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Abstract

Taiwan has 16 officially recognised Indigenous languages and all of them are endangered. Legislative efforts have been made to preserve these languages, but the results have not been fruitful. While it is often taken for granted that Indigenous language revitalisation policies are meant to promote Indigenous languages, this paper argues that other political agendas embedded in the policies may have obscured the good intentions for language revitalisation and thus resulted in the inefficacy of the policies. This paper employs a Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) framework to investigate how two successive Taiwanese governments with contrasting political positions (the DPP and the KMT) legitimise their intention for Indigenous language revitalisation. Two consecutive '6-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalisation', each prepared under the different government in power, were examined and compared. I draw on four legitimisation strategies applied by other CDS scholars to investigate the government's justifications for Indigenous language revitalisation. In spite of the similar language ideology with regard to language revitalisation, the Plans reflected the particular political positionings of each government. In other words, the term 'language revitalisation' is recontextualised by different political powers to address opaque political agendas.

Key words: language policy, policy analysis, Indigenous language revitalisation, critical discourse studies

1. Introduction

Typically, Taiwan's language policy research has gravitated to either negative criticism of the policies (i.e. lack of resources) or a positive description of how the policies have 'moved-on' from viewing language issues as a problem to a 'language-as -right' orientation (Tiun 2013). Driven by the understanding of social inequality, notably, with respect to the awareness of Indigenous and minority language rights, this paper takes a critical stance and explores the ideologies embedded in the policies. To investigate the political ideology in the language policy, this paper examines two consecutive language policies on Indigenous language revitalisation from two governmental powers with contrasting political ideologies. This paper aims to find out what political ideologies are embedded in the language revitalisation policies and how this may affect the language ideology of the government in Taiwan, and vice versa.

This study questions whether language ideology can function independently from the political ideology in which it is situated. Since a language policy is one of the mechanisms used to convey the government's ideology (Shohamy 2006), it is safe to assume that 'language revitalisation' is 'recontextualised' by the two opposing governments to mean different things and to achieve different political agendas. No research in Taiwan has looked at how political ideology may have an influence on language ideology nor how the government's ideological approach to Indigenous language revitalisation affects language revitalisation efforts. This study is the first of its kind that I am aware of that applies a CDS framework in research on Indigenous language revitalization policies in Taiwan.

In this paper, I start with a review of Taiwan's linguistic repertoire and its political context, within which I briefly introduce Taiwan's efforts on Indigenous language revitalisation policies. I then explain how the analytical tools used can further the understanding of 'how to do CDS' in a Chinese language context. In the analysis, I demonstrate what the policy is 'for' and 'about' can be manipulated by the political powers to meet other political agendas. In the end, I urge, regardless of the political ideology, we need to look at the efficacy of the language revitalisation policy from the language speakers' perspective in order for language revitalisation to be successful.

2. Taiwan's Linguistic Repertoire and Political Context

Taiwan is a north Pacific island situated next to Mainland China. Its official name is the Republic of China (R.O.C.). Approximately two per cent of the 23.5 million population are Indigenous people made up of 16 officially recognised tribes of varying sizes (350 to 17,000 people/per tribe). The other 98% of the population is made up of Hoklo-Taiwanese (73%), Mainlanders-Mandarin Chinese (13%), and Hakka (12%) language speakers. These three groups are collectively called the 'Han' (Chinese) people, who migrated to Taiwan at various times in history. The languages of Taiwan's Indigenous tribes are termed by linguists the Formosan languages. Formosan languages are extremely diverse at all linguistic levels, from phonology to morphology to syntax, which suggests that Taiwan is the homeland of Austronesian languages (Li 2008). However, many of the languages have fallen out of use and the absence of 'child speakers' is an alarming indication of the prospects for these languages (Bradley 2010).

After the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the Chinese-Nationalist government (Kuo-Min-Tang, KMT) moved to Taiwan and imposed a 'Mandarin Chinese Only' policy (Dupré 2017), resulting in the rapid decline of Taiwan's Indigenous languages (between 1949 and 1987 Taiwan was governed by Martial Law and had a very strong monolingual policy)¹. Although the Mainlanders-Mandarin Chinese speaking population only accounts for 13% of the total population, Mandarin Chinese is the de facto national language and the dominant language in public domains such as school and workplace. In contrast, the Hoklo-Taiwanese language, which is the largest language group on the island, is assigned a 'dialect' status. As a result, Mandarin Chinese was

‘perceived as a symbol of foreign domination and oppression by many Taiwanese nationalists’ (Dupré 2016: 416).

In 1996, nearly a decade after Martial Law was lifted, a central government organization devoted to Indigenous affairs, the Council of Indigenous People (CIP), was formed. Since the formation of the CIP, a considerable amount of legislation has been put in place to address the issues around Indigenous language revitalisation. The first legislative effort was the release of the Education Act for Indigenous Peoples in 1998 by the CIP. Since then, the Indigenous Peoples Basic law (2005), the Indigenous Language Development Act (2017), and the two Six-Year Indigenous Language Revitalisation Plans (2008-2019) were among the rules and regulations that aimed at the promotion of Indigenous languages and cultures. Despite the efforts, a UNESCO report showed that the languages are still at risk of becoming extinct (Bradley 2010). This means the language revitalisation efforts have not been fruitful and the policies were criticised for their lack of implementation and results, for example, the lack of teaching hours or teachers (Chang 1996; Chao 2014).

