“Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue”: Neocapitalism, the New Class, and the Creation of “Post-Industrial” Knowledge

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Introduction

The title of this paper “Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue” refers to a wedding tradition in Anglo-American societies when the new bride must dress her part with “something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue.” This saying is taken from an English rhyme and is intended to promote “good luck” for the bride-to-be who must choose something modern to go with traditional customs and rituals. The mission does not have to be feared and one can bring meaning and inspiration to the marriage my involving everyone. For example, one could choose to use a grandmother’s wedding ring as something old – which constitutes linking the marriage to family and the past. Something new could be represented with a bouquet of flowers taken from a park where the new couple first walked and suggests optimism and hope for the bride’s new life. For something borrowed the bride might chose a pearl necklace lent by a very close friend: thus, she can depend on family and friends. And something blue might mean wearing sexy blue underwear under an formal white gown, suggesting “fun,” and inverting the usual serious connotations for “blue” as also meaning “sad.” “Blue” is not only about “feelings,” it has connotations originating in Roman times to represent love, modesty and fidelity. In other words it has a long history. Up to the late 19th century, blue was a popular colour for wedding gowns and recalled the proverb: "Marry in blue, lover be true." By drawing the symbolic effects of the old, new, borrowed and blue, the marriage thus symbolizes of the reconstitution of the couple and reintegration of the community within Anglo-American culture. In this sense, “class” and “the analyses of the intelligentsia as a class” might be also be studied from what is old, new, borrow, and blue.

When the complete rhyme originated in the Victorian era (19th century England), it also included a line that has been since dropped: “And a silver sixpence in her shoe,” referring to money, of course, a silver coin worth six pennies (no longer British currency but was from 1551 to 1967). This coin usually came from a richer male benefactor who symbolized his support in
financing the good fortune of the couple (Pierre Bourdieu might call this a symbolic validation of the connection between social and economic capital – or what today’s financiers might call “guaranteeing liquidity in the event of an unexpected market downturn.” The symbolism may have deeper roots in Scottish culture, generally known as frugal people where the custom continues today, with a market of specially minted six–pence coins – which today can still be purchased and for lasting luck placed in the left shoe. For well–heeled there are companies which specialize in profiting from this tradition. For example, the Silver Six Pence Company offers, “Gladys,” a mint condition 1961 Morris Minor Convertible automobile which can be rented (or bought) for the wedding day (http://www.silver6pence.co.uk/). The analogy is that intellectual practitioners themselves might have dropped the “money” connotation from their own rhyme about their marriage to the capitalist system simply because its “magical” source can thus remain a mystery.

The topic “Neocapitalism, the New Class, and the Creation of ‘Post–Industrial’ Knowledge” suggests that all things “new” — as with the political economy and class relations — may also retain something “old” as well as “borrowed,” as in a play on another old saying that “the more capitalism changes the more it stays the same.” Or regarding what is “borrowed,” the “intelligentsia” may be viewed only by homology as if they were not members of a unique class but only something like a “class” (such as group or stratum). And “something blue” might suggest that as members of the P–MC or “intelligentsia,” ourselves, we might select and legitimate some approaches to the issues of “class” because it just feels good. With this title and the play on words, I suggest that all the elements are at work when analyzing the “intelligentsia” as a class and hold some truth. However the various elements make analysis a complex undertaking – especially if it is about property, money, and wealth and how the intelligentsia comes to own and control it.

Near the end of The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels write: “In short, the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements, they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time.” Furthermore, they “...
proclaim the inevitable impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property” because it implies the dissolution of modern bourgeois society, the conception of property, property relations and forms of property was important because of the key role it played in the complex systems of classes and social strata defining the core dynamic of capitalism. Lange (1963) goes so far as to argue that for Marx and Engels property ownership is the principle organizing mechanism for the relations of production and the relations of distribution.

Furthermore, Marx and Engels argued that changes in the forms of property could be used to identify successive historical socioeconomic formations from primitive communism to capitalism, socialism to communism and suggested that the global varieties of property other than the bourgeois property form and challenged the notion that it was the norm. Further anthropological study of property forms was to show the possibility for absence of, at least, land–based private property in tribal societies and a variety of property relations in Europe between Roman, Germanic and Slavonic societies. Central to reassessing Marxist conceptions of class requires paying particular attention to definitions of property, property relations and the different forms of private, tribal, and state ownership of the property, and the entailment of property rights therein; that is, how notions of “possession” regarding not only the nature of juridical ownership but attending to the social exercise of ownership and property rights in the current historical conjuncture of global capitalism.

According to Hegedus (1999), this attention should alert us to two controversies: (1) how might the states, societies and communities exercise possession possibilities in centralized and decentralized locations? And (2) how might professionals, technocrats, or intelligentsia exercise possession possibilities within various forms of property ownership, as might be in the case of new forms of bourgeois, socialist or kin–based ownership.

Robert Cox (1992, 1996: 301) comments that while “there is no explicit political or authority structure for the global economy, there is nevertheless something there that remains to be deciphered, something that could be described by the French word *nebuleuse* or by the notion of “governance without government.” Given the emergence of a transnational operating
economy and in light of the “internationalization of the state” thesis regarding its regulation, this *nebuleuse* seems to refer to a denationalized, total capital on a world scale that requires identifying its social basis and its functioning to defend or challenge its interests through mechanisms of control.

In light of Cox’s (1992, 1996) conception of *nebuleuse* in neo–Gramscian writings this paper takes up the second controversy about how might professionals, technocrats, or intelligentsia exercise *possession* as a cadre: stratum or class. Furthermore it also entertains the debate that revisits Konrad and Szelényi’s (1979; 2005) articulation of the New Class thesis as well as recent comparison found in King and Szelényi’s (2004) *Theories of the New Class*. In the “new class” thesis cadres in their control function may act as a class for themselves, as well as for or against the global capitalist ruling class. Furthermore, such an analysis might also open up international studies of the intelligentsia somewhat like such Erik Olin Wright’s (1997) *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis*. Furthermore, given hegemonic integration under neoliberalism under the cadre functioning of organizations such as the Mont Pelerin Society, the Trilateral Commission and the Davos Project — and given the limits of the mode of production becoming manifest — new comprehensive transnational planning bodies have begun to operate today (such as the World Economic Forum, [WEF]) to deal with challenges to neoliberalism because of evident exhaustion and new forms of resistance. It is in organizations such as the WEF and anti–globalization challenges to them a such as the World Social Forum initiated in Porto Alegre where the exhaustion of the so–called social stratum or “class” registers its effects.

The cadre stratum as a whole has been profoundly affected by restructuring. The hegemony of international finance and institutional mode of operation, for example through IMF dictates and OECD recommendations, has worked to remove many areas of domestic and local policy debate from the political arena and to undermine radical intellectual elites by instituting the dominant neoliberal framework and sanitizing decisions via consensus building exercises. However, attacking the cumulative structures of social protection and planning that had matured under corporate liberalism is not easy and potentially impossible if it requires undoing the processes of deep socialization especially
because there is an inevitable need for reintegration and resocialization. Different strategies, such as the development of consultancies, think tanks, rating agencies, and rights and ethics talk, are attempts to restore reintegration and resocialization after the damage has been done.

Similarly, rising from the social consequences of neoliberal practices, the social reproduction of the cadres, primarily through universities, has been undergone significant change, fragmentation, reorganization and subsumption within neoliberal capitalist lines – led primarily by the natural sciences, whose real subsumption within capitalist relations of production are the most advanced. These sites of social reproduction have entered a phase of selective reproduction, reorganization, and destruction of previous socialization practices. These new forms of socialization necessarily grate against the previous habitus that emerged from the postwar period and fundamentally challenge existing dispositions and expectations – especially those related to professional autonomy. Debates over personal and institutional autonomy, exhibit fractures and politicizations in varied ways and intensities because professorial labour and autonomy are divided up in uneven and unequal ways pitting faculties, disciplines, generations, researchers, teachers, support staff, casual toilers and others against each other. I would argue, that fundamental to these struggles over labour, time and autonomy is really a struggle over property, especially intellectual property as well as its articulations with other kinds of property. This struggle over property has been driven by the real subsumption of intellectual labour in capitalist relations and its alienation has emerged as a struggle over intellectual property rights as an attempt to systematically regulate the repercussions of both unregulated market capitalism and the specifically changing nature of intellectual labour, including its commodification and socialization, through a discourse of universalizing property rights aided by systemic analyses based on chaos and complexity theory.

I would also agree with Klees van der Pijls (1998) that such an understanding of the “service” sector and “university” occupations ascribes a role to cadres whose social function in the “service” economy does more than result in the proliferation of administrative interfaces between particular
activities or second order activities as suggested by Toffler (1991) or Etzioni (1978). Furthermore, do we classify these cadres as status groups or a new class? Or what even to call them? Are these cadres “new managers” (James Burham 1960 [1941]), the “new petty bourgeoisie” (Poulantzas 1971), a “surplus class” (Nicolaus 1970), “intellectuals” (Konrad and Szelényi 1981), “professional elites” (Perkin 1996), “experts” (Benveniste 1972), a “professional–managerial class” (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979) or simply “new middle class” (Eric Olin Wright 1978; 1989).

Contemporary events should alert us about the need to revive class analysis and to understand the special role the intelligentsia plays in contemporary processes. Recently, and in keeping with this “post–industrial” literature, Richard Florida (2002) conceptualizes four economic classes in The Rise of the Creative Class: agricultural, service, working and creative classes. He describes the rising income, power and culture of the creative class, and its super–creative core now constituting over 12% of the American work force and includes “scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers and architects, as well as thought leadership of modern society: non–fiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think–tank researchers, analysts, and other opinion–makers. Whether they are software programmers or engineers, architects or filmmakers, they engage in the creative process.” In his follow–up book, The Flight of the Creative Class (2005), Florida argues that the US is in danger of losing its most important economic advantage as a “talent magnet” because the new multi–polar world has unleashed a global competition for this talent that produces cutting–edge innovation. “Whether America suffers a long, slow decline, or rebounds to skillfully navigate this new playing field, depends entirely on how willing it is to restore its creativity and openness to full capacity” (238).

Retrospectively, Florida’s pronouncements on the “creative class” are worth exploring with the backdrop of key events in 2008 which seem to mark a moment of contingency, shifts in contemporary class analysis which might account for the nature and functioning of the intelligentsia, and the significant role the intelligentsia might play in configuring future social and state relations. In 2008, the Chinese held the spectacular Beijing Olympics and signaled to the
world their ascending economic power, the Russian army marched into Georgia ending the post–Cold War settlement and Russia’s subordinate position within it, the United States celebrated the election of Barack Hussein Obama as its 44th President rekindling fantasies of hope and opportunity; and American capitalism unsettled the world’s financial markets with a credit crisis flowing from deregulation of derivatives that triggered a recession, deflationary pressures and systemic overproduction. Of these events, only the market meltdown was the primary economic event that hints at the broader emerging crisis of global capitalism today and intimates important new social dynamics for the “educated” classes around the world.

Given the limitations of previous approaches to the intelligentsia and the power of intellectual practices, this paper suggests that Florida (2002: 68) accurately identifies the rise of a new economic “class,” its income and influence, and offers an opportunity to engage in the debate. However, his theoretical framework inadequately reproduces many of the previous errors. Also, he avoids defining class in traditional Marxian terms of the ownership of production, capital or the means of production. First, he inaccurately and inadequately assumes there is “little analytical utility” to use the broad categories of capitalist and worker because the creative class does not control any significant property in the physical sense as an intangible creative capacity. In so doing he misses the fundamental connections of the creative class to the capitalist and working classes. Second, he inaccurately portrays Marxian class analysis as incapable of adapting its conceptual apparatus to accommodate the emergence of new classes and thus demonstrates a common ignorance of the traditions of Marxian class analysis. Third, he fails to locate the rise of the service economy and the creative class within the international division of labor and its sources of income and wealth as well as the asymmetrical structures of neo-imperialism that have emerged in global capitalism. Fourth, he cannot accurately identify the key social class constraints and enablements that either impede or facilitate the transformation of American society. Here, he reproduces “the education ideology” that over-emphasizes the importance of education reform at the expense of class politics for solving the creativity, technology, and competitiveness gaps. Finally, Florida reproduces many of the assumptions of
the “Davos Project,” including the key principles of liberal globalization arising from Washington and its allies. Here, according to hegemonic intellectuals, the US must play a leadership role in the world or else chaos might ensue. In addition to taxes and trade, he points out that the focus should also include two other Ts: talent and tolerance. Other than a human capital approach to social reform, he thus rules out any other credible alternative.

In the derivative discourses of education research, Florida’s assumptions perform an interesting function as the conveyor of a kind of ideology of “left capitalism” which positions itself as both an emancipation from capitalism while at the same time facilitating its expansion, reaping the benefits, and displacing more trenchant critiques that would suggest rational, principled and credible alternatives and more progressive solutions.

This paper suggests (1) that Marx and Engels in their analysis of commodity fetishism, the circulation of money and real subsumption did provide a way to analyze the rise of the creative class; (2) that neo-Marxist class analysis has developed ways to analyze different varieties of class exclusion and exploitation to account for relationships other than that between capitalists and workers; (3) that Marxian analysis of neo-imperialism can adequately account for the dynamics of global capitalism, geopolitical conflict among great powers, and the emergence of cultural commodification as a specifically new economic and educational dynamic in the world today; and (4) that while Florida seeks a creative global economy and a new American society he will necessarily fail to address the central problems of the age if he does not include the analysis of the ownership of property as well as the production, circulation and consumption of cultural products, including “education” as one of the newest commodities implicated in the processes of neocapitalism.

My preferred term, as I have already assumed, is “cadre” in keeping with Kees van der Pijls (1998), Gerard Dumenil (1975), Luc Boltanski (1982), and Alain Bihr (1989) because they “link the existence and orientation of the cadres explicitly to the process of socialization” (1998: 137). In this sense I take the “intelligentsia” as the cadre class not narrowly and empirically as only “bureaucratic neomanagers” but also the scientists, artists, educators, intellectuals and so on who take on their tasks of “fixers” of capitalism. In a
more traditional intellectual or artistic role in early capitalism that still remains evident today but marginal as “clerks of the Empire” (Kachur 1995) — or in second wave capitalism as “the garage mechanics of capitalism,” (e.g. Underhill 1960). For third wave capitalism I would call the new intelligentsia “the Amway salespersons for globalization.” Clerks, mechanics and salespersons exist together in this third wave capitalism which has been variously named for different reasons in Marxian theoretical debates as late capitalism (Mandel), advanced capitalism (Adorno), or postmodern capitalism (Harvey, Jameson), suggesting respectively that capitalism is about to end, there is a vanguard version or that something new has emerged called postmodernity. Others suggest, nothing exceptionally new has happened (Callinicos). Here, my title captures my own thesis and I draw on Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007 [1999]) argument and conceptions regarding the cadre class in The New Spirit of Capitalism. They are the producers of the new spirit, an ideology which legitimates, regulates and constitutes the nature and functioning of a new capitalism which nevertheless retains and reworks many elements of the old, borrowing here and there, and (in a Deluezian–sense) seeking, capturing and creating the blue affect, the crisis of modernity: hedonistically desirable human responses with potentially sad effects.

Furthermore, I would also distinguish the empirically existing cadre from the objective subject position of Cadre much as Marx and Engels distinguished the empirical working class, a particular group, from the subject position of the proletariat, and similarly the capitalist class from the bourgeoisie. A similar analogy would be the kind of distinction drawn by Sandra Harding between a woman’s lot in life and the subjective position of feminist. Thus, in considering the “middle class” as a particular empirical group with all the ambiguities and contradictions that this might entail, it is also constituted as a subject position. It is important to keep in mind the distinction, connections and resulting gaps (absences) among these concepts to develop a parallax view when thinking about the nature, functioning and enactments of the producers of ideology and their symptomatic ideologies (Žižek 2006).

