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Abstract

"Chinese Dream" has become a dominant discourse held by the current Chinese political leadership. By drawing on the methodological synergy of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Corpus Linguistic methods and Framing analysis, this study addresses "Chinese Dream" discourse in its sociohistorical context by examining its discursive construction in speeches and in media representations in three English-language newspapers: China Daily, South China Morning Post *and* The New York Times. *The analysis identifies that (1) the sociohistorical context of contemporary China is absorbed into "Chinese Dream" and thus provides a common ground for its discursive formation; (2) the "Chinese Dream" discourse fundamentally promotes Chinese nationalism, the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) consolidation of legitimacy, and President Xi Jinping's authority; (3) transiting from original political speeches to global media representation, the three media adopt different news frames to shape "Chinese Dream", namely:* China Daily's *China-centric frame,* South China Morning Post's *multiculturalist-oriented frame and* The New York Times' *American-centric "othering" frame. These news frames (and related narratives) form the ground for variation of sociopolitical-ideological perspectives. It is hoped that the critical analysis of "Chinese Dream" can contribute to critically understanding contemporary Chinese political discourse in presidential speeches and media reporting.*

Key words: *Chinese Dream, Chinese political discourse, Sociohistorical context, Discursive construction, Speeches, News framing*

1. Introduction

The "Chinese Dream" was proposed by the Chinese President Xi Jinping when he visited a historical exhibition called 'The Road to Revival' at the National Museum of China on 29 November, 2012. Since then, the Dream discourse has been intensively propagated by China's state propaganda machines at home and abroad (Wang, 2014). China has increasingly entered onto the world's center stage. Yet, China's prominence is "largely due to its economic power rather than its political, military, or technological pre-eminence" (Cao & Wu, 2017, p. 1). Given the context, the "Chinese Dream" is aimed at realizing China's whole development, including politics, military, technology, and culture, supported by China's strong economic power. However, facing American President Donald Trump's negative policies toward China (especially the Sino-US "Trade War" since 2018), the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation is seemingly facing tough challenges. In addition, the

2019 Hong Kong people's Anti-Extradition Bill protests (Lee et al., 2019) and the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak have both put a shadow on the Dream.

This study focuses on the three dimensions of "Chinese Dream" political discourse analysis, namely the sociohistorical context, politicians' speeches and media representations. First, the sociohistorical context analysis paves the way for the analysis of political discourse and the discursive representations of the three global English-language newspapers, i.e. *China Daily*, *South China Morning Post* and *The New York Times*. By including the sociohistorical context, the article further enriches previous research on "Chinese Dream" (e.g. Hou, 2018; Wang, 2016, 2017). Second, Xi's political speeches are taken as representative samples to examine how the national Dream was discursively constructed by the Chinese leader. Third, transiting from Xi's original speeches to media representations, samples of news discourse and frames are examined in depth. This study aims to contribute to a holistic perspective covering sociohistorical context, political discursive construction and news representation to critical analyses of "Chinese Dream" discourse. Moreover, theoretically, the study proposes a discourse-analytical framework that applies the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl, 2017; Wodak, 2001), Framing Analysis (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993) and Corpus Linguistics (Baker, 2006; Baker et al., 2008; Sinclair, 2004). Within the framework, the three approaches are used in a complementary way that satisfies the analyses of sociohistorical context, political discourse and media representations.

Adhering to critical approaches to political discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2006; Wodak, 2001), the study examines "Chinese Dream" on the basis of three research questions (RQs) that relate to the sociohistorical context, discursive strategies and discursive representations thereof in the media. By doing so, it hopes to provide a holistic lens to critically examine the political nature of "Chinese Dream".

> RQ1: In what kind of sociohistorical context (historical, domestic and international) is the "Chinese Dream" discourse embedded?
>
> RQ2: How did President Xi Jinping linguistically construct the "Chinese Dream" by using discursive strategies in his official speeches?
>
> RQ3: Transiting from Xi's original speeches to media representations, how did *China Daily*, *South China Morning Post* and *The New York Times* discursively reshape and represent the "Chinese Dream", and by using what kinds of news frames?

The structure of this paper is arranged in the following way: section 2 provides an overview of political discourse and discourse studies on "Chinese Dream"; section 3 presents the data and analytical framework of the study; section 4 examines the sociohistorical context of "Chinese Dream" with the focus on critical socio-political features; section 5 focuses on the salient strategies of discursive construction; section 6 focuses on the discursive representations in the news; finally, section 7 summarizes the key findings and draws some conclusions.

2. *Political Discourse and "Chinese Dream"*

Political discourse is traditionally rooted in Western classic rhetoric (e.g. Aristotle). Naturally, politics needs rhetoric in that 'politics cannot be conducted without language' (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 303). In practice, political action is intertwined with political discourse, and therefore the discourse is representative of political actions and ideologies. More precisely, political discourse can be defined as a discourse that 'is produced by a political actor carrying out a political action (e.g. to govern, legislate, protest or vote) in an institutional context of communication (e.g. parliamentary debates, public speeches, official addresses)' (Randour et al., 2020, p. 429). In that sense, the "Chinese Dream" has been the object of linguistic and discourse studies with a focus on the discursive construction and mediatized narratives. Using a contrastive angle, Wang's (2016) analysis of the phenomena of narrative mediatization of "Chinese Dream" in American and Chinese media reveals that American and Chinese media respectively establish narrative patterns that are largely incompatible due to differences in their sociocultural patterns.

More deeply, Hou (2018) presents a comparative analysis of two news corpora related to "American Dream" and "Chinese Dream" respectively. This study involves corpus-driven CDA, and illustrates that the "American Dream" is associated with family, work, education and individual realization, while the "Chinese Dream" relates closely to collective identity and national rejuvenation. The discourse of nationalism is central to Wang's (2017) study, which pays particular attention to nation-building in "Chinese Dream", pointing out that it is a hybrid type of nationalist discourse involving various linguistic strategies (e.g. overwording, rewording, evaluative expressions) and Chinese cultural resources such as Taoism and Confucianism (Wang, 2017, p. 845). However, Wang (2014) regards the "Chinese Dream" as just another well-designed political slogan of the Chinese Communist Party aiming to appeal to the Chinese people at large. He concludes that it is 'a continuation of the rejuvenation narrative' of the Party but not an innovative discourse (Wang, 2014, p. 6, 11). Servaes (2016) regards the "Chinese Dream" as a global strategy of the authoritarian regime to build soft power. He argues that the values of "Chinese Dream" would not resonate with Western "democratic societies" because their deep-layered ideologies are in conflict with each other. Multidimensional interpretations and even critique on "Chinese Dream" are unavoidable but also valuable as they can provide a holistic view of the discourse that may help to create mutual understanding between China and the Western world.