In 2000, the KMT lost power to the opposition (DPP) for the first time (the DPP is the Democratic Progressive Party, known for its Taiwanese-Nationalist stance). Since then, the political power has changed hands several times (see table 1). Meanwhile, the CIP released two Six-Year Plans for Indigenous Language Revitalization covering the period 2008 to 2019. The Stage 1 Plan (2008-2013) was drafted under the DPP government and the Stage 2 Plan (2014-2019) was amended under the KMT government. Both parties have portrayed themselves as the ‘legitimate protectors of minority interests’ (Dupré 2016: 417). However, given the colonial history and the increasing cross-strait tension with mainland China regarding the ‘one China’ ideology, the approach to language issues is not just about languages.

Period	President	Political party
1949-2000	(Several)	KMT
2000-2008	Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁)	DPP
2008-2016	Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九)	KMT
2016-2020	Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文)	DPP

Table 1. Political power shift in Taiwan

3. Theoretical Groundings

Structurally speaking, this study is guided by Fairclough’s (2001, 2003, 2010) 4-stage procedure to textual analysis with the first stage of the project focusing upon a social problem. As pointed out above, this study problematises the marginalisation and oppression of Indigenous Taiwanese language in relation to language policies. The second stage of the project asks ‘what is standing in the way of the problem being addressed?’ At this stage, the formal analysis of selected textual data takes place. How the textural analysis is carried out is outlined in section 5 and section 6, within which the interplay between the government’s political ideology and their language ideology has been identified as the obstacles that may have resulted in the inefficacy of the

language policy. The third stage is ‘considers whether the social order needs the social wrong’, which simply asks ‘who benefits from it if the social wrong continues’. This is considered in the discussion section. The fourth stage ‘identifies possible ways past the obstacles’ is addressed in the conclusion section.

Below, I explain how a CDS approach contributes to language policy studies followed by the clarification of how the term ‘ideology’ is used in this study. I then explain the analytical tools used for this study.

3.1 CDS and its Significance to Language Policy Research

In the past three decades, there have been important changes in the way the role of language policy analysis and language itself is viewed. For example, Ruíz’s (1984) policy orientation theory (language as a problem, a right or a resource), and, later, Tollefson’s (1991) ‘historical-structure approach’, which took in the historic elements as an influential variable for decision-making. The changes in the theoretical orientation favour the view that language policy cannot simply be viewed as ‘words’ because language policies are used to ‘do things’ (i.e. nation-building, labour market control). In this light, language policies are viewed as ‘actions’, one of the manifestations of ‘discourse’ (Fairclough 2003).

To transition from ‘policy as text’ to ‘policy as discourse’ the analysis must engage the temporal-spatial dimension of discourse. This means taking into account the ‘context’ in which the discourse was constructed, the social aspect of discourse. As advised by Fairclough (2001: 129), a CDS analyst should use resources within and outside the academic domain to ‘get a sense of its social context’. This is especially relevant for language policy analysis. As Spolsky (2004) pointed out, language policies operate within a speech community and they exist as part of a complex ecological relationship. Both elements indicate that language policies are intrinsically social.

Another important reason to employ CDS for language policy analysis is that CDS views ideology as the means through which social injustice can be conveyed. A policy is a collective decision made by a multitude of social actors, thus, a policy is a collective ideological product that has myriad layers in a critical sense. Additionally, Ricento (2000) and Spolsky (2004) have both considered ideology a ‘fuzzy’ concept. Striving to demystify the policy ideology, this paper highlights the relationship between language ideology and the political ideology and seeks to answer the following questions:

1. What is the policy ideology(ies) in the text?
2. How does political ideology affect the language ideology of the government?
3. Can language ideology function independently from the political ideology in which it is situated?

3.2 Ideology and Language Ideology

Ideology is commonly associated with dominance and power in political discourse and is traditionally associated with negative concepts such as ‘false consciousness’, ‘domination’, and ‘hegemony’ (van Dijk 1996; Wodak and

Meyer 2016). In a critical sense, the purpose of ideology is to sustain power, i.e. political ideology. However, in the context of language ideology, it is more widely defined. There are varying definitions of language ideology. Generally, language ideology is associated with language users' beliefs about a language and how these beliefs affect their linguistic behaviours, the attitude towards a language (Austin and Sallabank 2014; Irvine and Gal 2000; Woolard 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994). Woolard (1998: 4) defined language ideology as 'a set of beliefs articulated by the users as rationalisation or justification of perceived language structure and use', broadly speaking, it is 'ideas about language and about how communication works as a social process' (Woolard 1998: 3). These definitions demonstrate that language ideology is a series of socially, culturally and politically constructed ideas of and about a language. That is to say, socio-politically constructed ideology influences language ideology.

3.3 Discursive Construction of Purpose

This section introduces the analytical tool - grammar of purpose (van Leeuwen 2008). Fairclough (2016: 94) stated that 'the particular method of textual analysis used in a specific case depends upon the objectives of the research'. In this paper, the objective is to investigate the policy discourse. Since government policies are the legal intention of the government (Coulthard et al. 2016), the 'grammar of purpose' (van Leeuwen 2008) was used to identify the government's intention.

The purpose of a statement signifies the will of the speaker 'with respect to what is desirable or undesirable, good or bad (evaluation)' (Fairclough 2003: 164). That is to say, when the purpose of a statement is articulated by the speaker, the purposeful clause is understood as the intention of the speaker. Therefore, a purposeful clause can be seen as a modalised clause. From the purposes, we are able to see the government's intention and ideology. Although van Leeuwen (2008: 125) made the distinction between legitimating and non-legitimatising purpose constructions, I see language policies as a collectively crafted intervention about languages, which generally states how a goal is set out and pursued. Spolsky (2004: 8) referred to this as 'language management'. In this light, this paper sees the purpose of the language revitalisation Plans as legitimations. These legitimations further frame and instrumentalise the institutional ideology.