1 At risk of oversimplification, Žižek’s dialectical materialist ontology draws four distinctions reworking Lacan’s categories: Imaginary, Symbolic, Real with “Absolute Absent Thing.” The Real is

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Something Old: The Canonical Interpretations of Intellectual Practice

The “new class” thesis has many manifestations and resurrections. There is a long tradition of work on the “credentialled strata,” “professional-managerial class” or “symbolic analysts” concerning discussions of the New Knowledge Economy (NKE). In the broad “post-industrial,” “post-capitalist” or “postmodern” shift to the “service economy” in the US economy, researchers have identified the central importance of science, technology and innovation and those who labour through the manipulation of ideas and symbols.

Contemporary approaches to intellectual practice show that they tend to cluster into four constellations which assume a particular set of defining relationships between class, power and knowledge. The traditional typology for theories of intellectual practice are the following: a) benign technocrats, b) liberal elitists, c) conservative humanists and d) orthodox Marxists.

According to Gouldner (1979), the first traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as “benign technocrats.” Here intellectuals are viewed as a new historical elite which is already entrenched its institutional influence but who act in benign and trustworthy ways adapting to a system which has its own inevitable trajectory. John Kenneth Galbraith (1972) and Daniel Bell (1973, 1976) defend this position, Mainly aligned with the American "liberal" tradition, these theorists identify the "new class" of individuals as a product of capitalism's overwhelming efficiency in recruiting and absorbing adversaries to the system. This "new class" -- in the non-Marxist sense -- was a benign technocracy of competently trained and institutionally proficient leaders who were the beneficiaries of an orderly transference of power in the new post-industrial service economy. Of course, post-industrial meant the "end of ideology" and the end of classes as traditionally construed. Because of their professional expertise in running the system better, the trained technical elite merely had taken over the reigns of power from the older hereditary elite. Power was ceded to a technical intelligentsia who needed to promote efficiency, safeguard individual freedoms and guarantee the gains of a minimum welfare.

the Absolute Absent Thing when it becomes symbolically represented as the Event, the return of petit a (kernel of the Real). For an introduction to Žižek’s materialist political theology see Adam Kotsko (2008) Žižek and Theology. New York: T&T Clark.

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state (Ross 1990). This "benign technocrat" approach does not identify the special vested interests which intellectuals pursue as well as the limitations of their rationality. It also occludes their subordinate position to the capitalist class -- at least in its collective form as a diversity of shareholders.

Recent criticisms by these social democratic and left-liberal anti-communists of the rise of the new class and the expansion of the American state drew Michael Harrington's ire. He dubbed Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz and others as "neo-conservatives" and one element of New Right hegemony in the 1980s (Lipset 1988). The neo-conservative critique was that intellectuals, in the nonprofit sector (especially in state and university institutions) were the primary threat to contemporary capitalism and the chief promoters of "bleeding heart" ideology (Bruce-Briggs 1981; Kristol 1978; Steinfels 1979). In the latter part of the 20th century, the arguments of the neo-conservatives solidified a new hegemonic alignment between scientists, engineers, lawyers and managers in the corporate sector and their chief ideologues, the futurists, such as John Naisbitt and Peter Drucker, the neo-Smithians, such as Michael Porter, and the neo-Keynesians, such as Robert Reich (1983), one of President Clinton's new mandarins. This constellation of thought -- in its neo-conservative form -- closely parallels the development of the second constellation.

The second traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as "elite rulers." Here the benign view is challenged as harbouring a new authoritarianism where domination is exercised by experts who keep power in their own hands by monopolizing knowledge and limiting the "excesses" of democratic accountability. Rather than Bell's claim that technocrats would safeguard individual freedom, adherents to the strong position argue that technocrats may well install a new and deeper domination. Adherents to a weak position, outlined here, view the shift to professional-managerial control just as another moment in a long history of circulating elites, in that, a new elite does not bring anything new to the world and continues to exploit others as did the old elites but by using education rather than money (Ross 1990). Elite analysis also overlooks the effects of shifting class alliances within civil society which influence the reconstruction of elite power. Early defenses of this position were

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made by Mikhael Bakunin (1911), J. W. Machajski (1937, 1979), and RobertMichels (1915). Michels distinguished two classes of intellectuals: (1) those who

got access to secure posts in the management of the state and (2) those who

were locked out. The conflict between heterodoxy and orthodoxy occurred

when the state was required to open up the bureaucratic canals to accommodate

adversaries to the social order in the hope of transforming them into partisans.

Bottomore (1964: 69) writes that the attribution of great social influence to elite
groups constituted by intellectuals, managers and bureaucrats was an attempt

by elite theorists to displace Marxist theory and show that the transformation of
capitalism could lead to a "classless" recruitment of elites but still maintain the

distinction between the ruling elites and the masses.

Closely related to elite theory is J. Burnham's (1941) conception of the

"managerial revolution." This idea which imputed a special and independent

role for intellectuals concerned with planning and managing the new

bureaucratic societies. Burnham influenced early critical theory as well as the
ideas of George Orwell and Alvin Toffler (Eyerman et al. 1987). It is the

identification of the New Class that links elite analysis and the managerial
revolution to the benign technocrat thesis. Milovan Djilas's (1957) analysis of
the rise of the Soviet nomenclatura provided the basis for an anti-communist
and anti-statist critique which could be appropriated by American theorists as a
critique of university dons and state mandarins. Djilas's thesis of a new ruling
class of state managers and Burnham's thesis that managers and professionals

who monopolized expertise were or had supplanted capitalists as the rulers of
economic life in American style democracies were brought together in a
synthesis. The newly articulated thesis, used for example by Peter Drucker,
accomplished several objectives. It could retain the illusion that America, unlike
European and Third World societies, was a classless society. Liberal adherents
could thus frame a debate between the limited polarities of the democratic
thesis of unfettered pluralism versus the stratification thesis of circulating elites.
Such an approach could justify democracy and social inequality while at the
same time occluding class analysis. The thesis could also justify the corporate
intelligentsia. It did this by providing a critique of "communism as statism" and
evaluating state-based technocrats and university-based progressives as evil
while still reinforcing the rising power of corporate technocrats as good for the American national interest. The logic of the theory culminates in the thesis that America is a "post–capitalist society." The illusion of the private sector technocrat is thus reproduced at the level of "New Class" theory. For these theorists, the differentiation of capitalism from privatized personal ownership to collective share ownership by workers via their pension funds supposedly marks the transcendence of "capitalism." The thesis allows anonymous and collective forms of capitalist and technocratic power to exist and expand. In addition the thesis allows for a continued critique of "class–based" societies and radical intellectuals not committed to America's "core values" (e.g. European, Third World). It does this by evaluating national or socialist orientations to state intervention as a degenerate sign of the "new" class. Claims for an independent state–role by progressive liberals, social democrats, socialists, communists or nationalists can be evaluated as burdened with the "traditional" values representative of 19th century politics in the context of inevitable future of 21st century postmodernization.

Similarly, John and Barbara Ehrenreich's (1979, 1990) "Professional–Managerial Class" (PMC) or the "New Class" (in capital letters) designates a continuance of the above thesis, although in a somewhat different vein by claiming that intellectuals (defined by specific cultural habits and psychological dispositions) may be found (but not likely found) in the New Class which is mainly constituted by the professional middle–class of engineers, lawyers, executives etc. This position also shares some similarity with Erik Olin Wright's "analytical" Marxism in that these professionals–managers represent contradictory or "middle" class positions. The Ehrenreichs presume, though, that the intelligentsia form a class defined by "occupational commonality" and "internal social cohesion" (1990: 174). They have a common ownership of "education" as cultural capital and common interest in a class culture. Unlike Gouldner, though, intellectuals, they argue are not a class but a stratum straddling the New Class and other classes. The Ehrenreichs use a narrow descriptor (which Gramsci designated "traditional intellectuals") to distinguish intellectuals from the New Class. This approach fails to see the recent conjunction of knowledge/power and class/power as being historically unique.
(Gramsci's "new" or "organic" intellectual) and in some ways fails to acknowledge
the present discontinuous aspects of technocapitalism and postmodernity with
past relations of capitalist power (Jameson 1990; Kellner 1989; Poster 1989,
1990). The limitation of Ehrenreich's designation is that it generalizes about the
functioning of the New Class from assumptions about the functioning of the
"Old Class," that is, it theorizes class/power in terms of relations derived from
classical capitalism which may not be appropriate considering today's
dedifferentiation of state, science and class power and the commodification of
culture. This latter limitation is also found in the next two constellations.

The third traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as an
"Old Class ally." Here we get a restatement of Durkheim and Weber's class
commitment to the economic bourgeoisie. Intellectuals and other members of
the New Class are seen as a group of dedicated professionals whose vocation it
is to uplift the old propertied class from a venal group of capitalists into a
socially-oriented elite protecting more than their own private interest. This
position resembles the classical humanist tradition of the university don or
public iconoclast. In combination with mandarin intellectuals, this new genteel
elite can move society forward (Gouldner 1979). Gramsci (1971 [1926]) defines
the ideal typical traditional intellectual as comprised of the organizers of culture
(e.g. creative artists, scholars) and the vestiges of organic intellectuals from
previous social formations (e.g. ecclesiastics) who fuse in a common illusion
that they are autonomous from class interest. While not necessarily sharing the
world-view of the ruling class (e.g. idealism versus materialism), they eventually
effect a compromise with it, partially because of institutional pressures and
financial inducements. Nevertheless, their common conscious is conservative in
the name of the social order. The purpose of enunciating a conservative culture
is to provide an integrating function as producing compensations for market
anomie.

Two well-known American proponents to the Old Class ally thesis are
Talcott Parsons (1951) and Lionel Trilling (1965) and two of its contemporary
spokespersons are Allan Bloom (1987) and E.D. Hirsch Jr. (1987). This position
can be roughly described as culturally conservative and the home of Cold
Warriors. Made up mainly of "anticommunist" traditional intellectuals, the intent
of this position is for intellectuals to police the corridors of knowledge and purify it of any subversive contents. Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) in "The Politics of Literacy" argue that while "anti-communism" does not retain the same resonance in the post-Cold War period, voices such as Bloom and Hirsch now mobilize, anti-Black, anti-gay, anti-woman, and anti-Left political action with rhetorical claims to be the prime legislators of "liberal education," "neutral standards," "core American values," "equality of opportunity" and "literary efficiency." By appropriating the language of efficiency the new ideologists of the "traditional intellectual" have been able to reconstruct their alliance with the "benign technocrats" and "corporate managers" against the "statist" progressives, socialists, feminists who in alliance with the popular classes threaten the autonomy of disinterested practice. Thus, corporate managers and the private sector intelligentsia now join the laissez-faire liberals and the cultural "conservatives" (along with the religious right) to make up the "New Right" coalition in a new and tentative political accommodation united in an anti-statist and anti-democratic discourse as Old Class allies.

Daniel Bell's (1976) related interests concern the "economic dilemmas" confronting Western societies. By arguing for restoring a commitment to public norms, he illustrates how liberals can become neo-conservatives. He states "we have had no normative commitment to a public household or a public philosophy that would mediate private conflicts" (249). The reason, he posits, for the lack of normative commitment is that the popular classes via a democratic polity have now adopted "bourgeois appetites" and demand more social services and entitlements (248). In other words, it is not the bourgeois appetite that is the problem but rather the bourgeois ethic has been generalized beyond the bourgeois class. Bell also identifies a second reason for the lack of normative commitment. "There has been a loss of nerve on the part of the establishment" (244). The argument as a tautology offers no explanation at all. Cultural decline is explained with reference to cultural decline. Rather than explicating the exploitative nature of the capitalist economy and oppressive structures of racism and sexism, the new Old Class allies thus propose a program of remoralization to dampen the "expectations" of the popular classes, restore the faith of the elites in themselves and reeducate the young about the legitimacy of
the traditional institutions. In the case of the United States this means restoring
democratic elitism, private property rights, patriarchy, and hierarchical
education. The chief carriers of the restoration are the cultural, political and
economic elites defined as "experts" in their sphere of influence. While at the
same time occluding a scientific analysis of the mechanisms precipitating "moral
decline," an evangelical restoration of belief in "America" as defined by the
expert not only enforces religio on the general population it also cements the
relationship of the conservative culture critic with the old ruling class or a new
rising class (e.g. technocrats), whoever can best restore the lost order. The
humanist's accommodating nature is justified by the ideology of tolerance (i.e.,
accepting the given relations of power). The empirical fact of institutional
disruption, the triumph of conservative culture as tolerance becomes its
opposite and is expressed in its weaker form as a lament for a lost Golden Age.
In its stronger form, though, fatalism, cynicism or even reaction ensues,
resulting in conservative culture critics justifying intolerant actions in the name
of defending tolerance.

Allan Bloom (1987), as a case in point, identifies the "irrational pressures
of mass movements" and the adoption of "German ideas" such as nihilism and
socialism for causing the compromised position of the academic sphere. By
occluding the rationalization consequences of elite actions and the use of
bureaucratic and market mechanisms of capitalism in the creation of the "multi-
university," he pines for a past when traditional intellectual work could proceed
in an autonomous university without the bother of intrusions from the
uncultured. The so-called autonomous university of the past was merely
another name for the organic educational institution of the middle and upper
classes whose walls have now been breached by the popular classes. Having
aspired to the standard of a bourgeois education, the popular classes are thus
condemned for having lowered the standard by partially achieving the goal. The
crisis of modernity is thus perceived by the well-to-do as a lowering of
standards created by the external incursions of popular ("democratic") culture
rather than as a general organic decline of a society based on class privilege. A
property right to differential schooling is thus given primacy over a human right
to universal education. The empirical crisis of modernity and the decline of
educational standards is interpreted as the moral failing of "others" rather than the failing of a society constructed on the ground of class power. According to the conservative culture critic, this crisis can only be resolved by enhancing the power of the purveyors of excellence, that is, an empirical restoration of ruling class hegemony. In the conceptual gymnastics of traditional forms of abstraction promoted by the Old Class ally the victimizers are thus transformed into the victims.

Edward Shils (1982 [1971]) defines the mandarin intellectuals in a formally abstract and functionalist way in a search for the transhistorical essence of these "traditional" intellectuals.

The primary intellectual roles are constituted by: (1) the creation of patterns or symbols of general significance through the action of the imagination and the exercise of observational and rational powers and their precipitation into works, (2) the cultivation of the stocks of intellectual works, and (3) the transmission through interpretation of the traditions of intellectual works to those who have not experienced them. The secondary role is the performance of intellectual–practical (or intellectual–executive) actions in which intellectual works are intimately involved. (224)

Shils structural–functionalist approach starts from an abstract definition of intellectual practice and searches for the "essence" in the historical record. This mode of theorizing is not limited to "conservative" or sociological adherents but rather reproduces a totalizing paradigm for research into intellectual practice even for progressives. Hofstadter (1962) assumes the same distinctions. The history of American intellectual practice is thus specified as the history of anti–intellectualism but its causal mechanism remains unidentified. The rise of technocratic and political integration is perceived as the further degeneration of intellectual activity. Such might well be the case, but basing an analysis on such abstract distinctions cannot get beyond historical or sociological description to the identification of the mechanisms which cause the transitions or transformations in intellectual practice or core culture.

