sagt, dann ist das ein bisserl fad.*
> *Also es ist pfiffig einfach.'*

The recognition of the word's marketability by majority Austrians suggests that the usage of a 'foreign' code is widely read as an accommodating gesture, whether in a political sense (addressees as residents of the city) or in a commercial sense (addressees as clients of the museum). An exhibition visitor replied along these lines when the interviewer asked her to comment on the exhibition title:

(10)   "A: It is certainly suited to address also foreigners.
       Q: Do you know what it actually means? Is this simply a translation?
       A: It means guestworker in Turkish, I think. They said that in that radio
       programme."
       A.: Der ist sicher gut geeignet, um auch AusländerInnen anzusprechen.
       F.: Wissen Sie, was es eigentlich heißt? Ist das einfach eine Übersetzung?
       A.: Das heißt Gastarbeiter auf türkisch glaube ich. Das haben sie in der
       Diagonal-Sendung gesagt

The understanding of 'gastarbajteri' as a signal to the target group of migrants, labelled as 'foreigners' in the last quoted interview extract, comes close to the understanding of style as a commodity. The stylistic device, the use of a colloquial Serbo-Croatian term, is read as an identification offer, which aims at attracting the Serbo-Croatian speaking residents of Vienna to the exhibition.

4.2   From postmodern irony to 'double tschuschification'

A closer consideration of the visitors' readings shows further evidence of the multi-accentuality of the sign 'gastarbajteri,' in particular in the context of different readings of irony. Based on the collected data, the following characteristics of reception can be observed: the reduction of 'gastarbajteri' to 'guestworker' ('Gastarbeiter'); an ironic(ising) interpretation, which juxtaposes the term 'guestworker' with its social and historical context; a postmodern ironic reading; and finally the insider-

perspective, whereby the term highlights a 'double tschuschification' ('*doppelte Vertschuschung*').

The reduction of 'gastarbajteri' to 'guestworkers' could be observed mainly among majority Austrians. The actual title thus became a mere screen for associations, which contributes to an affirmation of the term 'guestworker', which was diametrically opposed to the intentions on the production side. To which extent the exhibition succeeded in challenging the contents that have been connoted with this term is another question that we could not address in our enquiry. The second of the following extracts from interviews with visitors of the exhibition suggests, however, that it did.

(11)   "I just thought that this is an indication of where the bulk of guestworkers comes from and they just call this gastarbajteri."
'Ich hab einfach gedacht, das ist also ein Hinweis darauf, wo kommt das Gros der Gastarbeiter her und die nennen das eben gastarbajteri.'

(12)   "The station on the residency law was especially informative. It is a shame that too few Austrians know of the exploitation of guestworkers."
'Besonders informativ war die Koje über das Aufenthaltsgesetz. Leider wissen viel zu wenige Österreicher über die Ausbeutung von Gastarbeitern Bescheid.'

A further aspect of the reception demands attention here, that is the perspective of visitors belonging to the 'second generation' of labour migrants — more precisely, the descendants of former 'gastarbajteri', for whom the exhibition conveyed a narration of their parents' and grandparents' history in Austria, with which they had been partly unfamiliar.

Depending on the recipient's contextual knowledge, the reduction — from 'gastarbajteri' to 'Gastarbeiter' respectively its direct translation back into German — was sometimes also read as a manifestation of irony. According to some recipients' understanding, the selection of the word 'guestworker' as exhibition title signified the exhibition makers' ironic comment on a public administration discourse. A discourse, whereby those who came and often stayed were verbally rendered permanent 'guests' while being treated as utterly unwelcome. Some exhibition visitors found the ambiguous term 'guestworker' therefore suitable for an exhibition that reveals precisely these contradictions. As one of the interviewed visitors put it:

(13)   "To me already the word guestworker is ironic, because a guest who stays for 30 years and has never been treated as a guest, this is ambiguous. Therefore I do not think this is an appropriate term, but maybe this is exactly why it fits for this exhibition, since considered realistically not everything was positive."

> *'Für mich allein schon das Wort Gastarbeiter ist ja eine Ironie, weil ein Gast,*
> *der hier 30 Jahre verweilt und auch niemals als Gast behandelt worden ist, das*
> *ist eine Doppeldeutigkeit, deswegen find ich ihn nicht sehr positiv besetzt, aber*
> *vielleicht passt er gerade für diese Ausstellung, weil eben nicht wirklich alles*
> *positiv war, jetzt realistisch betrachtet.'*

According to a third reading which we could also notice mainly among majority Austrians, the 'foreign' sounding title is perceived as provocative. Here 'gastarbajteri' stands for a postmodern signifier without a signified, which is not called in question any further. The signal effect, the awakening of interest, neutralises and overrules the evocation of a derogatory term. Asked what he thought of the title, another visitor replied:

(14) "I find it rather a bit provocative. And maybe attractive, so one engages with it. … I find the word guestworkers rather biased in Austria and I don't mind it, the title is a provocation and this maybe gets people here."
'Ich finde ihn eher etwas leicht provokant. Und vielleicht anziehend, dass man sich auch damit beschäftigt. … Ich finde, dass das Wort Gastarbeiter negativ unterlegt ist in Österreich und das stört mich/stört mich nicht, der Titel ist eine Provokation und das bringt vielleicht die Leute hierher.'

The fourth reading, the double 'tschuschification,' is restricted to those recipients who speak Serbo-Croatian and bear the respective kind of contextual knowledge. We borrow the verbal form 'tschuschifying' ('*vertschuschen*'), a derivative from the above mentioned term 'Tschusch', from one of the invited speakers in a thematic exhibition tour, whose statement will be quoted from below.

Different from the term 'Tschusch', which is only read either alongside its negative connotations or, in its reversed meaning, as an ironic self-denomination, the term 'gastarbajteri' allows for more diverse readings, as we have demonstrated. Even when read as an equivalent of 'guestworker', it is not necessarily connected to a derogatory meaning. The term 'gastarbajteri' has several reference groups; it allows for other connotations in the 'host country' than for example in the former Yugoslavia. The Zagreb-based journalist and cultural commentator Boris Buden explained in the course of one of the exhibition talks what he associates with the terms 'gastarbajteri' and 'guestworker':

(15) "My image of the guestworker was a man with a green hat, a blue jacket, a yellow shirt and the typical short red tie, a pair of hound's-tooth check pants and a beer bottle in his hand, cigarette in his mouth. They were like parrots in a grey world of labour, in the grey world of the social condition. … Gastarbajteri are similar to Tschuschen, are doubly tschuschified. They are nowhere at home, they succeed in making money, yet without climbing the

social ladder, they remain proletarians. For a guestworker child it is hard to become accepted by the elite in Zagreb."

'Das Bild vom Gastarbeiter war für mich ein Mann mit einem grünen Hut, einem blauen Sakko, einem gelben Hemd und der typischen kurzen roten Krawatte, eine Pepitahose dazu und eine Bierflasche in der Hand, die Zigarette im Mund. Sie waren wie Papageien in einer grauen Welt der Arbeit, in der grauen Welt der sozialen Lage. … Gastarbajteri ist so ähnlich wie Tschuschen, ist doppelt getschuscht. Sie sind nirgendwo zu Hause, es gelingt ihnen zwar, sich zu bereichern, doch nicht den sozialen Aufstieg zu machen, sie bleiben Proletarier. Für ein Gastarbeiterkind ist es schwer, sich in Zagreb gegen die Elite durchzusetzen.'

The above quoted interpretation implies a further level of ironic reading of the title, which has to be distinguished from the earlier mentioned 'postmodern ironic' reading. In the former Yugoslavia, 'gastarbajteri' was initially used as a derisive denomination of the people, who were officially named '*radnici na privremenem radu u inostranstvu*' (workers on a temporary stay abroad). Only later was it also used as an ironic self-denomination. Only those who dispose of this piece of contextual knowledge can interpret the exhibition title as 'double tschuschification'. For this group of recipients, two negative ascriptions resonate with the term, adding on to each other: 'gastarbajteri' as people, who dispose of economic yet only little cultural capital (as in the perspective of 'non- gastarbajteri' in former Yugoslavia), and 'guestworkers' as socio-economically marginalised people, who dispose only of a limited amount of social and cultural capital (as in the perspective of non-migrant Austrians). In the context of an exhibition that transports the marginalised history of labour migration to a prestigious place, both derogatory ascriptions are however not added any longer, but they are effectively multiplied with each other: from the double negative emerges a positive sign.

   With regard to the earlier discussed side of production, we can establish that this meaning was not primarily intended. On the contrary, the following quotations can be read as indications of a rather ignorant setting of a (postmodern inspired) sign of hybridity on behalf of the museum. The museum director explained the following on the usage of the word 'gastarbajteri':

(16)   "If one uses the term in its Slavic version, thus as a *self-denomination* of those people, who named themselves likewise — because there was no suitable term in their language for a historically novel form of organized labour migration." (Kos 2004, 14–15, *our emphasis*)
'Ja, wenn man ihn in seiner slawischen Version verwendet, also als Eigenbegriff jener, die sich so bezeichneten — weil in ihrer Sprache für eine

historisch neue Form von organisierter Arbeitsmigration kein brauchbares Wort vorhanden war.'

5.   Concluding remarks

The collected data has allowed us to analyse both the production and the reception side with regard to the exhibition title 'gastarbajteri. 40 years of labour migration'. On the production side, two principal readings were identified, both of which use irony as a stylistic device: The association Initiative Minorities aimed to express a reversal of perspectives as a strategy of empowerment, which it realises through ironic distancing; the Vienna Museum is keen to attract new urban audiences through the postmodern variant of an ironic quotation. The semantically relatively open term 'gastarbajteri', which did not belong to the standard majority language and was hardly known to a wider public, but worked as eye-catcher, facilitated bringing together the different expectations held by the cooperation partners. Furthermore, it found the positive approval of the title among all interviewees.

In its multi-accentuality, the sign 'gastarbajteri' is heteroglossic in several ways (Bakhtin 1973). On the level of the sign, it can not be assigned either to German or to Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian standard languages, yet refers to different codes. On the level of discourse, it refers to hegemonic discourses as well as to anti-hegemonic, counter- discourses. On an individual level, it allows for a plurality of readings (and possibilities for identification). The exhibition title has achieved the sought-after signal effect, which was proven not least by the number of visitors that exceeded all expectations. The average duration of visits exceeded in turn that of comparable exhibitions, which suggests that the exhibition managed to attract interest in a previously marginalised perspective. Furthermore, media reports on the exhibition partly adopted the title and, depending on their positioning, communicated its inherent reversal of perspectives either implicitly or explicitly in a wider discursive realm.

Notes

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Reframing Moral Politics

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1. Preview

This article[1] is an analysis and appraisal of Lakoff's classic work *Moral Politics*, drawing on insights of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

Notwithstanding a certain anachronism in subjecting this earlier work to the largely more recent (and geographically removed) CDA, it is never really unfair to subject one set of ideas to another: Modern philosophers criticize ancient Greek philosophers. There is nothing to prevent Lakoff from coming out the 'winner' on a specific issue; and indeed I will suggest that some work in CDA could well have followed Lakoff's example in certain respects.

The main issue to be raised is: How is it possible to incorporate discussion of 'values' into academic research into discourse and cognition, as both Lakoff and CDA do? Do we simply conclude that earlier scholarship was wrong to strive for impartiality? Or are there techniques that can prevent us from lapsing into unwarranted partiality?