To be 'purposeful', three elements are required (van Leeuwen 2008: 126): the purposeful action, the purposeful statement, and a purposeful link between these two. In the English language, the purposeful action and the purposeful statement may be linked by simple conjunctions such as 'in order to', for example, 'I wait in line in order to buy a ticket'. The purpose is 'to buy a ticket' and 'waiting in line' is the purposeful action. Sometimes the link may be implicit, in which case, a purposeful link may be inserted.

In this analysis, the Chinese character '*rang*' (讓) is interpreted as the purposeful link or intention marker for this investigation as '*rang*' has 'causatives' qualities (Wang 2011), which can be translated into 'make ... become' and 'allow'. In the English language, 'make ... become' and 'allow' are not considered intentions, but, because they indicate 'preference', thus they can be treated as modal of preference. The meaning of 'make A become B'

shows that, to a certain degree, the speaker ‘would like’ A to turn into B’. Similarly, ‘to allow *X* to do/become *Y*’ implies that the speaker ‘would like’ *X* to be (like) *Y*. Both structures contain the modal of preference ‘would like’, which demonstrates a level of rationality of the speakers to pursue selected action. Wang added that the use of *rang* is to show ‘determination and the desire to control’ (Wang 2011: 96). In this sense, ‘*rang*’ is seen as the will of the speaker. Since it is the desire of the speaker, the clause following *rang* is considered the purposeful clause. Using the *Rang structure*, this paper demonstrates a new analytical tool for CDS in languages other than English.

3.4 Legitimation Strategies

Legitimation strategies have gained attention in analysing political discourse, as Reyes (2011: 783) stressed ‘legitimization deserves special attention in political discourse because it is from this speech event that political leaders justify their political agenda to maintain or alter the direction of a whole nation’. Taking into account other scholarly articles on legitimation (Fairclough 2003; Reyes 2011; van Leeuwen 2008), this paper builds on the categories proposed by these scholars to examine the context of language revitalisation in Taiwan and the ideologically contrasting ways the two political parties construct and legitimize from their different ideological positionings. Below, I explain the theoretical foundations of the four legitimation strategies applied in this study to emphasise why the revitalisation of languages is believed to be important.

3.4.1 Legitimation through authorisation

Authorisation strategy is used to answer ‘why should we do this?’ by saying ‘we should, because the authority says we should’. It is often realised by the verbal process ‘say’, or mental process ‘believe’. The authoritarian voice does not necessarily need to be presented as a ‘human voice’, sometimes it is demonstrated by ‘role model’ or ‘expert’ authority. That is to say, if the (human or non-human) agent is considered ‘knowing better’ by its institutional position, it serves as an authority. In contrast to agented authority, sometimes authority can embody something that is ‘timeless’, which can be linguistically realised as ‘it is always like this’, or ‘everybody does this’. In other words, ‘tradition’ can be considered an authority (van Leeuwen 2008).

3.4.2 Legitimation through moral evaluation

Moral evaluation is trying to answer the question ‘why should we do this?’ by saying that we do this because this is ‘natural’ or ‘good’. The ‘natural order of things’ can be realised in grammatical features such as the use of present tense, or by lexicon choices such as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’. As other legitimation strategies sometimes require people to make a moral judgement, van Leeuwen (2008) emphasised that to operate moral evaluation independently from other legitimation strategies it needs to have some kind of ‘abstract moral quality’. Although an abstract quality may be difficult to define, I see this quality as ‘able to appeal to emotion that supports a moral judgment’. In this light, moral evaluation is not just logically or socially natural or good, it is also emotionally ‘right’- it contains a ‘feel-good factor’.

3.4.3 Legitimation through rationalisation

Unlike the authorisation strategy, the rationalisation strategy requires the readers to see the legitimised statements as being ‘well-reasoned’ or ‘well thought through’; therefore, these are the right things to do. This process implies a procedure of consultation and reasoning with a goal in mind, an agreed end, which can be linguistically realised by verbal processes such as discuss or consult. It can also be realised by referring the current text to other well-reasoned text, thus creating an intertextual chain (e.g. text X is based on text Y). Moreover, rationality can be demonstrated by telling the readers ‘it works’. van Leeuwen called this ‘instrumental rationality’, including the use of ‘grammar of purpose’ (do X in order to achieve Y). The third rationalisation strategy is ‘theoretical rationalisation’, which is based on ‘some kind of truth’ (van Leeuwen 2008), the way things are.

3.4.4 Legitimation through perceived ‘better future’

Better future strategy is trying to answer the question ‘why should we do this?’ by saying ‘if we do this our future will be better’, or ‘because it is the trend’. Although this strategy contains elements of rationality and moral evaluation, the key is to convince the reader of a brighter future. This can be realised by using the future tense or hypothetical tense ‘if’. Or, it can be realised by indication of the future, for example, ‘for our children ...’.

4. Data Selection and Preparation

The textual data I investigate in this qualitative study are the *原住民族語言振興六年計畫* (2008-2013) [6-Year Plans for Indigenous language revitalisation Stage 1], and *原住民族語言振興第2期六年計畫* (2014-2019) [6-Year Plans for Indigenous language revitalisation Stage 2]. Below I refer to them as S1 and S2. As Wodak and Meyer (2016: 21) pointed out that textual data provides ‘non-reactive’ data - data that represents the corresponding ideology at the time of the production of such data; therefore, the two Plans prepared under two different governments best demonstrate how Indigenous languages are constructed in Taiwan’s changing political landscape and how the two powers recontextualise the notion ‘language revitalisation’ to support their own political ideologies.

