The Undemocratic Role of Turkish Cypriot Radio News in the Cyprus Conflict

LYNDON C.S. WAY

Izmir University of Economics

lyndoncsway@hotmail.com

Abstract

Drawing on newsroom studies and a Critical Discourse Analysis of news broadcasts this paper looks at the way Turkish Cypriot radio news in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is guilty of hampering democratic processes, particularly as regards the resolution of the conflict with the Republic of Cyprus. On the one hand stations appear to support currently popular pro-solution politics but a closer look at the language used shows that each uses lexical and grammatical choices to also communicate threat and suspicion, in each case slightly differently to support their own associated ideologies and interests, which are consistently anti-solution. For all intents and purposes these are news organisations only in terms of the 'news semiotic'. Employees called journalists work with news agency feeds, write, produce, edit and air news stories for newscasts daily like news in other European states, but what they are in fact doing is reflecting the interests of elites associated with each station, working to the detriment of democratic popular notions of unity throughout Cyprus.

Keywords: Cyprus, TRNC, Radio, News, Critical Discourse Analysis

1. Introduction

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is an internationally unrecognised nation-state occupying the northern third of the island of Cyprus which since the 1960s has existed in conflict with the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus (ROC). After a shared Republic following independence from Britain between 1960 and 1963, the two sides have existed in various degrees of conflict. Today the TRNC remains closely linked to mainland Turkey as does the ROC to mainland Greece. While the ROC is integrated into the European Community the TRNC, due to international sanction and embargoes, exists in isolation. Despite this isolation, the TRNC is a multi-party democracy though the Turkish government and its military maintain a powerful influence (Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Mallinson 2005).

TRNC political parties claim they want 'solutions' to the conflict on Cyprus, but maintaining two separate Cypriot states brings huge rewards in terms of power and finance to those in positions of power (Lacher and Kaymak 2005). The Turkish nationalist UBP party's 'solution' calls for close ties with Turkey and a separate state or a very loose confederation with the ROC. The pro-

federation CTP party wants less ties with Turkey and more cooperation with the ROC with the goal of a federation. The desire of much of the TRNC's population favouring a solution to the conflict with the ultimate aim of unification was reflected in CTP's 2003 parliamentary and 2004 presidential electoral victories. The ROC also elected a pro-federation government in 2008. Despite these popular steps towards a solution, news media in both states aggravate the conflict (Bailie and Azgin 2008; Panayiotou 2006; Papadakis 2005; Azgın 1996).

This discrepency can be explained through an examination of TRNC news media's relations to political parties. In any given nation, the news media are thought of as an integral part of its social and political system, informing, prioritizing, shaping and controlling events, opinions and society itself (Fairclough 2003; Wodak 2001; Tuchman 1978). However, it has been shown that relations between a nation's news media and politics differ from one nation to the next (Weaver 2005, 1998). Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify three models of media and politics, TRNC being characteristic of the *Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model*. It has a politically oriented press; high political parallelism in journalism where the government, political parties, and businessmen with political ties use the media; the state plays a large role as owner, regulator and funder; there is weak journalistic professionalisation and a high degree of ideological diversity and conflict in society. The TRNC differs from this model by having a large press circulation, is not experiencing de-regulation and political power holders continue to control the media.

This model highlights that not all media are characteristic of *the North Atlantic* model which is most associated with the ideals of objectivity and the role of the fourth estate (ibid.: 67). In fact, it has been demonstrated that these ideals do not sit well with nations with high political parallelism, such as the TRNC (Mancini 2004; Waisbord 2000). TRNC radio draw on a 'news semiotic' mirroring the Anglo-American model through having employees called 'journalists' and 'editors' who work with news agency feeds, write, produce, edit and air news stories. However none of the values of neutrality, balance and objectivity carried as in-built ethics by Anglo-American journalists are present. Mancini (2000: 267-272) makes a similar observation about the 1990's Italian media, where journalists presented themselves as though part of an Anglo-American model where clearly they were not. Again mirroring the Anglo-American model, a plurality of viewpoints appears to be maintained in the TRNC through a large number of stations each with different ownership and ideologies. Listeners accept that all stations are partisan but do not see this as particularly problematic due to the available menu of different points of view.

The radio stations examined in this paper are used largely as political instruments to maintain different kinds of nationalist projects, each station's output articulating competing and self-serving discourses of nations. This can be seen when data from news production studies and a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the language used in radio station's newscasts is carried out. Representations of events surrounding the opening of a border crossing between the TRNC and the ROC known as 'Lokmacı Gate' are analysed. This close analysis reveals stories highlight difference, mistrust and even an

adversarial relationship with the ROC. Though this event could have been represented positively as part of a unification process, it is framed in ways which covertly present the agendas of stations' owners/controllers who are fundamentally against improved relations. Pro-solution discourses are omitted or where they are present serve as a pretext to support discourses beneficial to anti-unifying elites associated with each station, a strategy noted by van Dijk (1993: 7) when examining texts about race.

