Taking a Stance on Stance: Metastancing as Legitimation

ILONA VANDERGRIFF

San Francisco State University

vdgriff@sfsu.edu

Abstract

Employing theoretical concepts and frameworks from pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis, this study shows how taking a stance on stance (henceforth: metastancing) can be used to as a legitimation strategy in political speeches. Based on a data collection extracted from Hitler speeches (1935-1941) I document how this speaker's metastances serve two complementary "constructive strategies" (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92), a polarized negative other-representation and positive self-representation. Whereas negative references and predications are well-documented in this kind of discourse, the manner in which opponents of Nazi ideology (including Jews, communists/socialists, or the Allies) are disrespected or even ridiculed deserves special attention. Instead of derogatory or pejorative terms, conventionally positively evaluated references and predications are voiced with irony, sarcasm and mockery. By discrediting opponents and critics in this way, the speaker simultaneously voices and suppresses challenges to or criticisms of Nazi political action. Complementing this negative other-representation the speaker uses self-references and predications to enhance his or his party's positive image. These references and predications in conjunction with framing and fallacious argumentation promote a polarized us-against-them mentality that invites the audience to align with the speaker. By showing oppositional stances as inferior to the speaker's, the speaker seeks legitimation of Nazi policy and ideology.

Keywords: (Meta-)stance, propaganda, legitimation, quotation, represented discourse

1. Introduction

Backed by coercion and the threat of violence, totalitarian regimes strive for total control by socializing the population into a common political ideology by means of a common public discourse. New words are coined and existing words and phrases obtain new meanings or connotations. One way to destabilize an existing form–meaning link is to use words and phrases in new contexts. In this article, I focus on the new meanings words and propositions gain when they are used in a way that signals the speaker's distance to the expressed meaning. In Nazi propaganda, quotation marks were often placed around a word or phrase to cue irony, sarcasm or mockery (a.k.a. 'scare quotes'). This observation was first made by Victor Klemperer in his account of the language and style of National Socialism titled *Lingua Tertii Imperii* or

LTI ([1947] 2007). He describes the ironic quotation mark as the hallmark of NS rhetoric:

> Dagegen bedient sich die LTI bis zum Überdruss dessen, was ich die ironischen Anführungszeichen nennen möchte. Das einfache und primäre Anführungszeichen bedeutet nichts anderes als die wörtliche Wiedergabe dessen, was ein anderer gesagt oder geschrieben hat. Das ironische Anführungszeichen beschränkt sich nicht auf solches Zitieren, sondern setzt Zweifel in die Wahrheit des Zitierten, erklärt von sich aus den mitgeteilten Ausspruch für Lüge. Indem das im Reden durch einen bloßen Zusatz von Hohn in der Stimme des Sprechers zum Ausdruck kommt, ist das ironische Anführungszeichen aufs engste mit dem rhetorischen Charakter der LTI verbunden…Sie gehören zur gedruckten LTI wie zum Tonfall Hitlers und Goebbels', sie sind ihr eingeboren. ([1947] 2007: 99-100)

> 'LTI [i.e. Nazi language], however, makes excessive use of what I would call ironic quotation marks. The simple and primary quotation mark signals nothing but the literal repetition of what another person said or wrote. The ironic quotation mark, by contrast, does not restrict itself to quoting, but questions instead the truth of what is quoted and declares the quoted content a lie. Since speech can express this simply via sarcastic tone, the ironic quotation mark is closely linked with the rhetorical character of LTI […] They [i.e. ironic quotation marks or scare quotes] belong to the printed LTI as they do to the tone of Hitler and Goebbels, they are inherent in it.'

Klemperer claims that these ironic quotation marks are not only characteristic of Nazi language but so frequently used that the 'ironic use [i.e., scare quotes] outweighs the neutral one [i.e., quotation marks] many times over' (Klemperer 2000: 67). Although Klemperer's claim is well–known, widely cited, and often challenged, little research has been done thus far to follow up. His observations provide the starting point for the current study. I will analyze the use of ironic quotes and other linguistic markers of speaker distancing in the larger context of documenting and analyzing stancetaking. The paper explores how a previous stance is represented in the genre of propaganda speech and how stance on stance (i.e., metastance) is constructed. More specifically, I inquire how non-speaker-based (third party) and speaker-based utterances are represented. What linguistic and pragmatic features are associated with constructing aligning and disaligning metastances? What functions do they serve in propaganda speech? Ultimately, this paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which linguistic forms and strategies are used to persuade the hearer as part of the larger goal of expressing, legitimizing and manipulating political action and power.

Following a brief summary of research on the rhetoric of Nazi propaganda, including Klemperer's observations, I provide a schematic overview of stance as a theoretical concept.

2. Prior Research

2.1 The Language of Nazi Propaganda

Studies in political communication have highlighted different aspects of language use, e.g. the role of prosody (on Nazi language use, e.g., Schnauber 1972; Schwitalla 1994), the interaction between speaker and audience (on Hitler, e.g., Beck 2001) or rhetorical operations such as repetition, addition, and imagery (e.g., Billig 1991, 1995; Bitzer 1981). The majority of scholarship on persuasive language in politics, however, has focused on the role of the lexicon (Bolinger 1982; Geis 1987; Hodge and Fowler 1979; Wodak 1989; for an overview see Wilson 2001). Likewise, early research on the language of National Socialism favored word-level analyses. With few exceptions, most notably Kenneth Burke's 1939 "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'" and George Steiner's famous essay "The Hollow Miracle" (1979), first published in 1959, linguistic inquiries into Nazi usage beyond the lexical level were published in the past two decades. These recent studies have significantly enhanced our understanding of Nazi language, in particular with respect to rhetorics and metaphor use (e.g. Chilton 2005; Forster 2009; Musolff 2010; Pegelow Kaplan 2009; Ulonska 1990; Vierhufe 2008).