The policy data were obtained from the CIP website and only the Chinese version was released²; no official English version is published. Therefore, I analysed the policies using my own translation of the Chinese language version for the analysis.

For the analysis, the purpose of the two Plans were identified using the Chinese character ‘*rang*’. With ‘language revitalisation’ in mind as the intention, strategies that legitimise this intention are further explored using the legitimisation strategies.

5. What the Policy Is 'For': The Construction of Purpose

As stated previously, the key linguistic feature to be explored in this study is the Chinese character 'rang' (讓), which translates into 'make - become' and 'allow'. *Rang* is translated to 'make - become' when followed by Cheng-wei (成為), which means become. The meaning of 'make A become B' shows that, to a certain degree, the speaker 'would like' A to turn into B'. For this reason, *rang* is a modal of preference, the speakers 'desire'. *Rang* is translated to 'allow' when 'agent 1 concedes to the will of agent 2' (Wang 2011: 70), without the explicit 'cheng-wei'. When translated into 'allow' in the texts *Rang* is considered to be carrying purposeful clauses, which convey the speaker's intention. Through *rang* I was able to detect 'who wants what done'. This demonstrates how uneven power is exercised between social actors. In the following sections, I examine and compare the *Rang* structures in S1 and S2.

5.1 Rang Structure 1 (make – become)

Rang structure 1 means 'make – become', make X become Y. That is to say, the speaker is doing certain things to the subject in anticipation of a certain effect, via the material transitivity process (*make - become*). In this structure, X is the Beneficiary, benefiting from the Effect Y. Rang structure 1 is illustrated below:

Rang Structure 1

Active Agent + 'rang' (讓)+ Beneficiary (X) + cheng-wei' (成為) + Affected/Effect (Y)

For example, in English 'my mother made me (become) a better person', 'me' is the beneficiary (X) and 'a better person' is the effect (Y) with 'my mother' being the active agent. In *rang structure 1* it is [my mother + *rang* + me + *cheng-wei* + better person].

S1 (2008 - 2013)	S2 (2014 - 2019)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the written and spoken Taiwan's Austronesian languages [...] + rang + Indigenous language [...] + (cheng-wei) the research headquarters for Austronesian languages. make Taiwan the research headquarters + rang + promotion of Taiwan's Indigenous languages + (cheng-wei) the role model for Austronesian language development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the promotion of written and spoken Indigenous languages + rang + Taiwan + (cheng-wei) the research headquarters for Austronesian languages. in the process of democracy ... + rang + respect for other cultures + (cheng-wei) the bases for democracy. promotion of orthography + rang + Indigenous languages + (cheng-wei) the medium for reading and acquiring knowledge

Table 2. Rang Structure 1 (make - become)

Table 2 compares the use of *Rang structure 1* in S1 and S2. An interesting process found in this structure is that the structure always takes a 'nominalised action or process' as the active agent. In other words, *Rang*

structure 1 does not have human agency as an ‘active agent’. This indicates, ‘no one’ takes responsibilities for any actions. The lack of active human agents shows no government agency is constructed as responsible. Also, the analysis suggests that both Plans intend to differentiate Taiwan from China by lexicon choices such as *Taiwan* and *democracy* as the Beneficiary following ‘rang’. Both Plans also highlights *Taiwan* as the research headquarters for Austronesian languages, instead of using its official name ‘Republic of China’.

There is a difference in Rang Structure 1 between the two Plans that is revealed through the difference in Beneficiary. In S2 the Beneficiaries are not always the language, while in the S1 the Beneficiary is always the language (see the bold font in Table 2). This means, in S1 the ‘language’ is always the one that benefits from the action, whereas in S2 two other social constituents also benefit from the actions. In this regard, S2 contains two other agendas in addition to language issues. I examine the implication of this contrast later in the discussion section.

5.2 Rang Structure 2 (allow)

In the context of the 6-year Plans, ‘allow’ is not used as a transitive verb, as in ‘to permit’; rather it is used as an intransitive verb, as in ‘to allow *for*’, which means ‘give consideration to a circumstance’. *Rang Structure 2* highlights the position of the ‘passive agent’ and the future circumstances that are intentionally ‘done’ to the agent. With this intention, *Rang structure 2* also contains *purposeful statements*. An English example would be ‘the computer programme allows the children to do the activities from home’. In this structure ‘the children’ are the ‘passive agents’, and ‘do the activities from home’ is the purposeful statement. Below is how *Rang structure 2* is recognised in the text and table 3 shows the examples identified from the texts.

Rang Structure 2

Active Agent + rang (讓) + **passive agent** + future circumstances/*purposeful statement*

Table 3 below shows that in S2, there are 15 examples of *Rang Structure 2* while in the S1 there is only 3. The reason for this could be that S1 is a prototype Plan for language revitalisation, the first regulation solely aimed at Indigenous language revitalisation. The analysis also reveals that in S1 Indigenous people are always positioned as the ‘passive agent’, in contrast to Taiwan as the active agent. Similarly, 12 out of the 15 examples in S2 place Indigenous people in the same passive position. This runs the risk of inferring a ‘disability discourse’ which portrays the Indigenous community as ‘incapable’, and thus, jeopardises the empowerment of the speakers (McCarty 2013).