The answer I will suggest is a concept of 'balance,' used somewhat non-traditionally: Its traditional context was attempting to achieve 'impartiality,' a traditional discourse ideal which will be rejected here as a goal. However bland and obvious a call for balance may seem to be, it is actually totally ignored in some work in CDA (see Section 4). Also, while many teachers are committed to balance, others allow a well-intentioned advocacy take over, and it is always difficult for a teacher to have a truly fair discussion with a student that holds a different opinion, in view of the power differential between them (as noted by Billig below). Lakoff admits his own preference for the liberal side of the political divide. One could use his admission as basis for a condemnation under the traditional criterion of impartiality, but, as previewed, the impartiality as such will not be deemed a desirable goal here.

2. Impartiality vs. responsibility

In CDA, there has been a deliberate attempt to allow the discussion of 'values' into scholarship. Sayer's (forthcoming) example deserves to be taken as classic: Of the two statements, (a) Thousands died in the Nazi concentration camps, and (b) Thousands were systematically exterminated in the Nazi concentration camps, the second sentence (b) is more subjective than the first, but it is also more accurate. Sayer notes that "emotional judgments are fallible — we may be falsely proud, or mistakenly angry — but then so too is unemotional reason. Reasoning and rationality are not to be confused with infallibility."

As a variant of discourse theory, CDA analyzes not only the linguistic features of discourse, but also their content. Thus, van Dijk contrasts CDA with the traditional "dominant norms of scholarship" in which the analysis is carried on "in a distanced and disinterested way": In CDA, the analysts "become more actively involved in the topics and phenomena they study" (van Dijk 1997: 22). Along these lines, Wodak (forthcoming) calls for "integrating insights from socio-cognitive theories." And Sayer (forthcoming) writes that "critical discourse analysis (CDA) can hardly be critical unless it acknowledges and evaluates how discourses impute and interpret significance or import and *how this relates to well-being*" (emphasis mine). "What CDA has done, greatly to its credit, is to make discourse analysis relevant by relating it to a moral cause and an ideological purpose" — so says Widdowson (2004: 89) praising this political aspect of CDA, while broadly criticizing it methodologically, for cherry-picking.

CDA can "disrupt the 'suspension of disbelief' which the everyday practices of a community perpetuate," by "turning language back on itself," and attempting to "examine the very reality" created, especially, by ruling elites. This is the goal of the present article. But the 'elite' that we will examine is not the Bush administration, as is common, but rather a specific 'academic elite': academic researchers in their own research in CDA and cognitive linguistics.

Clearly, Lakoff, with his overt participation in the presidential campaign for John Kerry, would go along with the political goals of CDA; Widdowson's comment — both its praise and its critique — would actually apply more strongly to Lakoff, because his methodology, such as it is, is far less systematic than that of CDA. As in his previous research, Lakoff contents himself with laying out hypotheses with their empirical implications — usually amounting to isolated examples, many of them unsourced. Surely one never finds, in his work, anything approaching a systematic analysis of some coherently defined body of data, such as 'Republican national speeches, 1990–2000.' The article by Butt et al. and even the one by Chilton, to be discussed in Section 4 as examples of CDA, *seem* closer to this traditional approach.

Were our predecessors wrong to value impartiality? Or are we simply 'selling out' for the sake of being able to make claims that were once regarded as irresponsible? As cognitive linguists and discourse specialists, are we in fact bringing to bear specific important insights about the nature of thought and language, or are we simply trading off our 'good reputation' in the name of a worthy (but subjective, and therefore essentially private) cause? But here the question of whether we have special expertise is tricky: A professor of meteorological science ought to be able to bring special expertise to issues of global warming — but is s/he immune to persuading himself on political grounds? And what general expertise, applicable to the nature of public debate, does an expert in discourse theory have?

Widdowson's comment, as quoted above, is actually rather complex in its intentions and implications. I suggest that we should be most disturbed by its positive dimension: If support for a cause is not justified by the quality of the research, then shouldn't he be more critical of the whole enterprise? Will 'using' our name in the service of a political goal, no matter how worthy, compromise the future of our very institution?

It should be no secret that the overwhelming majority of faculty and students in American universities are liberal (where not leftist). "College faculties, long assumed to be a liberal bastion, lean further to the left than even the most conspiratorial conservatives might have imagined, a new study says. By their own description, 72 percent of those teaching at American universities and colleges are liberal, and 15 percent are conservative, says the study being published this week …" (Kurtz 2005). On my own campus, which perhaps as far to the right as one generally sees, a debate on the Iraq War, as early as 2002, could find only one professor from a faculty of a thousand to represent the 'pro' side. Examples could be easily multiplied.

While there is a clear distinction between 'bias' (a strongly held opinion, motivated by prejudice) and 'opinion' (which may result from considerable thought and research), it is important to invoke a further concept on the same scale: a scholarly 'claim.' To achieve a claim, one must examine the evidence explicitly, and be able to lay out specific, legitimate lines of argumentation referring to reliable data. Scholarly research should consist of reasoned claims, not opinions. For contrast, consider the 'historic Slavonic conference' referred to in de Bray (1963) at which the attending *experts* 'voted' that Serbo-Croatian is the "most pleasant sounding Slavic tongue." Surely this is an opinion, not a scientific claim, no matter how well-established the 'expertise' of the attendees.

Even a well-reasoned and well-researched claim does *not* guarantee 'truth.' This is one reason why oats or nuts may be proclaimed as good for us one day, and bad the next. Science does not always accumulate truths, but rather more commonly overturns *seeming* 'truths' from one generation to the next. No research field, no matter how scientific, is immune to the well-known pendulum swing.

Global warming is predicted now, but global winter was predicted several decades ago. Even the reasoned claims of many scholars in consensus do not guarantee truth, and yet we should demand reasoned claims in academic research, not consensus. We must not let validation of important scholarly ideas come cheap — whatever happens to motivate them. And I will propose a concept of 'balance' as a useful concept in this process of validation.

3. Two levels of validation

We must begin considering Lakoff's *Moral Politics* (henceforth *MP*) by drawing a distinction between two levels of validation: the psychological/descriptive and the political/normative. It seems to me that not very much attention has been devoted to the specific question of *how* claims on each of these levels can be validated: As we will see (and this will be my rephrasing of Widdowson's methodological complaint), claims are often put forth in an ad-hoc and willy-nilly fashion, with little attention to this broader issue. And this complaint applies, if anything, more to some research in CDA than to *MP*, although there are crucial gaps in Lakoff's outline on both levels.

Since our focus is *MP,* we can conveniently use as examples the two overarching cognitive models presented in this book, the Strict Father and the Nurturant Parent.

As is well-known, the Strict Father is the psychological model proposed for *conservative* political thinking. Lakoff does not present this complex metaphor in a strictly deductive way, but a notion of *absolute morality* is a logical key to the whole metaphor. Thus, there is a 'natural moral order' that provides a place (a 'frame') for God, societies (including nations), and families. On the individual level, 'personal character' ('moral strength') refers to the ability to follow absolute morality, with a host of specific metaphors, referring e.g. to economic transactions, life as a journey, and health (that is moral health) at each point. It is obvious enough that opponents of the moral order are classified as 'immoral' in this system. Of course there can be variants in application, as Lakoff notes; for example, a woman can fill the role of the 'Strict Father' of the model, in a family that she heads, as Lakoff notes.

In contrast, the Nurturant Parent is proposed as a model for *liberal* political thinking. Its main notions are 'empathy' and 'cooperation.' The model is essentially simpler than the Strict Father, in that each application discussed is a direct application of the concepts of 'empathy' and 'cooperation' to the given moral domain: taxes are needed to help (*cooperate* with) our fellow-citizens who are in need; war is best avoided because it is better to *cooperate*, with the help of *empathizing* with others' points of view.

Both models are examples of the general concept of metaphoric thinking, presented earlier in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who propose that all human cognition is by its nature metaphoric, whether daily use of syntactic constructions (e.g. 'within a week' and other expressions using the 'container' metaphor for time), or political metaphors, such as the family metaphors applied to politics in *MP*.

3a. The psychological/descriptive

On the first level of validation, any metaphors and models, as claims about psychological reality, would have to be validated as predictors of psychological behavior (including discourse). For example, to classify a given discourse as conservative vs. liberal, following Lakoff, one would have to find examples of the two metaphors — presumably in proportions that would justify classification.

We can again note the almost complete absence in *MP* of any discourse data. Lakoff limits himself to a brief note with the generalization that I have just given, with unsourced individual examples, rather than proving all aspects of the two models with references to actual political discourses. This is an accurate enough complaint, and surely legitimate in the ultimate appraisal of *MP*. But I have mixed feelings about the fairness of so doing — almost as if to say: "Surely Aristotle is the father of empirical science, and yet his empirical observations are often vague." One may fairly criticize Lakoff's brand of 'cognitive linguistics' for being less empirical than CDA, which has much the same goals. And yet it is also fair to ask whether or not Lakoff reasonably well accomplishes his own goals, which we can define as outlining the two contrasting models; and, equally important, are the models relevant and useful in empirical research?

I suggest a positive appraisal: I have used his contrasting political models in my college course in 'Language and Politics': Students read the book and discuss the models, and then find examples of them in political discourses. There is simply no question that these models function very well for this kind of research, providing students with an exciting as well as significant activity. To be sure, not every political discourse uses the metaphors, but most do, in very straightforward ways. Lakoff's models are clearly a highlight of the study of language and politics.

I particularly give Lakoff credit for his attempt at *balance*, in that he presents the two overarching contrasting models in the first place. Once it was routinely expected that both sides of an issue would be presented; this was, for example, the basis of formal debate, as well as an ideal for intellectual conversation generally. As noted, the attempt at balance went along with the ideal of impartiality — which I rejected as an ideal above. But even if the ideal of balance once emerged from the ideal of impartiality, this does not mean that it makes sense only in that context. On the contrary, I suggest that striving for balance is a very worthy ideal, even a

criterion — at least as a step in evaluating models. Scientific method at its best does not lay out criteria for 'truth,' but only for reasoned scientific 'claims': In the real world, truth itself may be forever hidden from us, and it is our job to spell out *criteria* for scientific claims. And 'balance' is a legitimate part, I propose, of these criteria.

Large scale surveys of actual discourses hardly seem likely to provide grounds for the kind of specific tinkering with the models that empirical scientists like to do, or at least ought to like to do. But striving for balance is one possible technique to help tinkering. In my course, one student noticed that the description of the Strict Father model in *MP* is somewhat longer than the description of the Nurturant Parent — and attributed this difference to Lakoff's admitted preference for the Nurturant Parent model, if Lakoff was more able to describe the model of his opponents than of his own side. Not only is the description of the Nurturant Parent model shorter, it also seems, on logical examination, to be missing logical elements ('frames') that are clearly necessary to explain the linguistic and cognitive behavior of liberals, in particular as regards those who oppose the given model, as we will now see.

Later in *MP*, Lakoff introduces a concept of 'demons,' with Hillary Clinton as the example for conservatives, and Newt Gingrich as the example for liberals.[2] Following the Nurturant Parent model, we could not help wondering where the demons come from in the model, that is, where is the 'frame' for them? Within the Strict Father model, it is easy to see why, logically, there are demons. Given 'absolute' concepts of good and evil within the model, it is natural to conclude that anyone advocating 'evil' positions, and especially anyone fighting for them, not only with political action, but especially with violence, will naturally qualify as a 'demon.' But how, in the Nurturant Parent model, which is all *empathy* and *cooperation*, and has no concepts of good and evil as such, does a category of 'demons' arise at all? There is simply no 'frame' for this concept — at least as far as Lakoff has elaborated the model!