This paper begins with a methodology section followed by a description of each station. The national Turkish Cypriot news agency (*TAK)* is also described due to stations' heavy dependence on this news source. Finally, data analysis is presented based on newsroom studies and an analysis of extracts of news broadcasts.

2. Methodology

Three radio stations' news stories about Lokmacı's opening are analysed in this paper. Stations were chosen based on their political diversity, representing various dominant political powers and interests in TRNC (see section 3.2). During the week of its opening (31 March to 5 April 2008), news stories about Lokmacı were broadcasted 28 times on the main 18:00 evening newscasts of the sample radio stations. All stories, which include preparations, international responses, the opening ceremony, Lokmacı's temporary closure and a protest, are analysed in this paper. This week's coverage exemplifies how even positive events in TRNC are framed in ways which articulate discourses advantageous to those associated with broadcasters, yet disadvantageous to the majority of the population who want a solution to the present conflict.

In CDA, texts are analysed in terms of the details of the linguistic choices that they contain as these allow the analyst to reveal the broader discourses that are articulated (Fairclough 2003; van Dijk 1993). These discourses can be thought of as models of the world, in the sense described by Foucault (1972) and project certain social values and ideas which contribute to the (re)production of social life. This paper seeks to reveal the models of the world, identities and values drawn upon in each station's broadcasts.

The question of power has been at the core of CDA. The aim is to reveal what kinds of social relations of power are present in texts both explicitly and implicitly (van Dijk 1993). Since language can (re)produce social life, what kind of world is being created by texts and what kinds of inequalities, interests might this seek to perpetuate, generate or legitimate. Here language is not simply a neutral vehicle of communication but a means of social construction. Analysis of TRNC radio broadcasts reveals just such a perpetuation of social relations in the name of power and economic interest.

Analysis draws on basic lexical analysis which reveals what kinds of words are found in texts. What is included and excluded may be politically or socially significant, suiting text producer's interests and purposes (Kress 1989). These can be thought of, therefore, as ways by which authors seek to shape the way the world and events appear. Also analysed is the representation of participants or social actors (Wodak and Weiss 2005), drawing especially on

van Leeuwen's (1995, 1996) approaches to the way these and their actions can be classified, categorised and re-contextualised. Here questions such as who does what to whom in sentences and where participants are positioned in more active or passive roles are examined. Also considered are sentence position in terms of emphasising or de-emphasising social actors (van Dijk 1993) and collocations (Fairclough 2003; Sinclair 1991). How speech is recontextualised is analysed, relying both on Caldas-Coulthard's (1994) analysis of glossing verbs and sources and relevant aspects of Appraisal Theory (White 2006). This paper's data reveals that different radio stations foreground or background specific social actors through representational strategies and the attribution of agency.

The CDA is supplemented by newsroom studies. It is the ethnographic data that allows us to understand the 'social goings on' behind the news broadcasts that are subsequently analysed. There is a long tradition of newsroom studies from the classic work of Fishman (1980) and Tuchman (1978) to a more recent revival such as in work by Niblock and Machin (2006) and Paterson and Domingo (2008). Such studies allow the researcher to go behind the scenes of production and investigate the tacit assumptions and processes that go into making news. In this study, the ownership, affiliation and news-writing practices of *Bayrak International (BRTI)*, *KFM* and *Radyo T* are described based on observations and interviews conducted over six months. The ethnographic component of this research is particularly important given criticisms of CDA that it often assumes too much from simple text analysis and does not consider pretext and context (Widdowson 2004; Philo 2007). In fact leading proponents of CDA have themselves argued for just such an addition (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2000; van Dijk 2001, 1997). For example, Baker et al. (2008: 281) call for CDA practitioners to analyse texts and 'explain why and under what circumstances and consequences the producers of the text have made specific linguistic choices'.

3. Turkish Cypriot Radio

As in many other British colonies, radio was established in 1948 by and for the British military to promote the colonial government's policies (Kannaouros 2004: 2; Dedeçay 1988: 45). During the time of the shared Republic (1960 to 1963), the *Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation* (*CyBC*) was seen as essential for propaganda purposes for the new Republic (Dedeçay 1988: 79). It was run by the Republic's pro-*Enosis* government, *Enosis* being a policy of unifying the whole of Cyprus with Greece. With the collapse of the shared Republic, Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their places at *CyBC* and established six new radio stations (Azgın 1996: 657; Sayıl 2000: 5). Later, in 1997, private broadcasting was introduced and 29 of these broadcasters are operating in 2010. The state owned radio stations are controlled by political elites with the strong influence of the Turkish military and private stations are controlled by more individualised political interests.