3. *Methodology*

3.1 Data

The textual data used in the analysis include President Xi Jinping's English monograph and news coverage. Xi's nine representative speeches on "Chinese Dream" were collected from his signature monograph, i.e. *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China* (Xi, 2014, 2017). These speeches were delivered by Xi on various key domestic and international occasions between November 2012 and July 2017, covering his first presidential term. The reason for choosing

Xi's speeches is that the Chinese top leader's text and talk reflect his political ideologies and policy-decisions. The transcribed speeches constitute a small corpus known as the Chinese Dream Speech Corpus (CDSC) with 13,130 words.

The news corpus was collected from three global, English-language newspapers, i.e. *China Daily* (CD), *South China Morning Post* (SCMP) and *The New York Times* (NYT) (available from the Dow Jones FACTIVA news database). The rationale for choosing these three newspapers is that they are influential in global media circles and highly representative of Mainland China, Hong Kong and the United States respectively. The CD, established in 1981, is a leading English-language newspaper in China. It is generally seen as a key English channel to communicate China's official ideology, playing the role of 'the Party's mouthpiece' (Bhatia, 2016, p. 666). The SCMP goes back for over a century and is Hong Kong's most influential newspaper, known as 'the most credible newspaper in the city' (Krumbein, 2015, p. 160). The NYT is regarded as one of the most prominent newspapers with a strong international reputation because of its professional journalism. In the USA it is regarded as a national elite newspaper (Carpenter, 2007, p. 766).

The timespan of the news data runs from November 2012 to March 2018 and covers Xi Jinping's first term as the top leader of China[1] from November 2012 to his reelection as Chinese President in March 2018. The search keywords were "*Chinese Dream*" and "*Chinese Dream & Xi Jinping*". Duplicated copies of news articles were manually filtered out. Accordingly, three news corpora were built, namely *China Daily* Corpus (CDC), *South China Morning Post* Corpus (SCMPC) and *The New York Times* Corpus (NYTC). The CDC contained 296 news texts (214,290 words), the SCMPC contained 177 texts (136,814 words) and the NYT contained 51 texts (56,900 words). This amounts to 524 texts with a total of 408,004 words.

The number of words of each subcorpus is not equal. This can be explained by the fact that they aim to satisfy different needs. SCMP and NYT are more market oriented and only report on hot topics, whereas the state-run English edition of CD is rooted in Chinese leadership ideologies. A geographic explanation can be given for the difference in the subcorpus size of Hong Kong based SCMP and New York based NYT in that Hong Kong is politically close to Mainland China, while it is foreign to the USA. Considering these differences, the news coverage in these three papers also has different foci and therefore vary in the number of articles as well as words about "Chinese Dream".

3.2 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework applies three methods, namely, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Corpus Linguistic analysis and Framing analysis. It is designed to integrate the analytical elements of these approaches to form a critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework for the analysis of "Chinese Dream".

The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) plays a key role in critical discourse studies, particularly in political discourse. DHA focuses on the relationship of language, power and ideology from the linguistic micro level (e.g. lexicogrammar, rhetorical skills, textual structure) to the macro level of a socio-historical context (e.g. political system, culture, history) (Reisigl, 2017; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009). Essentially, DHA is socio-politically oriented and

emphasizes the development of discursive/semiotic practices that represent power and ideology in the political domain. DHA provides a set of discursive strategies to analyze political discourse, namely: *nomination*, *predication*, *argumentation*, *perspectivization* and *intensification or mitigation*. According to Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 94), *nomination* emphasizes 'discursive construction of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions'; *predication* reflects 'discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (positively or negatively)'; *argumentation* aims to justify or doubt 'claims of truth and normative rightness'; *perspectivization* (also framing) is for 'positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance'; last but not least, *intensification/mitigation* is used to enhance or reduce 'the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances'. The present study follows this categorization with a bottom-up approach that identifies and summarizes the discursive strategies that actually occur in the data. The historical dimension is considered vital (Reisigl, 2017, p. 53) to a socio-historical analysis, in this case, of the development of "Chinese Dream" discourse between 2012-2018.

Corpus Linguistic (CL) analysis provides objective statistical measures for lexical frequency, keywords and collocations. By combining corpus linguistic and (critical) discourse analysis, the corpus-assisted analysis forms a powerful methodological synergy (Baker et al., 2008). The corpus software LancsBox 4.5 (Brezina et al., 2015) was employed. Although corpus tools can provide ample statistical information on big data, it requires manual interpretations to do justice to specific features of data in context, and the research questions. Therefore, by combining corpus linguistics with DHA and framing analysis, the study forms a corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis to examine the discursive realization of "Chinese Dream" through lexical frequency, concordance, collocation, semantic preference and semantic prosody.

Specifically, Sinclair's (2004) descriptive model of lexical co-selection was adopted. The model has five categories of co-selection, including (1) *core*, (2) *collocation*, (3) *colligation*, (4) *semantic preference* and (5) *semantic prosody*. The *core* is 'invariable, and constitutes the evidence of the occurrence of the item as a whole' (Sinclair, 2004, p. 141); the *collocation* is 'the co-occurrence of words with no more than four intervening words' (Sinclair, 2004, p. 141); the *colligation* is 'the co-occurrence of grammatical phenomena' or grammatical choices (Sinclair, 2004, p. 142); the *semantic preference* is 'the restriction of regular co-occurrence to items which share a semantic feature' (Sinclair, 2004, p. 142); and the *semantic prosody* refers to 'the determiner of the meaning of the whole' (Sinclair, 2004, p. 141). Among them, *core* and *semantic prosody* are primary categories, while the other three are optional. Specifically, the primary categories shape the overall meaning of a sentence, while the optional categories 'realize co-ordinated secondary choices within the item, fine-tuning the meaning and giving semantic cohesion to the text as a whole' (Sinclair, 2004, p. 141).

In addition to DHA and CL, Framing Analysis was drawn upon as an analytical perspective. Framing emphasizes the selection and salience of some perspectives of a news event, while it intentionally neglects other perspectives/contents of the event that emerge from rhetorical and linguistic devices. Selection, emphasis and intentional masking of information about social realities are the salient characteristics of framing (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

News media can influence and even manipulate public opinions on social-political events by framing social realities in a particular way (de Vreese, 2005, p. 51). Different news frames, adopted to discursively construct a social-political event, can produce different effects which, accordingly, invoke public reactions to the event. This study takes framing as a strategy of news discursive representation to identify and conceptualize news frames adopted by the three media toward the "Chinese Dream" through looking for specific attributes in news stories, especially keywords, concepts, metaphors, photographs (if any) and names of persons, ideas and actions (Kuypers, 2010, p. 301).