Furthermore, the analysis of S2 shows 14 out of the 15 examples have language revitalisation activities as the purpose, which is fitting for the aim of the plan. In contrast, in S1, there are only three examples using the Rang Structure 2, none of which contains language revitalisation activities. Instead, S1’s purposeful clause contains phrases *step out* and *stand on one’s two feet*. The significance of these phrases is explained through legitimisation

strategies. The different focus in the purposeful statement between the two Plans further highlights the differences in political ideology and language ideology. That is not to say that S1 does not have language revitalisation as its purpose as both Plans aim at language revitalisation. Rather, language revitalisation serves other political purposes. In the next section, I discuss the four legitimisation strategies, in which the hidden agendas of S1 and S2 is further elaborated.

S1 (2008 - 2013)	S2 (2014 - 2019)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Taiwan to stand on its two feet +rang +our Indigenous friends + stand on their two feet first • Taiwan to step out +rang + our Indigenous friends + to step out first • Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living outside the tribes + establish a sense of belonging. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish language learning environment for infant + rang + infants + acquired language skills. • Democracy and multicultural understanding helps with language protection policies +rang+ Indigenous language + more accessible. • Strengthen infant immersion school + rang + infant, children and adults + has appropriate channels for learning Indigenous languages • Digital platform + rang + different learners + easy access to learning materials • Language nannies are required to use the mother tongue + rang + infants + language immersion and language learning • Create camps + rang + Indigenous people living in outside the tribes + establish a sense of belonging. • Strengthen church's function on language preservation + rang+ Indigenous people + learn the language at church • Establish open teaching resource platform + rang +people interested in compiling teaching material + exchange information, compile and edit materials • Establish multimedia platform + rang + more people + learn Indigenous languages • Language skills certification +rang + people that gained the certification + offer training so they can teach the languages • Teacher development classes + rang + student teachers + strengthen knowledge in language teaching • Change attitude + rang + Indigenous people + engage in the operation of this Plan • Strengthen language preservation and transmission +rang + language + continue development (of language) • Promote and establish learning channels + rang + learners of different ability + easy to learn • promote language skills certification + rang + tests + convenient (accessible)

Table 3. Rang structure 2 (allow)

6. What the Policy Is 'About': Legitimation Strategies

Below, I illustrate four legitimisation strategies used in the text – authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and the notion of a better future (Fairclough 2003; Reyes 2011; van Leeuwen 2008). Using the four strategies, I investigate how the purposes of S1 and S2 are legitimised.

6.1 Legitimation through Authorisation

Authorisation strategy is used to answer 'why should we revitalise the languages?' by saying 'we should because the authority says we should'. Both Plans contain the 'role model authority' as is illustrated in example (1) and (2):

- (1) The *experiences* from *Western developed* countries *tell* us: language is a 'liberty right'.
- (2) From the *experiences* and *theories* of Indigenous language revitalisation in *Western countries*, we now *know* that, in order to see results, language transmission needs to be enforced in families, tribes, and inter-generations.

Example (1) and (2) demonstrate that the *West* is seen as the 'role model', because these countries are *developed*, therefore, they know best. These excerpts also demonstrate an 'expert authority'. These western countries are experts because they are *experienced* and have *theories*. Their authoritative voice comes through via the use of verbal process 'tell' - they told us language is a liberty right, therefore we should help Indigenous languages. Although (2) uses a mental process 'know', the mental process 'know' shows that the 'West told us', that is how we know.

One major distinction between S1 and S2 is that, S1 used the voice of the president as the authoritarian figure, as S1 states:

- (3) The president said 'without our Indigenous *friends*, there will be no Taiwan; (if) Taiwan were to *stand on its two feet*, we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first. (If) Taiwan were to *step out*, we must allow our Indigenous friends to step out'.

The president in example (3) refers to President Chen, from the DPP. Notice the various use of metaphors in the statement, such as *stand on two feet* (站起來), *step out* (走出去). These metaphors are Hoklo-Taiwanese colloquialism³. This type of metaphor is not evident in the S2 plan as the S2 plan is formulated by the Chinese-Nationalist Party KMT (the Mainlanders). The use of these metaphors highlights the DPP's 'Taiwanese' identity and political stance on pro-Taiwan independence with 'stand on one's two feet' being a synonym for independence.

The use of *friends*, as in ‘Indigenous friends’, positions DPP’s President Chen and his party as inclusive - contrary to the colonial power (the KMT). This appears to be an attempt to demarcate DPP from KMT – the inauguration of President Chen was the first time an opposition party had gained power since the KMT moved to Taiwan in 1949. DPP positions itself as the ‘local’ Taiwanese government along with their Indigenous *friends*, and they can make Taiwan *stand on its two feet*, in contrast to KMT which was the Chinese-Nationalist government that ‘took over’ Taiwan, and oppressed the Indigenous languages and other Taiwanese dialects.

The linguistic features used in the DPP S1 Plan to construct the President as the ‘Taiwanese president’ signals two political agendas. First, to establish DPP as the representation of Taiwan; second, to distinguish the Taiwanese identity from a Mainland Chinese identity.