Let's consider specific examples. One of the main claims of the liberal complaint about the War on Terrorism is that we could have avoided it by dialogue: We should have 'talked' with Saddam Hussein, and even (in the view of some) Osama bin-Ladin, as well as the current Mahmud Ahmedinejad and Kim Jong-Il. These are all 'demons' to conservatives, but to liberals they are simply 'human beings' (or, at most, 'bad guys,' and certainly not 'evil people'), who need to be understood (via *empathy*) and talked with (via *cooperation*).

For a few on the same side of the political divide, George W. Bush is the 'real terrorist,' and the US is a 'bigger threat' to world peace; surveys of Europeans and others often arrive at a similar hierarchy. Similarly, Congressman Jim McDermott, interviewed in Baghdad on the eve of the Iraq invasion, accused Bush of lying, but,

when asked about Saddam Hussein, said that his words should be "taken at face value." Anyone following the statements coming from Democrats more recently (Ted Kennedy, Dick Durbin, James Murtha, etc.) will surely have heard similar logic (even if sometimes only briefly). Noam Chomsky, at a conference in Lebanon, noted that "the policies of Hamas are more forthcoming and conducive to peace than those of the United States or Israel." (http://www.memritv.org/Transcript. asp?P1=1152) Surely the idea of demons — Bush, as well as Gingrich — is a pervasive enough logical trope in liberal discourse that we would want to ensure that it is allowed, via a 'frame,' in the Nurturant Parent model. But how does it relate to *empathy* and *cooperation*, the central (if not only) concepts of the model?

To put the point in a cognitive anthropological format, "group cohesion … leads to xenophobia, which leads to fanatical hatred" (Boyer 2001: 265) — but this is "supposed to be" a description of old-fashioned *religious* hatred (the quote begins "gods and spirits lead to group cohesion…"), which liberalism is "supposed to be" the antidote to. How can it then characterize liberalism itself?

Of course it is empirically conceivable that George W. Bush really *is* a 'bigger terrorist' than bin-Ladin, e.g. that Bush's attack on Iraq is a morally more reprehensible than bin-Ladin's attack on the World Trade Center. But this is a specific empirical claim, in need of specific empirical evaluation (a 'level-two' claim). One cannot help suspecting that the 'Bush as terrorist' claim is a corollary of the Nurturant Parent model — an idea that naturally spills out of the model and informs the analysis of empirical facts, rather than a claim deriving from empirical facts as such. And to the extent that this is true, it is worth wondering why the Nurturant Parent model, which does not even seem to have a logical place (a 'frame') for demons *at all*, is apparently (as an empirical matter) in such great need of finding demons.

For another example of gaps in the Nurturant Parent model, while it is natural within the Strict Father model to *preserve* existing social structures as exemplars of the moral order, there is nothing in the notions of cooperation and empathy that would lead one necessarily to want to *overturn* existing social structures — and yet it is common for liberals to suggest such overturning. One current example is same-sex marriage. It is easy enough for a liberal to argue that same-sex marriage is justified by considerations of love — but Lakoff describes the Nurturant Parent model as being based on cooperation, not love! Again, a logical link is missing in the model.

Lakoff's main argument for same-sex marriage, repeated in *MP* and in *Don't Think of an Elephant* (Lakoff 2004), is that marriage is a loving commitment between two adults. However, the overwhelming majority of dictionaries define marriage with reference as a relationship between adults of opposite sex. Dictionaries are not legislatures, of course, but they are observations of usage. On what

grounds would Lakoff create his own definition? Such persuasive definitions are an example of circular logic, and obviously illegitimate as argument. It is surely fair for the Nurturant Parent model to be more sympathetic (*empathetic*) to the psychological needs of gay people: That much is given directly by the models. But redefining an institution radically for the sake of less than 1% of the population (since not all gay people do in fact want to marry) does not follow quite so easily — unless one has a built-in preference for overturning social structures (as noted, an oddity of liberalism).

Liberals sometimes claim that the written laws of marriage do not specify opposite sex. But to interpret a law literally while changing its societal effects radically would seem to be the move of a specific type of lawyer — not a type known for its *empathy* and *cooperation*! The broader, underlying question is why the Nurturant Parent model favors innovation with as much conviction as conservatives prefer to conserve. A liberal or leftist would surely be able to argue passionately for every institution that s/he would like to overturn; but it is the job of the discourse specialist or cognitive linguist to observe how readily s/he is doing so, when it would seem that empathy and cooperation would recommend a certain respect for human society and its institutions.

Finally, let us note that there is lack of balance in Lakoff's very choice of terms. Lakoff notes that mothers can be 'Strict Fathers,' but here he notes that the Nurturant Parent model "seems to have begun as a mother's model, it has now become widespread among both sexes" (*MP* 2002: 108). As it happens, Lakoff's own theoretical concepts allow a more balanced choice of terms: Definitions are often put forth, classically, as sets (as in Set Theory), which requires 'all and only' features defining the set; but Lakoff refers to 'radial categories,' e.g. while a robin is a prototypical bird, penguins and ostriches can also be birds in a 'radial' sense, although not prototypical. Analyzing cognition in terms of metaphors inevitably fits this mode of defining: Obviously, time is not a container, even when metaphorically conceptualized as such, nor is George Washington an actual 'father,' although he is a metaphorical father of his country, i.e. a radial non-prototypical father.[3]

So what would be the problem with a terminologically neat contrast between 'Mommy model' and 'Daddy model,' drawing on the old metaphor and concept of the 'War of the Sexes'? Just as a woman can be a 'Strict Father' in metaphoric terms by acting according to the model, so too a man, 'radially,' can be a 'Nurturant Mother.' To name the two models in such a more balanced way seems to aid clarity.

Also, of course, 'Strict' is a negatively loaded word in current American English, whereas Nurturant is positively loaded. Since Lakoff admits his own preference for what we will therefore call the 'Mommy' model, it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that he simply tried to 'universalize' his own worldview: 'Strict Father' clearly evokes feelings of "angry white men," whereas Nurturant Parent can

hardly offend the most chauvinist male. Whatever Lakoff's intentions, choosing a narrower term for one's opponent's views is an old technique of 'marginalization.' In any case, the goal of models is not to avoid giving offense, but rather to achieve clarity.

Returning to our question of validation on this first level: In the abstract, the criteria for validation are clear enough, amounting simply to how well a given model predicts (explains) specific verbal and cognitive features of the population that it describes. This generality is easy enough to agree on, but, as discussed here, the urgent goal at present is not to do mass application of Lakoff's models to broad corpora: A more urgent need, I suggest, is study and elaboration of ('tinkering with') the models themselves, as I have attempted here. And in this attempt, I find that the (intuitive) concept of 'balance' — in particular, balance over the American political divide — was helpful in discovering specific modes of thought and rhetorical tropes that were not accounted for in Lakoff's 'Mommy' (Nurturant Parent) model.

While including references to how liberals find conservatism 'mean-spirited,' etc., let us note too that Lakoff's outline is also short on the description of how conservatives find liberalism, for which such terms as 'naïve,' 'adolescent,' or the like, would be appropriate. Lakoff similarly discusses the issue of application in some detail for the Daddy model, but for the Mommy model, all is again empathy and cooperation, without a specific consideration of where common sense might enter as a limiting factor. But the very idea that empathy and cooperation might solve all the world's problems is an example of the very naiveté that conservatives point to on the other side.

3b. The political/normative

Let us turn now to the second level of validation, the political/normative. Here we are concerned not with how well the models describe psychological reality, but rather with how well each model puts forth useful 'prescriptions' for society. Here again we can recall Widdowson's comment, which assumes the obvious: that CDA takes a more or less unified stand on the liberal side of the political spectrum.

Let us consider a specific repeated misstatement of Lakoff, this time on taxes. Lakoff often repeats the concept that, to conservatives, taxes are 'theft' of private property. But no mainstream conservatives oppose all taxation, as Lakoff's formulation implies. And it is hardly reasonable, much less conservative, to be willing to write a check to a mugger in the street, even if he is just demanding a small sum, on grounds that he is stealing 'just a little.' Conservatives oppose the expansive liberal programs that liberals, including Lakoff, propose to be the 'price of citizenship.' The conservative's concept of 'starving the beast' relates less to tax as theft, and more to a critique of 'do-something-ism,' the assumption that every problem

needs a federal program, and that every federal program needs more funding. To use an epithet from our comparison, conservatives find it 'naïve' to think that every problem can or should be solved by expansive federal programs   which, in the past (often unbeknownst to liberals), have often produced more harm than good. One example is Johnson's War on Poverty, which, instead of reducing poverty, created an intergenerational cycle of dependence on welfare that lasted until the 'mean-spirited' welfare reform.

Another example is the banning of DDT: Although initially justified (in Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*) because of suspected harm to the bird population, the ban has since allowed a million or more deaths caused by malaria, which DDT would have prevented, as indeed it had already wiped out malaria in the West.

Are social programs justified by their intentions — or by their results? The naïveté that conservatives attribute to liberals is relevant here. Liberal programs are often defended on the basis of the intentions behind them; this is the basis for the complaint that conservatives are 'mean-spirited,' after all.

Does raising the minimum wage in fact lead to more unemployment of the workers earning at that level? Does lowering tax rates invariably raise tax revenues (the Laffer Curve)? Discourse specialists cannot, of course, replace empirical scientists, but we can, hopefully, detect (or at least investigate) important discourse features of their argumentation and research. Discourse specialists might have something valuable to contribute by summarizing the debate on either question. For example, they can point out that calling someone 'mean-spirited' for opposing a higher minimum wage or lower taxes does not constitute a legitimate validation for the opposing claim, and that tax cuts will always 'favor the rich' in the sense of giving back more to those who pay more — unless they engage in income redistribution.

Other interesting issues abound: Is the consensus about global warming based on the reasoned claims of a majority of scientists in their research? Or, as professor of meteorology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard S. Lindzen (Lindzen undated) argues, is it an artificially manufactured consensus, perpetuated by the channeling of research funding — and the tyranny of the majority? (See also Lomborg 2001.) The proposed goal of 'balance' would imply the need for supporting the research of mavericks, in order to test the consensus.[4]

Lakoff's main mechanism for validation of political models on our 'level 2' is to rely on 'scholarly studies.' Thus he invokes a number of scholarly studies against corporal punishment for children, for example. The biggest weakness in this type of argumentation appears clearly in his argument for same-sex marriage, where he refers to a "growing body of research" supporting the idea that homosexuality is innate. This rhetorical trope might be termed the 'argument from future research' — and it is surely a logical fallacy.

But even citing a large body of research, as Lakoff does with corporal punishment, is worthy of our suspicion — and can be better evaluated, I suggest, via the concept of balance. The simple fact is that academic researchers do have their personal preference — and it is overwhelmingly liberal (or leftist). To make a specific claim for a liberal 'bias' in research would be far more than I can presently deliver,[5] but Lakoff himself has put forth the observation that the research is predominantly liberal in its conclusions. I am not able to prove that the guard of the hen-house actually ate the missing chicken — but there does seem to be value, even in the absence of such a proof, to point out that the guard is, after all, a fox, and foxes have been known to like hens.

