

The Glencairn Uprising, 1653-54

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Occupied Scotland: The Background to the Uprising

The Glencairn uprising cannot be viewed as a stand-alone episode in Anglo-Scottish relations. The causes of this two-year rebellion span back years before the start of the Civil War and involve both countries' internal political situations alongside their relationship to one another. This relationship during the period 1637 to 1660 was one of great complexity and instability. Following its status as political ally in the early 1640s, Scotland was defeated on its own ground by English forces in 1651 and relegated to little more than a conquered province. Although full parliamentary union was established before long between both countries, English forces did not leave Scotland until 1660.

The execution of Charles I in January 1649 proved another turning point in Anglo-Scottish relations, bringing the Scottish attachment to the notion of hereditary rule and its particular bond to the Stuart line to the forefront. The new King, exiled in Jersey, sailed for France in mid-February where he conferred with his mother at Beauvais before meeting commissioners from the Scottish parliament at Breda. Despondent at the recent defeat of his supporters in Ireland and Montrose's lack of success in Scotland, Charles II signed a draft agreement on 1 May 1650.¹ The new King was forced to agree to a number of humiliating concessions both before and after his return to Scottish land. He not only signed both Covenants and was forced into dismissing many members of his household but, against his own beliefs and conscience, renounced his Irish supporters and agreed to impose Presbyterianism throughout the three kingdoms.²

The leaders of the English Parliament were convinced that the best way of countermanding the Scottish threat was to launch a pre-emptive strike and an army

¹ Indeed, unbeknownst to Charles II, Montrose had suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of Archibald Strachan and the Covenanting cavalry on 27 April, and was publicly hanged a few weeks later. See Woolrych, A. *Britain in Revolution 1625-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.480-1.

² Paterson, R.C. *No Tragic Story: The Fall of the House of Campbell* (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2001), p.13 and Woolrych, A. *Britain in Revolution*, p.481.

was duly sent north under Cromwell in the summer of 1650. However, victory was by no means assured. In July the Scottish forces under David Leslie rivalled the English in terms of man-power and enjoyed a higher morale than the English who suffered much illness as a result of constant exposure to wet weather. Moreover, Leslie was a talented commander who realised English manpower and supplies would be worn down even if he tactically avoided pitched battle. Despite an enforced purge of the Scottish army at the hands of the kirk, Leslie's generalmanship was proving effective. In early September, Cromwell was forced back to Dunbar where his fortunes took an almost miraculous turn for the better.³

On 3 September, Cromwell's men devastated the Scottish at the battle at Dunbar and gave the English control of south-east Scotland. Hearing of the defeat at Dunbar, the population of Edinburgh reacted with panic and was soon overtaken by Cromwell's men. Leslie and his nominal commander, the elderly Leven, withdrew to Stirling under a hail of criticism. Cromwell let them go, preferring to let the Scottish internal divisions - irate in the wake of the Dunbar defeat - do his work for him. His policy towards the everyday Scottish population was characterised by persuasion rather than force.⁴

By the end of the year, Major General Lambert's defeat of the western army secured the south-west of the country. The loss of Edinburgh Castle was a double blow in terms of strategic advantage and the loss of Scottish morale.⁵ After an interruption to hostilities due to illness, Cromwell once again took the offensive. In the summer of 1651 his army overran Fife and, by early August, had accepted the surrender of Perth.

Charles II viewed the situation with increasing desperation. In a bold move, he decided that the best chance of salvation lay in attempting to lure Cromwell away from Scotland. Against the advice of Argyle and Loudoun, he thus sent the bulk of his army into England where it was ultimately defeated at Worcester on 3 September.

³ Woolrych, A. *Britain in Revolution*, pp.483-7.

⁴ Woolrych, A. *Britain in Revolution*, p.488.

⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland 1651-1660* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1979), p.11.

However, Cromwell had left a substantial force in Scotland under the command of the talented commander, Lieutenant General George Monck.⁶

Monck proceeded to subjugate the rest of the country, capturing Stirling on 6 August and then Dundee at the beginning of September. A few days before, Colonel Matthew Alured and his men stormed Alyth in Perthshire, where part of the Scottish Committee of Estates was taking refuge. In his position as chancellor, the Earl of Loudoun commented that this was a sad blow for the resisters as it deprived the Scottish people of the central authority necessary to unite national efforts against the invaders.⁷ The conquests at Worcester and Alyth meant the virtual destruction of, respectively, Scotland's military and political independence.⁸ However, a number of royalist strongholds continued to display the standard of Charles II, namely the Bass Rock, Dumbarton, Dunnottar and Brodick Castles.