Shils (1982 [1971]) promotes the general method of the traditional intellect (from heaven to earth) as do Parsons and Bell. They offer, though, a scientized language of conservative culture criticism. This dominant form of American sociology -- even in its newest forms -- recycles the assumptions of
the "grand" alliance between a traditional cultural aristocracy and a rising economic bourgeoisie. Shils imputes the dominant definition of American "core culture" and then identifies its transmission as the ideal–typical form of intellectual practice. This common practice in educational research is also generalized to research on intellectuals. Intellectuals, as traditional intellectuals, are thus identified to symbolize the essential intellect as both the cultural expert on the core American values and the ideal example of the educated person. Professionals, scientists and managers, on the other hand, are also identified as having their intellect tainted by having to deal with mundane existence. Their mental activity is defined as "intelligence," that is, practical or technical expertise. In pressing the logic to its conclusion, the people who work with their hands, such as the manual labourer, are presumed to be without the competency for either intellect or intelligence. This mythical construct lays the basis for what Paulo Freire calls "the banking model of education." The popular classes thus appear as objects of education rather than subjects. Freire (1970) writes that "in this view, man is not a conscious being (corpo consciente); he is rather the possessor of a conscious; an empty "mind" passively open to the reception of deposits of reality from the world outside" (62). Paralleling the deep resonances of possessive individualism, the intellectual is treated as the banker of culture and the intelligentsia becomes the loans officer of expertise. They invest their capitals in the undeveloped territory of the virgin mind of the populous in return for the right to the surplus profit as personal property, that is, the intellectual as the keeper of "civilization" and the intelligentsia as the keeper of "expertise."

The structural functionalism of Shils thus reproduces a familiar pattern where two holisms of mental activity, between intellectuals (theoretical) and the intelligentsia (practical), are kept separate. Intellectuals who become practically involved thus lose their essence and are by definition no longer considered intellectuals. Intellectuals, to maintain their essence, must aspire to "disinterestedness" and "ideals." The promotion of values must not include political activism, that is, "partisan" values. The only accepted partisan value is the defence of the core value of tolerance which is assumed to be the ground for "disinterested critique." For example, Lewis Coser (1965) in *Men of Ideas*
defines intellectuals as characterized by a particular psychological essence as "men who never seem satisfied with things as they are" (viii). By definition then someone who is "satisfied" (or "female"?) is in some way deficient or deviant if claiming intellectual status. But, this definition of critique is also framed within a core culture of American values which the intellectual is responsible to reproduce as eternal and natural truths. This conceptualization of "intellectual" practice, then, gives a rather narrow reading to "critique." Intellectuals are theoretically defined to be carriers of "critique" yet empirically blocked from critically evaluating the first principles of a supposedly transhistorical American "core culture." "Tolerance" finds its real meaning as conformity to hegemonic values defined as "tradition." Tolerance, thus, can be used to justify its opposite, conforming to intolerance. "Intellectuals" who criticize the "core culture" or popular classes who challenge the definition of reality enunciated by the keepers of civilization are themselves defined as "anti-American," "irrelevant" or "irrational" -- or as Bloom in the name of toleration selectively highlights, it is the purveyors of "German ideas" or civil rights or gender equity who are the intolerant ones not the capitalists, racists and patriarchs. To make his philosophical claim stick the conservative culture critic must assume a false empirical claim that class-bias, white supremacy and patriarchy do not in fact exist. In the division of intellectual labour between the intellectuals and the intelligentsia, the American philosopher is not accountable for empirical correctness which he or she argues is best left to the sociologist and historian, who, in a marriage of convenience, also argue that metanarration is best left to the philosopher.

The grand alliance thesis as a fact fails to identify that neither the cultural "aristocracy" nor the economic bourgeoisie is necessarily morally bound to the general interest. The economic class is constrained to protect its profits and the cultural class cashes in on its education and social prestige. On one hand, the differences between the classes are based on the fact that each is willing to exploit the other as well as try to impose its own rationality and logic on the society as a whole. On the other hand, both are willing to come to some compromise if their own positions are challenged by the popular movements, in
which case, they work together to maintain their distinctive spheres of power and privilege (Gouldner 1979).

The fourth traditional constellation of thought treats intellectuals as "servants of power." Here is a restatement of variants of Marxist orthodoxy but through the prism of American empiricism. Marxism has historically been given a very narrow reading in the United States derived from the early reading of Marxism–Leninism as defined by Stalin for the Communist Party. Even the Trotskyist tradition since its emergence in the 1930s has always considered itself anti-communist (anti-Marxist?). Trotskyism still has a strong resonance in the U.S. and provided one basis for neoconservative anti-statism. This "wasteland" effect means that American "Marxism" is equated with the reductionism, economism and abstract materialism of Stalin's Marxism–Leninism.

In spite of the absurdities of Stalinist vulgar Marxism as it is interpreted in Anglo-American circles and the straw man arguments by liberals and conservatives who use vulgar Marxism to discredit Marxism, thinkers in this constellation have continued to challenge the premise that Modern America is a classless society. According to structural and analytical Marxists, intellectuals are viewed as instrumentally subservient to the big capitalists who retain power much as they always did by simply using the intellectuals to maintain their domination of society. American Marxism thus retains many similarities to the other three constellations by mystifying the relationship between class and elite rule and adhering to many of the paradigmal assumptions of analytical thought which disdains historical and dialectical thinking. Here, intellectual agency is seen as a function of a structural domination whereby the capitalist class controls other classes. Marxist critique thus appears as a mirror to the hegemonic discourse. The Old Alliance thesis between economic liberals and cultural conservatives is accepted as true but evaluated as a form of negative domination rather than positive leadership. Two of the more sophisticated adherents to this position are the political anarchist Noam Chomsky (1967, 1978, 1989) and the analytical Marxist Erik Olin Wright (1978, 1985, 2005). Chomsky and Wright are motivated by different politics but nevertheless they
share common assumptions about the nature of domination and provide exemplary arguments common to this "constellation."

Chomsky argues that university system is integrated into the structures of power and scholarly output has to adapt to the logic of power and market demands for intellectual resources. The ethos of professionalism in academic life is used to hide a systematic corruption of intellectual activity where objectivity and neutrality serves vested interests. Because intellectuals have greater access than the average person to the university, mass media and cultural production, they also have a greater opportunity to make critical statements. The intellectuals have abrogated their personal responsibility and have bought into the system. Chomsky's structural analysis undermines his ability to identify collective transformational processes and his pessimistic conclusions, mixed with moral urgency based on a form of socialist spontaneism, result in a call for moralizing intellectuals. According to Boggs (1993), Chomsky views intellectuals as "conscientious individuals who confront power with truth and reason in the service of democratic and humanistic goals" (162).

Wright was one of the first Marxists to break with the two-class model and recognize knowledge as a potential basis for class. He posits that the intelligentsia is an intermediate and contradictory class between capital and labour. Wright conceives skill as a "productive asset" that can be controlled for economic advantage. His work is highly abstract and analytical and lacks historical analysis of class struggle between capitalists, the middle classes and workers. He posits that managers mobilize "organization assets." Where professionals exploit skill, managers control the nature of jobs and the coordination of tasks. He considers the right of control in corporations and state bureaucracies as a kind of property right. Power is derived from organizational authority, and regardless of individual skills, this power is subordinated to the nature of ownership. Nevertheless, the managerial class as a "class" is indispensable to either bureaucratic capitalism or state socialism. Whether "private ownership" in this form is legitimately a form of capital is unclear. Furthermore, the class position of managers is complex. Top managers are intimately tied to capitalists and middle managers are
organized equally to professionals. According to Herman (1981:15) the
rationality of capital accumulation has not suffered from the rise of
management control, and according to Derber et al. (1990), Wright "glosses over
the intimate fusing of managerialism and capitalism at the top, the
proletarianization of middle and lower managers, and the growing
professionalization of managers at all levels" (223).

There are complex variations within this constellation of analytical and
structural neo-Marxism. Thinkers in this constellation have touted different
positions but each exemplifies a form of cultural determinism which this
analysis -- while supportive of their critique -- finds quite limited in explaining
how intellectual power works and whether intellectuals as part of the
intelligentsia will necessarily always be at the instrumental service of capitalists.

Briefly stated, adherents to the above thesis posit that the function of
intellectuals is to manufacture illusion, that is, to actively produce ideology
which mystifies social relationships or to reproduce the organizational relations
of capitalism, that is, what Bowles and Gintis (1976) call the "correspondence
principle." As a class (or its various other designations as group, fraction,
stratum etc.) the intelligentsia is at the service of the big bourgeoisie.
Managers, doctors, lawyers, journalists, professors, writers and priests etc.
make their livelihood perfecting the illusions of capitalism. One such illusion is
that the accumulation of wealth is based on the differential effects of hard work
and entrepreneurial intelligence but not on the differential distribution of power
and the exploitation of wage-labourers.

Furthermore, this "class" of functionaries also promulgates a second
illusion that capitalism functions on the basis of "equality of opportunity" where
the achievement of wealth is based on merit (sometimes luck) and not biased by
the ascriptive characteristics of class, gender and race or the power to control
the structural "corridors" of "equal" opportunity. A structural corridor could
seem as benign as the construction of an "intelligence" test or a public
washroom or as generalized as the structure of representative democracy, that
is, those with money represent those without it.

Also, they promulgate a third illusion of "professionalism" by which they
are able to sustain their own position between the big bourgeoisie and the
popular classes by claiming that their private ownership of a specialized kind of property (mental competencies) is required for the functioning of society as a whole. As such, Marx's complex conception of ideology as a moment of class struggle is de-historicized and instrumentalized.

Although much evidence is available to support the validity of what Chomsky and Wright claim for the presence of ideological domination based on class, their explanations fail to generate information explaining collective agency or the ideological construction of class forms as well as how and why "class" arises, changes or can be transformed – or in fact, any alternative forms of exploitation, let alone what might be uniquely available to the intelligentsia as a Marxist class category. Stanley Aronowitz (1992a) writes that the new debates are those of agency and specific here intellectual practice as class agency. In response to the above approaches to class, he adds:

Needless to say, the burning question since Marx bearing on class theory is not, as often assumed, the spatial relation of social categories to the mode of production of material existence. The economic identification of social classes -- whether they own, control, or are objects of the production and reproduction of material existence, whether they occupy an intermediate position between the owners and the propertyless -- are interesting sociological questions but do not exhaust the politico-historico dimension of class issues. (126)

Aronowitz's (1992a) work at this point marks an important detour away from political economy to politics and then to culture and subjectivity in the analysis of class relations (Aronowitz 2003) and provides important groundwork for the postmodern displacement of political economy and "life after class" as a conceptual category altogether (Pakulski and Waters 1996). Today "exclusion" as an oppressive practice limiting bourgeois freedom for women, racialized and sexual minorities and the inadequately credentialled has captured the ground of so-called "radical" critique once held by a political economic analysis of "exploitation" as the necessary form of capitalist "freedom" – the best that can be got without political economic revolution.

**Something New: Does An "Intellectual Class" Exist?**

Class contradiction or individual consensus theories based on functionalist assumptions reflect different ideological assumptions about the
system but fail to achieve an authentic scientific explanation of causality. To maintain either of the functionalist theses means assuming an explanation for structuration and ignoring history, especially revolutionary history, where radicalized intellectuals played a leadership role in the structural transformations of the last two centuries. Such theses also greatly exaggerate the common interests linking intellectuals and capitalists and systematically miss the tensions and contradictions between the rationalities they mobilize as specific and differential forms of power. They also ignore the fact that it is within the realm of historical possibility -- claimed by Marx and others -- that the capitalist class is historically constituted and could pass away. What the "ruling class" is, whether it is in control, and how it is in control, are three empirical questions that should not be presumed to be answered before an investigation starts. This flaw is endemic to structural and analytical analysis for both Marxist and non-Marxist approaches alike. Furthermore, to make such synchronic assumptions and then to sacrifice diachronic analysis underestimates the transformative potentials the players in the "new class" and in the changing densities of education, research and communication have. To hypostatize "capitalism" and "classes" sacrifices the possible identification of discontinuities in both their specific and general aspects. According to Gouldner (1979), to theorize about capitalism in such a way is to presuppose the permanence of a social order in even a more fundamental way than Talcott Parsons ever did.

Recent shifts in the theoretical discourses on intellectual practice suggest a realignment of non-democratic political interests. The first three traditional approaches appear to be coming to a rationalized theoretical accommodation concerning the nature of conservative culture, scientific management and neoliberal economics. This new official rationalization marginalizes proponents of democratic, humanist, popular and public interests.

The above canonical interpretations of intellectual practice focus on the heroic practices of public intellectuals or expert opinion-makers. The primary limitation of these theories is an emphasis on intellectuals as individuals (or groups of individuals) rather than as practitioners of symbolic mediation. Missed are the structural aspects of "collective" agency and the increasingly "anonymous" nature of intellectual practice. Traditional approaches are also

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compromised because they fail to account for the effects of cultural commodification or for the scientific management of desire, let alone old and new forms of exploitation. This second problematic concerns the fact that traditional approaches to cultural analysis reify culture. This latter failure means that traditional approaches cannot account for two major elements of intellectual activity: the economy of desire regulated by scientific management or the specific non-discursive power of intellectuals who normatively regulate discourse. The fact that the above approaches to culture are theoretically and methodologically compromised suggests that an alternative theoretical approach is necessary.

One of the most contentious issues this study raises is that "the intelligentsia," and "intellectuals" as a special case of the intelligentsia, should be considered a social class in the "Marxist" sense of the word. This claim can be justified in two ways: theoretical or methodological. First, the theoretical justification would make a strong case and would require much more empirical support. I would have to show not only that the conception of the intelligentsia as a class is in keeping with the Marxist or a Marxist theoretical tradition, I would have to locate it in a more historically nuanced exposition. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make this strong case by taking such a complicated and complex digression. I am also not willing to entertain this theoretical claim at this moment simply because it might contradict some key points in Gramsci's argument that the intelligentsia formed a strata and not a class — a position I have taken in previous work (Kachur 1995, 2003). It is sufficient here to hypothesize that the "intelligentsia" may now be a social class in this contemporary period which Jameson might define as postmodern capitalism but not for the reasons he suggests. In this case, I posit that whether the intelligentsia is a social class or not is ultimately an empirical, practical and real question. A legitimate defense of this position needs to justify that my method is in keeping with Marx's historical materialism.

As such, my position offers a new point of view on the intelligentsia that distinguishes itself from the theoretical debates that have been the tradition in critical sociology (e.g. Cuneo 1993). This latter debate has been framed as one between E. O. Wright's (1978, 1985) treatment of the intelligentsia as an
intermediate class between capital and labour and Barbara and John Ehrenreich's (1979) treatment of the intelligentsia as a new middle class. This narrow framing of the issue is part of a larger debate on the conception of the intelligentsia as a class (see Bottomore et al. 1983: 74). Furthermore, unlike the 1980s, I also have to defend class as a legitimate construct in its own right. The destructive effects of the postmodern turn depended on erasing completely the ontological line between representation and reality. My differences, though, not only concern theoretical points concerning the intelligentsia but also methodological points regarding reason, representation and reality differences concerning how to approach the historical material. This paper finds these theories based on faulty methodological assumptions derived from positivist assumptions and shared with postmodernists which can’t be taken up here.²

With the above clarifications in mind, my theoretical claim would be that the intelligentsia is neither intermediate nor new but a social class with distinctive relational characteristics to other classes and the means of production. As a historical materialist postulate, though, its correctness as a hypothesis depends on empirical verification and not an orthodox authorial assertion to analytical correctness. In this methodological sense, my claim is in keeping with Marx's fundamental methodological principle that the historical analysis of social relations should determine the scientific development of analytical constructs rather than vice versa (Bhaskar 1975, 1979, 1986, 1989; Gramsci 1971; Habermas 1979; Marx 1973 [1857]; Marx and Engels 1965 [1846]; Sayer 1979, 1984). My conclusions about the nature of the intelligentsia as a class in the contemporary period may thus contradict conclusions by Marx and others, such as, Gramsci or Althusser, without doing violence to their method used in a different historical period. It was through a similar kind of

² For critiques of positivist, postmodernist and hermeneutic approaches and defense of critical realist approaches to social research see Brian Fay (1984) Social Theory and Political Practice; William Outhwaite (1987) New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory; Andrew Collier (1994) Critical Realism: An Introduction to the Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso); Andrew Sayer (1992) Method is Social Science: A Realist Approach and (2002) Realism and Social Science. Alex Callinicos (2006) The Resources of Critique (Polity) provides a good overview showing the applicability of the philosophy of critical realism for integrating the analysis of key thinkers central to my argument here (e.g. Habermas, Bourdieu, Boltanski and Chiapello, Žižek). For articulating qualitative and quantitative research see Berth Danemark, Mats Ekström, Liselotte Jakobsen and Jan Karlsson (Routledge). Critical Realism and the Social Sciences; and a range of mixed methods see Jose Lopez and Gary Potter (2001) After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism (Althone).