6.2 Legitimisation through Moral Evaluation

Moral evaluation is trying to answer the question ‘why should we revitalise the languages?’ by saying that we do this because this is ‘natural’ or ‘good’. The ‘natural order of things’ can be realised in grammatical features such as the use of the present tense, or by lexicon choices such as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’. The existential ‘is’ in example (1) ‘language is a liberty right’ shows that it is natural to see language as an inherent right, therefore, to secure the linguistic rights of the Indigenous people is the ‘right thing to do’. This statement is evident in both Plans and it demonstrates the ‘language ideology’ of both political powers. However, a contrary effect is that, by using the present tense ‘is’, the historic wrongdoings of the government (i.e. oppression of language and culture) are disregarded and ‘language as a right’ is constructed as ‘always being the case’ in Taiwan.

Moral evaluation can be used when a statement contains emotional support and provides a feel-good factor for the hearers. Example (4) below illustrates how a statement in the form of an apology can be looked at as a moral action (a speech act), especially when there are historic wrongdoings. Note, this statement only appears in S1.

- (4) The death of the Indigenous languages is due to the *government’s* ‘Mandarin only, no local languages’ policy for the past 50 years [...] so to break out of the unfair Mandarin Only situation.

Example (4) appears to contain an apology from the government for its historic wrongdoings. The emotive phrase ‘the death of the Indigenous languages’ followed by the word ‘unfair’ seems to illustrate remorse and a will to restore justice. However, bearing in mind the previous discussion regarding DPP’s backhanded criticism about KMT, example (4) is not an apology from the DPP, but rather a criticism directed at the KMT. The *government* mentioned in (4) is the KMT government, which was the colonial nationalist government that ruled Taiwan for 50 years and had an oppressive language regime. The ‘Mandarin Only’ criticism is aimed at the KMT as the DPP originally comes from a pro Hoklo-Taiwanese speech community. While the moral and emotional appeal suggests an ‘apology’ from the government, it

functions as an indirect apology with implied criticism, which is actually transferring the blame to the previous government.

The moral evaluation strategy also involves metaphorical associations with something that is 'moral'. In S1, language is described as 'the window to the soul' (語言是心靈之窗), this metaphor is not found in S2. It is common for language speakers of a minority language to describe their language as the 'soul' (Austin and Sallabank 2014; Hadjidemetriou 2014). The word 'soul' has its obvious spiritual connotation. The 'soul' is thought to be the essence of a person, thus, saving the languages is like saving the people, and by extension the nation, which meets the moral evaluation criteria of 'the right thing to do' and the emotional appeal.

Moral evaluation can also be realised by linguistic terms or strategies that connote a positive intention.

- (5) (In order) To *make up for* the lack of different learning channels in the previous plan (Stage 1), this plan (Stage2) will establish a language learning system for learners at different stages of language learning.

The use of *make up for* indicates a 'remedy' for something, especially when followed by 'lack of'. To remedy something is associated with good intention. The non-explicit use of 'in order to' further expresses the intention. Thus, (5) shows that S2 is a remedy for S1, and thus is better. Be reminded again, that S1 was developed by DPP, therefore, it seems that S2 (KMT) is criticising S1 (DPP) for its unfruitful language policy.

Another way to express moral evaluation is the use of analogy - use A to justify B. (van Leeuwen 2008: 111). It is answering the question 'why should we revitalise languages?' by saying 'because it is like another activity which is associated with positive values' (van Leeuwen 2008: 111-112), not because it is intrinsically good itself. This strategy is only found in S2.

- (6) To realise the essence of the Constitution, to eradicate *gender bias* and promote *gender equality*, all government agencies and local groups are encouraged to include gender equality awareness in their plans when conducting language revitalisation work. Apart from promoting language revitalisation, personnel involved should develop *tolerance towards different values and beliefs*.

Example (6) shows that promoting gender equality indicates 'tolerance towards different values and beliefs'. Akin to promoting gender equality, Indigenous language revitalisation also demonstrates the quality of 'tolerance towards different values and beliefs'. Therefore, the association with the positive value of gender equality legitimises language revitalisation.

6.3 Legitimation through Rationalisation

Rationalisation strategies are demonstrated in three ways. Firstly, the rationality can be illustrated by using explicit intertextual references that refer the current text to other texts that have demonstrated a process of rationalisation. In S1 and S2, the intertextual references are made by directly referring the rationality of the Plans to the Constitution Amendments, the Education Act for Indigenous peoples (1998), the Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (2005), and other rules and regulations. Put plainly, because other laws have been put in place that say we should do this, therefore, we should do this. ‘Laws and regulations’ imply that debates and discussion took place – a rational decision-making process under democracy. They also connote a collective agreement, a collective ideology, of the society as part of the democratic process. Meaning, the (previous) laws and regulations were agreed upon by the society as a whole. In this light, the development plans for language revitalisation (S1 and S2) are seen as a collective rational decision.

Secondly, rationality can be demonstrated by telling the readers the writer has used some sort of rationalisation process (e.g. a discussion or research). For instance, S2 has the advantage to be *based on* S1 (see example 7), in this light, it is not a randomly selected action. Also, if it is not successful, the blame may be passed on to the S1 Plan for its lack of foundation.

- (7) The stage 2 Indigenous language revitalisation 6-Year Plan *is based on* the Indigenous language revitalisation stage 1 Plan (2008-2013).

Moreover, ‘instrumental rationalisation’ is used to persuade the readers ‘it works’ (van Leeuwen 2008), which can be linguistically constructed by using goals-orientated statements or means- orientated structures. Goals-oriented statements can be formulated as ‘I do *X* in order to do (or be, or have) *Y*’. This can then be realized explicitly by a purpose clause with ‘to’, ‘in order to’ and so on. In the case of ‘means orientation’, the purpose is constructed as ‘in the action’ (van Leeuwen 2008: 114). The formula is then either ‘I achieve doing (or being, or having) *Y* by *X*-ing’, or ‘by means of’, ‘through’ ... etc. Note that, although the linguistic construction of the goals and means orientation does not require the statement to conform to morality, to serve as legitimations, the statement must contain elements of moralization in its purpose (van Leeuwen 2008: 113).