Monck, aided by the arrival of a number of new regiments of horse and foot, now busied himself with overcoming these last pockets of military resistance. At the beginning of September, Dundee was stormed and plundered by uncontrollable English troops. The excessive brutality displayed by the English soldiers has often been attributed to the recommendations of their leader. However, it appears that although Monck did grant permission for a full day of plundering, his men continued to loot for a further fortnight against his direct orders. On 15 September, the General finally issued proclamations forbidding plunder on pain of courts-martial and ordering the troops to restore all shops, cellars and warehouses to their Scottish owners.⁹

⁶ *ibid.*, p.11.

⁷ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth: Letters and Papers Relating to the Military Government of Scotland, from August 1651 to December 1653* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1895), p.xviii.

⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.15-16. Hale has written about the impact of war on civilian society and identifies the siege as the most drastic and direct civilian confrontation with the military. In instances where civilian populations aided the defence of their city, the conquering army little distinguished them from the professional soldiers. Furthermore, if the civilian was spared personal attack by the siege-army, it suffered in terms of the destruction of local homes, farmland and places of worship alongside being exposed to diseases frequently introduced by the conquering army. Often the longer a town resisted, the worse its surrender terms would be. Hale has written that whatever followed a surrender was ultimately determined by the mood of the victorious troops, the hold over them of their officers, the influence of a municipal government and the decision whether order or terrorism would be a better strategy. Indeed, the actions of the English army in Dundee can be viewed as a standard wartime response to a town that resisted and was eventually taken by storm. See Hale, J.R. *War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620* (Leicester: Leicester University Press in association with Fontana Paperbacks, 1985), pp.191-4 and written comments by Michael Seymour to the author on 2 February 2000.

The sack of Dundee gave the English command of the northern shores of the Firth of Tay and as far up the east coast as Aberdeen.¹⁰ At the beginning of the following year, Dumbarton Castle fell. However, the three other castles – all occupying key positions on the coast - remained at liberty, the most powerful man in Scotland, Argyle, maintained an equivocal position, and the Highlanders showed no sign of accepting English domination.¹¹

Overcome by illness, Monck was unable to complete his victory of Scotland and was succeeded in February 1652 by Major-General Richard Deane. In April, both Brodick Castle on the Isle of Arran and the Bass Rock were defeated. The first resulted from military victory; the second came about after a series of protracted negotiations with the owner of the Bass, John Hepburne, laird of Wauchton. After an eight-month siege, Dunnottar Castle was the last stronghold to capitulate on 24 May.¹² However, the cessation of open warfare did not mean that the Scottish people had relinquished every thought of resistance.

The relationship between Argyle and the English government is one of the most complex and uncertain elements in the history of seventeenth-century Scotland. Like many major political players in the seventeenth century, Archibald Campbell, the 8th Earl of Argyle, had experienced a rather unpredictable career. Since the fourteenth century, the Campbells had traditionally been reliable supporters of the king. However, at the onset of his political life, Argyle had opposed the political and ecclesiastical schemes of Charles I. He had supported the Solemn League and Covenant, acting as Commander-in-Chief in Scotland and helping to suppress a Royalist uprising under the Marquis of Huntly, who also happened to be his brother-in-law. Argyle suffered greatly as a result of Montrose's victories, resigning his commission as commander-in-chief and witnessing the repeated ransacking of his property.¹³ After the brief reinstatement of Charles II to the Scottish throne, Argyle

¹⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.16.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.62.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp.62-3.

¹³ See Willcock, J. *The Great Marquess: Life and Times of Archibald, 8th Earl, and 1st (and only) Marquess of Argyll (1607-1661)* (Edinburgh and London: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1903) and Paterson, R.C. *No Tragic Story*, ch.1.

refused to take part in the desperate plan to invade England. However, he was far from ready to publicly accept English dominance of Scotland.