In the name of balance, professors, whether of natural sciences or of discourse, might well purposely subject themselves to an enforced balance by reading any of the many works coming 'from the other side.' I can specially recommend Johnson's *The Intellectuals* (1988) as well as Jastrow (1992) on general intellectual history, and on specific issues Greene (2005), Dalrymple (2001); and also Collier and Horowitz (2004), and, more popularly, Stossel (2006), Schweizer (2005), Charen (2004), Flynn (2005), and others easily found.

4. Conclusion: Bias and balance

Here I will briefly recapitulate the general claim of this article, bringing in a few hitherto unmentioned implications, and, just as important, briefly mention three other examples for rhetorical analysis — including the two articles in CDA that I have already mentioned as providing interesting further examples.

The goal of research is to accumulate claims (based on reasoned argumentation and reliable data). The ultimate goal of truth remains elusive, but we can enforce, through our definition of scientific method, important distinctions between bias/opinion on one hand, and legitimate claims on the other. I doubt whether it is worthwhile to try to distinguish bias and opinion: We are not interested in whether Lakoff has the 'opinion' that liberal approaches to child rearing are better, unless he can turn this opinion into a 'claim.'

I have elsewhere (bar-Lev forthcoming) done a close analysis of two critiques, in CDA, of Bush's rhetoric, one by Butt et al. (2004), the other by Paul Chilton (2001). Both articles would obviously find approval in the positive side of Widdowson's comment, criticized here. It is particularly worth noting, from our present point of view, that both CDA critiques of Bush are bereft of any attempt to achieve balance on any of the various possible levels on which balance could be achieved. They do not contrast Bush's discourse with anyone else's; they do not even contrast Bush's discourse with some imaginary ideal. Bush is accused of Nazi-

like rhetoric — but without any comparison with actual pieces of Nazi rhetoric, or with anything else. Although not a part of traditional syllogistic logic, it does seem to be a reasonable minimum requirement to somehow spell out what one means by one's terms in such contrastive ways.

It is not clear that their criticism amounts to anything more than pointing to Bush's advocating war. In my critique of the analysis of Butt et al., I noted that Bush's rhetoric was quite similar to that of Churchill and FDR — not widely reputed to be 'Nazi-like.' There is nothing in either article to explicitly distinguish this war from other wars, including World War II: If they wish to criticize Bush for starting *this* war, and only this war, aren't they obligated to draw this distinction? Or does CDA want to proclaim that *all* war is 'Nazi-like' (perhaps including war against Nazis)?

They accuse Bush of unwarranted grouping (and therefore stereotyping) of the 'enemy,' but in fact Bush took pains to exclude Muslims in general (hence the awkward term 'War on Terrorism'). Of course it is possible to disagree with the grouping of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, which is implicitly assumed by the Iraq invasion.[6]

There is no attempt in either article to show ways in which Bush's specific grouping, or his call to war, or his metaphors are actually incorrect, or even less apt than specific alternatives. Does this not amount to an implicit assumption that one should never group 'enemies,' never invoke the need for war or violence — and never use metaphors? It is certainly possible to read both articles this way, because of the absence of the relevant disclaimers. In my critique of the articles, I argue that grouping[7] and enemies and metaphors are inevitable and wholly benign modes of thought. If the claim is that violence and war are 'never the answer,' they should certainly prove this claim in research journals of politics, where it would constitute a hugely significant advance in politics, rather than assume it as a way of 'bashing' one's political opponents for their rhetoric. Until then, there is a lively concept of *casus belli*, accepted in international law.

These critics of Bush use their own grouping, stereotyping, and demonizing. Butt et al., in particular, accuse Bush of 'demonizing' those groups involved in, or sympathetic to, 9/11 — but I accused Butt et al. of 'demonizing' Bush. Bush, at least, accuses his opponents of violent *acts* such as 9/11, whereas Butt et al. accuse Bush of being Nazi-like for his war-like *rhetoric*. But what was wrong with the Nazis was not their rhetoric but their genocidal acts.

Not that I am criticizing Butt et al. for focusing on rhetoric: That is only appropriate for discourse specialists to do, especially in a journal of discourse. But by ignoring the needed larger context, they are in danger of blowing their insights out of proportion, like a Parisian tailor complaining, 'Yes, Hitler did that genocide thing — but you should just think about the atrocities of fashion that he committed!'

In conclusion, let me note again that my concept of rhetorical 'balance' is not a mechanical concept that one can apply in some automatic way. I have argued that that impartiality is not a worthwhile goal: I think that even scholars are more likely to fool themselves into thinking that they are already impartial than to imposing any sort of self-correction on this level. But they may be helped by an external criterion of balance, to force them into answering the 'best arguments' of their opponents, or at least to read their opponents, and be aware of their viewpoints — at their strongest, not their weakest.

A final brief example, from the ravings that fill Middle Eastern political discourse, is an article that begins: "About six million Jews lost their lives in the Nazi Holocaust. [But while] the [number of] victims of the tit-for-tat killings between Israelis and Palestinians during the past decades may not reach the number of the victims of Auschwitz and Treblinka in a day, there are obvious similarities between what the Jews suffered under Nazism and what the descendants of the Holocaust victims are afflicting to the Palestinians." (http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD120006)

What I find interesting about this article is that, in spite of its obvious one-sided 'logic,' it includes just enough balance to provide data for its own undoing: If the actual number of dead in all the decades of Israeli 'oppression' of Palestinians is less than the number of Jewish victims of Nazis in a single day, then considerations of balance would certainly lead one to ask in what way there are 'similarities,' and whether these similarities really are significant. I rather less expect the author of this article himself to ask these questions than for Lakoff to suddenly argue the benefits of the Iraq War, but certainly, for example, seeking balance for the article would make an interesting class-room experience. It is similarly not unreasonable to expect that asking for such balance would be a routine part of the expertise of discourse analysis, although it does not seem at present to be a routine part of CDA, as we can see from the two articles discussed briefly above.

Universities, like newspapers or other institutions, can define themselves in partisan terms if they wish — but perhaps not without compromising their essence. I can see a positive purpose in professors themselves modeling active citizenship via advocacy of particular positions — as long as they do not turn their classes into 'teach-ins,' in which advocacy overcomes clarity and insight. Of course it is important for scholars to be careful that their advocacy focuses on worthy causes, e.g. genocide in Darfur, as opposed to defense of the Hamas party platform as superior to the views of Israel or America (at least this is my own appraisal, even though it seems to differ from that of Noam Chomsky).

But if any advocacy is allowed, it is crucial to seek balance — with enough energy to overcome the inherent power imbalance of the classroom. Even partisans will want to train their protégés to be able to answer the best of opposing

arguments, not their worst arguments. It is odd that American universities, at least, in their desperate search for diversity (which has even sometimes put them at odds with the constitutional requirement of non-discrimination), would ignore the need for diversity in the one area in which the university specializes: ideas.

Sorting out values issues within empirical issues is a complicated business — but one to which discourse analysts can hopefully contribute. As discourse specialists, we may be needed to help empirical specialists avoid their own errors, and in any case to evaluate their arguments in specific, discourse related ways. This may be an interesting way to answer Wodak's call for bringing empirical science into discourse theory.

The new 'logic' used in modern science and politics is already not the same as old-fashioned, 'classical' logic (e.g. set theory is no longer adequate). But there must also be an implicit, as yet only dimly perceived *newer* logic, e.g. to distinguish between persuasive rhetoric (including rhetorical tricks) and valid argumentation. I can conceive of no finer goal for modern discourse theory, including CDA, than to spell out this new logic.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Ruth Wodak for introducing me to CDA, Enikö Csomay for discussion related to this article, and Jeff Kaplan for suggestions on two earlier versions; of course, they are not responsible for its shortcomings, nor do they necessarily agree with any of its conclusions.

2. I suggest that the notion of 'demons' is far too simple: Apart from true demons — that is, almost Satanic figures, there can also be, for any ideology, simple opponents, as well as more or less innocent by-standers. For conservatives, for example, there is a clear difference between John McCain and Ted Kennedy. But for simplicity I will continue to use the term 'demons,' following Lakoff's usage.

3. This may be an appropriate place to note that the first definition given by Webster in his original, 18th Century dictionary of English — contemporaneous with "all men are created equal" in the Declaration of Independence — was not "male," but "human being."

4. I am not proposing that every single issue needs to be presented with a balancing opponent in every venue, e.g. flat-earth theory or Nazism (although it is good for libraries to preserve them). But if liberals imply that any skeptic about global warming is like a flat-earth theorist, or that tax-cuts or even the Iraq War are "Nazi-like," they are (I suggest) engaging in obvious 'demonization.'

5. One interesting area for such a proof might be bilingual education: Many linguists support "bilingual education," in which children continue to be educated in their native language, although they are well aware that children readily acquire new languages via immersion.

6. It is presumably relevant to note that many Americans supporting the Iraq invasion believe in Saddam Hussein's explicit involvement in 9/11 — although they cannot attribute this belief to explicit claims of Bush or his administration. But empirically we might do well to take into account Stephen Hayes' (2004) extensive description of cooperation between al-Qaeda and Iraq, and other relevant insights in Miniter (2005).

7. On the universality of grouping, see Boyer (2001), p.127, who conveniently supplies an example from politics.

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Negatives and positives in the language of politics

Attitudes towards authority in the British and Chinese press

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An analytic model based on MAK Halliday's System of Transitivity provides a powerful tool for decoding a journalist's attitude to the events or individuals being written about. Chen (2005) showed how in the UK *Times* use of certain verbal processes rather than others to introduce direct or indirect speech could be an indicator that the journalist's attitude towards the person being quoted was either negative or positive.

In this study, using a model for the linguistic comparison of the British and Chinese press developed by Chen (2004), verbal process use in the UK *Times* and the English-language *China Daily* is contrasted for evidence of differences in the attitude of British and Chinese journalists towards political figures.

The evidence is clear. *Times* journalists frequently use 'negative' verbal processes which indicate doubt or scepticism towards the person being quoted. *China Daily* journalists, meanwhile, more often use 'positive' verbal processes which enhance the authority of the speaker.

Keywords: Media; verbal process; authority; attitudes; China; Halliday; Transitivity

1. Introduction

The importance of the media in political communication is well established. Gurevitch and Blumler argue that the process of political communication itself can be regarded as a system in which political and media organizations interact (Gurevitch and Blumler 1977).

Fowler says there are several cultural and economic features of the press which combine to give it a unique importance in the (re)production of political ideology

(Fowler 1991: 120). Key among these is the mass circulation of the press and the fact that readers form the habit of "consuming newspapers as a fixed part of their daily routine. For the majority of people, reading the daily newspaper makes up their most substantial and significant consumption of printed discourse." (Fowler 1991: 121.)

The press, therefore, is one of the key mediums through which most ordinary people imbibe politics. Given this, an understanding of the way in which the media represents (and transforms) political discourse is crucial to the study of politics.

This paper looks at one aspect of the way in which politics is represented in the media: namely, how newspapers report what politicians (and other authority figures) say. Specifically, it looks at the speech verbs (or, to use MAK Halliday's nomenclature, verbal processes) that journalists choose to introduce what politicians say.

These verbal processes, Chen showed (Chen 2005), can be very revealing of a journalist's attitude towards the politicians being quoted. Choice of one verbal process rather than another can be an indicator that the journalist's attitude is either favourable or unfavourable. Chen defined three sub-categories of verbal process; the negative verbal process (which indicates an unfavourable attitude of doubt, scepticism or even hostility on the part of the writer towards the person being quoted); the positive verbal process (which indicates a favourable attitude); and the neutral verbal process (which indicates no strong attitude).