Research on lexical usage has documented and analyzed both new coinages and the manipulation of existing vocabulary, whereby old words receive new meanings (Berning 1964; Bork 1970; Klemperer 2000; Sauer 1978; Schmitz-Berning 1998; Seidel and Seidel-Slotty 1961; Sternberger, Storz and Süskind 1962; Wulf 1964; Zeman 1964; *inter alia*). In his comprehensive study of Nazi vocabulary, Siegfried Bork (1970) analyzes lexical choices made by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* as well as in *Völkischer Beobachter*, the official newspaper of the Nazi party. Bork shows that these lexical choices established recurrent lexical or semantic fields, i.e., 'group[s] of words that are related in meaning as a result of being connected with a particular context of use' (Beard 2000: 119). These lexical fields are, moreover, highly antonymous in nature, overly positive or even laudatory when they describe Nazi ideology and its supporters and intensely negative when they describe oppositional stances or opponents e.g., Jews, members of other political groups (socialists, communists, etc.) or the Allied forces. The contrasting references result in extremely polarized language in constructing identities, supporting ideological positioning of us–versus–them. Aside from references, Critical Discourse Analysis has identified other means of positive self-representation and negative other-presentation such as predication, perspectivisation and involvement, intensification/ mitigation, and argumentation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 46). Predication can take the form of 'stereotypical, evaluative attributions of positive or negative traits and implicit or explicit predicates'. Strategies of perspectivisation, framing or discourse representation use means of 'reporting, description, narration or quotation of events and utterances' (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 27). In this way, speakers can 'double-voice' utterances and represent discourse to express new meanings, where the speaker's stance will be an overlay to the author's stance. A well-documented strategy in political discourse beyond totalitarian regimes (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92; see also Van Dijk 2005), staging two irreconcilable stances ultimately serves to legitimize political actions. Specifically, speakers stage the polarized stances for emotive

effect in the process of legitimation, i.e., 'a justification of a behavior' (Reyes 2011: 782) as 'right' or 'appropriate' in contrast to an 'other' which is 'wrong' and 'inappropriate.' Ideologically shaped and defined within social groups, these moral or ethical concepts are rooted in authorization from authority figures or traditions, moral evaluation within a value system, rationalization with references to goals and uses of institutionalized social action and/or mythopoesis (narratives that reward legitimate actions) (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Van Leeuwen 2007). Linguistic realizations of positive self- and negative other-presentation thus serve to legitimize speaker-based stances and delegitimize non-speaker based stances.

The earliest systematic account of Nazi language *LTI* ('Lingua Tertii Imperii') was published in 1947 by Victor Klemperer, an accomplished Romance philologist, who recorded his linguistic observations in a secret notebook during the Third Reich as he sought to understand the mentality of National Socialism through his observations of language use. His book marks the beginning of Germany's long and vigorous tradition of studying fascist language, which includes numerous studies focusing on the lexicon, propaganda, and media (Ehlich 1989). Sensitive to the link between language and power (Barbe 2007: 509), Klemperer calls for critical analysis of language, including one's own usage. He even fears that the use of Nazi language could lead to Nazi thinking because the propaganda is so poisonous that even the linguistic observer is not immune (Barbe 2007). Most scholars today would deny the strong formulation of linguistic determinism that ascribes such power to language (Watt 2001; cf. Vierhufe 2008). Furthermore, linguists are skeptical because Klemperer looks at Nazi language primarily at the word level; how to view the little context he provides remains a matter of debate (Watt 2001; but cf. Barbe 2007: 509). By comparison, Klemperer's observations regarding the pervasive use of irony have attracted little research attention. He makes a strong claim that the ironic quotation mark, not the exclamation mark is a characteristic feature of Nazi language:

> If the Spanish revolutionaries gain a victory, if they have officers or a general staff, they are invariably 'red "victories"', 'red "officers"', a 'red "general staff"'. Later the same was true of the Russian 'strategy' and of Yugoslavia's '"Marshal" Tito'. Chamberlain and Churchill and Roosevelt are always only 'statesmen' in ironic inverted commas, Einstein is a 'research scientist', Rathenau a 'German' and Heine a '"German" writer'. There is not a single newspaper article or imprint of a speech which is not crawling with these ironic inverted commas, and they are also to be found in more temperate and expansive studies. They belong to both the printed LTI and the intonation of Hitler and Goebbels, they are intrinsic to them. (Klemperer 2000: 67)

While ironic quotes are frequently used for human referents, even words like *Demokratie* 'democracy', *reden* 'talk', and *verhandeln* 'negotiate' are used ironically (Hitler 1925, cited in Press 2005), i.e., they signal that the speaker does not mean what he says. In other words, the speaker distances himself from the literal or conventional meaning. More specifically, the ironic quotes give a negative evaluation to what is conventionally associated with a positive evaluation. Irony also describes the reverse process, namely when the speaker gives positive evaluation to what is conventionally associated with a negative evaluation (Kotthoff 2003: 1390). Thus the affirmative use of formerly

pejorative terms as *blindlings* 'blindly' (Klemperer 2007: 173), *fanatisch* 'fanatical' (Klemperer 2007: 66) and *unbändig* 'unrestrained' (Klemperer 2007: 296) is also ironic although these do not appear with ironic quotation marks. In fact, punctuation is an unreliable marker of irony as it is often not accompanied by ironic quotation marks; more often than not, the speaker relies on contextual cues to signal irony.[1] Ironic use of words like *demokratisch* (with a negative evaluation) or *fanatisch (*with a positive evaluation) are examples of other- and self-representation, respectively.