3.1 TAK

Virtually all news heard on TRNC radio, newsroom observations revealed, is sourced from *TAK*. While stations change feeds to foreground and background different social actors, they all had very few resources. This meant that *TAK*'s ideology would be found in stories sitting alongside that of individual news stations.

TAK, founded in 1973, offers written news and a photography service for local broadcasters and newspapers. According to *TAK* journalist Selim Kumbaracı, over 90 percent of TRNC news comes from the agency. On the one hand, *TAK* tends to produce news that supports the CTP government since it is overseen by a seven member board of directors who are all government political appointments and it is financed by the government along with subscription fees. On the other hand, *TAK* has a longer Turkish nationalistic heritage. The agency forms one part of the Turkish Cypriot civil service built up by 40 years of Turkish and nationalist rule. According to Azgın (1996), the Turkish Cypriot civil service has a deep nationalistic tradition and, crucially, the military's influence should not be underestimated even if not directly represented. This was supported by the researcher's own conversations with *TAK* employees and those of its client radio stations. In the *TAK* news feed, therefore, it is common to find a mixture of pro-government discourse along with pro-Turkish nationalism and heavily anti-Greek Cypriot discourse.

3.2 Radio Stations

3.2.1 BRTI

BRTI is the English language radio service of state-run broadcaster *BRTK*. The station is financed mainly by the TRNC government with some advertising. TRNC's *Bayrak Radio-Television Corporation Law number 50/1983*, which established *BRTK* in 1983, states that the station must broadcast 'successful events and anniversaries of national days, instil a sense of patriotism, and produce news in accordance with the national interests'. This law also dictates that *BRTK* is directly linked to the Prime Minister's office and answerable to its board of governors made up of government political appointments and representatives from the Turkish military. These circumstances dictate that *BRTI* represent the government positively at all times balanced with the views of Turkish nationalists due to the civil service tradition and the presence of the military.

Of the three radio stations, *BRTI* has the largest number of staff at around 22, although journalists had little formal training and complained of being unable to source or corroborate stories due to a severe lack of equipment. Two computers and telephones were shared. With few exceptions, the role of journalists was to filter and edit *TAK* stories. After this, language would be checked by the editor. No verification was carried out on any of the claims made in the news feed meaning *TAK* with its pro-government/ nationalistic influences laid out the news agenda.

3.2.2 KFM

KFM is the radio service of TRNC's largest media conglomerate *KMG*. It is financed by advertising and *KMG*'s newspaper operations. Editors and management said, when interviewed by the author, that *KMG* was independent of political parties. *KMG*'s editor-in-chief Süleyman Erğuçlu said that he would 'never prioritise party politics'. However, observation and interviews revealed that the political interests of owner Asıl Nadir are a key influence on output. Before CTP's 2003 parliamentary victory, Nadir and *KMG* media were vocal supporters of the Turkish nationalist UBP (Azgın 1996: 656). However, Nadir switched allegiances and developed close contacts with pro-federation CTP. In interviews, station employees reported how this resulted in a dramatic change of programming content. Nadir's allegiances form part of a political and business network, of which *KFM* is a part. Nadir benefits from a large number of monopoly import and export licenses ranging from white goods to fruit to exclusive restaurant chain deals. Though these interests are not connected directly to mainland Turkey, they would suffer greatly through unification which would result in a loss of their monopolies due to the arrival of the international competitors that already trade in the ROC. In short, unification is bad for Nadir and his businesses, despite his support for pro-federation CTP.

KFM employed nine newsroom staff, most inexperienced, young, university graduates with no formal training. There was no collection of news stories by staff whatsoever. Journalists had the job of simply cutting and pasting from *TAK* with no attempt at any verification or corroboration. When asked, newsworkers said that they chose news from *TAK* which was independent of political parties and 'what is good for the TRNC'. But this independence was not evident in newscasts, as was acknowledged by one editor-announcer who said: 'You won't see any anti-government stories in our news. We tend to protect them. In radio we follow *TAK* who are controlled by the government anyway'. As seen above, this is not strictly true as *TAK* contains a confusion of positive representations of the government along with Turkish nationalist discourses. We find evidence for this in the news stories of *KFM*.

3.2.3 Radyo T

Radyo T is the radio service of the *T Media Group*. Newsroom manager Mehmet Moreket stated that *T Media Group* 'is just making a profit' and has no political agenda. However, it was observed that nationalist politicians visited the station daily to discuss programming with Moreket. Moreket himself was a self-professed nationalist who on several occasions recounted his days as a Turkish Cypriot soldier. *T Media Group* employ eight newsworkers of which two are reporter-editors; necessary equipment is even more scarce than at the other stations. So, Moreket himself writes and controls all aspects of news-making.