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analysis of the Fordist regime of capitalism at the turn of the century that Gramsci was able to modify the conceptual constructs of Marxism and introduce new ideas about the exercise of hegemony and the intelligentsia as a strata. It is through this kind of approach to postmodern capitalism that the intelligentsia as a class should be considered. In this latter defense I need only a sufficient case. I achieve this sufficiency by remaining true to Marx's method for analyzing the historical nature of social relations rather than drawing on the definitional authority of one of many Marxist traditions about the nature of the intelligentsia and a theory of social classes – even though I do owe much to Boltanski and Chiapello's contribution on exploitation via “social networks, it is in highlighting and contextualizing their analysis which is my contribution. My theoretical claim, then, is that the intelligentsia are a class because they have two distinctive characteristics that define social classes in the Marxist sense: (1) the intelligentsia has a distinctive relationship to other classes and the means of production and (2) the intelligentsia has a distinctive qualitative power and positioning based on the cultural production of the symbolic order and is not reducible to occupational categorization or statistical quantification as such.

**Something Borrowed: The Material Base for Intellectual Transformation**

My own work (1995 onward), along with Kees van der Pijls (1998), and others, has been about these “cadres” who have throughout the twentieth century developed into a conscious class to sustain social cohesion whenever the bourgeois order suffers a severe crisis. In the contemporary crisis the political orientation of the cadres will depend on whether they will feel compelled to seek to uphold the privileges of the ruling class or under impetus from popular movements from below. As an abolitionist, my own contribution, here, is to bring attention to political philosophy and social theory of exclusionary private property and to highlight the empirical emergence of some alternative forms and inclusionary forms of property and the struggles therein. I have suggested that such a conception can only be understood through a focus on the social basis of the state and an analysis of the *nèbuleuse* as an emerging complex of mutually reinforcing sets of relationships between the “Washington consensus,” the policies and practices of national state agencies, and their
regional orchestrating institutions (e.g. OECD, CMEC, NAFTA). The new world of intellectual property rights, international relations, and cultural commodities (i.e. the commercialization and regulation of S&T in universities and of education services through online delivery), the analysis of the intelligentsia cannot ignore a classical analysis of exploitation.

Entertaining the notion with new kinds of property their may be emerging modified or new forms of property relations as well as the possible end of other forms, and they mark the possibility of the emergence of new kinds of societies or relationships incorporating transitions to them. This includes my previous international analyses of university restructuring, the mantra of the neoliberal “New Economy” and many of the recent trends that have been identified:

1. increased national and post–national coordination of secondary and post–secondary (CMEC, Bologna Process);
2. increased juridification of and financial sanctions for rules of research (e.g. Tri–council (NSERC, CIHR & SSHRC) ethics reviews);
3. shift of faculty recognition from teaching and publishing to revenue–generation and commercialized research;
4. international collaboration through NAFTA, OECD and WTO to institute trade regimes for intellectual property rights and trade in educational services;
5. formalization of research networks and specialization clusters via “Centres of Excellence” and “Research Chairs” along with the promotion of multi–, cross–, and inter–disciplinary studies;
6. increased stratification and differentiated specializations amongst teaching and research universities;
7. facilitation to inequities in power and resources amongst faculties, genders, regions and North–South countries;
8. funding of a star system for researchers in the Canada Research Chairs Program;
9. the dedication of SSHRC to become a Granting Council to become a Knowledge Council;
10. and a myriad of new dynamics amongst students, support staff, casual lecturers, departments faculties, administrations, industries and so on.

Central to this research about the “intellectual–state–industrial complex” are some of the preconditions leading to international collaboration through NAFTA, OECD and WTO to institute trade regimes for intellectual property rights and trade in educational services was the emergence of a new structure of relationships based on the reality of new digitized materials such as computer software. What seems to have been emerging were new relations of production

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related to intellectual activities and new forms of ownership and control regarding those activities.

Across industry, state and academe, the stratified social reality is also related to new digitized materials and the reorganization of information systems. I won’t touch on even a basic introduction here except to mention that others have covered these aspects in accessible form. The distinction I would make here from these other researchers is that for the most part the intellectual property rights debate is usually posed as a struggle and resulting pragmatic compromises as between the creators (such as artists, writers and inventors) and the consumers (such as educators, librarians and MP3 downloaders). However, I have been exploring the emergence of a new kind of right that has developed on this topic: “investor rights.”

Innovations though the introduction of information technology to education attempts to marry commodification and resocialization, thus, is a highly problematic balancing act as a national development strategy whereby education sites are treated as captured markets, progressive resocializers and centres for capital accumulation. This problem is especially so when regulated by new property regimes and conflicting levels of governance. At the global level, the education–related provisions of the TRIPS agreement protect computer programs (whether in source or object code), of compilations of data (databases), and integrated circuit designs. In addition, the scope for access to and use of copyrighted works is becoming more restrictive because of legal and technological developments beyond the TRIPS agreement.

Second, because perfect digital copying is possible and the regulation of the right to reproduce difficult, especially for private copying, new technological developments facilitate access to supposedly protected works. Devices can be developed (such as encryption or licensed management). Nevertheless, new laws are enacted but quickly superceded by new technologies. Third, short of using

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electronic fences or prohibition, title-holders use or seek payment for any use of technologically produced works.

Finally, fair use doctrine can be restricted to original compilations of data (databases) if a “substantial investment” in creating the contents has been made. In this latter case, property ownership is founded not so much on the creation but on the investment in the creation. The investors are the owners and have the right to prevent the extraction or re-utilization of the whole or a substantial part of the contents of the database. The IP protection of plants and animals, living matter, seed systems or DNA “maps” are also treated as a database and is a highly sensitive and controversial topic.4

Also, new international rules for IPRs bring greater uniformity but not necessarily full harmonization of national legislation and practices. WTO member nations use flexibility to adopt pro-competitive measures that may facilitate the access to information and technologies. In the area of information technologies, the TRIPS agreement introduced new standards and a number of post-TRIPS developments are creating barriers to the access of all types of information, which affect not only access to technology but also access to factual information and scientific knowledge in the public domain.5

Implications for North American universities have been profound even if we just consider universities in Canada as key “investors” with property rights. American universities, such as Stanford and MIT, are the models of the commercialization of academic labor and IP-related institutional policy and strategy in Canada.6 The Stanford model encourages faculty and students to invent and commercialize with little or no IP ownership by the university. The University of Waterloo follows this model. It presupposes that the university should be a dynamic place where researchers, students and innovators gravitate. The polar opposite IP model is more apparent in Canadian universities. It can take different forms and value-distributions in terms of inventor, joint or university ownership and revenue distribution between

6 Doern and Sharaput (2000:175).
inventors, universities and industry. For example the University of Toronto and the University of Alberta where all inventions are the university’s IP, and on that basis, shared returns are negotiated among the inventors, the university and commercial investors. A closer look at the top five research universities shows different patterns: University of Toronto and University of Alberta have inventor ownership, Université de Montréal and McGill University joint ownership, and University of British Columbia university ownership.⁷

The new political economy of knowledge production and consumption raises fundamental issues about knowledge and education that go beyond traditional debates about socialization and selection into the "economic" realm of marketization, privatization, and commodification of culture. The nature of the university is changing. More and more its cutting edge institutions are run like a business for business with hopes of becoming sites for capital accumulation. How might we think about situating this new class dynamic of production, consumption and ownership of cultural commodities – and the new properties owned, produced and exchanged and profits to be gained. To get at the significant changes in social relations in the new capitalisms requires understanding the effect of formal to real subsumption of intellectual practices in capitalism within intellectual institutions such as universities.

In Kees van der Pijl’s (1998) exploration of transnational classes and international relation, he has taken a more specific look at the capitalist dynamic of the cadre function, and drawing on Marx (Grundrisse 1973: 161) points toward: “The connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also the independence of this connection from the individual,” where the moment of socialization in the development of the world market is not sustained spontaneously. Other thinkers, such as Adam Smith, were also interested in the functioning of the property system and its production of a particular moral character or civic virtue or vice. In addition to the virtues of private property that imprinted the realm of liberal freedom, Smith was also concerned about the vices of socialization into a commercial society to undermine martial or civic virtues and character development. For Marx, socialization proceeds in

⁷ See for example statistics for Technology Transfer List: University of Alberta. http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/strategic/nav03.cfm?nav03=17170&nav02=17145&nav01=17121

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conjunction with commodification and the condition of universal, impersonal
interconnection engendered by the world market as well as by other modes of
alienation which have captured our attention such as state formation, the need
for control and direction of collective labour, and the task of maintaining social
cohesion under conditions of advanced division of labour, bring forth as specific
stratum of functionaries (Kees van der Pijl 1998: 136).

So when thinking about the “education system” it is important to
remember that “education” is more than the clichéd connection to K–12 and
postsecondary schooling and even if we expand the cliché to early childhood
learning in the household or lifelong training in the workplace it does not
capture the kind of education I am talking about. It is also something more than
the education Gramsci speaks of when conceiving “political society” or Althusser
the “ideological state apparatuses.” Even Foucault’s conception of
“governmentality” comes close to comprehending this “moment of socialization”
and it is captured in studies of the modes of neomanagerialism regulating the
interstices and collapsing the distinctions between industry, state and academy
something has been missed. What “education” is, in the sense created by the
process of Vergesellschaftung, is the other face of commodification in the
commodification process inherent to the functioning of the property system.
And, furthermore, according to Marx, these “educators” in this education system
take a definite form associated with this kind of socialization which also
“contains the conditions for going beyond it.” Left unexplained in many studies,
however, is the source of these new values or practices. 8

If these values originated internally, what is the source of these new
values? Or if these values or practices originated externally, why were the

8 E.g. Pannu, Shugurensky & Plumb (1992) relapses into a somewhat traditional explanation of
university reform in either its idealist or historicist versions: as a historical product of a clash of
ideologies, such as corporate, bureaucratic, or populist, with neoliberal ideology the driving force.
This is a similar line of argument taken by many researchers (too numerous to name) but a
sampling should suffice: conflicting values (Axelrod 2002), lack of public support and commercial
support (Slaughter and Leslie 1997), exchange and corporatization (Chan and Fisher 2008)
pragmatic political interests (Pocklington and Tupper 2002), corporate domination (Turk 2000),
class struggle and strength of faculty associations (Tudiver 1999), the capitalist, scientific and
state complex (Greenberg 2001) or a myriad of intersecting external social factors and
evolutionary functions: hedonistic distractions, inadequate socialization, declining skills,
corporate culture, government policies, changing workplaces, private debt and declining skills
required in the economy (Côté and Allahar 2007).
university’s borders so permeable at this historical juncture? All those who use a value-based conflict of ideas or a praxis-based clash of historical agents have missed the importance of one-half of the equation of the nature of the commodity form and its relationship to sociation and socialization. This critique may also be applied to consensus-based explanations. I emphasize, while values, ideas and practices are necessary elements in the explanations, they are not sufficient. It is toward a more adequate and non-reductive analysis that this paper points, one that theorizes not only cultural commodification as the source of new values, ideas and practices but also toward new sources of exploitation.\(^9\)

In a nutshell, the process goes like this: First, in the process of commodification lives are increasingly embraced by a world of market relations where goods are produced and services rendered, including the raw material of nature and human beings subjected to economic discipline which defines and treats them as commodities. Second, there is a process of socialization whereby elementary exchanges develop into complex webs of quasi-organic interdependence with an initial division of labour objectified in knowledge, machinery and organization and is facilitated by capital accumulation or state activity. Third, an ever-tightening interconnection of technical labour processes resulting from competitive profit strategies exert continuous pressure towards transcending the limits of separate spheres of socialization creating ongoing disruption, dislocation and destruction of the existing social fabric — and potentially the biosphere — although no historical necessity assures that the new order will supplant the old. However, powerful ideological processes such as commodity fetishism turns the capitalist economy into a quasi-natural phenomenon, as this reification sets in, it appears as if democratic regulation will stand in the way of naturalized assumptions of progress. So historically developed authority invested with maintaining internal cohesion deals with class and cultural conflicts provoked by the imposition of a NEW discipline of capital – new forms of governmentality (Foucault) — these conflicts may get displaced to various accumulation, legitimation or motivation crises requiring again new

\(^9\) I have presented a paper on this topic in detail elsewhere “Cultural Commodification and the Intelligentsia: A New Transnational Class?” (Socialist Studies Society, 76th Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences Saskatoon, Canada, 2 June 2007). The analysis is consistent with Marx (MEW 23:102), Weber (1976), Polyani (1957) and van der Pijls (1998).
disciplines (Habermas, O’Connor). New disciplines of capital evoke a renewed politics of property over redefinitions of property ownership (Macpherson) and eliciting new struggles based on new class formations with emancipatory possibility and political responsibilities for cadres.

Central to the mission of analyzing the intelligentsia and following Marx was the need to assume and untangle: (1) the relationship between material and mental production and; (2) the theory of the commodity. Few, until recently, thought through these two dynamics together. I believe this is required to understand their co-implications for the mode of intellectual production in higher education. For example, internal to every university is struggle between the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the professions utilizing a mix of practice-based, applied and pure social science. Since the real subsumption of the natural sciences is the most advanced, the attempt to generalize the model of capitalist relations to the social and professional science has been differentially successful and elicited new resistances and accommodations with the academy and between faculties. These struggles are variously coded as between research and teaching, for or against service, and calls for increased commercialization of deliverables.

Marx’s conception of the “social production of life” taking place on the basis of “material productive forces” in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy (1859) must be reread in light of the variously defined linguistic, cultural and postmodern turns in contemporary social science. But it must also be read in light of the new relations between commodities and socialization and struggles over properties owned, rented or borrowed by different cadres. Thus, Marx and Engels’ conception of language as practical consciousness now takes on a rather neo-orthodox rendering in the famous – and infamously abused – quotation: “It is not the consciousness of men that conditions [bestimmt] their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that conditions their consciousness.” The question is what is this social being, and has it changed, and if so, how and why.

I highlight the two key premises of Marx’s work on the subject: (1) the relationship between material and mental production and (2) the theory of the commodity, and to highlight the dearth of analyses on the commodity form and
its implications for the intellectual mode of production in higher education. While contemporary theorizing about intellectual production emphasizes a shift toward moral–political pragmatism and praxis–based approaches, little energy is expended rethinking the Real relationship between commodification, re–sociation and socialization and potentially new bases for capitalist exploitation and cultural formation.