2.2 Stance

Represented discourse, both at the word and the utterance levels, will be analyzed within the framework of stance (Du Bois 2007; see also Bucholtz and Hall 2005; Kärkkäinnen 2006), a robust theoretical framework that is based on the notion that all utterances are dialogical. This is perhaps obvious for conversations but it also holds for political speeches because in both activities the speaker takes the addressee into account. By evaluating an object and thus taking a stance, the subject positions himself vis-à-vis the other subject. Stance has been defined as the interacting linguistic features that mark a speaker's orientation to discourse (Du Bois 2002). The speaker evaluates something (the stance object), and thereby positions himself, and thereby aligns with a second speaker. Du Bois explains that 'stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positions subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to salient dimension of the sociocultural field' (Du Bois 2007: 163). (Dis-)alignment subsumes the range of possible types of convergent and divergent positions the subjects can take.


Fig. 1 Stance Triangle (adapted from Du Bois 2007: 163)

Du Bois' stance triangle brings together different research strands developed over the past two decades, each focused on a different facet of stance. Evaluation was analyzed both from a conversation/discourse analytic perspective (Conrad and Biber 2000; Hunston and Sinclair 2000; Hunston and Thomson 2000; Lemke 1998) and from a linguistic anthropological perspective (Besnier 1993; Haviland 1991; Maynard 1993; Ochs 1996; Shoaps 2002). Other research inquired into positioning, both from a discourse analytic (Schiffrin 1994, 2006; Ribeiro 2006) and from a social psychological (Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and van Langenhove 1992, 1999) perspective. Finally, a number of conversation analytic studies focused on assessments and alignments (Pomerantz 1984; Goodwin and Goodwin 1992; Heritage 2002; Heritage and Raymond 2005; Goodwin 2006). Since stance is primarily conveyed through language, one line of research is concerned with the linguistic elements that mark it, e.g. evaluative words (Biber and Finegan 1988, 1989; Conrad and Biber 2000; Downing 2002; Hunston and Sinclair 2000), other words and phrases which are evaluative in specific contexts (Channell 2000), or syntactic structures (Hoey 2000; Kärkkäinen 2003) (for an overview see Oropreza-Escobar 2011: 163).

In order to fully understand stance, the analysis must 'locate' the stancetaker (Du Bois 2007) understand the object (here the previous stance) and what speaker information is available to listeners. When a speaker quotes someone else's words (i.e., the 'author's', Goffman 1981), the quotation is not neutral. Instead it always reflects the current speaker's stance because even neutral stance is a stance. Metastances thus involve both framing the previous third-party stance (speaker representing author's utterance) and taking a stance on the author's utterance (speaker taking a stance on the previous stance). Finally, the situational context plays a crucial role in trying to understand why a certain stance is being taken under present conditions.

3. Data and Methodology

During the Nazi regime (1933-1945), speeches by Adolf Hitler were widely disseminated on the radio, often via the *Volksempfänger*[2] and in print. Their purpose was to socialize the population into a common public discourse that would encompass all domains of public life. Political speeches are monologic on the surface because the speaker and hearer roles do not shift as in a conversation but the interactional structure, which underlies them, is dialogic because these speeches address an audience. Although speeches given in the Reichstag, for example, were ostensibly addressed to Nazi parliamentarians (e.g., *'Männer des Deutschen Reichstags!'* 'Men of the German Reichtstag!', Hitler, 21 May 1935, cited in Domarus 1988), they were often staged for the overhearing German public. Through persuasive speech, the speaker sought to convince the hearer of the speaker's standpoint on an issue, i.e., to invite the hearer to align with his stance.

Employing a collection of 98 cases of quotations extracted from eight Hitler speech transcripts (1935-1941), I use discourse-analytic methods to document in context instances of represented utterances. My goal is to better understand how disaligning and aligning metastances are constructed. Specifically, I analyze the ways in which linguistic features are employed and what functions

they serve. I will first present exemplary cases that characterize key aspects of how the speaker frames a third-party based previous stance and how he constructs a metastance. In the second section, I will do the same for speaker-based stances. Finally, I will look at form–function pairings and highlight the range of rhetorical functions metastancing serves in propaganda speech.

In my data quotations appear in the context of constructing a metastance, where the speaker takes a stance on a previous stance. Although stance can also be implicit, my analysis will only include cases where the previous speaker's utterance is represented explicitly either as (1) a direct quotation which purports to be a verbatim reproduction of the original utterance or as (2) an indirect quotation, the speaker's paraphrase of the original utterance, which would typically include a *verbum dicendi* such as *say, assert, claim* etc. I will thus not consider examples of inferred or implicit previous speaker stance, as illustrated in (3).

(1)

Solcher Art hat England nun seit dem 3., bzw. 4. September zahlreiche 'Siege' erfochten. Der glorreichste Sieg - in unseren Augen wäre es der schmählichste Mißerfolg - war die Flucht aus Dünkirchen. Aber was tut man nicht in der Not! Wir brauchen bloß die britische Kriegsberichterstattung zu lesen, um zu wissen, was es mit diesem Erfolg auf sich hat. Da heißt es z. B.: 'Man sagt uns, daß ... oder: 'Man erfährt aus wohlunterrichteten Kreisen ...' oder: 'Man hört von wohlinformierten Stellen ...' oder: 'Man kann von Sachverständigen vernehmen ...' oder: 'Man glaubt, ernstlich annehmen zu dürfen, daß...' usw. Ja, einmal hieß es: 'Man glaubt, Grund zu haben, glauben zu dürfen, daß ... usw.' Und dann, wie gesagt, kann natürlich jede Niederlage zum Erfolg werden. (Hitler, September 4, 1940, cited in Domarus 1965: 1576)

England surely has fought through to many a 'success' of this kind since that September 3 and 4, respectively. The most glorious of these victories – although a disgraceful fiasco in our eyes– was the flight from Dunkirk. Any port in a storm. We need only read a British war bulletin to know what all these 'successes' amount to. For instance, it says: "We were told that . . ." or "one gains the following information from well-informed circles . . ." or "one hears from knowledgeable officials . . ." or "from expert statements one can infer..." or "We believe we are allowed to assume' etc. One even read: "We believe we have cause to be permitted to believe that . . ." In this way any defeat can be transformed into a success! (Hitler, September 4, 1940, cited in Domarus 1997: 2082)