Radyo T's business links are more limited than *KFM*. However, because owner Ersin Tatar is the Minister of Finance for the Turkish Nationalist UBP and part owner of Tatar & Co. Chartered Accountants, he is allowed access to lucrative, mostly Turkish mainland, contacts and contracts which businessmen without his political connections do not enjoy. But in the first

place this station was controlled by those who were deeply embittered by the conflict and sought no co-operation with the ROC.

Radyo T also uses *TAK* with stories being chosen that involved Turkish nationalist UBP interests. This was supplemented with information from the *BRT* website and Turkish nationalist politicians themselves who would provide additional information while visiting the station.

4. Radio Broadcasts

The opening of Lokmacı was of great significance for many Cypriots and a celebrated success for pro-federation supporters . Up to 1956, the Lokmacı area in the capital Nicosia's centre, was a popular shopping and socialising district. With an escalation in intercommunal violence in 1958, Turkish Cypriots withdrew to Nicosia's north and the street was divided with a barricade. Lokmacı was the first barricade erected in Cyprus dividing the two communities and became a symbol of division (*BRTI*, 03.04.08). Aside from the years of the shared Republic, it has been closed. It took four years of negotiations between the TRNC and the ROC's governments before the barricade was dismantled and replaced by a small pedestrian crossing on 3 April 2008.

Events surrounding the opening of Lokmacı could reasonably have been represented as a positive, celebrated event which re-united aspects of Cyprus, a stepping stone on the way to a solution to the Cyprus conflict. One could imagine the way this would have been covered in a North Atlantic news outlet, framed sentimentally as one people coming together, where differences were essentially superficial or existed only artificially imposed by politicians and bureaucrats, returning the area to how it should be. However, these chances are lost. Due to public opinion which was in favour of unification and Lokmacı's opening, all stations on one level appeared to represent events positively. However, a closer look at the language reveals that stories are shaped to create a broader context of mistrust each in a way that promotes a slightly different model of TRNC. Stations recontextualise events, shaping them in their respective ideological interests benefitting elites closely associated with each station, centred around slightly different versions of alignement with mainland Turkey and autonomy from the ROC. This section examines the different ways each station does this.

4.1 BRTI

Stories throughout the week demonstrate *BRTI's* support for a distinct multi-functional Turkish Cypriot nation with governance in the hands of CTP. The ROC's government is a troublesome 'other', though strategies are used which represent actions less positively and negatively than they could be. These veiled activations act as a pretext to promote CTP governance.

A number of strategies are used which reveal *BRTI* support for CTP. The use of honorifics and functional titles not only show this support but also play a role in nation-building. Functional titles like 'President Mehmet Ali Talat' and functional names like 'the Turkish Cypriot aide' emphasise the roles of

individuals, giving them a sense of importance, a common strategy used to legitimise power and status (van Leeuwen 1996: 59) whilst representing an important and multi-functional government.

Another strategy is by mostly representing the party personally and nominalised, like 'Prime Minister Soyer'. This highlights personal aspects of the government and provides listeners with CTP points of identification (ibid.: 52-53).

A third strategy is accentuating the governments ability to control and make things happen by giving CTP agency. For example, '[...] Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer rejected Greek Cypriot Sides claims that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.' Here, Soyer is activated at the beginning of the main clause, a dominant position. He is controlling a situation by rejecting claims made by the ROC which run against TRNC interests, evoking discourses of CTP protecting TRNC interests from the ROC.

A fourth strategy is in representing reported speech. *BRTI* uses CTP government sources almost exclusively showing its support (White 2006: 58; Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 304). The choice of speaking verbs also shows this support. Though the neutral 'said' is most common, illocutionary verbs which represent CTP as powerful ('announce', 'stress', 'remind', 'point to', 'reject'), friendly ('thank') and knowledgeable ('state', 'note', 'explain') are also used (White 2006: 58-59; Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 295).

Bıt it is not just CTP, but also a distinct multi-functional TRNC which is supported in these stories. *BRTI* names the TRNC and its government commonly using the lexical choice 'Turkish Cypriot', such as 'Lefkoşa Turkish Cypriot Municipality Mayor Cemal Bulutoğluları', 'Turkish Cypriot police' and 'the Turkish Cypriot side'. This lexical choice reminds listeners of their 'Turkish Cypriot' government and nation, distinct from the ROC and not part of an all-Cypriot nation. When asked why TRNC is promoted as such, an editor said this is an obligation as outlined in TRNC's *BRTK Law* so it had become second nature in order to satisfy management.

Multiple representations of aspects of the nation such as Lokmacı, borders, 'Cikkos area', 'Ercan airport' and 'Nicosia' map out what is included in the nation, differentiating it from the ROC. However, these are mostly in prepositional phrases or passivated, represented as powerless, de-emphasised, and a recipient of action. Part of the reason for this grammatical strategy is Lokmacı is named 'a gate' which needs to be 'opened' and 'closed' by somebody. For example, 'The gate – which was opened to crossings yesterday morning – was closed by the Greek Cypriot Side.' However, it could have been represented as a 'state of affairs' verb process such as 'The gate is open' activated and emphasised (Fairclough 1993; Fairclough 1995a: 110), a strategy used on *Radyo T* which emphasises the nation more than on *BRTI*.