Overall, the analytical framework that applies the DHA, Corpus Linguistic methods and Framing Analysis forms a complementary way to the critical analysis of "Chinese Dream" discourse. This study is essentially a qualitatively-oriented discourse analysis that aims to unveil the potential influence of the sociohistorical context, the discursive strategies that construct the "Chinese Dream" today and how media discursively (re-)present China's national "Dream" in different ways.

4. The Socio-historical Context of the "Chinese Dream"

The socio-historical context is a key dimension for construing political discourses (Reisigl, 2017; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) because any discourse is created within a given socio-historical context. The discursive practice of "Chinese Dream" is realized in the specific socio-historical context of Xi Jinping's China that is striving to achieve national rejuvenation and to further global leadership. The Chinese national rejuvenation became a dream of the Chinese people since the First Opium War (1839-1842) when Imperial China fell into the dark age of a 'century of humiliation' (Kaufman, 2010) that lasted from 1839 to 1949. The dream remained that China should restore its power in the world someday. Relying on the massive propaganda launched by China's media, the "Chinese Dream" has turned into a dominant political narrative in the 21st Century, and of Xi Jinping leadership's ideological embodiment.

Given China's political power hierarchy that is dominated by a paramount leader, the President will unavoidably project it into his political discourse. In this manner, 'understanding the concept of the Chinese Dream is essential to understanding Xi Jinping's administration and China's future policy orientation' (Wang, 2014, p. 1). In that sense, the "Chinese Dream" can be seen as Xi's political brand which represents his vision for the sociopolitical, economic and cultural policies of China. For the core meaning of the Dream, Xi emphasized that it aims to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Xi, 2014). However, the narratives of national revival, state development and prosperity are not new. Generations of past Chinese leadership have already utilized similar discursive narratives to mobilize the Chinese populace in support of their ruling of China, from the Kuomintang's (Chinese Nationalist Party) Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek to Chiang Ching-kuo, or the Chinese Communist Party's Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao (Wang, 2014, p. 2). The "Chinese Dream" was formally proposed by Xi Jinping in November 2012.

The "Chinese Dream" is inward-oriented, which means this discourse is substantially about domestic politics and emphasizes the collective identity of the Chinese nation (Callahan, 2017, p. 253). It fundamentally aims at enhancing Chinese nationalism and providing the promise of a bright future for the Chinese populace. This promise should be led by a strong Chinese leader and President Xi Jinping is undoubtedly the next strong political leader since Chairman Mao Zedong (Keliher & Wu, 2016, p. 5). He has systematically centralized nearly all decision-making power from the Party, the Government and the Military systems in his hands. In order to achieve the goal of national rejuvenation, Xi has conducted radical internal reforms, especially personal power centralization (Shirk, 2018, p. 22) and more assertive foreign policies (Yan, 2014).

In internal affairs, Xi has initiated a series of political campaigns to centralize power and further established his absolute authority, including an anti-corruption campaign (Keliher & Wu, 2016), China's military system reform (Wuthnow & Saunders, 2017) and the abolition of the Chinese presidential term limits. The anti-corruption campaign helped Xi gain the Chinese public's wide support, while abolishing the presidential term limits was sharply criticised (Economy, 2018). Without doubt, Xi has *de facto* become the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. Western observers pointed out that the "Collective Leadership" that was established by Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues was to prevent overconcentration of top political power (like Mao), but it ended and China was back to one-man rule, which easily resulted in dictatorship and instability (see Nakazawa, 2017; Shirk, 2018). One-man rule undeniably has deep roots in Chinese history and its return is no surprise (Marschik, 2018).

In foreign affairs, the traditional strategy of "Keeping a Low Profile" settled by Deng Xiaoping in 1990s has been shifted to "Strive for Achievement" (Yan, 2014, p. 154). This indicates that China was set on playing a more active role in global competition while striving for national interests. The "Belt and Road" Initiative (B&R for short), "New Type of Great Power Relations" and "Community of Common Destiny" were proposed by President Xi. Among them, the B&R plays a big role in reshaping Asian geopolitical order. The B&R proposed in 2013 is a grand strategy that Xi's administration adopts to establish a new regional order headed by China in order to compete for global leadership with other great powers in the world. This is one of the core aims of Chinese national rejuvenation, specifically, in its efforts to catch up with, and even surpass, the United States regarding Comprehensive National Power (Yan, 2014, p. 164).

The concentration of power on one leader and the adjustment of foreign strategies are both a part of the fulfillment of Xi's aspiration of realizing the goal of making China great again. The sociohistorical analysis has provided necessary contextual knowledge through critical interpretations of the background events to understand the "Chinese Dream". In the next section we focus on discursive strategies of constructing the "Chinese Dream".

5. Strategies in the Discursive Construction of "Chinese Dream"

By close reading of the Chinese Dream Speech Corpus (CDSC: 12919 tokens; 2270 types; 2031 lemmas), it was found that a series of well-designed discursive strategies were adopted to construct the "Chinese Dream". Based on the discursive strategies of DHA (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009) and the features of the specific discourses, four significant strategies were identified: (1) the strategic use of the first person plural; (2) imperative syntactic structure; (3) intertextual representation; and (4) the appropriation of cultural symbols. The analysis of the discursive strategies is conducted by using specific text excerpts.[2]

5.1 The Strategic Use of the First Person Plural Pronoun

The use of the first person plural is a strategy of constructing subjectivity and collectivity in "Chinese Dream" discourse. It echoes the *nomination* strategy of DHA that aims at discursively constructing social actors by using membership categorization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94). The use of the first person plural ('we') is a strategy that categorizes membership in a social-political context. It is also a vital linguistic device to construct collective identity of a group, community and nation. According to Wei and Duann (2019, p. 7), the use of *we* can 'create national collectivity, construct legitimization, and forge alliances in changing socio-political context'. In the CDSC, 'we' (including its possessive and objective form) has a high-frequency, occurring 280 times.