(2)

Wenn wir aber heute von Seiten meiner internationalen Gegner aus vorgehalten wird, daß ich doch diese Zusammenarbeit mit Rußland ablehne, so muß ich demgegenüber folgendes erklären: Ich lehne und lehnte diese Zusammenarbeit nicht ab mit Rußland, sondern mit dem auf die Herrschaft der Welt Anspruch erhebenden Bolschewismus. (Hitler, March 7, 1936, cited in Domarus 1965: 587)

> When today my international opponents confront me with the fact that I refuse to practice this cooperation with Russia, I must counter this assertion with the following: I rejected and continue to reject this cooperation not with Russia, but with the Bolshevism which lays claim to world rulership. *(*Hitler, March 7, 1936, cited in Domarus 1997: 767)

(3)

> England aber hat auch diesen Vorschlag abgelehnt und statt dessen geglaubt, dem Deutschen Reich ein zweistündiges Ultimatum mit einer unmöglichen Forderung schicken zu können. Die Engländer sich nur dabei in einem getäuscht! (Hitler, September 19, 1939, cited in Domarus 1965: 1359)

> But England believed it was in a position to reject this proposal and to place a two-hour ultimatum before the German Reich, an ultimatum which contained provisions impossible to comply with. However, the English were mistaken on one account. (Hitler, September 19, 1939, cited in Domarus 1997: 1806)

Unlike *Siege* 'victories' in (1), the vast majority of ironic usages which could show ironic quotation marks are graphically unmarked in the transcripts I considered. In my analysis I will therefore ignore punctuation, relying instead on contextual clues to signal ironic usage.

Leaving aside *implicit* authorial stance exemplified in (3), this study will only consider cases of direct or indirect quotation (e.g., (1) 'We were told that . . .' and (2) 'that I refuse to cooperate with Russia') which explicitly express an author's (in this case a third-party based) stance. It is also important to note that the represented discourse and its associated stance is generally treated as part of the public discourse record, known to both speaker and audience. They are part of the stance field (Du Bois 2007). The following model of metastancing emerges.

While monologic on the surface, metastancing has an underlying dialogic or even trialogic interactional structure in my view. The speaker is not only speaking to the audience but is also taking on the voice of a third party, an opponent in order to challenge or refute their argumentation and defend his own version of the facts. Portions of the stance triangle not explicitly expressed can often be inferred.

The speaker evokes and frames an author's stance in a way which signals speaker distance to the author's intended meaning. Bakhtin (1981) describes this as double voicing. For Bakhtin (1981: 324–325), double-voiced discourse

> ...serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they – as it were – know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other... A potential dialogue is embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two voice, two world views, two languages.

Fig. 2 Metastance Triangle: Taking a stance on non-speaker or speaker- based stance

Double-voiced discourse is discourse that contains a deliberate reference to someone else's words (Bakhtin 1981: 185–87). Such discourse inserts 'a new semantic intention into a discourse which already has, and which retains, an intention of its own' (Bakhtin 1981: 189). Evoking and framing a previous stance allows the speaker to evaluate the stance as an object, express (dis-)alignment and invite the audience to align with the speaker. In this way, metastancing is a public act of a political actor, used strategically to build a coalition between the speaker and the audience in the expression and manipulation of power.

4. Framing a Third-Party-Based Stance

In this section I analyze the linguistic and pragmatic features that are associated with constructing a metastance on third-party based stances. In his speech at the Reichstag on January 30, 1939, (4) Hitler responds to international criticism of the expulsion of German Jews.

(4)

Vor allem aber die deutsche Kultur ist, wie schon ihr Name sagt, eine deutsche und keine jüdische, und es wird daher auch ihre Verwaltung und Pflege in die Hände unseres Volkes gelegt. Wenn aber die übrige Welt mit heuchlerischer Miene aufschreit über diese barbarische Austreibung eines so unersetzbaren, kulturell wertvollsten Elementes aus Deutschland, dann können wir nur

erstaunt sein über die Folgerungen, die daraus gezogen werden. Denn wie müßte man uns dankbar sein, daß wir diese herrlichen Kulturträger freigeben und der anderen Welt zur Verfügung stellen. Sie kann nach ihren eigenen Erklärungen nicht einen Grund zur Entschuldigung anführen, weshalb sie diesen wertvollsten Menschen die Aufnahme in ihren Ländern verweigert. (Hitler, January 30, 1939, cited in Domarus 1965: 1057)

Above all, as the literal meaning of the term already indicates, German culture is exclusively German; it is not Jewish. Hence we shall place the administration and the care for our culture in the hands of our *Volk*. Should the rest of the world be outraged and protest hypocritically [literally: with hypocritical facial expression] against Germany's barbarian expulsion of such an extraordinary, culturally valuable, irreplaceable element, then we can only be astonished at the consequences such a stance would imply. Should not the outside world be most grateful to us for setting free these glorious bearers of culture and placing them at its disposal? In accordance with its own statements, how is the outside world to justify its refusal to grant refuge in its various countries to these most valuable members of the human race? (Hitler, January 30, 1939, cited in Domarus 1997: 1448–1449)