A small number of namings within the sample suggest a more inclusive Cypriot identity, however, these are minimal. When asked why inclusive namings are not used more often, one editor said they are not acceptable to managers who cite the *BRT Law*. For example, 'A special ceremony was held at Lokmacı this morning which was marked by high participation of people and peaceful slogans.' 'People' refers to residents and politicians from both states, creating a more inclusive Cypriot 'us' group. Elsewhere, 'Turkish

Cypriots' and 'Greek Cypriots' are collocated with 'experiencing' and 'witnessing' positive events like Lokmacı's opening and 'solving' problems 'together'. These evoke a more inclusive and cooperative Cypriot discourse, reflecting some of the station's pro-solution interests.

However, 'Turkish Cypriots' and 'Greek Cypriots' are the most common naming of residents. Though they share a common 'Cypriot' naming, they also repeatedly evoke a discourse of difference, accentuated by being commonly collocated. These strategies remind listeners of their 'Turkish' identity which is distinct from their 'Greek' counterparts.

The ROC's government is a troublesome 'other'. At the level of lexical choices personal namings are more numerous than other stations, giving listeners a point of identification with the ROC's politicians. However namings such as 'the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias' highlight otherness. If written as 'President of the Republic of Cyprus Dimitris Christofias' difference would be de-emphasised, not accentuated. A troublesome other discourse is realised by activating it (three times) blocking aid and blaming Turkey for no solution and collocating it with 'saddening', 'do(es) not comply', 'closed', 'not giving' and 'attempts' which are a 'critical negativity'.

However, the negative representation of the ROC is positively modified through grammatical strategies. Prepositional phrases are used extensively to de-emphasise the ROC, while emphasising its negative actions. Consider:

> The crossings at Lokmacı-Ledra Border Gate are continuing between the two sides in Cyprus despite a brief closure of the gate late on Thursday. The gate - which was opened to crossings yesterday morning – was closed by the Greek Cypriot Side at around 8:30 with a claim that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.

In the first sentence, the ROC is not named, but inferred in the clause 'despite a brief closure of the gate'. This clause, in a near-end sentence position, does not mention the ROC; its agency and visibility backgrounded, moving it into abstraction. In sentence two, the ROC and its negative actions are identified, though de-emphasised with agency being clouded in a non-dominant sentence position within a prepositional phrase. This construction, though negative, is less negative than the activation 'the ROC closed the gate' (van Dijk 1991: 216). Here, language chosen contains a clear sense of underlying threat and opposition without this dominating the broadcast.

In fact, *BRTI* sometimes represents the ROC positively, though agency is clouded. Consider, 'The first speech was delivered by the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias aide Yorgos Yakovu.' The choice of a passive structure and de-emphasising Yakovu in a good news event (Lokmacı's opening ceremony) cannot be overlooked. Sentence position backgrounds Yakovu while foregrounding the 'first speech'.

Sometimes, CTP actually benefits from positive representations of the ROC, as in, 'President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias agreed on the 21st of March to open the gate.' This strategy of ROC officials sharing good news with TRNC officials who enjoy prominent sentence position (ibid.: 215), diminishes the good news factor for the ROC while emphasising CTP actions and governance. These strategies reflect a strong

pro-Turkish nationalist discourse due to Turkish nationalism continuing at both institutional and individual journalists' levels as well as *BRTK* answerability to pro-federation CTP. As one editor said:

> We write so as not to offend all those people in the Cyprus conflict like the government, Turkey, the Turkish military, the EU, the US and money groups in TRNC.

4.2 KFM

Recontextualisations of the week's events demonstrate that *KFM* shows far more support for CTP politicians than *BRTI*. The CTP policy of a need for negotiations with the ROC is indicated by backgrounding the TRNC nation and its Turkish Cypriot character. However, the ROC is represented more negatively than *BRTI*. This runs against CTP policies for partnership and compromise, but reflect *KFM* newsroom practices of cutting and pasting from *TAK*.

Throughout the week, *KFM* positively represents CTP by almost exclusively personalising the party, representing it as President Talat himself. This highlights its human side though Kress (1985) would refer to this as overlexicalisation – where a lexical item appears more than would normally be expected in a text. However, the sheer number of functional and formal namings create an impression of an important president whilst providing listeners with CTP points of identification.