In Excerpt (1), the first person pronoun plural ('we', 'our' and 'us') can be interpreted as a discursive strategy to construct a collective identity of social actors who are members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Within the collective identity of CCP membership, social actors' actions are placed in the three dimensions of time, i.e. the past, present and future. In the past time frame, Chinese people's collective memory is that China was attacked by imperialists, which, in modern history, is activated automatically by the discourse. In the present time frame, the collective *we* must overcome difficulties under the leadership of the Party to pave the way for the future. Finally, in the future time frame, a great future, event, or course is discursively constructed. In this manner, 'we', the Party members, including President Xi himself as the Party's leader, has become a vital social actor who pursues the great "Chinese Dream". While in this context, the 'we'/'our'/'us' featured is political elites excluding ordinary people. Specifically, the 'we' in this context refers to the collective identity of ruling class of China.

(1) Reviewing the past, all Party members must bear in mind that backwardness left **us** vulnerable to attack, whereas only development makes **us** strong. Looking at the present, all Party members must bear in mind that the path **we** take determines **our** destiny and that **we** must resolutely keep to the right path that **we** have found through great difficulties. Looking ahead at the future, all Party members must bear in mind that **we** still have a long way to go and much hard work to do before **we** can turn **our** blueprint into reality.

(Xi's speech at the National Museum of China, 29/11/2012)

Admittedly, the discursive construction of collective identity by using 'we' is context-dependent, which means its scope of inclusion can be narrowed or expanded in terms of specific pragmatic purposes and target audiences. Moreover, the strategic use of the first person plural constructs a shared identity and emphasizes common social-political-economic interests in the CCP's rule of China.

5.2 Imperative Syntactic Structure

The frequent use of imperative syntactic structure echoes the *predication* strategy used in DHA to analyze constructs of discursive qualification, characteristics and qualities of social actors, events and phenomena through linguistic devices, e.g. positive or negative traits, collocations, explicit predicates, rhetorical figures, allusions, evocations and other related phenomena (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94). In Xi's speeches, the *predication* strategy is realized through the syntactic structure (subject + modal verb + explicit predicates). According to Biber (2006, p. 99), modal verbs express the stance and attitude of speakers or authors and also serve the purpose of persuasion. For *must* and *should*, they refer to necessity or obligation, while *will/would* refers to prediction and volition according to specific contexts (Biber, 2006, p. 101). In the corpus, 'should' occurs 91 times, followed by 'must' with 77, and 'will' occurs 57 times.

Specifically, the collocational structure (we + modal verb (must/should/will) + verb/verb phrase) serves to construct discursive characteristics of social actors. In Excerpt (2), 'we must uphold', 'we should be guided by' and 'we will fulfill' show a positive semantic feature in the context and emphasize what social actor must do, should do and will do under the Party's leadership. This also makes Xi's stance transparent regarding social-political policies. In doing so, it presents that Xi as the top leader requires or orders his people (including senior officials, Party members, organizations and ordinaries) to make efforts to achieve the goals of "Chinese Dream", and further shapes Xi's image as a powerful leader.

>   (2) ***We must*** uphold at the same time the leadership of the Party, the position of the people as masters of their own destiny [......]. ***We should*** be guided by the strategic thinking that only development will make a difference [......]. ***We will*** fulfill our international responsibilities and obligations [......].
>
>   (Xi's speech at the 1st Session of the 12th National People's Congress, 17/3/2013)

5.3 Intertextual Representation

Intertextuality, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2009, p. 90), refers to 'texts that are linked to other texts, both in the past and in the present.' It is usually realized by quotation or reproducing other or prior texts into the present text. Intertextuality, to some extent, corresponds with DHA's *perspectivization* strategy that is realized by the devices of 'deixis, quotation marks, discourse markers/practices' (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 94). In order to construct specific connotations on "Chinese Dream", Xi refers to classic

Chinese philosophy to express his point of view, as shown in Excerpts (3) and (4).

In Excerpt (3), Xi skillfully quotes a poem written by Li Bai (*李白*, 701-762 AD), one of China's great poets of the Tang Dynasty (*唐朝*, 618-907 AD). It implies that the Chinese nation will have more great achievements under his leadership in the future, while indirectly expressing his point of view. Yet, Li Bai's poem is highly context-dependent, which must be understood by linking the implicatures of the poem with China's sociopolitical context in which Xi rules China and makes a promise to rejuvenate the nation. In Excerpt (4), Xi paraphrases a discourse fragment derived from Gu Yanwu (*顾炎武*, 1613-1682 AD), a philosopher of the Ming Dynasty (*明朝*, 1368-1644 AD), who criticized cultural and political elites' *qingtan* (*清谈*, [pure conversation]) that was an intellectual movement about debating lofty ideas, metaphysics, or philosophical issues like Taoism in the Wei-Jin period (*魏晋时期*, 220-420 AD) (D'Ambrosio, 2016, p. 624). The *qingtan* was seen as a sociocultural phenomenon that was disadvantageous to the governance of the country in the Wei-Jin period (Liu, 2005, pp. 66-67). Here, in Xi's discourse, he required that workers should work hard to serve the society but not talk emptily. It can be seen as a recontextualization of translating Gu Yanwu's discourse into Xi's own discourse. Furthermore, it links ancient thoughts with the present social context of China, showing an extralinguistic historical intertextuality. In Xi's intertextual strategy, cultural symbols play a significant role, which is further discussed in the next section.

(3) In the future, the Chinese nation will "***forge ahead like a gigantic ship breaking through strong winds and heavy waves***."

(Xi's speech at the National Museum of China, 29/11/2012)

(4) ***We*** often say, "***Empty talk harms the country, while hard work makes it flourish***." This means we must first get down to work.

(Xi's speech at a meeting with national model workers, 28/4/2013)

5.4 The Appropriation of Cultural Symbols

In Chinese society, cultural/philosophical tradition is generally seen as 'the source of moral values, guidance, authority, and legitimacy' (Cao & Wu, 2017, p. 2). The "Chinese Dream" discourse is featured in ample Chinese philosophical thought. Confucianism, Taoism, historical events and cultural figures play a part of the discursive construction of "Chinese Dream". The ancient Chinese philosophers or poets, especially Laozi (*老子*, around 571-471 BC), Li Bai (*李白*, 701-762 AD), Fan Zhongyan (*范仲淹*, 989-1052 AD) and their thoughts were recontextualized into Xi's discourse: for example, Laozi's saying [a journey of one thousand miles begins with a single step] ('*千里之行始于足下*') from Chapter 64 of the *Tao Te Ching* (*道德经*); Li Bai's poem [forge ahead like a gigantic ship breaking through strong winds and heavy waves] ('*长风破浪会有时*') from *The Hard Road* (*行路难*); and Fan Zhongyan's prose [being the first to worry about the affairs of the state and the

last to enjoy oneself] ('先天下之忧而忧, 后天下之乐而乐) from *The Yueyang Tower* (*岳阳楼记*).[3]

It appears that, although China is governed under the banner of socialism/communism that enshrines Marxism-Leninism, the traditional Chinese culture, e.g. Taoism and Confucianism, is still an inseparable part in Chinese political narrative. The fusion of Chinese traditional culture and Marxism-Leninism is one of the important devices that can legitimize the ruling of the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, the appropriation of Chinese cultural symbols can be understood as a cultural representation of Chinese nationalism. However, this cultural representation is not purely Chinese. Rather, it is a 'hybridity' which employs not only Chinese native culture, such as Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism, but also patriotism, collective historical memory and Marxism-Leninism in modern China (Wang, 2017, pp. 833-834). Moving away from Xi as a speaker, the next section examines media representation of the "Chinese Dream" through unique discursive patterns and news frames.