Employing various linguistic forms and strategies the opponent's stance is overtly and successively evaluated negatively, perhaps must obviously through evaluative lexical items. The opponent's prior stance is associated with a particular kind of authorial voicing, namely as *mit heuchlerischer Miene* (literally 'with hypocritical facial expression'), an *ad hominem* on the critics who, according to the speaker, do not act on the morals they preach. This negative predicational strategy of the opponent frames the stance (that the persecution of Jewish Germans is a 'barbarian expulsion of one such irreplaceable, culturally acclaimed element from Germany') and presents [it] as a lie, implying that the author does not really believe that Jews have these qualities. As represented by the speaker, the stance itself sets up an extremely polarized evaluation of Nazi as barbarians and Jews as a cultural elite, which in light of the introductory phrase (*mit heuchlerischer Miene*, literally 'with hypocritical facial expression') and spoken by the leader of Nazi Germany is a stance the speaker clearly disaligns with (see Kotthoff 2003). The referents to German Jews presented as quotes (*unersetzbaren, kulturell wertvollsten Elementes aus Deutschland* 'irreplaceable, culturally acclaimed element from Germany', *diese herrlichen Kulturträger* ' these glorious bearers of culture') lose their conventional positive evaluation and become negative in their present context. The frame thus evokes two stances, one the aforementioned stance critical of Hitler's horrendous policy, the other Hitler's facetious mocking of that criticism. Because the facial expressions attributed to the opponent as well as his actions expose his words as lies (predication and *argumentatum ad hominem*), the speaker's stance is presented as superior and invites the hearer's alignment. Irony and lexical choices thus function as linguistic markers of stance.

On the syntactic level, the speaker uses *wenn* 'if'-construction to signal speaker distance from the framed stance (Wenn *aber die übrige Welt mit heuchlerischer Miene aufschreit...* 'Should the rest of the world be outraged and protest hypocritically [literally: with hypocritical facial expression] against Germany's barbarian expulsion of such an extraordinary, culturally valuable, irreplaceable element...'). Prior research has shown that *wenn* 'if' is

often used to reactivate propositions that are a) contextually evident and b) non-speaker based (Gohl 2002: 205). As the speaker reactivates third–party based propositions 'if' signals his distance to the truth of that proposition (Dancygier and Sweetser 2000; Ford 1997; Gohl 2002; Zifonun et al. 1997), though not necessarily disalignment of the speaker and author stances. In contrast to more prototypical conditionals, these quotative *wenn* 'if' - constructions are non-hypothetical and treat the quoted proposition as shared common ground, part of the stance field (Du Bois 2007). They evoke this common ground tentatively, though, as they signal that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the quoted proposition. The purpose for speaker distance can be politeness, as shown for Gohl's (2002) talk in interaction data where speakers signal their openness to being corrected. These constructions have also been associated with scholarly or argumentative discourse in earlier studies (Hermodsson 1977; Zifonun et al. 1997).[3] I have shown elsewhere (Vandergriff 2010) that they allow the speaker to discredit another's words, to appear careful and deliberate in citing them. By evoking common ground tentatively and signaling that the speaker is not committed to his or her words (Zifonun et al. 1997; Gohl 2002; on reported speech, see Günthner 1997, 1998; Kotthoff 1998), *wenn* 'if'-constructions are uniquely suited to disendorse the quoted proposition and disalign with the author's stance. What gives such 'if'-constructions their strategic potential is that the speaker stages the dialogue (a strategy discussed in Günthner 1997, 1998; Kotthoff 1998; Tannen 1989, *inter alia*). In this way, these *wenn* 'if'-constructions go beyond evoking common ground by representing a third-party stance. Instead they evoke common ground by representing *the speaker's frame* of a third-party stance as common ground.

While excerpt (4) serves to illustrate lexical and syntactic forms of framing third-party based stance, (5) documents the use of speaker-distancing morphological marking. Embedded in a speech warning against the projected Bolshevik take-over, the Klaipėda (German *Memel*) dispute about the East Prussian region detached from Germany after World War I through the Versailles Treaty provides the immediate context.[4]

(5)

In einer großen internationalen Zeitung las ich vor wenigen Wochen die Bemerkung, daß Deutschland doch leicht auf das Memelgebiet Verzicht leisten könne, es sei ohnehin schon groß genug. Dieser edle menschenfreundliche Skribent vergißt nur eines, daß 140 000 Menschen endlich ja auch ein eigenes Lebensrecht besitzen, daß es sich gar nicht darum handelt, ob Deutschland sie will oder nicht will, sondern darum, ob sie selbst Deutsche oder keine Deutschen sein möchten. (Hitler, 21 May 1935)

In a major international newspaper I read the comment a few weeks ago that Germany could still easily relinquish the Memel territory, that it was big enough anyway. This noble humanitarian scribe forgets one thing, that 140 000 people have finally their own right to exist, that it is not about whether Germany wants them or not, but whether they themselves want to be Germans or not. (Hitler, 21 May 1935; my translation)

Citing a 'big international paper,' the speaker initially frames the stance in a way that suggests neutrality and minimal speaker distancing, signalled by

morphological marking only. Both verbs appear in subjunctive mode, which is employed in the written mode and formal registers to mark speaker/writer distance to the quoted proposition. The tone is one of deliberate neutrality and non-commitment. The speaker's disalignment can only be inferred by subtle marking at the lexical level. Using the 'straw man fallacy' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 73) he distorts the quotation ascribed to the 'big international paper' as it purportedly dismisses German claims in a way that makes the writer come across as simple-minded and naïve ('Germany is big enough anyway'). In the next sentence the speaker takes an explicit negative stance on the critic's stance by intensifying the *ad hominem*. By means of a reference/predication strategy he mocks the writer as a 'noble humanitarian scribe' who forgets the people's right to self-determination. In constructing the metastance, the speaker shows initial deliberate restraint in the framing of the author's stance, then builds up to a crescendo of the portrait of the writer as a hypocrite in his stance on stance. Furthermore, the excerpt evidences a strategic move to win the audience over with a fake appeal for compassion ('*argumentum ad misericordiam*' Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 72).

Whereas (4) and (5) use indirect quotations, I now consider the role of direct quotations in metastancing. Quoting an opponent directly seems risky at first glance because the speaker does not distance himself from quoted proposition(s). After all, why would the speaker give a voice to the opponent? How does the speaker make sure that the audience will align with the speaker's and not the author's stance? Containing what looks like a direct quotation from enemy war reports, the following extract (6) is from a speech given on the occasion of the first anniversary of WWII on the occasion of the inauguration of the *Winterhilfswerk*, a state-run charity.