Jhally (1987) highlights, drawing also on the work of Kline and Leiss (1978), a new kind of subsumption; what he calls a “double subsumption.” Not that the world of true needs has been subordinated to the world of false needs, but that the realm of needing has become a function of the field of communication. Central then is the functioning of the communication industry that mediates needs an understanding of the social role of advertising. Advertising supported media valorizes time, and the impact of this valorizing on the style and content of commercials and the effect of this on the satisfaction of needs becomes crucial. Jhally argues that “in the realm of communication also, use–value is subordinated to exchange–value, such that it is the double subsumption of use–value to exchange value that best helps us understand the social role of advertising in Western industrial society” (23).

In rethinking the real subsumption of higher education in an analysis of cultural commodities and emerging fetishes, we must turn our attention not only to the new dynamics of political economy initiated by the new information technologies and struggles over private property rights, we must also look at the new dynamics of culture where “higher education” functions as advertisement and entertainment industry – higher education as “edutainment,” that valorizes consciousness, generates revenues from selling audience time where the more shows we sponsor, the more audiences we capture the more we can sell these audiences to advertisers.

Where the university domain becomes a proper capitalist enterprise it becomes interested primarily in its own productivity. We must understand the system of its own messages and what function messaging performs within the system of exchange value. Members of the university must be reminded that in this new media system to function as commercials and to communicate something to attract audience attention – it aim is to affect behavior after the
time of viewing. Programs are messages to be “sold” to consumers—they are in fact consumer goods, and during programming time (consumption watching time) audiences create meaning for themselves. But during commercial time (labour watching time) audiences create meaning for capital. The ratings or evaluations or “test scores” of the industry help secure the best possible purchase of audiences for their clients. Human activity is watching. Power simply disappears and instead we have the audience as a raw material, being worked upon and processed by the agents of capital in both the broad- and narrow-casting industries from early childhood development to postsecondary schooling and onward to lifelong learning. Most important is the valorization of the “watching activity” as a real extension of the domain of capital. So there is a colonization of time where certain activities must be performed on the head and in the head as compulsive time. The nature of this compulsion is in the material and mental functioning of capitalism whereby the human search for meaning in a fragmented symbolic order seeks the marketplace as its only means of meaning-fulfillment and, of course, the symbolic processes are dominated by economic ones and, more specifically, the attempt to generate increasing amounts of surplus value for private producers.

According to Jhally (1990), the symbolic processes connected to goods are collapsed into one sphere (the market), and the institution of advertising reflects this duality. The movement of value invades the symbolic/material process of human needing and destroys any idea of superstructure and base in a Real process of totalization. “Capital invades the process of meaning construction, it valorizes consciousness itself” (205).

**Something Blue: Exploitation as Capitalists, Tribute, and Office Holding**

As discussed above, the transformation of intellectual institutions by their real subsumption in capitalist social relations does not suggest much that is unique except that “educators” and “researchers” are being transformed into entrepreneurs and capitalists. Relations are transformed from teacher and student to capitalist and worker whereby exploitation mirrors similar kinds of relationships in the capitalist economy. The cultural commodification, however, not only opens up this kind of exploitative relationship. It also opens up the
possibility for reinscribing other kinds of exploitative possibilities which I explore here and in the rest of the paper.

This section reviews the different kinds of traditional exploitation and ends with an analysis of exploitation related to political office holding that emerged in the State Socialist societies and points toward the following section about exploitation in a Connexionist society. For the most part, the above analysis of cultural commodification and new opportunities for explanation are based on conceiving the intelligentsia as “entrepreneurs” rather than “educators.” Missed in this kind of analysis — as important as it is — is that any profits gained in the shift are not so much about the emergence of a new class but most importantly as a shift from an in-between contradictory class position to a class position that could be defined as capitalist or proletariat in a classical sense of the word. This shift could be called the embourgeoisement or proletarianization of the intelligentsia made possible by the commodification of new properties and new divisions of labour — in this case, in the cultural realm as a result of digitization (e.g. music, software) and new managerial and worker functions dependent on reskilling and deskilling.

To review: Most Marxists would agree with Bottomore (1991: 84) that class as a concept and as a new political force engaged in a struggle for emancipation is of central importance to Marxist theory. They would also agree that class structure provides a main reference point for a Marxist theory of history and the development of capitalism. Class struggle as the driving force of history, of all history of, “hitherto existing society,” also cannot be ignored; however, Marx and Engels also recognized the prominent uniqueness of class for capitalist society. They were well aware that of conflicts between status groups complicating the arrangement of historical societies as class societies, that is, they included: “…various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank” and contrasted them from bourgeois society because of its two great hostile camps, the bourgeoisie and proletariat while at the same time suggesting that except for tribal societies “it is always the direct relation between the owners of the conditions of production and the direct producers which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden foundation, of the entire social edifice” (Capital III, Ch. 47).
If I focus our attention on this matter of direct relations of owners (i.e. exclusive private property) and the newest innermost secret of contemporary (i.e. cultural commodification via digital technologies), two important questions are at issue: (1) what is the precise nature of the complications of social ranking and stratification in relations to the basic classes and their naming; and (2) in the development of the two principal classes, what is the nature and mechanisms of their formation as classes, and supplementary to this, what is the nature and mechanisms of the development of class interest and consciousness? Without giving pause to the answers given to these questions within the various strands of Marxism and its allies, opponents and enemies, suffice it to say here they are important questions to ask given the spokespersons for contemporary radical political movements which are non-class based and for the pervasive weight of the neoliberal global order who deny not just the relevance of class analysis but the real existence of class itself. So a major subtext of this examination of class exploitation is also a defense of the reality of class and the importance of its analysis for liberation for all.

Various definitions of class circulate in confused ways and are embedded in the common sense of everyday discourse. A Marxist definition of class is defined primarily (1) in terms of relations rather than in gradations (e.g. factoral ecology); (2) in terms of relations of production rather than relations of exchange (domestic property classes); (3) and in terms of specific relations of exploitation, domination, and ownership of the means of production rather than in terms of production relations based on the division of labour, occupation or industrial sector (e.g. gentrification and post-industrial cities) (Pratt in Johnston 1994: 69). For class theorists (Weberian, Marxist and otherwise) a key theoretical issue is how to move between abstractions about class structure to analyses of class structure, consciousness and formation in concrete societies. The key assumption here for theorists (many working in cultural studies and the sociology of education and including Marxists) is the mistaken belief that there is no longer a direct link between position in class structure and class consciousness and action. They interpret the constitution of class identity as a highly contingent and indeterminant sociopolitical activity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Willis 1977 etc.). With the postmodern turn, some have gone so far as to
reject any determinant connections or the possibility to even analyze them. Most attention today is given to the interrelations between different social identities. However, my attention is not there but rather a return to the classical questions about structure, consciousness and formation, to definitions of materiality, property, and class, and to new, old and alternative forms of ownership of the means of production, such as in precapitalist and postcommunist societies as well as in the newly emergent economies based on cultural commodification, digital technologies, new regimes of property ownership and the emergence of potentially new kinds of exploitation.

Specific to this research are two questions about the nature and function of the social structure and nature of class, status and identity differences: (1) has there been a real change in the relation of individuals to the means of production regarding private ownership or collective control by a specific social group which exercises social power; and (2) whether the conflicts, compromises and continuities are only between groups of status or distinction or whether they have broader class characteristics. The answer to these questions are more complex and ambiguous than appears in the writings of Marx and Engels and writing about class and property cuts to the bone of Marxism. But they will be given by investigation, in Marx’s words (draft letter to Mikhailovsky 1877), that cannot be resolved by “the passé-partout of a historical–philosophical theory” by an analysis of the “empirically given circumstances.”

Are intellectuals (intelligentsia) a class? To answer such a question presumes a definition of "class." The question also might assume a definition of historical materialism as one form of class analysis. I stayed away from specifying an answer to this question or risking a clear definition, but have preferred to conceive of such terms as "cultural bourgeoisie," the "New Class," "intellectual stratum" or "educated middle classes" as contested theoretical constructs that are heuristically valuable attempts at coming to terms with intellectual practices in the twentieth century. I preferred using the designations "intellectual practice" and "mental labour." I have attempted as much as possible to take an empirical and realist approach to intellectual practices rather than assuming an ideal conception of an "intellectual." What must disappear from the lexicon of researchers are such claims as Boggs (1993) makes in reaching for
his Gramscian "dictionary" (and assuming a claim that properly should be demonstrated) that "under no circumstances, however, do intellectuals as such constitute a distinct class or social bloc; they do not exercise their own unique influence upon historical change" (163). Impregnated in this claim is not only a definition of intellectuals but a worldview about the nature of intellectual practice and its unfolding development, abstracted from the challenges of critical discourse.

So what are the processes of direct and indirect exploitation? Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 373) identify that “one characteristic of capitalism is comparison with other regimes (like slavery or serfdom) is that exploitation under it does not necessarily assume a patent, visible form. The existence of exploitation always assumes some form of coercion. But whereas in precapitalist societies is invariably direct, in capitalism it passed through a series of detours to mask it.” Furthermore, in capitalism, exploitation is “disclaimed juridically, since the actors who contribute to production are in a contractual relationship.” And third, in capitalism, exploitation [also] “involves actors who operate from a distance, possibly in ignorance of one another and with different intentions.” Finally, they point out that “Those who exercise close control (the cadre or administrator) [over the exploitation process] are not necessarily those who derive the greatest profit from it (e.g. shareholders)” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 373).

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) also summarize what a Marxist explanatory critique of exploitation includes: a) identifiable bodies which contribute to profit creation, and the contributions by each of them; b) demonstrating functional interdependence; c) stating what each party has contributed; and d) establishing the level of remuneration of each contribution should be if it is to count as just. However, “it is not enough to reveal calculable injustice. To sustain an accusation of exploitation, it is equally necessary to specify the nature of the strength which the unequal division is based, and also what makes it invisible (otherwise, unveiling it would be pointless)” (2007: 376).

In specifying the different kinds of exploitation and justice, it must be remembered that as historical phenomenon they may remain articulated in a
mode of production with other kinds of exploitation in contemporary times: these include: a) Pre-industrial societies as is shown in the work of Eric Wolf in Marxist Anthropology; b) Industrial societies as shown by Marx and Engels in Classical Marxism; in c) Bureaucratic/ Socialist societies as shown in the work of Claude Lefort’s Neo-Marxism and finally in d) Connexionist societies as demonstrated in the Neo-Marxism of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007).

In looking at the first three kinds of exploitation, Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) specify four different kinds of exploitation and related concepts of justice. I will leave the description and discussion of exploitation and justice in a connexionist society for the next section. (The focus in this section is to think a little more about the pre- and post-industrial capitalist forms of exploitation and intellectual labour since I have already discussed in detail the newly emerging industrial capitalist forms related to cultural commodification in the previous section.)

1. In pre-industrial societies social bonds of unequal division rest primarily on kinship (e.g. gender, age, prestige [merit]) and exploitation is based on relations of personal dependence grounded in membership of a lineage, and prescribed forms of subordination and fealty. In this case justice reduces dependence on filial relations of kinship.

2. In industrial societies unequal division rests on a property differential (i.e. legal category). Here some (capitalists) own the means of production (tools) so they can exploit those who, not possessing the means of production, can enter into production only as sellers of their labour-power. In this case, justice focuses on redistribution of social production based on merit and need.

3. In bureaucratic/socialist societies, unequal division rests on a power differential (likewise legally guaranteed), which makes it possible to extort a surplus of power. The occupation of a higher echelon is guaranteed by title to office (educational, functional, political, etc.) and assumes a decision-making power. In this case, justice returns to parity through redistribution of official power corresponding to the distribution of real power through self-management.

Recent trends in history and sociology do show an increased interest in the social origins and actions of the intelligentsia and provides some sense that
the world of intellectual activity is changing. Part of this change involves the different kinds of products intellectuals produce as well as the ownership patterns of those products.

In terms of kinds of products produced and according to the early-Habermas (1971), intellectual practice is constituted by three kinds of knowledge interests. In the middle-Habermas (1984, 1987a), these knowledge interests were rearticulated by the kinds of worlds they refer to: the natural world, the social world; and the personal world. In discussing intellectual practice, thus, the "educated middle class," "cultural bourgeoisie" or "new intellectual class" may be identified by the institutionalized relations with other classes and by the kind of knowledge they are interested in. This intellectual class which I have categorized in total as the intelligentsia or cadre class has special characteristics that distinguish it from what has been traditionally treated as either the petit bourgeoisie (see e.g. Veltmeyer 1986) or an intermediary class characterized by its contradictory location within the class structure between capital and labour (see e.g. E.O. Wright 1985). First, the intelligentsia should be situated in a class position distinguishable from either the classical bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, the working class or intermediary classes. The reason I say this is twofold: (1) the nature of the intelligentsia's production and (2) the intelligentsia's special social relationship to the state.

Let me clarify. The commodities which the "traditional capitalist" intelligentsia produce are called "services" (see Larson 1977). Service production functions according to a different economy than other forms of commodity production in that "services" also circulate as "gifts" and can only retain intellectual value by being "given away" (see Pefanis 1991). Much like circulating in a "kula ring" or "potlach relations," knowledge cannot be privately hoarded to remain "knowledge." The intelligentsia thus require what Eric Wolf (1982) calls a "tributary mode of production," and he summarizes the attributes of tribute relations: "social labour is, under these conditions, mobilized and committed to the transformation of nature primarily through the exercise of power and domination -- through a political process. Hence, the deployment of social labor is, in this mode, a function of the locus of political power; it will differ as
this locus shifts position" (Wolf 1982: 80). Power and domination, in the case of the intelligentsia, is exercised by the "gift" of knowledge and the intelligentsia's monopoly over the competency to provide "information." Unlike non-intellectual products, then, intellectual products can only increase their value for domination in accordance with their circulation through exchanges. More exchange indicates more cultural value. When intellectual products are exchanged as capitalist "commodities" they thus embody a double nature, that of a commodity form and that of a tributary form.

Second, because of its special commodity nature as an "abstraction" such as "health service," "education service" or "information service" etc., the production of intellectual commodities requires the double-mediation of the state. Where the other classes require only single-mediation to sanction their private property rights to accumulate, the intelligentsia require yet another state sanctioned right to protect their property. They need to monopolize the exchange of their abstract "good"; that is, the intelligentsia require the "professional right" to retain a monopoly over an intellectual competency. Professional "value" can only be maintained by appropriating the right to define "expertise." The state is required to sanction the monopolization of "credential" production for purposes similar to Weber's notion of "social closure" in market exchanges. The state standardizes competency and limits expertise to a select few. I am talking about use value not merely as material value but also as symbolic value. "Expertise" has no value if everyone has it. The shorter the supply the higher the value.

What makes professionals different (and most of the intelligentsia today are legitimated as credentialled professionals via higher education) is that while the "credential" is treated as materialized expertise it must also circulate freely as a marketable commodity called "information service." This latter "abstract" expertise must be monopolized through the credentialling process and requires state intervention in the market to make it possible. For the intelligentsia to retain the value of their products, they require that the state sanction their contradictory demands for the maximization of value: (1) complete exchange, that is, a free market to maximize the exchange of information and (2) complete monopoly, that is, a maximized monopoly over the private possession of
The practices of laissez-faire and professionalism are contradictory not because the intelligentsia is a "contradictory class" between capitalist owners and wage labourers, but because its practical interests are contradictory and internal to the class as a whole. These interests may be accommodated to each other but not without creating real tensions, subordinations and ambiguous effects.