This study seeks to apply an analytical model based upon these sub-categories to a comparative analysis of two corpora of media texts: 50 from the UK *Times* and 50 from the English-language *China Daily*. The aim is to contrast attitudes towards authority (as evidenced by the way the words of those in power are introduced using positive, negative or neutral verbal processes) of the press in Britain and China. By doing so, the study seeks to shed light on the different nature of the relationship between the media and politicians in the two countries.

Non-comparative studies of the British and Chinese media suggest traditions radically different in their approach to the selection and presentation of news and in the prevailing attitude towards authority. The British press emerges from the literature as commercial, largely independent of direct political control, robust in its questioning of authority and obsessed with conflict and negative reporting (see, for example, Hall 1977, Curran 1977, Fowler 1991, and Chen 2005). The mainstream Chinese press, meanwhile, is seen as non-commercial, politically controlled, supportive of authority and concerned to present positive news (see e.g. Conley and Tripoli 1992, Lee 1990, Zhang 1997, Zhao 1998, and Li 1999).

This study uses a model developed by Chen (2004) to provide direct linguistic evidence for these differences.

2.   Two media traditions compared

2.1   The media in Britain and China

Much has been written about the role of the media in Western English-speaking societies such as Britain. Principally, perhaps, British newspapers are businesses: commercial organisations which rely on sales to generate revenue from advertising. This tradition goes back a long way. Curran (1977) points out that by the mid 19th century state control over the press in Britain had broken down and been replaced by a "more effective control system based on remorseless economic forces." (Curran 1977: 226).

Fowler asserts that the main economic purpose of British newspapers appears to be to sell advertising space (Fowler, 1991:121). This affects the news values and ideologies expounded by the print media: they conspire to construct a myth of an ideal consumer world.

Curran (1977) and Hall (1977) both noted the role of the media in Britain in upholding the status quo. Hall argued that the British media underwrite an underlying unity and consensus which goes beyond party-political difference (Hall 1977: 346).

Another feature of the British (and British-influenced) print media, however, is its appetite for negative news stories. The then-editor of the British-influenced South China Morning News — based in Hong Kong — is cited in Knight and Nakano (1999: 173) as saying "News is conflict. News is where there is disagreement."

The Chinese media is very different. Despite significant changes in recent years, various commentators (e.g. Li 1999; Zhao 1998; Lee 1990) have described the comparative lack of freedom enjoyed by the Chinese media when compared to the Western media, even today. Zhao distinguishes between two main categories of newspaper in China: those — mainly local evening newspapers — that are sold on the streets; and those — the major national Party organs such as the *People's Daily* and specialised newspapers published by government departments — that are subscribed to with public money and circulated in offices, classrooms and places of work. Journalists working on the latter, he says, are still generally expected to report positive events and/ or put a positive spin on those events that are reported (Zhao 1998:129). This view is supported by others (see, e.g. Zhang 1997; Conley and Tripoli in Porter (ed.) 1992).

2.2   The case for a direct comparison between *The Times* and *China Daily*

For functional linguists seeking to compare and contrast the role played by the media in different societies, it is useful to be able to make a direct linguistic

comparison. This makes it possible to supplement non-comparative studies of the role played by the media in the target societies with comparative data derived from a rigorous linguistic analytic approach.

Such a direct comparative approach is feasible when the societies being studied have the same first language — the UK and the United States, for instance. When the target societies have different first languages, however, it becomes more problematic.

Chen's 2004 model, in which English-language media texts from the UK (specifically the UK *Times*) were directly contrasted with texts from China's state-controlled English-language newspaper, the *China Daily*, was an attempt to overcome this.

The tool Chen selected for her analysis of 50 texts from the UK *Times* and 50 from the *China Daily* was that aspect of the narrative structure of a text that Labov (1972) labelled evaluation. The analysis revealed significant differences in the way the two newspapers used evaluation, both in the frequency with which evaluative devices appeared and also in the way such devices were used.

There are two objections to attempting a direct comparative analysis of the UK *Times* and the *China Daily* in order to draw wider conclusions about the comparative role of the media in Britain and China. First, no one media outlet can be truly representative of the full range of print media within a society. Second, the *China Daily*, being an English-language newspaper, is not written in the journalists' native language and can not therefore be held to be typical of the print media in China.

While no single newspaper can be held to be fully representative of the various print media in a society, Kathleen Jamieson and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argue that it is acceptable to use 'elite' newspapers to stand in for others in samples (Jamieson and Kohrs Campbell 1992: 18–19). The UK *Times* can reasonably be considered to be such an 'elite' newspaper. It is, Chen pointed out, "one of the longest-established broadsheet national daily newspapers published in the UK, and arguably one of the country's most influential newspapers" (Chen 2004: 680).

A persuasive case can also be made for the *China Daily* being one of China's 'elite' newspapers. It is owned by China's principle Chinese-language daily newspaper, the *People's Daily*, and is produced in the same building in Beijing. Effectively an English-language sister paper of the *People's Daily*, it belongs to the tradition of major, subscribed-to newspapers which are more or less directly under Party control.

Given this, many of the ideological and political constraints operating upon the state-controlled sector of the Chinese media generally operate also upon the *China Daily*.

3. Positive and negative verbal processes

Verbal processes

Critical news analysis, Fowler said, "should pay particular attention to how what people say is transformed. There are clearly conventions for rendering speech newsworthy, for bestowing significance on it. Such conventions are little understood at the moment." (Fowler 1991: 231–232).

Halliday's System of Transitivity offers a particularly effective tool for analysing the way what people say is transformed in news reportage.

Transitivity is one of Halliday's three main 'systems' of English functional grammar. It deals with what Halliday calls processes — essentially predicate verb-phrases — which represent "goings on" in the world around us (Halliday 1994:1). Chen (2005) says Transitivity enables us to see how, by choosing certain verb processes rather than others, the producer of a text is able to 'foreground' certain meanings in discourse while others are suppressed. It thus provides a tool for investigating how the linguistic structure of a text effectively encodes a particular 'world view' — that of the producer(s) of the text — and also gives an insight into how a reader's perception of the meaning of a text can be pushed in a particular direction by the producer of that text.

The verbal process is just one of the process types identified by Halliday under the system of Transitivity (for an account of the others, see Halliday 1994: 106–143). Verbal processes are 'processes of saying' which serve functionally to introduce into a written text the content of what someone has said. They therefore provide a particularly powerful tool for analysing the linguistic strategies used by journalists to encode their own world view in news texts and influence the reader (Chen 2005).

3.1 Negative verbal processes

Chen's 2005 paper recognised three sub-categories of verbal process: positive, negative and neutral. She assigned verbal processes to one or other of these categories according to whether they revealed a generally positive, negative or neutral attitude on the part of the writer towards those whose words were being reported.

Chen's recognition that verbal processes carry connotations of various kinds was not new. Halliday himself explicitly recognised this. He gives a number of examples, which include *insist* ("say emphatically"), *complain* ("say irritably") and *stammer* ("say with embarrassment") (Halliday 1994: 252). The writer of a text who chooses one of these verbal processes to introduce the content of what someone else has said is implicitly ascribing to that person a state of irritableness or

embarrassment, or suggesting that he or she feels the need to emphasise what is being said.

There is, Halliday says, a very wide range of verbs which can be pressed into use by a writer "to suggest attitudes, emotions or expressive gestures that accompanied the act of speaking." (Halliday 1994: 252). He lists a few — *sob, snort, twinkle, beam, venture, breathe*.

Halliday does not tease out the precise connotations attached to these verbal processes: nor does he categorise verbal processes in terms of whether the connotations they carry are positive or negative. But the precedent is clear.

Halliday in fact recognises four sub-classes of verbal process. These are:

1. *say*, the general member of the class
2. verbal processes specific to statements and questions, such as *tell* (*say* to someone)
3. verbal processes combining *say* with some circumstantial element, e.g. *explain* (*say* in explanation), *interrupt* (*say* out of turn)
4. verbal processes with connotations, as discussed above.

Halliday's criteria, when assigning verbal processes to these four categories, focussed on the relationships between the participants whose words or actions were being reported (the sayer and the receiver) and also on the circumstances in which they were communicating. Chen, in her alternative categorisation of verbal processes into neutral, negative and positive (Chen 2005), followed a similar functional approach but focussed primarily on the relationships between the writer of a text with both the reader and the participants whose words were being reported.

According to Chen's system, neutral verbal processes (which include most of Halliday's category (1) and (2) verbal processes, and are typified by *say*) are those which carry no connotations. They cannot therefore be used by a writer to suggest attitudes or emotions on the part of the person being quoted, and so are unrevealing about the writer's attitude towards that person.

Negative verbal processes are those, usually members of Halliday's categories (3) and (4), which carry connotations or associations which cast the person quoted in a negative light. Where it was the writer's choice to use such a process, therefore, they reveal a negative attitude on the part of the writer towards that person. Generally-speaking, such processes convey an element of doubt or scepticism as to the veracity of what the speaker being reported was saying, or else imply a certain weakness on the speaker's part.

Positive verbal processes are those, again usually members of Halliday's categories (3) and (4), which carry connotations or associations which cast the person being quoted in a positive light. Where it was the writer's choice to use such a

process, therefore, they reveal a positive attitude on the part of the writer towards that person; generally-speaking, one of respect or approval.

An example of a negative verbal process cited from Chen (2005) is *insisted*. As noted above, Halliday himself acknowledged the connotation carried by this process: namely, that to *insist* is to *say emphatically*. This might appear the opposite of a negative connotation. Chen argued, however, that the mere fact of a speaker having to emphasise what she or he was saying indicates there is a certain resistance or opposition to what is being said on the part of the audience. The choice of the process *insist* by a writer to introduce what a speaker has to say thus casts the speaker as defensive and suggests that the writer her/himself shares some degree of opposition to what the speaker is saying.

To illustrate the point, Chen looked at the use of the process *insisted* in the sentence "Mr Blair's official spokesman *insisted* that the Prime Minister still had the highest regard for Mr Brown" (a sentence taken from the corpus of texts analysed). Use of the process *insisted* suggested that Tony Blair or his spokesmen were on the defensive, Chen said. The mere fact they had to insist something was not the case implied there were grounds for thinking it might be. The journalist could have used the neutral process *said* instead. Had they done so, "while on the surface the meaning would have been identical, subliminally it would have been subtly yet powerfully different. The spokesman would not be felt by the reader to be on the defensive in the same way. The clause would have been more objective: it would also have been less dramatic and interesting, and less questioning of the methods, motives and true beliefs of those in authority" (Chen 2005:43).

Other negative verbal processes identified by Chen in 2005 included: *claim, deny, admit, complain.*

What negative verbal processes have in common is that they all suggest that the speaker is defensive, or weak, or that what they say may not be true. Where it is a writer's choice to use such a process rather than a neutral verbal process such as *say*, therefore, it is a fair assumption that the writer intended to ascribe some or all of these negative connotations to the speaker, Chen argued.

In addition to distinguishing between negative, neutral and positive verbal processes, Chen also identified three sub-functions of negative verbal process (Chen 2005: 41). These were:

1. **Material negative verbal processes**, which represent a verbal action committed by one of the participants — for example, a plea of guilt or innocence in court. Such verbal processes, by describing what someone has done, operate almost like Halliday's material processes, hence the designation. Because of the circumstances in which these are often used (such as, for example, to represent the act of pleading guilty in court, as in "he *admitted* drink driving"), the writer often has little choice but to use them

2. **Attitudinal negative verbal processes**, processes deliberately chosen by a writer which reveal something about his or her own negative or hostile attitude towards those whose words are being reported;

3. **Relational negative verbal processes**, processes deliberately chosen by a writer which reveal something about her or his interpretation of relationships between participants in the events being reported. Where negative verbal processes are used, these are generally relationships of inferiority, defensiveness, conflict, tension or suspicion.