(6)

Als die Operationen begann, da freute sich die englische Kriegsberichterstattung über den ungeheuren 'Fehler', den wir nun gemacht hätten. 'Endlich haben die Deutschen jetzt einen Fehler gemacht, und das werden sie jetzt büßen', so schrieb man, und man freue sich in England, daß man jetzt die Gelegenheit bekomme, sich mit den Deutschen messen zu können. Dabei sind wir im Westen seit Monaten bloß einige hundert Meter auseinander gewesen! Sie hätten sich in jeder Stunde mit uns messen können! Sie taten so, als ob sie uns überhaupt nicht hätten sehen können im Westen, und nun zum erstenmal in Norwegen, da gab ihnen das gütige Schicksal nun die Gelegenheit, dank unserer und besonders meiner Dummheit, endlich sich mit uns kriegerisch auseinandersetzen zu können. (Hitler, September 4, 1940, cited in Domarus 1965: 1576)

When operations began, English war reporters rejoiced at the colossal "mistake" we Germans had supposedly committed. "Finally the Germans made a mistake, and now they will have to pay for it," so they wrote. And they were happy in England that finally they had been afforded the chance to measure themselves against the Germans. They could have measured themselves at any hour, since in the West we were but a few hundred meters apart! Still they pretended they could not possibly have seen us. And then, for the first time, good fortune afforded them the opportunity, thanks to our foolishness and in particular my own, to oppose us in armed conflict. (Hitler, September 4, 1940, cited in Domarus 1997: 2083)

In an effort to refute the position allegedly expressed in English war reports, the speaker introduces the author's stance by talking about mistakes Germany allegedly made in military strategy. Speaker distancing is indicated by ironic quotation marks ("*Fehler*" "'mistake'"). This serves as keying marker that signals speaker distancing to the stance quoted in the direct quotation (*Endlich haben die Deutschen...* 'Finally the Germans...'). Consistent with the direct quotation is the author's point of view, referring to 'die Deutschen' in the third person. This is followed by a framing device (*so schrieb man* 'so they wrote') and an indirect quotation using subjunctive marking (*man freue̲ ... bekomme̲... '*they were ...afforded...') *seit Monaten bloß einige hundert Meter auseinander gewesen! Sie hätten sich in jeder Stunde mit uns messen können!* 'They could have measured themselves at any hour, since in the West we were but a few hundred meters apart!'). The stance attributed to English war reporters is shown as false because it contrasts sharply with what is presented as facts in the next two sentences, then followed with an explicit (*sie taten so* 'they pretended') that characterizes the opponent as a liar. The sequence climaxes in an indirect quotation which takes the speaker's point of view (referring to the English in the third person and Germans troops as *uns* 'us') and double-voices the author's words as it refers to the 'German mistake' as good fortune and Germans and especially the speaker as 'stupid'. Criticism of the cited author is not explicit in this excerpt, in fact, there are no predications or referents that are negatively evaluated. The discrepancies between the quoted author's words and alleged facts thus function as a predicational strategy to discredit the opponent by attacking his credibility and competence. Aside from the direct quotation, voicing the author's words with a speaker point of view (*dank unserer und besonders meiner Dummheit* 'thanks to our and in particular my own foolishness') may be risky and only advantageous if the speaker can count on audience alignment. Staging the author's stance in this way has the advantage of conferring immediacy and allows the audience to witness – at it were – the opponent's stance taking (Brünner 1991:7). Whereas indirect quotations are a distancing mechanism, the performance of other-utterances is a form of parody. Günthner (1997, 1998) has shown that enacted challenges to the speaker in everyday conversation often show direct quotations as do jokes (Kotthoff 1998).

The speaker's purpose is to sway the audience into alignment with the speaker's metastance(s), seeking 'restricted consent under conditions of suspended rationality' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 70). To do so, the speaker uses neither debasing or derogatory anthroponyms in these excerpts (although they can easily be found elsewhere in Nazi discourse) nor explicit negative evaluations of others, yet it would not be an exaggeration to characterize these metastances as vituperative attacks on the opponent. Excerpts (4), (5), and (6) document how irony, sarcasm, ridicule and mockery are used to create a negative other-representation through mocking referential strategies (*menschenfreundlicher Skribent* 'humanitarian scribe') or predicational strategies which – by virtue of framing the other-stance as inferior – reveal the opponent as a hypocrite or liar. The analysis thus lends support to Klemperer's view that the 'ironic quotation mark' and 'a sarcastic tone' are a key feature of Nazi usage.

Carrying echoes of the interactional structure of a rational argument between two opposing parties, metastancing by evoking and responding to

oppositional stances has been documented in domains outside of political discourse, including everyday speech (e.g., Günthner 1997). For legal proceedings, this strategy of voicing an opponent's stance has been documented by Pascual (2006). Not surprisingly, the interactional structure is similar to that of a persuasive political speech in that a speaker (politician and attorney/prosecutor, respectively) addresses an audience (German people and jury, respectively) showing the speaker's own stance superior to the oppositional third-party stance. In legal proceedings (like in politics) this can be done by challenging or disproving the version of the facts proposed by the opposite team — which may be shared by a skeptical jury or audience — or, alternatively, counter-arguing a prior or anticipated future attack on one's own version of the facts (see Pascual 2006). In legal proceedings, like in politics, *ad hominem* attacks, which seek to discredit the opponent by attacking his competence and his credibility, are admissible in principle. By presenting the opponent in a negative light, the speaker showing the oppositional stance as inferior. In both settings, what appears to be crucial are a) the fact that opponent's stances are represented and responded to, echoing the interactional structure of debate and b) giving voice to dissonant views in a new discursive frame which allows the speaker to make the oppositional third-party stance seem inferior. In the context of Nazi Germany, metastancing aimed at pre-empting or stabilizing any turbulence that might have disrupted this illusion of 'one people–one voice'.