KFM represents him as a political celebrity. This is achieved using three strategies. Firstly, he is named formally with functional honorifics more than any other actor. Naming him 'President Mehmet Ali Talat' four times in one story alone, grants him status and importance unlike all other politicians. Secondly, Talat is represented performing positive actions. CTP is activated in action, event and mental processes, almost all attributed to Talat. For example:

> Talat wants TUSİAD to continue working on the topics solving the Cyprus problem, and the ending of the Turkish Cypriot isolation. They gave him positive answers.

In the first sentence, Talat is activated in a mental process, being powerful in a position to ask a Turkish institution to 'continue working' on the Cyprus conflict. In the second sentence, he is passivated by being given a positive answer. But the passivation is a response to Talat's request and a result of Talat's meetings. So, co-text empowers Talat positively. In fact, he is collocated with 'finish meetings' or 'had meetings' four times, a strategy used to stress Talat's importance as an important politician who has 'meetings'. He is a hard-working, powerful and active celebrity in a world of powerful politicians.

Support for CTP is also represented by naming the government extensively as part of a 'we' group, a strategy not seen on *BRTI*. Fairclough (1995a: 181) claims politicians use 'we' for self-serving purposes, 'claim[ing] solidarity by placing everyone in the same boat' and 'claim[ing] authority in that the leader is claiming the right to speak for the people as a whole'. For example, 'we' is

used in the following by CTP politician Avcı, 'If there is an issue, we deal with it but within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission.' Here, 'we' refers to the government whose authority is presupposed by speaking for TRNC's population. Its authority to 'deal with' issues and 'never give permission' is presupposed and unquestioned, realising a discourse of CTP authority.

Another strategy used which shows CTP support is it being the only source of speech, unlike *BRTI* which mostly uses CTP. This limits the voices heard on *KFM* to CTP politicians. Choices in glossing verbs further represent CTP positively; as powerful ('remind'), knowledgeable ('explain', 'note', 'specify') and understanding ('acknowledge' and 'discuss').

A third strategy is government activations. CTP is represented as constructive in 'we did our work'; powerful in 'we never give permission'; and thoughtful in 'we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed'. Sometimes, abstractions are used to represent an active government and legitimate its actions, such as, 'If there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed.' Here, the generalisation 'we discuss and speak' does not really explain what the government does when there is 'a problem'. However, it legitimises the actions of CTP.

KFM supports CTP policies by omitting its support for the TRNC nation, thereby showing a need for negotiations. One strategy is by using the popular 'Turkish Cypriot' naming on *BRTI* less often. So, politician Erçakıca is named as 'Presidential Spokesman Erçakıca', instead of 'the Turkish Cypriot Presidential Spokesman'. Also, by naming the government with far fewer functional and formal namings than *BRTI*, the functions of the government and the nation are de-emphasised.

Another strategy used is almost excluding the TRNC nation. In fact, aside from Lokmacı and borders, 'Ercan airport' is the only other aspect of the nation named. These are almost exclusively in prepositional phrases which de-emphasise the nation even more. However, representations of Lokmacı emphasise its importance more than on *BRTI* whilst benefitting CTP. One strategy used is writing Lokmacı opening 'is of special value'. This activation, though agentless, emphasises this government's 'special' success as does it being collocated elsewhere with 'celebrated'.

TRNC residents are represented in ways which positively represent CTP as in, '[...] both the public relations improvements and the Turkish Cypriot public are connected to the solution process to remove the isolations.' Here, the 'public' is activated, but as one of two agents, the other being 'the public relations improvements'. It is presupposed that there are 'public relations improvements' due to CTP. Listing 'public relations improvements' at the beginning of the clause emphasises government activities and places residents in a less-dominant position, signifying discourses of CTP support.

Alternatively, the ROC is represented more negatively than on *BRTI*. This runs against CTP policies for partnership and compromise, reflecting *KFM* newsroom practices of highlighting CTP politicians whilst cutting and pasting from *TAK*. Three strategies represent the ROC more negatively, the first being it receives far fewer personal namings. These limit the number of points of

identification, making it easier to treat the ROC as a distant other (van Leeuwen 1996: 48).

Secondly, activations represent a far more troublesome ROC. Six of its eight activations see the ROC acting against TRNC interests. Like *BRTI*, the ROC closes Lokmacı and wants to 'slow down the removal of the continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public'. These activations differ firstly by there being far more negative actions on *KFM* and fewer positive ones. Secondly, it is given agency as in the above example representing a more powerfully negative ROC than on *BRTI* which obscures agency in passive constructions.

A third strategy used to advance the theme of a troublesome ROC is collocations. Eight times there is negative co-text associated with the ROC. All four times the words 'Turkish Cypriot' are used, the word 'isolation' is in the same sentence, three times collocated. When the ROC is in the same sentence, the theme becomes 'continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public'. These realise discourses of TRNC victimisation at the hands of the ROC, drawing upon Turkish nationalist discourses and indicating a lack of care taken in lexical and grammatical choices. When shown this analysis, one editor said these themes were written into scripts because this was 'the concern of the government at the time' according to *TAK*, despite running counter to CTP policies.