Examples of each taken from the corpus of texts analysed are:

"Scott-Barrett, 37, a divorcee, *admitted* drink driving…" (material taken from a court report);

"Mr Blair's official spokesman *insisted* that the Prime Minister still had the highest regard for Mr Brown" (attitudinal, already encountered, taken from a report alleging growing tensions between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown);

"An 18-year-old rating *complained* that he had touched her…" (relational, taken from a report of a sexual harassment court martial).

Admitted, in the sentence above, carries the information not only that Scott-Barrett said that he did something, but also that he committed the act of legally admitting it in court. It is thus material. Since with materials, the choice of alternative words is severely restricted, they are comparatively unrevealing of a writer's (or journalist's) attitude.

In the case of attitudinal and relational negative verbal processes, however, the journalist has much more choice. *Insisted* above has already been discussed. *Complained* could easily have been replaced by *said*. This, however, while conveying the claim that someone had touched the victim, would not have conveyed the extra information about the relationship between the participants (the sense of grievance, and also the powerlessness of one of the parties) that is carried by *complained*.

Often more than one of the three sub-functions can be expressed simultaneously by a single verbal process. An example is *claims* in the sentence: "Publication of the book, which *claims* Mr Blair broke a pact…" (cited from Chen 2005: 42). The sentence occurs in an article about growing tensions between Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and the book referred to is a biography of Gordon Brown by Paul Routledge. Use of the negative verbal process *claims* in this sentence achieves two things that would not be achieved by use of *says*, Chen said. First, it casts doubt over whether what the book says is true (making it attitudinal); but also it captures a relationship of conflict between the writer of the book, Paul Routledge (and by extension Gordon Brown himself, since he co-operated in the writing of the book) and the Prime Minister. To this extent it is also relational.

3.2 Positive verbal processes

According to Chen's system, positive verbal processes are those, again usually members of Halliday's categories (3) and (4), which carry connotations or associations which cast the person being quoted in a positive light.

An example is *announced that* in "George Mitchell, the talks chairman, *announced that* the participants had all undertaken to 'proceed promptly to negotiations on real issues.'" To announce something, according to the Collins English Dictionary (Collins 2003) is to make it known publicly, or to proclaim it. It involves more fanfare than merely saying something: the implication is that someone who announces something is important; or at the very least, that what he or she is announcing is important.

In the above sentence the journalist could have written "George Mitchell *said that* the participants had undertaken to proceed promptly…"; or even "George Mitchell *insisted that*…" The neutral *said that*, however, would have carried none of the conviction or importance conveyed on George Mitchell by use of *announced that*; while the negative *insisted that* would have made him seem weak and even a little desperate.

Chen (2007) identified three sub-functions of positive verbal process, analogous to the sub-functions of negative verbal process identified in Chen 2005. These were:

1. **Material positive verbal processes**, which represent an action (often only superficially verbal) committed by one of the participant individuals or organisations — for example, a *declaration* of independence, or a leader *announcing* his retirement.
2. **Attitudinal positive verbal processes**, processes deliberately chosen by a writer which reveal something about his or her own positive or favourable attitude towards those being quoted;
3. **Relational positive verbal processes**, processes deliberately chosen by a writer which reveal something about his or her interpretation of relationships between participants in the events being reported. Where positive verbal processes are used, these are generally used to represent real or perceived relationships of power, authority or moral superiority.

As with negative verbal processes, many (perhaps most) positive verbal processes express more than one of these sub-functions simultaneously. And as with material negative verbal processes, journalists often have little choice over which material positive verbal process to use since the process effectively represents a verbal action.

Chen further classified the positive verbal processes encountered in an analysis of *Times* texts into six categories, according to the nature of the role each imparted to the people whose words were being reported (Chen 2007). These categories were:

– **Declaratives**, such as a*nnounced, declared*. These convey the impression that the sayer is powerful, confident, and a man (or woman) of action who is in a position to make important decisions.
– **Authoritatives,** such as *ordered, demanded, emphasised, inquired*. These have the effect of making the speaker seem powerful, authoritative or influential, often through the associations the words have: only powerful people are in a position to demand or order.
– **Exhortatives**, such as *urged, recommended* and *suggested*. These create the impression that the sayer is wise; someone who knows best and is trying to encourage others to behave in ways that will be to their own good. They also, however, hint at weakness, however — at the fact that the sayer does not necessarily have the power to force others to do what they believe they should.
– **Accusatives**, such as *condemned, criticised* and *accused*. These have the effect of making the sayer seem to occupy the moral high ground. To accuse someone is to metaphorically stand above them and point the finger of blame: to say that what they are doing is wrong. They are also very dramatic, introducing notions of right and wrong and indicating the presence of conflict and disagreement, or even a sense of anger or betrayal.
– **Informatives**, such as *reported, explained*. These make the speaker seem wise, knowledgeable and responsible: to be possession of information which they are responsibly passing on to others. I
– **Predictives**, such as *will call for*, *will be urged*, *will announce*. These are a special category of positive verbal process identified not because of what they reveal about a journalist's attitude towards those whose words are being reported, but rather because of what they reveal about the role of the journalist him- or her-self. Predictives are all in the future tense; and mark a shift in the role of the journalist, away from being a mere reporter of events to something more pro-active — a speculator, willing to intervene to 'create' news in advance of anything actually happening by predicting or speculating about what will happen.

Table 1 shows the categorisation of positive verbal processes from Chen's 2007 analysis of *Times* texts.

Table 1. Positive verbal processes in the UK *Times*

Category of process	Instances found
Declarative	announced, declared
Authoritative	ordered, demanded, required, emphasised, indicated, stated, expressed, inquired, called (a meeting), spelled out, explained, pointed out that
Exhortative	urged, recommended, warned, suggested, proposed, appealed for, called for, called on, argued that, advocated
Accusative	accused, condemned, blamed, rebuked, criticised, questioned, rejected
Informative	reported, explained
Predictive	will call for, will be urged, will be ordered to, will be announced, are to spell out, will demand, will accuse, will announce, will be required,

4. Research methodology

A total of 50 reports each was analysed from the UK *Times* and the *China Daily*. Texts were all between 200 and 600 words in length, about 'home' news, and were published over the internet between January to March 1998.

The 100 texts were analysed and instances of negative and positive verbal processes recorded and tabulated. The data for the two sets of texts were compared, and individual texts displaying particularly interesting usages of certain types of verbal process were looked at in detail.

5. Analysis

5.1 Quantitative results

The *China Daily* texts analysed were, on average, slightly shorter than the *Times* texts analysed. To take account of this, the frequency of verbal processes was

Table 2. Incidence and frequency of verbal processes in the *Times* and *China Daily*

Type of Verbal Process	*China Daily*		*Times*	
	Number of incidences	Frequency of verbal process (no of words per occurrence)	Number of incidences	Frequency of verbal process (no of words per occurrence)
All types	241	68.9	298	67.2
Neutral	168	98.8	186	107.6
Positive	70	237.2	77	259.9
Negative	3	5532.7	35	571.9

computed in terms of the average numbers of words of text per single occurrence of a verbal process for the corpus as a whole (see Table 2).

The results were as follows.

Verbal processes overall

A verbal process occurred once every 68.9 words in the *China Daily*, once every 67.2 words in the *Times*. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 0.09. The difference in frequency is not significant.

Neutral verbal processes

These were the most common type of process encountered (unsurprisingly, since *said* is the most common verbal process in English), occurring every 98.8 words in the *China Daily* and every 107.6 words in the *Times*. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 0.65. The difference is not significant.

Positive verbal processes

These occur on average once every 237.2 words in the *China Daily*, and once every 259.9 words in the *Times*. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 0.31. The difference in frequency is not significant. As will be seen later, however, the apparent similarity hides huge differences once the data is broken down.

Negative verbal processes

These occur only once every 5,533 words in the *China Daily*, but once every 572 words in the *Times* — roughly ten times as often. On a significance test χ^2 is 21.52. The result is highly significant.

5.2 Interpretation

Negative verbal processes

Negative verbal processes appear ten times more frequently in the *Times* than the *China Daily*. Their use in the former reveals a good deal about *Times* writers' attitudes towards those whose words or actions are being reported. The following are examples.

From Times article 28, headlined 'Navy officer accused of sexually taunting female crew'

> 1 "…an 18-year-old rating *complained* that he had touched her."
> 2 "Commander Bellingham…. *denies* three charges of touching female ratings…"

From *Times* article 15, headlined 'Blair condemns Diana stories':

> 3 "They also *denied* that Blair was critical of a book by two journalists…."

From *Times* article 15, headlined 'Blair and Brown tension grows':

> 4 "…publication of the book, which *claims* that Blair broke a pact not to stand against Mr Brown…"
> 5 "Mr Blair's official spokesman *insisted* that the Prime Minister still had the highest regard for Mr Brown…"

Complained in sentence 1 is a relational negative verbal process. The journalist could have used the neutral *said*. This, however, would have carried less information about the relationship between the participants in the court martial. *Complained* is rich in a sense of grievance, and also implies a certain weakness on the part of the complainant. It is therefore a more dramatically rich and satisfying a word than *said* — and suggests that to the writer of the article, the telling of the story in a dramatic way is important. *Denies* in sentence 2, meanwhile, is an example of a material negative verbal process. The journalist has little choice over the use of this word, since it represents the committing of a legal act in court: the formal denial of charges.

Denied in sentence 3 is different: here it is an attitudinal negative verbal process, and it was the journalist's choice to use it. The journalist could have written "They *said* Mr Blair *was not* critical of a book…" By choosing to use *denied* instead, the journalist highlights the possibility that there is something that needs to be denied (that Blair is critical of the book) and that Mr Blair's spokesmen are seeking to conceal this fact.

Claims in sentence 4 is both attitudinal and relational. It casts doubt on whether what the book says is true; but also captures a relationship of conflict between the writer of the book and the Prime Minister. *Insisted* in sentence 5, meanwhile, is attitudinal, casting the Prime Minister's spokesman in a negative light by raising in the reader's mind the possibility that he is trying too hard to convince people of the truth of what he is saying, and that he therefore may not be telling the full truth.

In all there are 35 instances of negative verbal process in the corpus of *Times* texts. Of these, 16 are solely or primarily attitudinal, five primarily relational and four primarily material; the remainder are not clearly one or the other. Of the 16 primarily attitudinal negative verbal processes — generally *claimed, insisted, admitted* or *denied* — ten are used to introduce the words of a figure in authority who is connected in some way with the Government. This is entirely in keeping with a newspaper which belongs to a media tradition of scepticism towards authority and of seeking to hold those in authority to account.

The contrast with the *China Daily* is stark. In the entire corpus of *China Daily* texts there were only three negative verbal processes. This in itself is highly significant. An examination of the way negative verbal processes were used in the *China Daily* is also interesting.

The following, from text 20, headlined 'Beijing tightens control over fireworks in city proper", is typical:

> 6 "Some people *complained* that fireworks nowadays are like weapons."