Similarly, their identification with other classes has the potential to create unpredictable alliances. The members of the intelligentsia, thus, cannot be viewed as workers, capitalists or half-worker/half-capitalists without doing some violence to the unique nature of their labour. This is not to say that all members of the intelligentsia should be considered a distinctive class or that the intelligentsia cannot be transformed from petty commodity producers to wage labourers or cultural capitalists. It is to say, though, that if some members of the intelligentsia form a distinctive class or if such a social transformation has taken place, it would be a category error to conflate those who work with the production of symbols with those who do not, or for that matter assume that all "information" workers "work" with symbols. In other words, it might well be time to theoretically reconsider the traditional interpretations of intellectual practice.

My distinction between the intelligentsia and the traditional conceptions of the petite bourgeoisie and proletariat is in keeping with (but not identical to) an alternate class model proposed by Nicholas Abercrombie and John Urry (1983). They also argue that the educated middle class be viewed as a separate service class from deskill white-collar labour. In the contemporary context members of the intelligentsia have become increasingly professionalized and in many cases have gained limited control over their own reproductive system based on monopolizing the credentialling of competencies represented by the expansion of the nation-state and higher education (Collins 1979; Derber, Schwartz & Magrass 1990; Larson 1977; Murphy 1988). In contemporary Canadian and other kinds of capitalism, this control is limited and subordinated to the global market, that is professionalism and the mode of intellectual tribute is here subordinated but not necessarily congruent with laissez-faire. An historical analysis of class politics must distinguish the unique interests and actions of this intelligentsia and the development of and challenges to state-
sanctioned credentialling. Conclusions about the nature of the intelligentsia and the form of their functioning cannot be assumed a priori as is done by analytical and/or structural Marxism. Empirical analyses informed by theoretical debates should be the final arbiter in the identification of a "knowledge class."

Based on Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich's analytical typology for the "new middle class," Carl J. Cuneo (1993) provides an interesting illustration of empirical work which includes identification of the different kinds of intellectual labour. He has divided the contemporary Canadian intelligentsia into five factions and each faction is defined by different knowledge interests, relationship to the state and other classes. In 1971, this "new middle class" constituted 20.8% of the employed population. By 1986, though, this class had risen to 24.6% of the employed population. Cuneo designates (1) approximately 1/2 of this class as policy enforcers, such as managers, administrators and officials whose main work is control and surveillance through the direct supervision of workers. (2) He designates approximately 1/25 of this class as repressive enforcers, such as judges, police and prison guards whose main work is not direct supervision of workers but indirect supervision through the use or threatened use of legitimate violence in the form of arrests, judicial sentencing and imprisonment. (3) He designates approximately 1/10 of this class as material reproducers, such as physicists, chemists, engineers and architects whose work is to create and sustain the inanimate forces of production in the form of roads, buildings, technologies and raw materials. (4) He designates approximately 1/10 of this class as physical reproducers, such as registered nurses, surgeons, veterinarians, and biologists whose work is to sustain the animate forces of production in caring for people and animals. And (5) he designates approximately 1/4 of this class as ideological reproducers such as social workers, teachers, librarians, writers, ministers, and artists who create and maintain the dominant ideas, attitudes and feelings of legitimacy.

Richard Florida's (2002) work inappropriately conceptualizes four economic classes in The Rise of the Creative Class; however, his statistics could be reworked with categories such as Cuneo's in mind. His work confirms the increasing importance of the creative class, and its super-creative core. In The Flight of the Creative Class (2005), Florida argues introduces international and

Using Cuneo's occupational categorization as a starting point but keeping my clarifications in mind, a look back at the history of the "educated middle class" in Canada reveals the growth in numbers and percentage of the Canadian population. As already described, from 1971 to 1986, the intelligentsia have grown in total percentage of the employed population from 21% to 25%. Also, in this contemporary period, women are underrepresented in the intelligentsia but this differential gap with men has narrowed. The total number who constitute the intelligentsia is also growing. This growth of the intelligentsia also positively correlates with the growth and expansion of post-secondary education (especially university education) and the requirements for professional credentialling offered by universities. Recently, though, the reproduction of this class has faced a shrinking occupational structure driving down the value of credentials. The ideological and political outcome of this effect is unpredictable (See Hay & Basran 1991; Schrimpton 1987). The "long-term" growth does not account for qualitative changes in this transition--retrenchment period which has created new kinds of programming, new kinds of differential effects, and differential payoffs in a more restricted labour market with credential inflation.

While Cuneo's analytical and structuralist presumptions do prescribe certain inherent functions to each faction in the reproduction of capitalist culture and class relations (conclusions I have omitted), he also concedes that these functions are contested and may be counter-hegemonic. But as a priori categories how would such a challenge be described or empirically verified? Analytical and structural Marxism lack an approach to agency (Craib 1984; Giddens 1987; Sayer 1987). As descriptive rather than explanatory categories, though, this description of the class structure for the intelligentsia is useful but lacks the theoretical power to understand the functioning of intellectual agency. As a heuristic device for explaining the dynamic of a capitalist society, Cuneo's categories are not useful for two reasons that have to do with the limitations of structuralist theory and empiricist methods of quantification touched on in detail earlier. First, power for the intelligentsia is not merely a matter of counting bodies but is also based on the "quality" of the narratives they produce.
and reproduce. It is this power which Gramsci (1971) noted belonged to the middle strata and provided the strength of hegemony.

A closer historical look at these narrational aspects of knowledge/power could be a complement to class/power as a qualitative aspect and a theory of ideological reception. The commodities (texts) that the intelligentsia produce and reproduce are "fantasies," that is, the service they provide are images of what people were, are or can be. The question about whether these fantasies, stories, or images are real or not is best left to the philosophical speculators. I am not interested in whether a fantasy is "real" or not. As an historical sociologist, I treat fantasies as "real" when people take them to be real and act accordingly. For example, whether "God" is a "Calvinist" or a "Muslim" or whether "Society" is constituted by "classes" or by "individuals" is irrelevant as an object of analysis. What is relevant is that people act accordingly when they believe these representations to be true — the objects are historically real. The "meaning" of these fantasies is thus variable and ambiguous and the power of fantasy depends on the way others are moved by their reception.

Second, the power of the intelligentsia is internally differentiated by hierarchy within its own ranks, somewhat like Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of class distinction and rules of art. This hierarchy sanctions who and how creative storytelling will be produced. There are those who make the rules and those who follow the rules. The power of a faction, thus, cannot be determined simply by a quantification of numbers. The researcher must distinguish and analyze this rule-making power. Furthermore, these internal hierarchies are not just a matter of degree but also of kind. The differentials in power between producing (creating) versus reproducing (transmitting) fantasy are important.

In distinguishing the transmission of knowledge from the production of knowledge, I would like to designate the elite producers of knowledge/power as a sixth category which cuts "horizontally" across Cuneo’s factions and akin to Florida’s “super-creative” core. The elite of the intelligentsia are the intellectuals or ideological producers, that is, the creators of fantasy and the rules of fantasy creation in each faction. Of course, this typological distinction which poses ideological reproducer against producer cannot be reduced to a single category or any structuralist assumption prescribing social function. In practice, and by
this definition, all the intelligentsia in some way produce and reproduce ideology.

Thus John Porter (1965: 493) in *The Vertical Mosaic* is incorrect to conceptualize the humanities as ideological, the natural sciences as not and the social sciences as somewhere in between. By presupposing that a continuum runs from the ideological and subjective to the empirical and objective, Porter misinterprets Karl Mannheim's theory of ideology and reproduces one of the fundamental ideological presuppositions of Common Sense ideology. The assumptions and social uses of natural science do inform political practice in fundamental ways. Those who follow Porter on this kind of conceptualization are bound to miss some of the most fundamental political influences legitimated in the name of the empirical and objective worlds.

Scientists are never merely scientists. Even the claim to objectivity is itself ideological as a claim of *professionism* and has political uses when *expertise* is used to legitimate social authority. Gordon's (1984) "The Image of Science, Technological Consciousness, and the Hidden Curriculum" and Popkewitz's (1985) "Intellectuals, Sciences, and Pedagogies: Critical Traditions and Instrumental Cultures" are just two examples of what Porter's approach misses. Another example is related to the regulation of health. Physicians construct new images of what the "body" is, they reproduce images of the body, they participate publicly in enunciating these images, and they regulate the embodiment of others whether working in their clinics and hospitals or on political commissions and boards of public health. Some recent studies in this area concerning Canada, England and the USA are Angus McLaren's (1990) *Our Own Master Race*, Ogburn's (1993) "Law and Discipline in Nineteenth Century English State Formation: The Contagious Diseases Acts of 1864, 1866 and 1869," and Trent's (1993) "To Cut and Control: Institutional Preservation and the Sterilization of Mentally Retarded People in the United States, 1892–1947." The abstractions of architects, engineers, biologists, physicists and others are also ideological because they intend to master the world, that is, dominate nature, including human nature.

The study of knowledge/power, then, cannot be reduced to a structural typification of class/power or to a statistical analysis of occupational
categorizations. In this way knowledge/power theory does not displace class/power theory, but rather supplements it. In distinction to Porter, Stanley Aronowitz (1992a) makes an important point about this process of typifying intellectual practice and conceiving of the relationship between knowledge/power and class/power: "Although theory must articulate the categories of analysis prior to a concrete historically specific investigation, the relations among these categories are not, \textit{a priori}, determined. \textit{In this discussion of intellectuals we are obliged to observe the same rule: whether intellectuals form a class or a social category is always an empirical question once the elements of class formation are stated}" (128 emphasis added).

The intelligentsia as a class has a distinctive qualitative power not reducible to numerical quantification or occupational categorization. This claim, I argue, is sufficient to establish an empirical challenge to class models based on pregiven analytical categories. The social reproduction of ideology is inadequate as a heuristic instrument to comprehend the cultural production of the symbolic order in the contemporary period.

Another point I want to raise completes the analysis of intellectuals and ideology. Slavoj Žižek (2008: 285, \textit{In Defense of Lost Causes}) emphasizes the significance of understanding this doubling between the universal and the particular and between two different kinds of universalisms in his discussion of populism versus class struggle in his critique of Ernesto Laclau:

\begin{quote}
Let us begin with a precise theoretical point about the status of universality: we are dealing here with two opposed logics of universality to be strictly distinguished. On the one hand, there is the state bureaucracy as the universal class of a society (or, in a larger scope, the US as world policeman, the universal enforcer and guarantor of human rights and democracy), the direct agent of the global Order; on the other hand, there is “supernumerary” universality, the universality embodied in the element which sticks out of the existing Order, which, while internal to it, has no proper place within it (what Jacques Rancière calls the “part of no part”). Not only are the two not the same, but the struggle is ultimately a struggle between these two universalities, not simply between the particular elements of the universality: not just about which particular content will “hegemonize” the empty form of universality, but a struggle between two exclusive forms of universality themselves.\textsuperscript{10}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} The debate originated in theist debates about the Divine based on theistic principles that things in the world do not proceed by themselves, but are dependent for their continued existence and operation on some Divine Source. In terms of immanence, beings in the universe do seem to act and interact autonomously, and modern science has been increasingly successful in showing the self–sufficient and law–like behaviour of Nature. The Modern partition of reality has tended to "allow" for Religion to capture minimally the logic of “transcendental” theism. Thus the idea that

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Furthermore, the term “cadre” and theses about the “intelligentsia follow on the strengths and weaknesses of Hegel and Marx’s thinking about this objective social position and empirical “group,” “stratum” or “class.” Hegel’s (1972: 182–3) conception of a universal class or estate entrusted to defend the general interests of the “social condition” yet it was limited to a single state and working out what had not been empirically worked out in Marx’s argument through concrete analysis for the development of a triumphant proletariat on a global scale and also linked to an intelligentsia who seemed to “switch sides,” cadres “represent something like the ‘the class representing classless society within the limits of class society’ (MEW 25: 452)—which, they, under certain circumstances, have developed into a historic social consciousness.

A longer answer for reconsidering "intellectuals as class" is essential for anyone who might consider a continuation of the debate I have initiated. Simply calling for more empirical studies will not resolve this issue because merely to name "intellectuals as a class" as a point of departure raises fundamental theoretical and methodological questions about the reconstruction of Marxism and/or historical materialism. Of course, more debate at the empirical, methodological, theoretical and meta-theoretical levels of analysis are required. The remainder of this section, thus, raises speculative questions that should be considered starting points -- not conclusions -- for reconsidering the

God, as well as creating the world might also sustains the continued existence of the created entities is still alive today. However, in the transcendental placeholder of “God” can be substituted “Soul,” “Absent Big Other,” “Return of the Real,” “Nature,” “Man” etc. the philosophy of the 20th century has included a wholesale attack of positivists and others on the “transcendent” within the sciences as a carryover from the critique of Religion and Metaphysics (or philosophies of “presence”). The major ontological dividing lines of importance here are between philosophies which understand the transcendental as (1) an existent presence, (2) an existent absence or (3) simply non-existent. The distinction between theories of immanence and theories of transcendence are central to the Marxist philosophical canon, suggesting an infinitely unresolved materialist dialectic of the two kinds of universalizing tendencies with finite resolutions at different historical conjunctures. Critical Realism has assimilated the absence/presence debate pushed forward energetically by Postmodernism. For a materialist example of the interplay of immanence and transcendence outside of the social sciences see The Dialectical Biologist (Harvard University Press, 2006) where Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin sketch a dialectical approach to biology. Stephen J. Gould’s evolutionary theory of punctuated equilibrium similarly draws on the interaction between two the kinds of universalizing tendencies. The source of Žižek’s thinking is Hegel, and Hegel’s importance on this debate in Marxism has been reinforced by Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks (Volume 38 Collected Works) Available online @ http://www.scribd.com/doc/4025775/Lenin–Philosophical–Notebooks–Volume–38–of-the–Collected–Works.

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theoretical aspects of class practices of exploitation by drawing on analyses of pre- and post-capitalist social formations.

In recalling that Marx's first premise is that the "real" and "definitions of the real" are ontologically non-identical and that the real must be privileged over definitions of it, one can move on to consider the other sub-premises of historical materialism. *For Marx, laws of class formation were not transhistorical essences as is the case of social analysis based on the positivistic natural sciences. Rather, these "laws" were historically specific to a particular mode of production.*

The classical model of the capitalist mode of production presupposed that the intelligentsia did not constitute a class except on occasion as a declining class of petty bourgeois professionals, that is, "independent commodity producers" similar to merchants, farmers or artisans. Because their interests were subordinated to an exchange of services in the marketplace they could not be considered an "exploitative" class. *So to speak of the "intelligentsia" as a class rather than a strata in the limited sense of a residual petty bourgeoisie is consistent with historical materialism.* As Larson writes (1977), "in the classic personal professions, the exchange of services typically tends to take place between the 'free' professional and his individual client. . . . Because professional labor is not, here, exchanged with capital and does not participate directly in the production of surplus value, it is, in strict terms, unproductive. The free professional escapes, therefore, capitalist exploitation" (214).