It does seem likely that Argyle did consider military resistance to the English. He was not only the chief of the Campbells but hereditary overlord of vast stretches of land in the west and north of Scotland, having the greatest manpower resources in the entirety of the country.¹⁴ During the siege of Dundee the English command had received reports that Argyle was attempting to organise a force of 4000 men in support of the resisters.¹⁵ However, on 9 November William Clark repeated the Earl of Wemyss's assertion that Argyle had not raised new levies in the west since Charles II went into exile.¹⁶

It seems, then, that Argyle preferred a safer and more ambiguous method of opposition. For over a decade he had been at the centre of public affairs but found that, ultimately, his career brought more suffering than reward. Moreover, he had made many enemies and was burdened by debt.¹⁷ For a time he favoured the proposals of Loudoun regarding the revival of the powers of the Committee of Estates. In a letter to Monck dated 15 October, Argyle appealed for the cessation of hostilities. His intentions appear to have been twofold: on the one hand, he aimed to seek permission, by means of a settlement, for the meeting of a Scottish Parliament, consisting largely of the remnants of the Committee of Estates. On the other, he was attempting to strengthen his own position by presenting himself as a vital mediator between both sides.¹⁸

I judge no man, yet I desire to know from you, as one having cheife trust in this Kingdome; if it were not fit that some men who have deserved Trust in both Kingdomes may not (meet to good purpose) in some convenient place, as a meanes to stop the shedding of more Christian blood?

¹⁴ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.20, 93.

¹⁵ See Monck's narrative of the Scottish conquest on 22 September in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.17.

¹⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.20.

¹⁷ Paterson, R.C. *No Tragic Story*, p.15.

¹⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.21.

Monck replied that, without direct agreement from the Parliament in England, it was not.¹⁹

Both the English and Scottish populations were deeply suspicious of Argyle's intentions and motives. On 19 November, Argyle had arranged to meet two of Monck's officers but never turned up, pleading illness. By the beginning of 1652, the situation had become further enflamed by the arrival of eight Commissioners appointed by the English government to organise the civil government and prepare for the union. In March, Argyle sent a series of letters to the Commissioners declaring that any reports they may have heard concerning his hostility towards them were maliciously deceitful. "I make it my humble desire therefore to your Honours that I may know what is required of mee, who shall be very willing to doe all which with a safe conscience I may for the peace and union of this Island." On 26 April, James Campbell, the deputy of Argyllshire, accepted the Tender of Incorporation on behalf of the shire's inhabitants at Dalkeith.²⁰

It was the march into the Highlands by Deane and Lilburne that ended any possibility of double-dealing. Argyle's formal acceptance of the union and his agreement to obey the Parliament in England gloatingly appeared in the newspaper, *Severall Proceedings in Parliament*, for 2-9 September.²¹ Moreover, Argyle also promised that he would, to his utmost ability, endeavour that both his family and the inhabitants of Argyllshire accept English authority. If members of his family failed to follow his lead, then he was obliged to report them to the nearest English garrison or to the Commander-in-chief of Scotland.²² He agreed that either he or his eldest son, Lord Lorne, would willingly surrender themselves to the Parliament or Council of State as hostages, if ordered. He also agreed to fulfil the assessment and other taxes on his shire.²³

¹⁹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.333, 335.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.37-8, 40-1,

²¹ "My duty to Religion, according to my Oath in the Covenant always reserved, I doe agree (for the Civill part) of Scotland being made a Commonwealth with England, That there be the same Government without King or House or Lords derived to the people of Scotland, and that in the mean time this can be practicable I shall live quietly under the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England and their authority." See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.50, n.1.

²² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.48-9.

²³ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times: Being Life and Times of Archibald 9th Earl of Argyll (1629-1685)* (Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1907), p.33.

Argyle later declared that he had signed this treaty under threat.²⁴ However, the settlement between the Earl and the English authorities did allow the former some form of independence. Argyle was permitted to follow the religion of his choosing without restriction. A supplementary treaty declared that except under some unforeseen emergency, no other English troops would be brought into Scotland. Three of the five garrisons that were occupied by the English – at Loch, Kincairn and Taret - were quickly attacked and disbanded by Highlander rebels. Although Argyle claimed to disapprove of these acts of aggression, he was no doubt pleased that only the garrisons at Dunstaffnage and Dunolly Castles were re-established.²⁵

By invading the Highlands, therefore, the English authorities managed to kill two birds with one stone: overcoming resistance in this unwieldy place and, as a result of this success, showing Argyle he had no choice but comply to English rule. Preparations for the Highland expedition had been progressing since March. On 9 June 1652, Deane appointed Colonel Robert Lilburne to command the campaign.²⁶ Deane wrote a series of letters to the Parliament in England narrating his experiences in the Highlands. On 6 July he wrote from the Vale of Baggonoye that his troops were experiencing difficulties due to the want of provisions. 'It is a dismall place where we scarce see a man or beast for 40 miles together.'²⁷

This was not the only time that English commanders would struggle with the inhabitable terrain of the Scottish Highlands. As Deane complained, the territory was mountainous and unfamiliar while it held a tradition of widespread violence and lawlessness.²⁸ Moreover, the foreign troops viewed the customs and conduct of the

²⁴ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xxii.