This is a clearly negative process. There is a hint of weakness about *complained*: people who complain do not have the power to resolve their complaint, and can only hope that others will do it for them. The process is attitudinal, since the journalist could have written "some people *said* that fireworks nowadays are like weapons". Importantly, however, while the use of the process occurs in a context which makes it clear that there is a state of affairs existing which many people regard as unsatisfactory, there is no hint of direct criticism of the authorities. If anything, the report as a whole lends support to attempts by the city authorities to rectify the firework problem.

In the *China Daily*, then, there is just a single instance in all 50 texts of an attitudinal negative verbal process, and even in this case, the process is not associated with the Government and the net effect is to end up portraying the Beijing city government in a positive light. There is in the *China Daily* not a single case in which the journalist projects his or her own negative attitude onto an authority figure.

The contrast with the *Times* could not be clearer.

6.2 Positive verbal processes

There was no significant difference in the overall frequency of positive verbal processes in the *China Daily* and the *Times* texts analysed. A further breakdown of the data, however, does reveal some interesting differences.

Authority figures

In the *China Daily,* 32 of the 70 sayers directly associated with a positive verbal process were either leading government figures or government departments. In addition, four were government-controlled organisations such as state industries (or the leaders thereof) and a further 13 were other Government-controlled news organisations such as the *China News Service* or *People's Daily*. Thus 70 per cent (49 out of 70) of the sayers directly associated with positive verbal processes in the *China Daily* are connected to the Government in some way, or can be expected to

be speaking on behalf of the Government. In the *Times* (see Table 3) this figure falls to 30 per cent (23 out of 77). On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 23.63. The result is highly significant.

Table 3. Types of Sayer associated with positive verbal process in *The Times* and the *China Daily*.

Type of Sayer	China Daily		The Times	
	No of instances	Percentage of total instances	No of instances	Percentage of total instances
Government	32	46	23	30
Government-controlled organisation	4	6	0	0
Anti-authority figure	0	0	10	13
Overseas leader	1	1	0	0
Newspaper	13	19	1	1
Speculative verbal process	1	1	16	21
Other	19	27	27	35
TOTAL	70	100	77	100

Anti-authority figures

Table 3 reveals further differences. Ten of the 77 sayers (13 per cent) associated with a positive verbal process in the *Times* are what could be described as 'anti-authority figures' — critics of Government policy or opposition politicians. In the *China Daily*, none is. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 9.75. The result is very significant.

To examine these differences in more detail, the *Times* and the *China Daily* were directly compared in terms of the way they make use of positive verbal processes belonging to each of the six categories identified earlier.

Table 4. Number of positive verbal processes occurring in the *Times* and *China Daily*, by category

Category of verbal process	China Daily		Times	
	No of instances	Frequency (no of words/ occurrence)	No of instances	Frequency (no of words/ occurrence
Declarative	12	1,383	8	2,502
Authoritative	30	553	15	1,334
Exhortative	6	2,766	19	1,053
Accusative	0	N/A	16	1,251
Informative	21	791	4	5004
Predictive	1	16,601	15	1,334

The frequency with which each of these categories of positive verbal process occurs in the two corpuses of texts is summarised in Table 4.

Declaratives

There are 12 declaratives in the corpus of *China Daily* texts: they occur once every 1,382 words. In the *Times* there are eight, and they occur once every 2,502 words. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 1.74. The difference is not significant. The way in which declaratives are used, however, is revealing. Of the eight declaratives found in the *Times* texts, five are material — and hence less revealing of the journalist's attitude — and only three non-material. Of these, two occurred in the same text: a report about rival political parties in Northern Ireland preparing to thrash out details of a proposed peace deal:

> 7 "George Mitchell, the talks chairman, *announced that* the participants had all undertaken to 'proceed promptly to negotiations on real issues."
> 8 "There will be no return to partitionist rule, he (Mitchel McLaughlin, chairman of Northern Ireland nationalist party Sinn Fein) *declared*."

Sentence 7 has been encountered already. Senator Mitchell was the chairman of talks being held between rival political parties in an attempt to reach agreement on the best way to govern Northern Ireland. *Announced* here is not a material verbal process. By announcing that the parties were ready to talk, Mitchell did not make it so. The journalist could easily have written that Senator Mitchell *said* that all parties were ready to talk (a neutral verbal process) or that he *claimed* or *insisted* all parties were ready to talk (negative processes which would have cast doubt on what Senator Mitchell said). By choosing to write that he *announced that* all parties were ready to talk, however, the journalist gave the statement the ring of authority and confidence, and made Senator Mitchell appear stronger (as only the powerful are in a position to make genuine announcements).

Sinn Fein leader Mitchel McLaughlin, meanwhile, was arguing that the British and Irish governments' proposals being discussed would involve 'partitionist' rule, in which Northern Ireland would be divided from the Republic of Ireland: a solution to which his party was opposed. Like Senator Mitchell's announcement, Mclaughlin's declaration is not a true material declaration. Had it been, there would have been no possibility of a return to a form of partitionist rule in Northern Ireland (because McLaughlin had declared that it would not happen). The key point is that McLaughlin did not have the power to make such a declaration. What he was in fact expressing was his determination to oppose a partitionist government by every means at his disposal.

Declared here is both attitudinal and relational: it was the journalist's choice to use the process. By doing so, he or she presents the Sinn Fein leader as determined, committed and powerful. Introducing the declarative also cranks up the drama of the text, however, by hinting at the strength of feeling on McLaughlin's part and capturing some of the heat of the clash of the various personalities involved in the talks.

While the majority (five out of eight) of declaratives encountered in the corpus of *Times* texts are material, in the *China Daily* the majority (eight out of 12) are non-material. They include:

> 9 "Qiu Daxiong, deputy commander of the Guangxi Military Area Command, *announced that…* troops … had cleared mines from 1.1 million square metres of ground."
> 10 "Chinese anti-drug departments dealt with a record 106,000 cases of drug-related crime … last year. The news *was announced* yesterday in Beijing by the National Narcotics Control Commission."

One of the things noticeable from the examples here is the tendency of *China Daily* journalists to use *announced* to introduce good news. Qiu Daxiong announces success in a mine-clearing operation; and drugs officials announce successes in clearing up drugs crimes. Neither of these are material declaratives. It is not the act of announcing success in clearing mines that itself makes the operation a success. *Announced*, however, has the effect of trumpeting the success. It makes it seem more of an achievement. The use of *announced* is attitudinal, betraying an eagerness on the part of the journalist to celebrate the achievements of those whose words are being reported.

Of the eight non-material declaratives occurring in the *China Daily*, six are cases of *announced* being used to introduce good news. This is entirely in keeping with the role of the *China Daily* as the mouthpiece of the Government, an officially-sanctioned newspaper whose function it is to report official success and not to rock the boat.

Authoritatives

There were 30 authoritatives identified in the corpus of *China Daily* texts; they occurred once every 553 words. In the *Times* there were 15, and they occurred once every 1,334 words. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 8.27. The result is very significant.

This greater use of authoritatives in the *China Daily* would, on the face of it, seem to fit with the hypothesis that it is a newspaper broadly supportive of those in authority, and seeking to present them in a favourable light. An analysis of the

type of sayer associated with authoritatives in each of the two sets of texts supports this view since, in both sets of texts, the vast majority of authoritatives (80 per cent in each case) are associated with those in powerful positions.

Table 5 reveals a wide range of authoritatives found in both sets of texts. In the *China Daily*, however, the range is considerably greater than in the *Times*.

Table 5. Authoritatives found in the *China Daily* and *Times*

China Daily	*Times*
noted (6)	ordered (2)
expressed (4)	expressed (2)
pointed out (3)	emphasised (2)
explained (3)	pointed out (2)
stressed (2)	demanded
demanded (2)	indicated
thanked	spell out
mentioned	must explain
praised	state
encouraged	called
outlined	inquired
requires	
were advised	
reiterated	
confirmed,	
commented	

What is particularly notable is that there are a number of authoritatives found in the *China Daily* — such as *noted, mentioned, commented* — that appear at first glance hardly to be authoritatives at all. *Noted*, not used once in the *Times*, is by far the most common. An examination of *China Daily* texts in which *noted* occurs reveals how it acts to subtly enhance the authority of the sayer.

> 11 "The expansion of friendly co-operative ties between the two countries…not only complies with the basic interests of the two peoples, but is also beneficial to world peace and stability, he (Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission) *noted.*"
>
> 12 "A frequent exchange of visits by high-ranking officials of both countries has played an important role in the promotion of bilateral co-operation…. Zhang *noted.*"

Sentences 11 and 12 both occur in the same text, an account of a meeting between Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission and Russian defence secretary Andrei Kokoshin. The entire text, headlined 'Progress achieved in bilateral co-operation', is couched in diplomatic, deliberately non-threatening language. The use of *noted* in sentences 11 and 12 is consistent with

this tone: it is low-key and unthreatening. In neither case is *noted* a material positive verbal process, so the journalist could have chosen an alternative. None would have had the same effect, however. "The expansion of friendly co-operative ties … is beneficial to world peace," he (Zhang) *declared*" would have made Zhang seem too aggressively dominant in the context of such a sensitive diplomatic meeting; the negative "The expansion of friendly co-operative ties …is beneficial to world peace," he (Zhang) *insisted*" would have suggested there was reason to doubt Zhang's statement. The neutral *said* would have been suitably unthreatening, but would have contained none of the overtones of coded approval contained in *noted*.

Noted does not always occur in the *China Daily* in the context of reports of diplomatic exchanges: but it does always have the same effect of depicting Government figures as wise, benevolent people who deserve to be listened to with respect. The majority of authoritatives encountered in the corpus of *China Daily* texts — processes such as *expressed, pointed out, explained, encouraged, commented* — have a similar effect of portraying the sayer as authoritative by virtue of their wisdom and benevolence rather than their overt power.

There is not a single instance of *noted* used in the *Times* as an authoritative positive verbal process. There is no *mentioned*, *commented*, *confirmed* or *reiterated* either. There is, nevertheless, a reasonable range of authoritatives, from the overt (*demanded, ordered*) to the more subtle (*pointed out, inquired, emphasised*). The following are a few examples:

> 13 "More involvement will be needed from parents if three quarters of all eleven-year-olds are to meet their standards by 2002, as the Government *has demanded*."
>
> 14 "After the Queen *inquired* whether it would fit in the boot of her Rolls Royce…"

Has demanded in sentence 13 occurs in text 3, an article about Government plans to encourage parents to play a greater role in developing their children's numeracy. No Government spokesmen are quoted directly in the article, which is based on an as-yet unpublished official Government document. Nevertheless, the journalist's choice of verbal process is interesting. There are alternatives that could have been used instead — "…as the Government *has requested",* for example; or "…as the Government *has required";* or even "…as the Government *has insisted* must happen." *Has requested* would have lacked the force of *has demanded,* and the effect would have been to make the Government's commitment to the plan seem less total. *Has required* is stronger but more formal: it fails to convey the dynamism and determination that *has demanded* does. *Has insisted* would have made the Government appear weak, and as though it was struggling to overcome opposition in imposing the plan.

Inquired in sentence 14 occurs in a report which describes a visit by the Queen of England to a local pub. The pub's landlady presents the Queen with a case of beer: and the Queen politely inquires whether it will fit in the boot of her car. The journalist could have used the neutral process *asked* instead of *inquired*, yet chose not to. The formal register of *inquired* achieves a number of things. It enhances the impression of stateliness and formal authority of the Queen, and somehow conveys an impression of good manners and good breeding too. Use of the process also reveals a certain deference on the journalist's part towards the Queen.