Example (8) and (9) below from S1 demonstrate both goals orientation and means orientation based on the same statement depending on how the sentence is translated⁴. These two examples are based on example (3). As is shown below the English translation could be constructed differently to show different orientation and meaning that is not explicit in the Chinese version.

- (8) (in order for) Taiwan to stand on its two feet, we must allow our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first;

- (9) By allowing our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first, we are allowing Taiwan to stand on its two feet.

Example (8) demonstrates the goals-oriented construction. ‘Taiwan to stand on its two feet’ is the ‘purpose’ followed by the non-explicit (inserted in the translation) purposeful link ‘in order for’. Conversely, in example (9) ‘allowing our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet’ is constructed as ‘means to an end’. Since the English translation works both ways, I use the Chinese *Rang Structure 2* to identify the purpose of the sentence. As explained earlier, the clause following *Rang*, is identified as the purpose statement. For this reason, ‘allowing our Indigenous friends to stand on their two feet first’ is the purpose statement for this sentence (see 5.2). Similarly, in example (10) ‘allow our Indigenous friends to step out’ is the purpose clause. This statement can also be constructed as a conditional sentence, which I discuss in the next section.

- (10) Taiwan to “step out”, we must allow our Indigenous friends to “step out”.

The third rationalisation strategy is ‘theoretical rationalisation’, which is based on ‘some kind of truth’ (van Leeuwen 2008). Example (11) shows that the wellbeing of the Taiwanese Indigenous community signals how well Taiwan is doing.

- (11) The development of the Indigenous community is closely related to the overall development of Taiwan.

This direct correlation signifies the ‘true nature’ between language and society. Therefore, the coexistence between society and Taiwanese Indigenous people is seen as ‘reality’ – ‘some kind of truth’, the way things are. For this reason, it suggests that Taiwan must develop and revitalise Taiwanese Indigenous languages. This excerpt from DPP’s S1 further highlights the S1 emphasis on the utilitarian use of Indigenous languages to assert Taiwan’s self-contained quality (the development of Taiwan). This also serves as a comparison to, and criticism of, Mainlander’s intolerance towards minority languages through the KMT’s past Mandarin Chinese Only policy.

6.4 Legitimisation through Perceived ‘Better Future’

Better future strategy is trying to support the argument of the need for the revitalisation of languages by saying ‘if we do this our future will be better’, or ‘because it is the trend’. In the Future Aspiration section of S1, better future strategy is realised by inserting ‘if’ to example (10) above to show a hypothetical future (if Taiwan is to step out, we must allow our Indigenous friends to step out). The hypothetical future for Taiwan signals a nationalistic approach with the phrase *stand on one’s two feet* being a synonym for ‘independence’. Although it does not explicitly say the future will be better, it

is implied to be the right thing to do by associated with positive phrases ‘stand on its two feet’ and ‘step out’.

Furthermore, a multilingual approach to language policy is also seen as a global *trend* in example (12), thus should be followed, or else Taiwan will ‘fall behind’.

- (12) From the language development *trend* of Western multilingual countries who have multilingual language policies [...] help Taiwan’s international image, and *stand side-by-side* with developed countries

In the previous discussion on the authorisation strategy, Western countries are seen as ‘experts’ and ‘role models’. Example (12) shows if we follow a multilingual policy *trend* headed by these ‘role models’, it will benefit Taiwan - to ‘help Taiwan’s international image’, so we can *stand side-by-side* with developed countries. While the Future Aspiration section was inspired by the West to have a multilingual approach to language policy, the focus is on the establishment of Taiwan’s international reputation and its desire for independence.

Both Plans promote ‘Taiwan’ as the future *leader* by stating:

- (13) Taiwan’s Indigenous languages *will* become the *leader* for international research in Austronesian languages.

A major distinction between S1 and S2 in the Future Aspiration is that S1 focuses on language-in-society, whereas S2 focus on ‘language as right’. S1 starts by saying,

- (14) The development of the Indigenous community is closely related to the overall development of Taiwan.

While S2 starts by saying,

- (15) The development and revitalisation of Indigenous language will follow the lead of the two Covenants⁵ international trend, and thus is an important lesson for our nation to raise our international reputation on human rights.

These statements not only demonstrate the political ideology of the government, they also demonstrate the language ideology of the government, that is, S1 sees Indigenous Taiwanese languages as an integral part of ‘Taiwan’, while S2 views supporting Indigenous languages as means to promote Taiwan’s *international reputation* on human rights.

7. Discussion

Following the third stage of the analytical procedure, the above analysis provides insight into how language revitalisation is recontextualised by the two opposing governments to meet their political agendas and to maintain the social order. The explanatory critique illustrates how KMT negotiate its pro-Chinese ideology within the growing Taiwanese-identifying generation and how DPP assert its de-Sinicization ideology through the Indigenous language revitalization Plans. While the general directions between S1 and S2 are similar, there are some differences in their political ideology and language ideology in relation to the Indigenous languages.