Ad hominem attacks (see Extracts (4), (5) and (6)) appear to be part and parcel of the discursive legitimation which seeks to persuade the audience. By passing off the opponent's stance as flawed or false the speaker invites the audience to regard the speaker's stance as true. At the same time, the speaker has not proven his stance to be true. This is a 'fallacy' (*argumentatum ad ignorantiam*), of course, because a standpoint or argument cannot be considered true simply because it has not been refuted (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 72). The theoretical concept of stance thus clarifies how metastancing can be effective as a linguistic strategy of legitimation because the speaker a) invites the audience to align with him by refuting a criticism or challenge on Nazi action, b) avoids expressing a standpoint on a stance object such as Nazi policy, which would require advancing argumentation related to the standpoint.

5. Framing a Speaker-Based Stance

In the preceding analysis I have shown how framing third-party-based stances allows the speaker to take a metastance and to invite the audience to align with the speaker's stance. In this section I document instances of framing a speaker-based stances and analyze how these function in context. Deflecting criticism that Germany should sign a treaty to provide assurances to the European neighbours of its peaceful intentions, the speaker argues that it does not matter how Germany expresses its desire for peace. In (7) the represented speaker-based stance allows for metastancing.

(7)

Deutschland braucht den Frieden, und es will den Frieden! Wenn ich nun aus dem Munde eines englischen Staatsmannes höre, daß solche Versicherungen nichts sind und nur in der Unterschrift unter kollektive Verträge die Gewähr der Aufrichtigkeit liegt, so bitte ich Mister Eden, dabei bedenken zu wollen, daß es sich in jedem Fall um eine 'Versicherung' handelt.... Wenn die deutsche Reichsregierung versichert, namens des deutschen Volkes nichts anderes als den Frieden zu wünschen, dann ist diese Erklärung entweder genau soviel wert als ihre Unterschrift unter irgendeine besondere Paktformulierung, oder diese könnte sonst nicht mehr wert sein als die erste feierliche Erklärung! (Hitler, May 21, 1935, cited in Domarus 1965: 506-507)

Germany needs peace and it desires peace. If I now hear from the lips of an English statesman that such assurances mean nothing and that the only guarantee of sincerity is a signature on collective treaties, then I ask Minister Eden to take into consideration that it is, in either case, an 'assurance'. If, in the name of the German people, the German government gives its assurances that it desires nothing but peace, then this declaration is worth as much as Germany's signature on a treaty; or the signature could not be worth more than declaring – before an entire nation and completely out in the open – one's support of a policy. (Hitler, May 21, 1935, my translation)

With the exception of the *wenn* 'if'-clause, the speaker-based stance (*Wenn die deutsche Reichsregierung versichert, namens des deutschen Volkes nichts anderes als den Frieden zu wünschen...* 'If in the name of the German people the German government gives its assurances that it wants nothing but peace...'*)* is presented without any markers of speaker distancing, signaling that the speaker aligns with the reactivated stance. At first glance, these examples are at odds with both Gohl's (2002) and Dancygier and Sweetser's (2005) accounts. Gohl (2002: 205) claims for *wenn* 'if' that it is used to reactivate propositions that are a) contextually evident and b) third-party based. I have argued elsewhere (Vandergriff 2010) that all quotative 'if'-constructions signal the speaker's distance to the represented stance but the speaker's reason for distancing himself only emerges in specific contexts. (7) documents that the speaker may distance himself even when endorsing the quoted proposition in order to give voice to an internal argument. The speaker reactivates the speaker-based stance ('Germany wants peace') to take a metastance ('a statement carries the same weight as a signed treaty'). Moreover, the 'if – then' link (also attested in metastancing third-party stances, see (2) and (4)) suggests a causal 'if – then' link between the statement and its weight (Vandergriff 2010); metastancing on one's own prior stance thus serves as a way to reason aloud.

In addition to evoking speaker-based stances by means of indirect quotations, the data also attest the use of direct quotations for this purpose such as in (8). In this speech to the Nazi party in Munich the speaker presents German efforts of consensus-building and appeasement in sharp contrast domestic and foreign responses by opponents.

(8)

Genau so trat ich auch vor die Welt. Ich habe gesagt: Ich will nichts, als was die anderen auch haben. Ich bin bereit, abzurüsten bis zum Letzten. Ich habe immer neue Vorschläge gemacht. Man hat uns ausgelacht und abgelehnt, genau wie im Innern! Ich wollte alles auf dem Verhandlungsweg, es kann ja auch gar nichts Besseres geben, als auf dem Verhandlungsweg die Ziele für ein Volk zu erreichen; denn es kostet weniger und es spart vor allem Blut. Wer wird so wahnsinnig sein, mit Gewalt etwas nehmen zu wollen, was er mit der Vernunft bekommt? (Hitler, February 24, 1941,)

In the same way, I appeared before the world and said: "I ask for no more than the others have. I am prepared to disarm to the limit". I constantly made new proposals, but we were ridiculed and our demands were refused, exactly as they had been at home. I wanted to negotiate for everything. There can be no better way of achieving anything for a people than by negotiating. It costs less, and, above all, no blood is shed. Who would be so mad as to take by force anything that he could get by reason? (Hitler, translation cited in http://www.ibiblio.org)

The direct quotation stages a speaker stance of extreme cooperation and reasonableness, using polarized language (*nichts* 'nothing', *bis zum Letzten* 'to the limit'). Following the direct self-quotations, the speaker characterizes his actions in a metastance (*Ich habe immer neue Vorschläge gemacht.* 'I constantly made new proposals.'), then describes the allegedly scornful reactions from opponents who, according to the speaker, rejected all reasonable offers and laughed at the speaker. Metastancing on one's own stance serves as a predicational strategy in positive self-representation. Even though no rational argumentation is advanced, the speaker presents the decision making process as 'heeded, evaluated and thoughtful' (Reyes 2011: 786), thus enacting legitimation through rationality.