Exhortatives

There are 19 exhortatives in the corpus of *Times* texts analysed; they occur once every 1,053 words. In the *China Daily* texts there are only six, and they occur once every 2,766 words. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 4.6. The difference is significant, but only marginally so.

There are, however, interesting differences in the *way* exhortatives are used. A few examples will illustrate this. First, the *Times*:

> 15 "Tony Blair … *appealed fo*r her (Princess Diana's) sons to be spared further books … about the Paris car crash."
> 16 "His (Ulster Democratic Party leader David Trimble's) delegation *urged* the prisoners to stick with the talks until they see how they develop."

Sentence 15 is abstracted from a report about British Prime Minister Tony Blair condemning the growing speculation surrounding the death of Princess Diana in a car crash in Paris. The Prime Minister is reported as saying the increasingly lurid speculation is 'tacky and inappropriate' and that it is harmful to Diana's two children, Princes William and Harry.

Choice of the exhortative *appealed for* to introduce the Prime Minister's request that there should be no further books about the circumstances surrounding the Princess's death is revealing. It presents the Prime Minister as essentially decent and well-meaning — but also powerless. Had the journalist believed that Mr Blair had the power to ensure that authors, journalists and film-makers cease their speculation, he or she would presumably have written that Mr Blair *ordered* or *instructed* or at least *demanded* that they do so. The journalist clearly does not believe that the Prime Minister's relationship with the audience towards whom his remarks are addressed is such that he has this power.

Urged in sentence 16 is equally revealing. The text from which this is taken is a report about attempts by loyalist political leaders to persuade loyalist 'paramilitaries' — code for terrorists — to support ongoing peace talks in Northern Ireland. Trimble's Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) was at the time the leading loyalist

political party (a political party committed to Northern Ireland remaining part of the UK) in Northern Ireland. A delegation of his supporters was visiting influential loyalist paramilitaries (terrorists committed to using violence to keep Northern Ireland in the UK) being held in a top security prison. The politically-mainstream UDP could not be seen to be directly associated with the illegal, extremist para-militaries. Nevertheless, the paramilitaries were influential with many in Northern Ireland, and if they were seen to be supportive of peace talks, the chance of those talks succeeding would be greatly improved.

The use of *urged* reflects the journalist's understanding of the sensitive, del-icately-balanced nature of the relationship between Mr Trimble's delegation and the prisoners. The journalist could have used the neutral *said* or *asked*; the nega-tive *begged*, even the authoritative *demanded* or *ordered*. *Begged* would have made the delegation seem weak; *demanded* or *ordered* would have implied the delega-tion was in a position of some authority over the prisoners (which it was clearly not); *said* or *asked* would have been flat and uninteresting. *Urged* conveys a picture of a delegation that believes itself to be in the right, that believes the course of ac-tion it is advising is in the best interests of all, and yet that does not have the power to force the paramilitaries to do what it wants.

In the *Times* texts, exhortatives clearly do a lot of work in establishing the re-lationships between participants, and their relative positions of power. As a conse-quence, they help to increase the drama and interest of a text. They can also reveal much about the attitude of the journalist.

The fact that exhortatives occur less frequently in the *China Daily* suggests the possibility that Chinese journalists are uncomfortable with assigning an impres-sion of even well-meaning weakness to Chinese leaders. Of the six exhortatives that are found, only four are directly associated with Chinese leaders. They include the following:

> 17 "Tang (Tang Shubei, vice chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits, Arats) *urged* expansion of exchanges…"

Sentence 17 occurs in a report about political talks on 'cross-straits relations' be-tween Chinese and Taiwanese leaders. *Urged* here is therefore presumably a re-flection of the delicate nature of the relationship between politicians from two different countries whose relations are as sensitive as that of China's and Taiwan's. It might be that the journalist recognises that Tang is in a position to urge, but not demand: it might also be that the journalist seeks to couch his or her report in diplomatic language that is non-confrontational.

Accusatives

There are 16 accusatives in the corpus of *Times* texts. They occur once every 1,251 words, making them the second largest category of positive verbal process. In the *China Daily* they are not found at all. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 13.28. The finding is highly significant.

Accusatives in *The Times* include:

> 18 "Tony Blair *has condemned* as tacky and inappropriate the mushrooming speculation about the death of Diana…."
> 19 "Francis Maude, Tory spokesman on culture, *accused* ministers of turning the lottery into the Government's lottery."

Has condemned in sentence 18 occurs in the same text about British Prime Minister Tony Blair criticising the growing speculation surrounding the death of Princess Diana in a car crash that we saw above. The effect of using the accusative is complex: it is forceful, dramatic and conveys the impression that Mr Blair occupies the moral high ground on this issue. In so far as *has condemned* depicts Mr Blair as a man of morals, it can be taken to be attitudinal. It is also richly relational, however. It conveys the journalist's perception of the relationship between Mr Blair and those at whom the Prime Minister's condemnation is directed — the journalists who keep endlessly speculating about Diana's death. That relationship is one of anger, indignation and moral superiority on the part of the Prime Minister (though not, interestingly, one of power, or the Prime Minister would have been *ordering* journalists to end their speculation).

Finally, by introducing an overt element of moral right and wrong, and elements of anger and accusation (and hence conflict), *has condemned* is highly dramatic and colourful.

The effect of *accused* in sentence 19 is in many ways similar — though here, the finger of accusation is pointed *at* the government, rather than *by* it. The journalist could have written "Francis Maude *claimed* ministers were turning the lottery into the Government's lottery." This would have seriously undermined Maude's accusation in the minds of readers, by suggesting there was doubt about the accuracy of his claims. *Accused*, by contrast, locates Maude on the moral high ground and casts him in the role of attacker. It also, subtly, reveals his essential weakness, however: he clearly himself does not have the power to act on his information, and can only appeal to those who do (possibly, here, the electorate) to consider what he has to say.

Maude is an example of an 'anti-authority' sayer: his accusation is levelled against those in authority. Strikingly, of the 16 accusatives that occur in the corpus of *Times* texts, nine are associated with 'anti-authority' figures of one sort or

another, such as critics of Government policy or opposition politicians like Maude. Only in three cases is the accusative associated with a Government figure or organisation. Since an accuser is essentially a critic on the attack, this imbalance could be interpreted as supporting evidence for the existence of an anti-authority stance in the *Times* itself: a stance critical towards and questioning of those in authority that is typical of a tradition of a print media which regards one of its roles as being to hold those in authority to account.

While the use of accusatives in the *Times* is common and richly revealing, there is as we have seen not a single instance of an accusative being used anywhere in the entire corpus of 50 *China Daily* texts.

Informatives

Use of informatives in the *Times* is very rare: only four instances were found in the entire corpus of *Times* texts: they occurred once every 5004 words. In the *China Daily*, by contrast, there were 21 imnformative, and they occurred once every 791 words. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 15.09. The difference is highly significant.

The following is typical of informatives found in the *Times*:

> 20 "Labour MPs … *have reported* huge disquiet among their constituents (about levels of new housing)…"

Have reported here is partially material. The journalist could have written "Labour MPs *say* there is huge disquiet among their constituents…", but this would not have fully represented the fact that MPs have officially reported the disquiet, and by doing so have brought it into the public domain. *Have reported* also, however, undoubtedly conveys the impression that the MPs are responsible individuals who, being in possession of certain information, have dutifully done their jobs by relaying it to the appropriate authorities.

The way in which informatives are used in the *China Daily* is very different. More than half of all informatives found are associated with other, state-owned media, such as the *China News Service* and *People's Daily*. In such cases, the *China Daily* informative introduces a straight lift of information from another news outlet. The following are examples:

> 21 "China News Service *reported* that Gongbei Customs Office… detected 11,000 smuggling cases…"
> 22 "China News Service *reported* customs efforts in the fight against smuggling are paying big dividends."

The fact that all the newspapers quoted from are state-owned or state-controlled newspapers is further evidence for the role of the *China Daily* as a Government mouthpiece use for the dissemination of approved information.

Predictives

There were 15 predictives found in the *Times*: they occurred once every 1,334 words. In the entire corpus of *China Daily* texts, by contrast, there was just one predictive, giving an occurrence of one every 16,601 words. On a standard significance test, χ^2 is 9.87. The difference is very significant.

An example from *The Times* is:

> 23 "A Government task force *will call for* a new partnership between home and school…"

Will call for in sentence 23 is an exhortative as well as a predictive. However, it is more interesting to the linguist for what it reveals about the role of the journalist. Sentence 23 is taken from the same report about British Government proposals to improve numeracy amongst school pupils encountered earlier. The first paragraph reads as follows:

> "Parents will be given a key role in an official blueprint to be published this week on improving numeracy. A Government task force *will call for* a new partnership between home and school to met ambitious targets."

What is striking about the report is that it is about something that has not yet happened, and is couched in the language of pure speculation. The journalist has not even interviewed (officially at least) anyone from the Government about the plans — not a single senior Government figure is quoted to give substance to the report. There may have been an off-the-record briefing, but in effect, the journalist is creating a news story by speculating about predicted future events.

Not so for the *China Daily*. The single instance of a predictive found in the entire corpus of 50 *China Daily* texts was as follows:

> 24 "The mainland… has never ruled out the use of force to settle the Taiwan issue, out of concern that Taiwan *may declare* independence…."

This is a genuine predictive, but a close reading of the text makes clear that rather than speculating about what may happen in future (the fact that Taiwan may declare independence) the journalist is actually expressing an existing concern — presumably the concern of the mainland Chinese leadership.

7. Conclusion

A contrastive analysis of 50 texts from the UK *Times* and 50 texts from the English-language *China Daily* reveals that there are significant differences in the pattern of use of negative and positive verbal processes.

Negative verbal processes are common in the *Times*. The effect is varied, ranging from casting the sayer in a negative light to heightening the drama and richness of a text by introducing emotion, conflict, tension and clashes of character. The *China Daily*, by contrast, makes almost no use of negative verbal processes.

Both the *Times* and *China Daily* make frequent use of positive verbal processes: but the way in which they are used is different. The *China Daily* makes most use of authoritatives (the overall effect of which is to depict the Chinese leadership as wise yet modest and benign rulers) and informatives (the result of effectively reproducing reports from other Chinese state-controlled media outlets, a practice which reinforces the impression that the *China Daily* acts at least partly as a Government mouthpiece). The *Times* makes great use of exhortatives (which emphasise well-meaning weakness on the part of sayers) and accusatives (often used in the context of opponents of Government policy launching attacks on the Government), both of which add drama and colour to a text; and also of predictives (used to speculate about future events). These reflect its concerns with cranking up the relational and dramatic richness of reports and with holding authority to account — and also its greater willingness to speculate.

The pattern of use of negative and positive verbal processes found, this researcher would argue, fits neatly with the independently-established view of the role of the two newspapers, and provides linguistic evidence for the correctness of that view. Essentially, it supports the view that the *Times* belongs to a media tradition that is sceptical and questioning of those in authority, that thrives on negative reporting, and that needs to produce dramatic, interesting copy in order to attract readers and ensure its continued survival. The *China Daily*, on the other hand, is an example of a state-controlled newspaper that is publicly subscribed to and circulated and that exists at least partly to serve as a mouthpiece for the ruling Government. The attitude of *China Daily* journalists towards authority figures revealed by this analysis is almost exclusively one of approbation and support.

[NOTE: complete analytical data in the form of detailed tables are available from the author]

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