6. Media Representations of the "Chinese Dream"

China Daily (CD), *South China Morning Post* (SCMP) and *The New York Times* (NYT) were chosen to analyze their news representations and conceptualize their news frames. It is admitted that this limited selection cannot reflect all of the stances and portrayals of the "Chinese Dream" in the global media community. However, it can provide a window to further investigate how global media perceive, shape and frame this political discourse and its Chinese characteristics.

6.1 *China Daily's* (CD) Representation

The "Chinese Dream" represented in CD is highly adhering to the official ideology and stance of China's authority. It is discursively shaped as a great and glorious "dream" as well as beneficial to other countries. Using 'Chinese dream*' ('*' refers to any suffix/word attached to the search item, it is also applicable to SCMPC and NYTC) as a key item, the *China Daily* corpus (CDC) generates 737 occurrences. Figure 1 presents sample concordances of "Chinese dream" in CDC within a span of 7 words left and right).


to express a world dream with a	"Chinese Dream".	The **ideal** of a "**harmonious world**" of
Party last November. This is also the	Chinese dream	of national **rejuvenation**, the **new concept** mooted
socialism with Chinese characteristics and **realize the**	Chinese Dream	of national **rejuvenation**. Fourth, since socialism with
people do well. Xi emphasized that the	Chinese Dream	in essence means **the dream of the (people)**
characteristics is propelling China toward **realizing the**	Chinese Dream	of national **rejuvenation**. China's democratic system under
the country. Xi also emphasized that the	Chinese Dream	is a dream for **peace, development, cooperation**
historical turning point. By **putting forward** the	Chinese Dream,	President Xi **opened a new chapter** for
especially in challenging settings. In **achieving** the	Chinese dream,	**positive psychology supports** Xi's emphasis on grit.
the profound changes brought about by the	Chinese Dream.	I believe that the **realization** of a (dream)
realization. Specifically, 89.4 percent believed that the	Chinese Dream	**could be realized**. People are **confident** in

Figure 1. Sample concordance lines of 'Chinese dream' in CDC

The phrase 'Chinese dream' mainly co-occurs with positive or pro-positive words. For example, co-occurrent lexical items with 'Chinese dream' are: 'ideal', 'harmonious world', 'rejuvenation', 'new concept', 'people do well', 'realizing', 'peace', 'development', 'cooperation', 'putting forward', 'opened a new chapter', 'achieving', 'positive psychology supports', 'realization', 'realized' and 'confident'. Further examining the 737 concordance lines, it shows that 'Chinese dream' in CDC presents the semantic preference of 'rejuvenation, progress and development' in 86.16% (635 out of 737) of instances, comparing with the semantic preference of 'misunderstanding, vagueness and critique' in only 1.09% (8 out of 737) and the neutral one in 12.75% (94 out of 737). Table 1 presents the discursive representation of "Chinese Dream" in CDC. This kind of phenomenon of lexical co-occurrence forms a positive semantic prosody. The semantic prosody, according to Sinclair (2004, p. 141), is 'the determiner of the meaning of the whole lexical item'. It can be seen that the determiner of meaning of "Chinese dream" in CDC is 'rejuvenation and development', indicating that the CD journalists intentionally frame a positive "Chinese dream".

Discursive prosody	Percentage	Discursive preference
Positive	86.16% (635/737)	*Rejuvenation, progress and development*
Negative	1.09% (8/737)	*Misunderstanding, vagueness and critique*
Neutral	12.75% (94/737)	*Political concept, plan and idea*

Table 1. Discursive representation of 'Chinese Dream' in CDC

In addition, the CD news narratives touch upon more general topics related to culture, economy, trade, technology, and international affair with Western powers, such as the United States, UK and EU. The "Chinese Dream" representations in these news stories are very broad, but the central point is China's interests at home and abroad. Moreover, CD not only focuses on 'collectivistic attributions of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation' (Hou, 2018, p. 317), but also supports personal interests (Excerpt 5)[4]. In this excerpt, CD illustrates that a 'personal Chinese dream' serves as a base of fulfilling the collective Chinese dream. This is also a response from China's official media to foreign critique that "Chinese Dream" overwhelmingly emphasizes national-collective interests but neglect individual interests or human rights. Yet, it should be noted that CD as a state-run media must defend its official ideology, and as an English-language media, it also has to reconcile the Chinese socialist ideology with its Western English readers' universal values.

(5) "In other words, to fulfill properly the national Chinese dream is to fulfill properly the ***personal Chinese dream***," he said. "Thus, the ***personal Chinese Dream*** refutes the foreign stereotype that China sacrifices individuals to serve the purposes of the collective."

(Experts interpret the Chinese Dream; CD, 8/12/2013)

These examples illustrate that the CD's representations of "Chinese Dream" align with Xi's official speeches. Yet, compared with Xi's speeches, its narrative scope is extended in CD and resonates with a variety of current sociocultural, economic, trade, foreign affairs and international issues. The core news frame in which CD presents the "Chinese Dream" can be characterized as China-centric. This China-centric frame emphasizes Chinese nationalism and the ruling Party's leadership, though other broad topics are also touched upon. Given China's media censorship, CD's news frames must be based on the CCP's ideology, while it also seeks legitimation and recognition of the "Chinese Dream" in global societies. This shows that the choices of news frames are restricted by dominant ideology and local sociopolitical system (i.e. Mainland China's socialism with Chinese characteristics and one-party rule system).

6.2 *South China Morning Post's* (SCMP) Representation

Given the "One Country, Two Systems" position of Hong Kong, it enjoys much more press freedom than Mainland China. On coverage of "Chinese Dream", the SCMP takes a variety of stances. In the SCMP corpus 'Chinese dream' occurs 281 times. By intensive reading throughout the concordance lines in context, it is found that the lexical choice contains plural attitudes toward "Chinese Dream".