4.3 Radyo T

Whilst recontextualising the week's events, *Radyo T* demonstrates its political allegiances to Turkish nationalism and the UBP party while negatively representing CTP. Unlike the other two stations, CTP lacks status, is a failure and is used to legitimise UBP policies, including UBP and Turkey being the obvious choice for TRNC governance. The ROC is represented as a dangerous enemy to be feared legitimising Turkish nationalist policies of a pan-Turkish national future.

Radyo T witholds its support for CTP using a number of lexical and grammatical strategies. One strategy is it rarely represents the government, less than most other participants in these stories. When it is named, it is mostly impersonal representations and almost never nominalised, such as 'the leaders'. These strategies background the government and de-emphasise its human aspects.

A second strategy is titilation. On all stations, politicians are first introduced in a story with functional honorifics. This is not the case for CTP politicians on *Radyo T* with one exception. Here, politicians are culturally classified as in 'Turkish Cypriot Talat'. Cultural classifications carry connotations, mostly negative (van Leeuwen 1996: 58). This break in routine naming of politicians evokes a discourse of CTP lacking status (ibid.: 59).

CTP is also activated performing both negative and positive actions. When activated negatively, it is named without the UBP, as in:

> The leaders and partners read the account [of negotiations] [...] one or the other of the leaders thinks twice [...] [then] leaders negotiate and strongly say no.

Here, the government fails in finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict because they 'think twice' and 'say no'.

When CTP is activated positively, a 'we' is used which includes UBP nationalists and in many cases Turkey. For example, former president Rauf Denktaş is represented saying, 'We opened it [Lokmacı] under the same conditions as before. The Greeks used to say, 'If there are soldiers, we won't open.' But we didn't step back.' Here, Denktaş has included himself in the 'we' who opened Lokmacı and set conditions. However, it is CTP which opened Lokmacı. The same can be said for 'we didn't step back'. Here is a brave move showing strength again attributed to 'we'. Using 'we' allows Denktaş to claim solidarity with voters, background CTP government actions by not naming them and take responsibility for positive actions.

Radyo T generalises government actions to support UBP's nationalist policies. For example, 'leaders thinks twice about [peace] proposals' and 'strongly say no'. Though indeed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict has alluded negotiators to date, some talks have been successful like the 1977 'Makarios-Denktaş accord' which claims that Cyprus should be an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic. Talks have also contributed to the successful opening of border crossing points. However, this generalisation legitimates the nationalist stance that peace initiatives do not work.

Radyo T recontextualisations show support for UBP through namings. It is always named personally and mostly nominalised. So, unlike CTP, nationalist politician Denktaş is named formally with the functional honorific 'President Rauf Denktaş'. Though he has not been president since 2004, *Radyo T* writers give him the title 'President', showing the station's and nationalist's reverence for him.

UBP is credited with positive actions, many with Turkey, demonstrating that UBP and Turkey ought to lead TRNC. Turkey is an important part of governance for Turkish nationalists, it being TRNC's motherland, close friend and protector. This is reflected in Turkey's high number of representations and activations. Turkey and UBP are activated with an array of process types such as mental, verbal and event processes. Consider the following reported speech by Denktaş, 'We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish soldiers are our guarantors.'

In the first sentence, Turkey is part of 'we' who will make agreements about its soldiers. Obviously, Turkey is the principle decision-maker about its troops. However, using 'we' ties TRNC governance with Turkey. The second sentence describes the relationship between the two. Turkey is 'our guarantor', a nationalist position. This realises discourses about a Turkish, TRNC and Denktaş 'we' group, with Turkey as protector and TRNC needing protection. It is presupposed 'we' need protection from 'them' the ROC.

The TRNC nation is supported in these stories using a number of strategies. Firstly, representations are extensive, far more than the other stations. Both 'the nation' and aspects of 'TRNC' such as Lokmacı, the border, 'here' and

'customs' are identified. In fact, eleven representations of the border demarcate and remind listeners that there are two nations with a border separating them, as in, 'This wall [the border] doesn't divide a nation, it prevents genocide, this wall is a peace wall.' This sentence presupposes two nations and the possibility of genocide evoking discourses of fear. Secondly, deixis is exploited by identifying 'our nation', 'our soldiers', 'our flag' and 'our vigilance'. Thirdly, giving TRNC the personality trait of 'our vigilance' exploits an aspect of nation-building identified by Wodak et al. (1999: 76). Fourthly, symbols of the state ('wall', 'gate', 'flags', 'nation' and 'TRNC') are activated in state processes, emphasising the nation more than when it appears in prepositional phrases, as is the case on *BRTI* and *KFM*, articulating a discourse of TRNC being a feasible solution in Cyprus

Representations of TRNC residents associated with nationalists are represented positively. The police, who are directly controlled by the Turkish military are one such case. For example:

> Nearly 20 Greeks shouting slogans and carrying protest signs passed the Greek barricades and came to the TRNCs controlled area north of Cikkos. TRNC police intervened, blocking their [protesters] path and taking their protest signs while pedestrians continued to pass.