According to Marx and followers, the petty bourgeoisie would be eventually assimilated into either of the two dominant classes. And in this case and in the above sense, the predictions were more or less accurate (e.g. the decline of small property-owning farmers declined dramatically under industrial capitalism). The anomaly that developed was the development of what might be called an administrative "petty bourgeoisie" or "strata" made up of small and medium officials, office workers in industry, commerce and banking etc., and the expansion of state officials in public administration, education, health-care and social services. Traditionally conceived, the transformation of the petty bourgeoisie into subordinates of the capitalist firm as "expert labour" marks the
end of the independent commodity production of services (e.g., science, education etc.). According to Larson (1977), "professional labor which is performed for the benefit of capitalist firm is therefore not structurally different from any other kind of labor which is subject to capitalist relations of production. From the point of view of exploitation, therefore, any kind of labor can be productive" (214 emphasis added). Larson's point is crucial in that the vague similarity between petty bourgeois forms of intellectual labour and the imbrication of intellectual labour in the capitalist firm each defined as "professional" does not compensate for the crucial differences between these occupations and does not account for the generalized breakdown of the pre-capitalist social structure of intellectual production. I will return to this explanation later, but suffice it to say here, although I agree with Larson on this claim I would differ on the point about a structural difference. Because Larson idealizes the two-class model of the capitalist mode of production, Larson assumes that the generalized breakdown of the pre-capitalist form could not also engender the empirical potentiality that intellectual production could also be transformed into a new kind of pre-capitalist or even a post-capitalist set of relations. Lost, for example, is the theoretical possibility that "bureaucracy" is the modern structural form of a pre-capitalist mode of production or that the managerial scientist who retains legal control over universities and markets the "signification of meaning" and the "regulation of discourse" is the postmodern structural form of a new class that cannot be merely read off of traditional class relations.

I would argue that rather than a relationship based on a conflation of subjective interests mediated by signs of capital, a (new?) class relationship has been established based on a form of exchange in what might be called a "vassal"

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11 Interestingly, Larson’s thesis holds for second wave capitalism; however, under New Right governments, neoliberal policies of “contracting-out” initiated a dramatic growth in the percentage of independent commodity production of services. The State as agent can have an independent effect on the formation of class structure! Whether, in this case, the State can sustain this agency favouring petty production of services against capitalist forces is another question with these independent contractors being reabsorbed into larger and larger configurations of service provision (e.g. independent daycare providers or coffee shops now assimilated under corporate control). It may be that each new and significant technological innovation, such as computerization of inventories and purchases, precipitates a new market niche for independent commodity production that can buck the overall trend. More empirical analysis on this dynamic is required.
relationship in its tributary mode of office or a "client" relationship in its bourgeois mode of office. The question thus becomes, what kind of relationship between intellectual and non-intellectuals have been established in today; that is, what is the nature of the exchange, what is being exchanged and what distinguishes this exchange and/or production from tributary and capitalist forms? Let us for the moment call this the "intellectual/X" class relationship.

This "new" class is also theorized in other ways as shown in the work of Gouldner (1979), Szelényi (with Konrad 1979; with Martin 1987) and King and Szelényi (2004) but the difference here is that I emphasize the material basis of the office as a means of production whereas these other approaches treat the intelligentsia as a class based on their cultural characteristics and control of competencies rather than objective control of an "office" which makes the use of culture and competencies possible. The reference to "credentials" and "skills" as capital merely refocuses on a materialized form of subjective identity as would the equation of money with "capital." Left unidentified is the underlying mechanism that explains how "credentials" or "skills" can become a social force. This mechanism, I believe, is a class relationship of intellectual labour power defined as "office," that is as "intellectual/X." An analysis cannot succeed by defining class according to cultural identity (i.e., a ideal thing) nor can it succeed myopically defending the old version of class interaction in the face of empirical evidence that the intelligentsia at times do appear to act independently of either the bourgeoisie or proletariat through their control of state or state-sponsored office as a means of intellectual production.

An analysis which treats the intelligentsia as a "class" does raise important political questions which are problematic for any "office holder" who claims both professional expertise in knowledge and a necessary fusion of an interest with the others who do not hold office. Because, intellectual practice is never directly linked to material production, the intellectual's life is necessarily once removed from the necessities of material existence. Yet material existence is necessary. Definitions of "class" derived from an imbrication in the capitalist mode of production assume that the principle agents of social change as classes are derived from the presence of private property. Yet in Marx's analysis of pre-capitalist formations "classes" exercised power not by owning the means of
production but by controlling the state apparatus. In other words, the "class" structure of these societies such as slave and feudal societies were defined with reference to the power inscribed in office holding. Struggles between freeman and slave, between creditors and debtors, and between lords and serfs were certainly viewed as agents of "class" struggle, albeit in terms not applicable to the capitalist mode of production, yet nevertheless, retaining an affinity to subordinate and to be subordinated to the capitalist mode of class relations. Marx's usage of class resonates with multiple meanings that go beyond traditionally conceived productive economic relations and empirical indicators of those relations. The emergence of "town burgesses" as a new class in feudal societies and the ambiguous position played by "peasants as a class" in the nineteenth century are not any more or less conceptually correct than similar claims about the intelligentsia today as forms of a new or ambiguous class. The question, more importantly, is whether such specifications of "town burgesses," "peasants," or "intellectual class" heuristically serve historical analysis better.

Crucial here is not whether the new set of social relations is called a "stratum" or a "class" but that the nature of the forces and relations which imbricate this "class of individuals" with other individuals is specified analytically for empirical research. The thesis of the "new class" or "stratum" must be derived from this kind of analysis rather than by definitional caveat. With the focus on identifying the combination of forces and relations rather than assuming one definition as a claim to orthodoxy, one can then argue that what distinguishes intellectuals as a class from other classes is that intellectual practice is never directly linked to material production and yet material existence is a necessity for the intelligentsia's reproduction. Yet to say that intellectual practice is not directly linked to material production is not to say that it is somehow relatively autonomous or completely autonomous from material production. The relationship between intellectual and material existence was not problematic until social differentiation through the division of labour reproduced the fragmentation of mind and body into a real differences between social classes, that is, when conception and execution differentiated into a characteristic that could distinguish a ruling class from the direct producers. In this sense, pre-capitalist ruling classes were never
producers in the modern sense but rather in some ways office holders. And the struggle for office was primarily between warriors and priests.

In feudal times, this struggle for office "as person" provided the basis for the official power to expropriate social surplus and reproduce the social structure. The tributary form was not completely one-sided between the office holders and primary producers. There was always an exchange — even if it was a forced exchange — that motivated the producing class to relinquish its surplus in a variety of tributary forms. This tribute, though, was about material life and its future promise. In the case of the priestly class, the direct producer promised life in this world by providing material goods. The priest in exchange promised life in the next world, that is, material life as the seduction of fantasy. In the case of the warrior class, the direct producer also promised life in this world and in return the warrior promised the same in kind through active protection or withholding death, that is, through domination.

The rise of the merchant class and the use of bills of exchange were conjunctural with a dissolution of personal exchanges based on vassalage into impersonal relations mediated by paper. Similar to the priestly relationship of office, the power of the merchant was based on an exchange that promised a future life to be realized. Different to the priestly relationship of office, the merchants seduced each other on the basis of mutual contract rather than vassalage. The exchange of equivalences was an exchange of simulated material futures as fantasies. For the merchant, exchange was based on life deferred. The mediation of a paper exchange, permeated other relations removing the exchangers of paper from relations of mundane exchange and created the illusion of material independence for those whose currency of life was fantasy. The merging of merchant and priestly exchanges completed an inversion of the meaning of real existence as a belief in the perfected form of paper exchange. The WORD had come to earth, only to be resurrected in an exchange of words circulating on paper.

For example, the sale of indulgences before the Protestant Revolution, was a way of transforming material futures gained in the market into material futures in the afterlife. Church office mediated a stock exchange of souls thus realizing materiality as life of paper transactions. University office provided a
similar mediation in the provisioning of degrees. The decline of intellectual rigor in the late middle ages was directly related to this sale of paper -- not to the highest intellect based on merit -- but to those whose wealth was generated by non-intellectual merit (see Le Goff 1988, 1993). *The late Middle Ages and Early Modernity were marked by this dualism of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary trade in intellectual futures, that is, the seduction of eternal life revealed as the accumulation of signs of grace.* The feudal office remained the primary mode of intellectual production in the state and the commercial office remained the primary mode of intellectual production in the emerging market. Practitioners each attempted to monopolize reproduction, but the power of monopoly was derived not from the market but from the material basis of the office.

The capitalist mode of production gained ascendency, but in so doing, did not transform intellectual office but rather subordinated it through formal incorporation. Office of vassalage was retained for the state, but in various ways in Europe this office was no longer handed down purely on the basis of kinship but increasingly mediated by money. Offices were purchased. For example, a military officer purchased a commission. In this way, *offices were treated as private property and its purchase created the ownership based on a bundle of rights that allowed the expropriation of surplus value through domination (exchange of force) or seduction (exchange of fantasy). Offices could also be purchased as "private practice."* In this case, what has come to be known as the petty bourgeois intelligentsia, also purchased a bundle of rights to enter into exchanges with their clients. By then the X factor in the office mode of intellectual production had gone through three relational transformations in each of the three modes: feudal, commercial, and petty bourgeois. Although, each "intellectual/X" relationship was articulated and subordinated in different ways, each retained distinctive characteristics, none of which could be considered capitalistic, that is, based on the exploitation of waged labour.

The emergence of a capitalist office, thus exhibits unique features that go beyond merely the introduction of "free" labour into the equation, for the capitalist mode of intellectual production must at least subordinate the other three modes. Furthermore, a dual process was at work and made possible by the increasing specialization in the division of intellectual labour that centred the
analysis for this study. First, the division of labour created the potential for exploitation to exist at the level of the office creating a relationship between a proletariat and a bourgeoisie who produced cultural commodities, for example, for the market in "credentials." Second, the division of labour increasingly depersonalized intellectual labour into anonymous and collective forms contrasting it with the traditional heroic conception of intellectual practice, including traditional professions.

The capitalist mode of intellectual production was not necessarily completely dominant and allowed for former kinds of office production to be articulated to a variety of modes each retaining different hierarchical forms and in no way reflective of industrial capitalistic forms. For example, the growth and specialization of the modern medical office incorporated a free exchange based on commercial contract model between doctors, it incorporated a free exchange between various offices based on the petty bourgeois model as an exchange between different private practices (e.g. medical, legal or otherwise), and it incorporated a feudal office form in the patriarchal subordination of other salaried and waged personnel (see e.g. Starr 1982). Once the office began to produce cultural commodities for exchange, the workers who directly produced the commodities in an exchange of mental power for wages represent the realization of the capitalist office as distinctive from the merely formal subordination of other modes of intellectual practice to the capitalist organization of society as a whole. The introduction of the examination and credential standardization allowed for the formal incorporation of the bureaucratic form into market relations and a form of intellectual reproduction through the control of the offices of higher education which produced the cultural commodities required to mediate the cash nexus. In the recent cultural transformation, previous intellectual modes of production are being "industrialized," marking the formal subsumption of petty commodity production by the capitalist mode into the real subsumption of cultural commodification into the capitalist mode (see e.g. Derber et al. 1990). In all these cases, it also cannot be presumed that one mode of production dominates the other. In a capitalist society there may be a variety of office social formations where the capitalist mode of intellectual production does not
dominate in the sense of real subsumption. Nevertheless, having said this, an empirical analysis of an intellectual mode of production in a society must take the above specifications into account.

As a future hypothesis I would suggest that the state-sponsored producers of fantasy is not a new class, but emerged initially in its modern form wherever the ideology of "nation" was substituted for a conception of intellectual–class power and the imagination of community. Potentially this means that the search begins as far back as the English and French Revolutions and their emerging conceptions (as cultural constructions) of the "nation–state," that is, the ideology of the modern office writ large or what I call the "nascent state" as agent.

The questions I have raised about the intelligentsia as a "nascent state" and producers of a fantasy called "nation" speak specifically to the rise of the modern intellectual as a class. If not resolving the problematic of class, state and nation, this paper hypothesizes a potentially new set of social relations.

The members of the intelligentsia share a common interest: they depend on the direct producers of material goods and they need to sustain their power in a gift economy of symbolic sharing. But they are also characterized by diverse practices, relations of offices and differing class alliances that thwart their formation into a self-active and interested agent. They are further divided by the differential mediations of the state and the market. The recent reconfiguration of intellectual practices clearly shows the development of a split in class alignments. Those who are against public service forms of intellectual practice (e.g. medicine, education, social work) have been able to mobilize popular opinion against the monopolization of educational credentials and the visible advantages it brings. The purveyors of consumer services present themselves as the solution to the excesses of the public service intelligentsia while deflecting popular resentments away from their own complicity in the crisis.

A New Exploitation? The Rise of a Connexionist Society

According to Benveniste (1972: 12), “Ignorance of the political sociology of their own role tends to orient the new experts to conventional role
definitions.” As Noble (1979) points out for technically qualified managers or professionals in the USA, rarely are they class conscious, and when they are it is usually a sign of defeatism and disillusionment. However, even if there is no ready class consciousness among cadres, certain typical dispositions can be ascribed to them which when added up and under specific conditions may be considered a class perspective. According to Klees van der Pijls (1998: 141) these are (1) a preference for modernity, its stability as well as shifting coordinates; (2) a commitment to rationality, that is, an orientation towards rationalizing social and economic development; and (3) a potential for democratization, or its rejection when impatient with democratic politics. These three basic assumptions of technocracy tend to produce a “utopian” disposition which promotes the ideal state as based on the existing state of affairs. Sometimes, this existing state of affairs arising in the current allocation of responsibility is where the ruling class is promoting “change.” What change will the cadres imagine as creating a new existing state of affairs? Whose side will they be on? And what kind of property and property rights will they side with? What is the source of their profit and how might they fight to keep more for themselves?

Reaction within the cadres to commodification/resocialization has had many effects and attending oppositions of which self-protection of professorial autonomy has been one, however sporadic; politicization, however erratic; philosophical speculation, however embryonic and confused; and territorialization over intellectual property and rights to it, however, spontaneous. This section initiates a discussion about a different and new kind of property and the rights and profits that accrue to it. It is a challenge to the hegemonic conceptions of it and problematizes cadre sensitivity to struggles over “their” property regarding social capital and networks of exploitation in neocapitalism.

In specifying the different kinds of exploitation and justice, Boltanski & Chiapello’s (2007) primary focus is on the development of connexionist societies. In this society exploitation is differentially rooted in relations of mobility and immobility, the capacity to escape from supervised tests of merit and the ability to contaminate tests of merit with adjoining connexionist forces.
In a connexionist society justice requires a new formula: the establishment of new accounting frameworks, permitting an inventory of the different contributors and their contributions in a network logic.

Definitions and analyses of social capital are not without their problems. They also suggest dangers for emancipatory and critical research as Margaret Somers (2005) chapter title suggests “Beware Trojan Horses Bearing Social Capital: How Privatization Turned Solidarity into a Bowling Team.”\textsuperscript{12} However, as extensive research has shown, successful societies are foundationally dependent on non-market, non-contractual, and non-state social relations. The classical roots for these ideas can be found in Aristotle, Adam Smith, Marx, Tocqueville, Durkheim, Weber, Malinowski, and Karl Polanyi. Contemporary roots for social capital analysis include Hanifan (1920), Jane Jacobs (1961), Coleman (1966, 1988, 2000), Loury (1977) Becker (2000), Bourdieu (1986), and Robert Putnam (1993). There is also a diversity of competing conceptions of social capital in neocapitalism as well as competing concepts such as civil society, community, social movements and networks. Recent research draws its key metaphorical analogies from neurology and computer science describing a reticular formation: “diffuse network of nerve pathways in the brainstem connecting the spinal cord, cerebrum, and cerebellum, and mediating the overall level of consciousness” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 104). The key ideas have defused from economics and sociology into scientific management and now into education administration. The analogy is pushed to name a network: “social life is composed of a proliferation of encounters and temporary, but reactivatable connections with various groups, operated at potentially considerable social, professional, geographical and cultural distance” (ibid.).