SCMP's news representations of "Chinese Dream" were critically examined on different aspects. According to the samples shown in Figure 2, the "Chinese Dream" does not solely have a positive connotation. It is facing a series of challenges, for example, military conflicts would 'greatly disrupt Xi's 'Chinese dream'' (see concordance line 1), the "dream" is 'so-called' and 'broadly defined' (line 2), and the SCMP proposes to 'think about what the 'Chinese dream' really means' (line 3). At this point, the SCMP provides a rethinking attitude to the national Dream discourse. Moreover, the "Chinese Dream" is linked with Hong Kong's local society. Since Hong Kong is a part of China, the "Chinese Dream" is also Hong Kong people's dream. However, what is Hong Kong people's "Chinese Dream", that is a question. In SCMP's coverage, it is a 'democracy dream' (see line 4). Yet, democratic politics is conflict with the one-party system that Mainland China now adopts.

military confrontation, which would greatly **disrupt** Xi's	"Chinese dream"	of making China a global power by
Xi Jinping's ambition to **realise** the **so-called**	"Chinese Dream"-	**broadly defined as** a national rejuvenation and
is time to **think about what the**	Chinese dream	**really means.** Marxist doctrine used to say
Since Xi had been talking of his	"Chinese Dream",	he should share **Hongkongers' "democracy dream"** and
and **American dreams**, with some saying the	Chinese dream	is the **perfect model** for developing countries
what it will take to **achieve** the	Chinese Dream.	In economic terms, a "**moderately prosperous society**"
individual dreams. In order to **realise** the	Chinese dream,	China needs a thriving SME sector. Dr
Powers during the past five centuries. Xi's	"Chinese dream"	of **global renaissance** shows his **ambitious China**
remarks, internet users began to **compare** the	Chinese dream	with the **American dream**- a set of
aspect and end goal of **achieving** the	Chinese dream	is to **rid China of past humiliations**

Figure 2. Sample concordance lines of 'Chinese dream' in SCMPC

Even though there are some criticisms, the SCMP is not purely negative in its portrayal of the "Chinese Dream". It compares the "American Dream" with the "Chinese Dream", and quotes Michael Chugani's point of view, a Hong Kong journalist and TV host, saying that:

> Xi's message of rejuvenating the nation has drawn comparisons between the Chinese and American dreams, with some saying the Chinese dream is the perfect model for developing countries disillusioned by the political havoc Western-style democracy has wreaked on the US.
>
> (see line 5, source: *Why Xi Jinping's Chinese dream is nothing like the American one*, SCMP, 1/11/2017).

Besides, the SCMP presents a nationalist stance that 'Xi's 'Chinese dream' of global renaissance shows his ambitious China seems increasingly confident of its 'great power' stature' (line 8, source: *How US President Donald Trump's visit to China can make both nations great again*, 24/9/2017) and 'the end goal of achieving the Chinese dream is to rid China of past humiliations' (line 10, source: *Beijing scores points as it marks 120th anniversary of defeat by Japan*, SCMP, 27/2/2014). Here, a discourse-historical context is shaped, activating target readers' collective memory on China's 'century of humiliation' (Kaufman, 2010).

The semantic prosody surrounding the "Chinese dream" in SCMPC is a mix that comprises positive, negative and neutral stances which can be reflected in its semantic preferences, see Table 2. The "Chinese dream" in SCMPC yielded the following semantic preferences, namely 'Chinese new political vision, pursuit, roadmap' occupies 36.65% (103 out of 281) of the instances, 'undemocratic, vague and conflict' occupies 25.27% (71 out of 281) and 'ideology, propaganda and Xi's political label' accounts for 38.08% (107 out of 281). These preferences echo the semantic prosody of positive, negative and neutral respectively.

Discursive prosody	Percentage	Discursive preference
Positive	36.65% (103/281)	*Chinese new political vision, pursuit, roadmap*
Negative	25.27% (71/281)	*Undemocratic, vague and conflict*
Neutral	38.08% (107/281)	*Ideology, propaganda and Xi's political label*

Table 2. Discursive representation of 'Chinese Dream' in SCMPC

It can be found that the SCMP used a balanced reporting method or multiculturalist stance that covers different political orientations. Embracing diverse political orientations (or multicultural political position), thus, is a salient feature in SCMP's representations of "Chinese Dream". The news frame with multiple stances provides an insight in the nature of the Dream discourse while simultaneously it enhances the credibility of news discourse, as can be seen from Excerpts (6) and (7).

(6) Tsang said: "**The Chinese dream is not the dream of the people of China** freely articulated by them. It is 'the Chinese dream' to be articulated **on their behalf by Xi** and **the Communist Party**."

(*Just what is Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream' and 'Chinese renaissance'?*. SCMP, 6/2/2013)

(7) In much the same way, a modernised civil service will be better equipped to bring about President Xi's "Chinese dream" for a stable and prosperous nation, and a society living in harmony with the rest of the world. **We in Hong Kong should do our part to support him**.

(*Raising morale; Hilton Cheong-Leen believes China needs a well-trained and well-paid civil service if the nation is to modernise and curb corruption*, SCMP, 7/6/2014)

In Excerpt (6), SCMP shows a sharply ideological critique of the "Chinese Dream" and directly points out that it is not exactly a Chinese people's dream but the Party's and its ruling elites' dream. The so-called grand "dream" narrative is just a manipulation of discourse (van Dijk, 2006, pp. 360-361). This stance is in opposition with China's official ideology, suggesting a pro-democracy orientation. However, in Excerpt (7), a supportive position of pro-Beijing is shown. The SCMP uses the source's view to propose that Hong Kong should do its part to help Xi to realize the Dream. In the two excerpts, the SCMP's news framing does not fall into one side, rather it attempts to cover different voices and stances. Combining the mix semantic prosody in SCMPC, its dominated news frame can be called as a multiculturalist-oriented frame. The multiculturalist-oriented perspective here means taking into account diverse sociocultural norms and ideologies while allowing the existence of different and even conflicted political orientations. It has a profound social foundation that shapes Hong Kong's multicultural society that hybridizes Eastern and Western cultures (Law & Lee, 2012, p. 117).

In short, SCMP adopts a multiculturalist-oriented frame to construct a multifaceted "Chinese Dream", neither purely positive nor totally negative. In this sense, compared with CD, the SCMP neither fully converges to China's official narrative nor completely diverges from it, instead it provides an open dialogue platform containing multicultural and multi-political orientations.