In terms of political ideology, it is evident that both Plans are trying to establish Taiwan as 'not Mainland China' by using Taiwan's unique Indigenous linguistic repertoire. S1 uses the colloquial 'stand on its two feet', and 'step out' to assert Taiwan's independence from China. Similarly, S2 shows an inclination to differentiate Taiwan from China, but it is done more subtly. S2 uses the democratic process to show how multilingualism is part of democratic China (R.O.C) as opposed to communist China. The differences in their approach to nationalism underline the two powers' different level of acceptance of the controversial 'one China' ideology.

S1, designed by DPP, was also trying to differentiate DPP from the previous ruling party, the colonial power KMT. By using the direct quote from the president, the DPP's Stage 1 Plan illustrates two strong political elements. Firstly, it is a tool to showcase DPP's commitment to Indigenous languages, but also function as an attempt to promote other 'local languages', including the Hoklo-Taiwanese. Secondly, it is branding the DPP as the rightful representative of Taiwan. In this political environment, DPP has indirectly criticised KMT by concluding the death of Taiwan's Indigenous languages is the result of KMT's oppressive regime.

Additionally, DPP criticises that the Indigenous people are reluctant to learn the languages is directly resulted from KMT's long-term linguistic assimilation policy. On this account, KMT downplayed its responsibility for a monolingual policy in S2 by saying the reluctance to learn the languages is because 'they can all communicate using Mandarin Chinese'. The lack of willingness to confront language revitalisation responsibilities in both Plans is evident in the 'rang' structure where 'no one' is constructed as responsible agents for language revitalisation.

Regarding language ideology, KMT brought the Mandarin Only policy to Taiwan over 50 years ago, and because of that, DPP and KMT have different ideological approaches to the Indigenous languages. DPP's S1 seems to have a more inclusive language ideology towards Indigenous languages because their language (Hoklo-Taiwanese) was in the same position as the Indigenous languages. Therefore, S1 appears to put Indigenous language at the heart of Taiwan's multilingual repertoire, it has a multilingual = multicultural Taiwan tone. The metaphor 'language is the soul' also shows an attachment to language not only for Indigenous people but perhaps for the Hoklo-Taiwanese speakers as well, whose language was also banned by KMT. This interpretation of DPP's emotional attachment to languages adheres to the analysis of *Rang Structure 1* where the 'language' is the Beneficiary. The

strong appreciation of 'local language' underscores DPP's attempt to create a unique 'Taiwan flavour'.

As for S2, it acknowledges the importance of Indigenous languages, but an emphasis has been put on the pursuit of the linguistic human rights to boost Taiwan's international reputation. This is not to say that S1 does not have the same agenda, but language rights and Taiwan's international image are not the first item (priority) in S1, whereas it is in S2 (Future Aspiration section). While S1 mentions Indigenous culture as crucial to the Taiwanese society, S2 focuses on how respect for other cultures exemplifies democracy, which highlights the KMT's Chinese-Nationalist ideology 'we are the democratic China'.

8. Conclusion

Given the colonial history and the current cross-strait situation, Taiwan's Indigenous languages appear to be used as a political tool to influence decision-making. Each political party has its political ideology embedded in the policy, subtly, using language revitalisation as camouflage. While the purpose statements for Indigenous language revitalisation provide 'substantive equality' (Grin 2003: 82) to the Indigenous communities and the legitimisation strategies further demonstrate the will of the government to support Indigenous languages, two major political agendas were revealed in the S1 and S2. Firstly, both Plans show a desire to differentiate Taiwan from China. In this regard, I argue that the Plans are used as nation-building exercise. Secondly, both political powers took the opportunity to undermine each other with the DPP performing a 'non-apology', and in return, KMT slapped DPP on the wrist by using the phrase 'to make up for' (see example 5) to indicate the ineffectiveness of DPP's S1.

Aside from the political arm-wrestling, the general approach to the Indigenous languages from both Plans is positive and supportive. Both Plans want Taiwan's Indigenous languages to do well for different reasons. Nevertheless, the one reason that they share is that Indigenous Taiwanese are part of 'Taiwan'; therefore, to be 'Taiwan' we must protect our Indigenous Taiwanese cultures and languages. As such, both Parties have the same motivation when it comes to using Indigenous language revitalisation to enhance Taiwan's international reputation.

To answer my third question, 'can language ideology function independently from the political ideology in which it is situated?'. The answer appears to be no, not for the political parties. Their language ideology about the Indigenous languages cannot escape their history with these languages. However, for the language speakers, their language ideology may be independent from the political agendas.

To reflect on Stage 4 of the procedure, which identifies possible and yet unrealised potentials to improve the current condition of the objective identified in Stage 1, a follow-up research from this point of departure is the investigation of the discourse of language revitalisation from the language speakers' perspective. This will inform the policy decision-making and contest the ideology embedded in the policy.

Notes

1. The Hoklo-Taiwanese and Hakka migrated to Taiwan from South Eastern China from the seventeenth century onward, while Mainlanders arrived in Taiwan after 1945 as part of the KMT military and administrative contingent. Although originally from various parts of China, Mainlanders have nonetheless been associated with Mandarin because it is the Mainlander-dominated KMT that introduced and enforced the language in Taiwan (Dupré 2016).
2. The Chinese version of the policies are retrieved from the CIP website https://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/index.html?lang=zh_TW
3. The majority DPP supporters are Hoklo-Taiwanese language speakers, and KMT supporters are Mandarin Chinese speakers (the Mainlanders from China in 1949).
4. The English translation for both example (8) and (9) in the Legitimation are based on the same statement depending on how the sentence is translated. The original text is 台灣要站起來，就要讓原住民朋友先站起來。
5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

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