Here, 'TRNC police' are represented performing three action processes of intervening, 'blocking' protesters and 'taking' their signs. These actions have agency which represent the police as powerful (Fairclough 1995b: 113). Representing the police positively is seen by Turkish nationalists and newsroom manager Moreket as 'what is good for the nation'.

This same utterance names residents of the ROC as 'Greeks', excluding the common 'Cypriot' naming, evoking discourses of difference more than on *BRTI* and demonstrating Turkish nationalists views that Cyprus has two nations and two nationalities: 'Turkish' and 'Greek'. They are activated performing negative acts like 'shouting slogans' and 'carrying protest signs'. Some lexical choices, such as 'crossed' the 'barricade' and entered 'TRNCs controlled area' connote military acts of aggression, drawing upon discourses of a dangerous other.

Elsewhere, residents are collocated with 'Turkish Cypriot'. Unlike *BRTI*, they are not collocated with positive cooperative events, but with 'the Cyprus problem'. This not only identifies the two groups of residents as different from each other, but reinforces a negative theme of Cyprus as a 'problem'. These help legitimise separation on Cyprus, a UBP Turkish nationalist stance.

The ROC's government is not only represented negatively, but as a dangerous enemy, one not to negotiate with. Lexical choices such as 'Greeks', 'the Greek side' and 'they' create a distinct 'them' group (Fairclough 2003: 149; van Dijk 1991). These namings which draw upon discourses of difference moreso than other stations also question any pro-solution future.

Another strategy not seen on the other stations, is the ROC's numerous activations. The ROC is empowered performing actions against TRNC interests which can be grouped into seven themes. The ROC:

1. Is weak: 'they [ROC] pleaded.'
2. Lies: 'they make a story like the Berlin wall'.
3. Is untrustworthy: 'They will close the gate again'.
4. Is against TRNC interests: The ROC 'didn't agree [to Lokmacı]'.
5. Is naive: 'they think this [opening of Lokmacı] has affected negotiation timing'.
6. Is wrong: 'they cant do this [change the borders]'.
7. Wants to control TRNC: 'Greeks aim is to replace the 1974 TRNC border with the 1963 border'.

Through these activation, *Radyo T* evokes discourses of opposition and threat even though eleven of these are mental processes with no agency. Also, many of these actions are distillations such as in number five where the ROC 'thinks' and in number seven where it 'aims'. These actions give no detail as to what the ROC is actually doing but legitimises and realises the purpose of representing the ROC as a threat which in turn legitimises UBP's stance that the status quo and no negotiations are the best option to the Cyprus conflict.

5. Conclusion

Not all news media around the world operate along Fourth Estate principles of neutrality, objectivity and in the interests of democratic processes. Sometimes this takes place where journalists operate under the censorship of dictatorships and in others, like the TRNC, untrained and unprofessionalised staff, working with poor resources, produce news that is aligned to established ideologies, dominated by highly politicised chief editors. And unlike in a dictatorship, where the views of the population might be supressed, radio broadcasts do lip service to publically popular pro-solution politics, but use these rather as a pretext to be negative and to foster discourses of mistrust and division. This is done not in an overt manner but more subtly through lexical and grammatical choices.

Nevertheless the 'semiotic' of news journalism is used by journalists, editors and owners. Listeners, while assuming political partisanship of stations, still expect an underlying information role from them and are reassured through the plurality of viewpoints available through different stations. To some extent it is true that all events, even those that may not be in the interest of certain parties, such Lokmacı's opening, on the surface are covered positively by the radio stations. But what is much less widely understood are the more subtle processes of recontextualisation of events that meet the interests of TRNC and Turkish elites. So, this paper's analysis finds that *BRTI*, with its closeness to both Turkish nationalists and pro-federation CTP produce stories which benefit both. *KFM* produces news which supports CTP at the expense of its policies on Cypriot unity. This benefits CTP and *KFM*'s owner Nadir without jeopardising his business monopolies. *Radyo T* recontextualises events which support UBP and Turkish nationalism.

Unfortunately, none of these stations truly reflect the desires of a large part of the population which has voted for and wants a soluton to the Cyprus conflict. This undemocratic situation results in the continuation of political and economic isolation for Turkish Cypriots whilst elites continue to reep its

benefits. For the most part TRNC radio news is a fraud passenger that travels under the broad umbrella of what we call news and journalism, and is rather an enemy of democratic processes concealed in the clothing of the associated practices of news production.

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