According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 105), networks link projects to the accumulation process:

The project is the occasion and reason for the connection. It temporarily assembles a very disparate group of people, and presents itself as a highly activated section of network for a period of time that is relatively short, but allows for the construction of more enduring links that will be put on hold while remaining available. Projects make production and accumulation possible in a world which, were it to be purely connexionist, would certainly contain flows, where nothing could be stabilized, accumulated or crystallized. Everything would

\textsuperscript{12} Also see Ben Fine (2001) Social Capital Versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium (Routledge).

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be carried off in an endless stream of ephemeral associations which, given their capacity to put everything in communication, constantly distribute and dissolve whatever gels in them. The project is precisely a mass of active connections apt to create forms—that is to say, bring objects and subjects into existence—by stabilizing certain connections and making them irreversible. It is thus a temporary *pocket of accumulation* which, creating value, provides a base for the requirement of extending the network by further connections.

In relationship to exploitation and exclusion they point out: “...in such a world [where relative status appears to be justified and legitimate and equivalences can be accorded] these tests are quintessentially the moments marking the end of a project, when people are in search of a new engagement, their ability to integrate themselves into a new project constituting one of the palpable signs of status” (Boltanski & Chiapello 2007: 106). And, “in a world so constructed as to be entirely subject to network logic, there is no reason to pose the question of justice, because those of low status (who...can be very precisely characterized in such a framework as excluded) tend to disappear without a trace” (ibid). While in the past exploitation was predominantly exploitation through labour now exclusion refers in the main to various forms of expulsion from the sphere of work relations” (2007: 346).

Increased attention is now paid to labor market “attachment” giving people the choice between exclusion and exploitation and thus seeking “exploitation” as an economic good. A recent example comes from Leslie McCall’s *Complex Inequality: Gender, Class and Race in the New Economy* whereby she writes: “Although rising inequality encompasses more than divergences in wages, I restrict my analysis to wage inequality . . . . Class inequality refers to wage differences between between college- and non-college educated workers . . . .” (Footnote 5, 2001: 204) Of course, she identifies the doxic exclusions based on gender, credentials, race. Whither class—and its unjust forms of exploitation? Erased. How did this happen?

According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007)

The first use of the term “excluded” [1970s] referred to people who did not enjoy the beneficial effects of growth and prosperity because of their handicaps ... a handicap is primarily perceived as a physical or mental, not as “social handicap.” [Yet, second] already widely used to refer to those who were subject to negative selections or discrimination on account of their social properties or rejected by the education system (“education handicap”). The sidelining of the “excluded” (from growth) thus had reasons other than their own failure. It could be imputed to the self–interested actions of others...Unlike the model of social classes (the bourgeoisie, owners of the means of production), responsible for “exploitation,”
the model of exclusion permits identification of something negative without proceeding to level accusations. The excluded are no one’s victims, even if their membership of a common humanity (or “common citizenship”) requires that their suffering be considered and they may be assisted. (347)

The triumphal analysis of exclusion over exploitation occurred during the 1980s in conjunction with the politics of the New Right in the US under Reagan and the UK under Thatcher. Social capital analysis articulated well with neoliberalism as an important neoconservative compensation and rhetoric for evaluation: “community” good and “state” bad, a logic felt around the world and with strong resonances for those critics who took their anti–statism to mean they were against the capitalist “state” and developers of local community.

The 1980s in the West was a time marked by the growth of unemployment and what was initially identified in neoliberalizing regimes as the “new poverty” which registered people as without means of subsistence or fixed residence, surviving on handouts from public and private charities (see e.g. Michael Harrington, The New American Poverty, 1984). The term “exclusion” was henceforth used as an umbrella term for not only to those people with physical and mental handicaps but to all victims of the new social poverty, (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 347).

In defining the “homeless camp” the “excluded” designated not the handicapped, but precisely those marginalized in society, without any representation, abandoned. The working-class (e.g. trade unions) did not seem to be concerned and the economically marginalized were reduced to humiliating, ineffectual assistance (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 348). As a result political, sociological and administrative discourses emerged a new picture of society with two—compatible conceptions. “The first still used the term class, but stripped it of any conflictual connotations; the second relied, often implicitly, on the metaphor of networks” (2007: 348).

The identification relations of exclusion/inclusion were taken from macro-sociology to redefine contemporary class society as having a uniform middle class occupying the bulk of social space. Social work consisted in reintegrating “excluded” persons (children of marginalized families, single moms, foreigners without identity papers, “social misfits”) by enabling them to be included as much as possible in a statistically-defined large middle class.
The second interpretation used the metaphor of networks and came from micro-sociology which defined “the included” as those connected to others by a multiplicity and diversity of bonds. “The excluded” in this case were those whose bonds to others were severed, and were thus relegated to the fringes of the network. As outcasts, according to the literature, they lost their visibility, all rationale, and virtually all existence. Disaffiliation of individuals identified as the key problem. They suffered because they were no longer integrated into any network or attached to any of the chains whose intricate complex constitutes the social fabric. Consequently, they were considered to have no use to society (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 349).

The dynamic of exclusion/inclusion which was initially associated with the fate of marginal groups was now able to take the place previously assigned to social classes in the representation of social misery and the means of fixing it (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 349). Central to the shift in the analysis was a shift in proposed solutions arising from the turn to community charity to social movements. Thus, the notion of exclusion also allowed those on the bottom rung of the social ladder to find a place in the image of society offered created by artists, researchers and intellectuals and displace the earlier image of proletarians, the exploited, i.e. people belonging to social classes. According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 349), “in the absence of a clear notion of exploitation and hopes for social change, the rejection of social injustice has in a sense regressed to its original stimulus: indignation at suffering” [based] on “the piteous attributes of the excluded, defined primarily by the fact they are \textit{without}: without a voice, without a home, without papers, without work, without rights, and so on.”

New and numerous charitable associations born of leftism performed voluntary work and discovered a common language of “exclusion” and, whatever their immediate practical orientation, made the reintegration of the excluded their general objective. They intervened in very different spheres, received public funds, and often worked in partnership with the state, social workers, or administrative personnel belonging to local communities in particular, with which they are associated in setting up fixed-term local projects. The inadequacy of the local projects to deal with the issues at hand gave birth to
new social movements. “Inclusion” addresses exclusion has been picked up as the hegemonic solution to social problems.13

If I turn attention to the nature of exploitation in networks it is important to ask: How can the notion of exclusion be developed to identify the form of exploitation that develops in a connexionist world—that is to say, a world where the realization of profit occurs through organizing economic operations in networks?

According the Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 355) the generic form of connection arises for the network-extender whereby “the new network mechanisms encourage the emergence and development of an original form of opportunism” which is based on particular kind of aptitude which enjoys personal success as a shrewd manager of relational capital or project head who has the ability to maintain numerous diverse, enriching connections, and the ability to extend networks. The negative exploitative form of the network-extender is the networker: “people who succeed in this world use their qualities only to serve their own personal interests in selfish, even cynical fashion” (2007: 356). The main distinction is “…the success of the networker benefits him alone, whereas the network-extender’s attainment of better conditions benefits the whole city, and is thus a common good” (2007: 357).

Ronald Burt (1992) identified three types of capital (economic, human, social) of which social capital plays the most important role because it conditions the possibility of accumulating capital in the other two forms. Burt defines social capital as “the set of personal relations that an individual can totalize. But the accumulation of social capital fairly rapidly runs up against limits, inasmuch as, since it relies on personal commitment, it demands investments in time and energy that are difficult to delegate.” Thus the most profitable investments are not those made in the clique, but the long-distance ones that overcome structural holes where brokerage between cliques is achieved, asymmetries can be formed, and differential accumulation (primarily informational) is made possible.

13 A Google search for articles related to “OECD inclusion” generates almost 1.5 million hits. A similar “OECD” search for “exploitation” or “exclusion” generates approximately 800,000 for each – however, the vast majority of “exploitation” hits relate to “exploitation of natural resources.” Retrieved January 17, 2009.
According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 357) brokerage combines (1) "access to information that is not possessed [or acquirable] by other members of the clique and (2) “to achieve gains in terms of reputation in spaces that are difficult to access.” An important subject position is when the networker is transformed into a keyholder:

The accumulation of a social capital rich in structural holes can be a source of profits for the opportunistic networker….Similarly, the networker seeks to exploit asymmetries of information to the hilt. From his experience he derives an image of useful connections but he keeps it to himself and (unlike the network-extender) does everything in his power to prevent those close to him constructing an effective typology of the network. He shrouds himself in secrecy and, above all, does not put the different arenas he manoeuvres in touch with one another….So it is by maintaining a separation between different sections of networks which he has managed to bridge that the networker can become a keyholder” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 358).

Therefore, the best starting point in developing operations as a networker is when she gains access to the highest level of resources compatible with the lowest level of supervision, with a view to putting company property at the service of personal activity (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 359).

The strategy of maximizing networker profits as a collective strategy arise when the networker does not do what the management recommends in sharing information and links with her team. Nor does it arise from benefiting the centre on which she depends. Profitable strategies consist in exploiting the resources she has access to, and acquiring social capital that will give her an advantage over the team’s other members. The most important thing for a networker is to create a happening and to put her name to it (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 359).

Thus, according to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 361)

The transient, fluid character of the networker’s activities prompts him to derive maximum personal profit from each operations, without worrying unduly about the consequences for the institution which he derives his resources….What the weak contribute [to their own exploitation] must at once possess limited visibility, not be acknowledged in the framework of this [institutional] world, and have meagre value…while contributing to its enrichment.

And the key slogan is “Great men do not stand still. Little people remain rooted to the spot” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 361). Thus, exploitation finds its fundamental axis in the relationship between mobility/immobility. “The specific contribution of little people to enrichment in a connexionist world, and
the source of their exploitation by great men, consists precisely in that which constitutes their weakness in this framework—that is to say, their immobility” (2007: 361). Euphemistically, the fixity or “inflexibility” of little people is defined by the institutional demand “to be flexible,” that is, be available, adaptable and accountable for others. “In a connexionist work, mobility—the ability to move around autonomously not only in geographical space, but also between people, or in mental space, between ideas—is an essential quality of great men” (2007: 361).

If it is true that some people’s immobility is the precondition for the profits others derive from their inability to move around, and that this mobility procures incomparably greater profits for the mobile than those who remain in situ can aspire to, then we may say that in relation to the mobile the immobile are exploited. According to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007: 363), the immobile are exploited in the [Marxist] sense because the role they play as a factor of production does not receive the acknowledgement or remuneration it merits. “Staying put” is a free choice much like labouring for a capitalist is a free choice in a capitalist society. As Marx identified the compulsion to work under a “free”—labour contract to sustain oneself as a wage-earner was also the basis for exploitation in a capitalist society. “Staying put” is also a compulsion in a connexionist society: “In a network world, everyone thus lives in a state of permanent anxiety about being disconnected, rejected, abandoned on the spot by those who move around” (2007: 364).

Central to Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007: 364) analysis of network exploitation in the new enterprises mechanisms is subject is that there emerges new and deeper inequalities stemming from the extent and diversity of the networks over which people can circulate. “In contrast to those whose survival depends upon local, dense and compact networks, and who find themselves exposed to all manner of risks as soon as they stray from them, there are individuals and groups who, being able to circulate across extensive networks, own their security not to the support of territorial protection, but to the preservation of the space on which they stability or, if you like, the interconnection of the circuits they move around depends on”
In the industrial world, this borderline form of exploitation [threatening the reproductive capacity of individuals] consists in exhaustion through work. However, in the connexionist world, extreme forms of exploitation are expressed in an increasingly drastic privation of links and the gradual emergence of an inability not only to create new links, but even to maintain existing links (separation from friends, breaking of family ties, divorce, political abstentionism. In short, exclusion and exploitation function together within mechanisms of social capital formation. “The mobility of the exploiter has as its counterpart the flexibility of the exploited” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007: 365, 369).

Conclusion

Following the revival of Marxism in the 1960s in North America and its various expressions elsewhere, the effect of residual idealisms elicited a central problem that resonates today in the development of neo-Marxism and post-Marxist attempts to reconstruct the conception of intellectual practice. These "revisions" introduced idealist or positivist assumptions, challenged the ideal-typical representation of the capitalist mode of production as a bipolar model of class relations, jettisoned the socio-economic basis of class as it was conventionally conceived, and introduced "tripolar" and "multipolar" models (e.g. E.O. Wright 1978, 1985; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1979, 1990) thus denying -- in some cases -- the necessity that the "working class" was the primary agency for emancipation from the capitalist mode of production.

The theoretical turn to "cultural capital" or "intermediate" class positions challenged orthodox interpretations of "class." The turn to postmodernism and social capital erased it completely. In defending the "core," the orthodox saviors necessarily had to subordinate the empirical referent in the rise of the "new class." These explanations (e.g. Cohen 1978) had to privilege the analytical "ideal" of "capitalism" as a two-class model and foreclosed on the possibility in any and all circumstances that the empirically constituted new "class" could destroy their illusion of that two class reality. Radical theorists may have fallen victim to Adorno's (1973) primal form of ideology, the privileging of the abstract
over the concrete, and "identity thinking" became a problem when researchers came to consider the practices of intellectuals.

Marx uses the concept "mode of production" in at least three senses. First, he uses it in a restricted way as a technical manner of producing. Second, and more commonly, he deploys it to mean a social system of producing carried on within a particular set of ownership relations. Importantly, Marx always considers capitalist relations of production as defined by specific connections between people and productive forces even if defined in a technical manner. Third, and of central interest to my argument against the fetishism of idealizing "intellectual practice" and "mode of production," Marx sometimes uses "mode of production" as a connection between social and technical properties and as a claim that more than one mode of production may subsist within any empirical social formation.

In the Introduction to Grundrisse, Marx writes (1973 [1857–8]) that "in all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity" (106). The conflation of an ideal–typical "mode of production" with a particular real "capitalist society" or "capitalism" lends itself to misconstruing the fact that, empirically, modes of production coexist to varying degrees. Marx never specified the number or kind of relationships. He merely claimed that a mode of production articulated a combination of forces and relations. It was the job of the researcher to demonstrate and not assume the empirical validity of the forces and relations (Sayer 1987).

Hypothetically, then, Marx might argue that different modes of intellectual production could coexist with each other, and only rigorous historical research could determine how these different modes as a combination of forces and relations interacted and how each is subordinated to one particular mode as that which "bathes all the other colours." It is also entirely conceivable that a precapitalist intellectual practice could subordinate capitalist intellectual practice while itself being subordinated to capitalist forms of economic practice. And many other developments are possible. The assumption that intellectual practice is necessarily subordinated and reflective of a dominant
mode of production which itself is articulated in various ways to other modes of production cannot be assumed but must be empirically demonstrated.

Larrain (1989) correctly calls for considering the development of global capitalism as the articulation of a variety of historically circumscribed modes of production (a social formation), but what is left unexplained is the nature of these articulations, that is, questions about the nature of a capitalist mode of production must be subordinated to questions about the constitution of a capitalist society. The capitalist mode of production may find itself differentially superordinated, subordinated or balanced with alternate modes of production. What needs to be answered concerns the nature of the mediations defined "as the constitution of society" that enable the varied modes of production at both micro and macro levels to "communicate" with each other.

Hypothetically, then, in any social formation, intellectual practice as “exploitation” could be occurring in at least three ideal–typical forms: pre–capitalist, capitalist and post–capitalist. In a movement from capitalism to socialism, the socialist mode could appear at once in two different presences: (1) as classlessness and (2) as a form of “class” relationship specific to the socialist mode. No resolution of this complicated and controversial topic appears in sight, although I have offered some reconsiderations of intellectual practice and a rethinking of the nature of the historical transformations in the nature of intellectual modes of production regarding exploitation.