6.3 *The New York Times'* (NYT) Representation

The "Chinese Dream" in the NYT is framed as a relative, negative discourse object. In the NYT corpus (NYTC), the phrase 'Chinese dream' occurs 70 times. It is understandable, because its corpus size (56,900 words) is much smaller than that of CDC (214,290 words) and SCMPC (136,814 words). What should be emphasized is its discursive and semantic construction and the underlying ideologies. By using the combination of lexical selection and rhetorical devices, the NYT presents an unpleasant "Chinese Dream".

president, Xi Jinping, has held up the	"Chinese Dream"	as the **maxim** for his leadership, aiming
with confidence. The **dark side** of the	Chinese dream—	the **negative fantasy** that **haunts** China's psyche—
ode to Mr. Xi's **signature phrase**, the	"Chinese dream":	**Chinese dream for 1,000 years**, Chinese dream
Dream Mr. Xi's **signature slogan** is the	"Chinese Dream,"	**a vaguely defined promise** of prosperity and
society. Mr. Xi, in articulating **the so-called**	Chinese dream,	has called for a return to China's
what exactly **bombastic talk** of a shared	Chinese dream	means— and what it **obscures**. Mr. Xi's
the videos promote President Xi Jinping's **cherished**	"Chinese dream"	and two other **Communist Party slogans**, the
Xi has **championed the slogans** of "the	Chinese dream"	and a "great revival of the Chinese
Nov. 29, **Mr. Xi spoke of** the	"Chinese dream"	of realizing the **nation's "revival,"** which,
in modern times." The emphasis on a	"Chinese dream"	is **particular to Mr. Xi**, and could

Figure 3. Sample concordance lines of 'Chinese dream' in NYTC

The samples in Figure 3 show that the "Chinese Dream" shaped in NYT is negative or pro-negative largely. The NYT sees "Chinese Dream" as a political term owned by the Chinese leader's ideological power. In a neutral sense, "Chinese dream" is a 'maxim' and 'signature phrase' of Xi's leadership (see lines 1 and 3). Yet, in a negative sense, the NYT emphasizes the 'dark side' of "Chinese dream" that is 'the negative fantasy' that would be harmful to the Chinese mental state (see line 2). Furthermore, the NYT points out that it is just a slogan, e.g. 'Xi's signature slogan', 'Communist Party slogans' and 'Xi has championed the slogans' (lines 4, 7, 8). This slogan is 'a vaguely defined promise of prosperity' for China (see line 4). It should be noted that the term 'slogan' connotes quite a negative attitude in the Chinese context, indicating empty talk without actual meaning. Moreover, a series of negative modifiers are used to describe "Chinese dream" as an unreal discourse, e.g. 'so-called', 'bombastic' and 'obscure' (see lines 5 and 6). Although the rest of the two lines do not show salient negative/positive linguistic makers, the top leader's identity is strongly affiliated with the discourse, indicating implicitly that it is just the communist leader's dream.

Further examination of the concordance patterns showed that the "Chinese Dream" in the NYTC was attributed to the negative semantic preference of 'obscure, authoritarian, nationalism and party's slogan' in 51.43% (36 out of 70) of the instances, compared with the positive preference of 'hope, emotional appeal, national pursuit' in 25.71% (18 out of 70) and the neutral one in 22.86% (16 out of 70), like 'theme, concept', see Table 3. This shows

that "Chinese Dream" has a negative semantic prosody of 'doubtful, threatening-Western values, Chinese nationalism/populism' in the NYTC. The Dream discourse is shaped as a negative image that is a potential threat to the Western world. This reflects the NYT's critical attitude and the *perspectivization* strategy of DHA shows a shift in point of view regarding the specific issue/discursive object (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 113).

Discursive prosody	Percentage	Discursive preference
Positive	25.71% (18/70)	*Hope, emotional appeal, national pursuit*
Negative	51.43% (36/70)	*Obscure, authoritarian, nationalism and party's slogan*
Neutral	22.86% (16/70)	*Theme, concept*

Table 3. Discursive representation of 'Chinese Dream' in NYTC

The NYT has enjoyed a prominent reputation regarding its high-quality global news coverage. However, its coverage is predominantly American-centric. When it comes to framing non-Western issues, e.g. China's political affairs, human rights, and minority issues like in Xinjinag and Tibet, it tends to conduct a moral judgement based on American-values criteria to criticize others. This reflects that frames can '*make moral judgement* - evaluate causal agents and their effects' (Entman, 1993, p. 52, italics in original) in news. Especially, the coverage of "Chinese Dream" by the NYT shows a strong critical stance, shaping a negative image of China, as can be seen in Excerpts (8) and (9).

(8) Mr. Xi's self-assurance is not surprising, but his words and deeds betray a deep vein of **insecurity**. The talk of 1.3 billion people dreaming the same "Chinese dream" can't hide the fact that ***China's leaders continue to be plagued by nightmares not unlike those that haunted them in 1989***.

(*The Elusive Chinese Dream*, NYT, 27/12/2014)

(9) "***As the most powerful leader in China in decades***, Mr. Xi presented an opportunity for greater collaboration," said Bonnie S. Glaser, senior adviser on Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Instead, he "turned out to be ***an ultranationalist, bent on achieving the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation even if it meant damaging ties with the U.S. as well as China's neighbors***."

(*Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cybertheft*, NYT, 26/9/2015)

Excerpt (8) shows that the NYT poses a critical attitude to Mr. Xi's "Chinese Dream". It suggests that the Chinese leadership still worries about the communist regime's security, though grand nationalist narratives continue to be being constructed. Moreover, China's historical event is projected into the current discourse. The NYT intentionally mentions a historical moment, i.e.

the 1989 pro-democracy student movement in Beijing's Tiananmen square. It puts the "Chinese Dream" into a discourse-historical context, triggering target readers' collective-historical memory that the pro-democracy movement in 1989 was brutally cracked down by military (Pye, 1990, pp. 344-345). Such negative lexical words/metaphors as 'plague', 'nightmare' and 'haunt' are used to describe the current Chinese leadership's historical challenge. Implicitly, the NYT suggests that Xi's "Chinese Dream" cannot get rid of the Party's historical shadow of cracking down on its own people.

Nationalism in "Chinese Dream" plays a big role. The NYT exaggerates this in Excerpt (9), using an interviewee's comment to picture Xi as the most powerful Chinese leader with strong nationalism in decades. The term, 'ultranationalist' is adopted to portray Xi's image as a political strongman who is capable of doing anything to achieve his target, 'even if it meant damaging ties with the U.S. as well as China's neighbors'. Apparently, the NYT takes an America-centric stance in their so-called moral evaluation of China and Chinese leadership, presenting China as a trouble maker in the liberal global order.