6. Discussion

Evoking a stance, whether it is speaker-based or third-party-based, to take a metastance mimics the interactional structure of argument where two stances compete to sway an audience. Metastancing by framing speaker-based and non-speaker-based stances and taking a stance on them invokes the voice of reason by suggesting careful deliberation but, as shown above, such metastances are hardly examples of rational negotiation. Instead they seek to sway audience opinion through manipulation which Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 70) define as 'the means of intentionally influencing a person so that she or he adopts, fixes or changes her or his ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, object and ideas, and dispositions to behave or act in a specific way...' The preceding analysis shows that the speaker metastances in response to real or anticipated challenges or criticisms of Nazi policy. Instead of advancing argumentation on the object (speaker–based actions including Nazi policy), he uses fallacious argumentation (see e.g. Kienpointner 1996; van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger 1987: 78-94; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, Lanham 1991: 77ff.; Ulrich 1992; for an overview, see Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 71). First described in classical rhetorics, fallacious arguments are not concerned with the 'facts' of the matter, or the object

stance. One of the strategic advantages of quotations – even purportedly direct quotations – is that they can twist the author's words, i.e., they can give an exaggerated or distorted version of what was originally said or written. Framed by the current speaker oppositional third-party based stances will appear more refutable and speaker-based stances more tenable, as shown in examples (3) – (9). Metastancing thus provides the infrastructure for *ad hominem* attacks. Legitimizing through emotions, examples (4) – (6) and (8) illustrate instances of such verbal attacks on the antagonist's personality, character, and motives (of her or his credibility, integrity, honesty, expertise, competence, and so on). Other fallacious argumentation documented in the collection include *argumentum ad misericordiam* (Example 5), or legitimation through altruism, and *argumentum ad ignorantiam* (Examples 4, 5, and 6).

Aiming to sway the audience into alignment, these strategies are not about evaluating the stance object (Nazi policy) – after all, the speaker's positive stance on Nazi policy is known in the stance field – but about positioning the speaker. Because the topics and standpoints he chooses to highlight are bound to sociocultural values, they serve to display ideology. Framing prior stances and taking a metastance on them, often in conjunction with referential and predicational strategies, thus plays a crucial role in positive self-representation and negative other-representation in the discursive legitimation of ideology, aggression and discrimination.

If the eight speeches in my data collection are representative of Nazi usage, irony in evoking third-party based stances appears to be frequent in Nazi discourse. Four to five times as frequent as speaker-based quotations in my collection, non-speaking third–party based stances typically show irony, sarcasm or mockery. By the same token, it must be emphasized that they are not unique to Nazi language use. Klemperer states that they were used in French during WWI to discredit the German opponent.

> During the First World War, when the Germans were extolling the virtues of their superior culture and looking down on Western civilization as if it were an inferior, entirely superficial achievement, the French never failed to include the ironic sixty-sixes and ninety-nines when referring to the 'culture allemande', and it is likely that there was an ironic use of the inverted comma along the neutral one right from the outset. (Klemperer 2000: 67)

While the ironic quotation marks may indeed be a hallmark of totalitarian discourse (see also Peiter 2007: 180), they share features with linguistic strategies of everyday language.[5] The use of ironic quotation, of representing other-discourse by framing it to suit one's own purposes is widespread, for example, in conversational German. In fact, much like the documented representation of third-party based discourse, speakers report or even re-enact challenges or arguments in other contexts (e.g. in everyday conversation, see Günthner 1997, 1998; or legal proceedings, Pascual 2006), seeking the hearer's alignment.

7. Conclusion

Employing theoretical concepts and frameworks from pragmatics and Critical Discourse Analysis, this study has shown how metastancing is used in the discursive legitimation of policy and ideology. In my data, two complementary 'constructive strategies' (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92) are attested, negative other-representation and positive self-representation. Whereas negative references and predications are well-documented in this kind of discourse, the study documents mocking references to his opponents in Hitler speeches consistent with Klemperer's (2007) observations that ironic quotation marks are a hallmark of Nazi usage. While Klemperer's examples suggest that he was primarily thinking about irony at word-level, the speeches in my data collection evidence the use of at the propositional level. Direct and indirect quotations evoke opposing stances, often introduced with ironic personal references to their authors (negative other-presentation), often ridiculing them in a sharply dissonant fashion to present their stance as unjustified and inappropriate. The audience is invited to join the speaker in condemning the opponent's stance. Metastancing thus allows the speaker to simultaneously voice and suppress dissonant voices.

Complementing this negative other-presentation, reactivating a speaker-based stance and taking a metastance on it serves to construct a positive self-representation. The speaker thus presents his decision making process as heeded and thoughtful, even patient and, in this way enacts, legitimation through rationality. In this way speaker-based stances are presented as justified and appropriate. These two complementary strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (employing framing, fallacious argumentation, reference and predication strategies), promote a polarized us–against–them mentality that attempts to sway the audience to align with the speaker and serve as a discursive legitimation of political action.

Notes

1   Ironic uses are commonly unmarked at the level of punctuation. The headline "Dear Leader Dead" appeared without quotation marks in the *Huffington Post*. (Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/, December 18, 2011.)

2   Literally, the "People's Receiver", refers to the popular range of radios that were designed to exploit the power of the new medium for propaganda.

3   Zifonun et al. (1997: 2287) observe: '*Wie die Belege zeigen, wird dieser Typ besonders dazu verwendet, um Gesagtes zu kommentieren. In dieser Funktion ist er geradezu ein Stilmittel des gelehrten oder literarischen Diskurses, kann aber auch genereller in zitierenden und argumentierenden Disputen und Einlassungen verwendet werden*'. ('As the examples show, this type is primarily used to comment on what was said. In this function it is really a stylistic tool of scholarly or literary discourse but can also more generally be used in quotative or argumentative disputes or discussions.')

4   The Klaipėda region was annexed in 1939.

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