Undoubtedly, the NYT is biased towards American interests and democratic-freedom values. As a bystander/observer of Chinese politics, it commonly sees China from the American perspective. Thus, it is not surprising that the NYT takes an America-centric "othering" frame to reframe and represent the original "Chinese Dream". The "othering" perspective is based on the negative portrayal of those who do not adhere to the cultural or political norms of "us". The America-centric "othering" frame thus negates China on the basis of American sociocultural and political-economic norms. In this frame, the "Chinese Dream" is shaped as an ideological discourse involving strong Chinese nationalism/patriotism and socialism. China is discursively shaped as an "other" that combines traditional Chinese totalitarianism with communist ideology, which is different from the American-led Western democratic world. This reflects the long-standing Western stereotype that regards China as a cultural "other". In this regard, the NYT's representations diverge from what "Chinese Dream" really means in a Chinese context. The "Chinese Dream" in the NYT has been discursively reconstructed with an ideological bias that fits American values, and in a way that caters to the Western stereotype of China. However, it is an imaginary "Chinese Dream" based on the American-centric "othering" frame.

Summing up, the "Chinese Dream" was criticized in the NYT's news stories, suggesting that American-led Western elites adopted negative and critical opinions towards socialist China. Significantly, the NYT's representations of "Chinese Dream" have contributed to the Western stereotype of China.

7. Conclusion

This article has analyzed "Chinese Dream" discourse from the three dimensions of socio-historical context, discursive construction and its media representations by using a complementary framework that applies the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Corpus-assisted Linguistic methods and Framing Analysis.

First, by examining the socio-historical context of the discourse, it was found that the introduction of Xi's "Chinese Dream" marks the change of its

internal policies and foreign strategies. For China's internal politics, it may be more power concentration-oriented instead of democratic so as to enhance the Party's authority (Marschik, 2018; Shirk, 2018). For foreign policy, the traditional Deng-style of "Keeping a Low Profile" has shifted to Xi's "Striving for Achievement" (Yan, 2014). This shift will affect the current East-Asian geopolitical landscape. The new "Chinese Dream" is accompanied by the sociopolitical change of China, reflecting how political discourse relates to sociopolitical practice. On the one hand, the "Chinese Dream" is a political symbol that projects the Chinese leader's will, while on the other hand, it simultaneously contains an attempt to compete with Western powers for global leadership discourse.

Second, Xi's "Chinese Dream" was discursively constructed by four key strategies, namely (1) the strategic use of the first person plural, (2) imperative syntactic structure, (3) intertextual representation, and (4) the appropriation of cultural symbols (as discussed in section 5 above). By using these discursive strategies, Xi shaped the national discourse with strong nationalism/patriotism and historical memory (e.g. get rid of a 'century of humiliation'), rhetorically aiming to unite all Chinese people.

Third, transiting from original political speeches to media manifestation, the media discursive representations of "Chinese Dream" are based on respective news frames and profoundly mirror their embedded social ideologies. *China Daily* adopted a China-centric frame to portray a positive, rightful and great "Chinese Dream" that was in line with the Party's ideology. The Hong Kong based *South China Morning Post* took a multiculturalist-oriented frame to construct a multifaceted "Chinese Dream" that was interpreted from diverse perspectives and political orientations (e.g. pro-Beijing/pro-Democracy/neutral). *The New York Times* used an America-centric "othering" frame to reshape the "Chinese Dream" and criticized it by contrasting it with American-led Western values (e.g. political democracy and liberty, human rights). Specifically, the three news frames can be summarized as: 1. the China-centric frame emphasizes Chinese nationalism/patriotism and the ruling Party's authority, and positively presents China's image to the world in news reporting. 2. the multiculturalist-oriented frame means the media considers diverse sociocultural norms and ideologies and allows the existence of different political stances in news reporting; 3. The America-centric "othering" frame refers to the media reports of other countries' affairs (e.g. human rights, military activities) based on American socio-cultural norms and political standards and tend to critically present non-Western countries such as China, Iran and North Korea.

To sum up, the analysis shows how the "Chinese Dream" is used as a discursive brand that reflects China's President Xi Jinping's political vision. It represents a new ideological narrative of Xi's leadership in order to accommodate to a series of challenges regarding sociopolitical, economic, military and foreign conditions. In addition, the Dream discourse aims to unite Chinese people and make a promise that China, under Xi's leadership, will re-establish its success; while at the same time, the Dream is also shaped as a world dream, suggesting that the rise of China will be beneficial to the world. Moreover, it is also designed to compete with the "American Dream" in the global discourse of power. The three-dimensional analysis of sociohistorical context, discursive construction and media discursive representation of "Chinese Dream" can provide new insights into what the

Dream really means for the people of China, and to show how different global media (specifically *China Daily*, *South China Morning Post*, *The New York Times*) perceive and frame it to fit their own ideologies.

Notes

1. Xi Jinping assumed the role of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 and became Chinese President at the 12th National People's Congress of the P.R. China in March 2013.
2. Excerpts (1) to (4) are derived from the English version of President Xi Jinping's monograph, *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China* (Xi, 2014, 2017). The series of books is a collection of President Xi's important speeches, talks and instructions at home and abroad.
3. The three examples of Chinese classical thought, namely Laozi's words, Li Bai's poem and Fan Zhongyan's prose are quoted from *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China* (Xi, 2014, 2017). Their Chinese renditions are quoted from the Chinese version of *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*.
4. For the full contents of the Excerpts (5) to (9), see: (5) *Experts interpret the Chinese Dream*, By Wang Zhenghua, CD, 8 December 2013. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-12/08/content_17159773.htm; (6) *Just what is Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream' and 'Chinese renaissance'?* By Cary Huang, SCMP, 6 February 2013. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1143954/just-what-xi-jinpings-chinese-dream-and-chinese-renaissance; (7) *Raising morale; Hilton Cheong-Leen believes China needs a well-trained and well-paid civil service if the nation is to modernise and curb corruption.* By Hilton Cheong-Leen, SCMP, 7 June 2014. Its online title is *Clean and capable civil service needed to realise Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream',* and the published date is 6 June, 2014. https://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1526597/clean-and-capable-civil-service-needed-realise-xi-jinpings-chinese-dream; (8) *The Elusive Chinese Dream.* By Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, NYT, 27 December 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-elusive-chinese-dream.html; (9) *Obama and Xi Jinping of China Agree to Steps on Cybertheft.* By Julie Hirschfeld Davis and David E. Sanger, NYT, 26 September 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-white-house.html.

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