²⁵ Significantly, when Lord Lorne was being tried for his life in 1685 after his disastrous attempt to invade Scotland after the Restoration, he declared that he had organized and carried out these attacks as proof of his loyalty. If this is true, it seems unlikely that his father did not realise he was the perpetrator. See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxii-xxiii, 55, 60, 366, 368 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.35.

²⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xx, 45.

²⁷ Another letter illuminated current English thought towards Argyle. Deane reports that Argyle was entertaining his military commanders with great civility 'and makes many pretences of love and affection, but who knows not that it is but constrained? The Marquesse is no stranger to the art of Politicks; but we shall make use of him accordingly.' See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.361, 363.

²⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.17, 67.

Highlanders with a mixture of haughtiness and distaste. A report from Inveraray in August 1652 declared:

... the inhabitants are savage, cruell, covetous and treacherous; the men are proud of their trouses, belted plades and bonnets, as a Spaniard is of his high-crowned hat, long cloak and rapier; indeed they differ in their pace, for this tells his steps in the pace of a grand paw, whilst that runs like a roe, over hill an dale, till time stops him. Their women are pure Indian complexions, unparalleled for deformity; their inhabitants are like so many inaccessible charnel houses for nasty noysomness...²⁹

The Highlanders proved a challenge to the occupying English army when they stole food or money to improve their standard of living. However, as Dow has argued, the Highlands provided the largest threat as a potential centre of a *politically* inspired rebellion.³⁰ This explains why the English authorities realised how important it was to suffocate the leadership potential of Argyle. An essential element of seventeenth-century Scottish life was the extent to which clan chieftains and semi-feudal aristocrats controlled the behaviour and loyalties of ordinary Highlanders. As head of the Campbell clan, Argyle not only held considerable influence over the loyalties of all the inhabitants of Argyllshire, but shouldered responsibility for their behaviour. An important clause in the Articles of Agreement stipulated that Argyle would not only obey English rule himself, but would ensure that all inhabitants of his shire would follow his lead.³¹

However, the English authorities underestimated the influence of other Highland chieftains and the readiness of their clansmen to support a rebellion. Their own beliefs about the advantages of English political involvement blinded them to the popular Scottish attitude towards the Union. In other words, the same snobbishness that governed English attitudes towards Highland inhabitants, led to the assumption that every sensible Scotsman must view the theory of the Commonwealth as being hugely advantageous for their country. Edmund Ludlow wrote:

²⁹ Ibid., p.67.

³⁰ Ibid., p.67.

³¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.67 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.34.

This proposition of union was cheerfully accepted by the most judicious amongst the Scots, who well understood how great a condescension it was in the Parliament of England to permit a people they had conquered to have a part in the legislative power.³²

In reality, most Scots shared an understandable fear that the Parliament in England would not hesitate to exploit the weaker nation to its own benefit.³³

Was it in the best interests of the English Commonwealth to not only pacify but impose political union with Scotland? After all, the net annual costs in Scotland during the Protectorate for civil government and, even after considerable reductions, for the army were at least £130 000.³⁴ The jubilant mood after the English victory at Worcester was replaced, probably at the personal insistence of Cromwell, by references to a more moderate form of union between the two countries. The most obvious reason for the Commonwealth to extend its occupation of Scotland to political union was the desire to protect the revolution in England by, as Dow has written, exporting some elements of it to Scotland. As the Covenanters had earlier realised, security lay in union and uniformity.³⁵

In a way, the English intentions towards Scotland were admirable. The Commonwealth promised a certain amount of self-government rather than a straightforward military occupation. As Firth has written, the general aim was to reconcile Scotland to the union by even-handed justice and good government.³⁶ Seven Commissioners for the administration of justice were appointed in May 1652, three of

³² See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xxv.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.xxv.

³⁴ Ashley, M. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1962), p.91.

³⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.30-2. The English Commonwealth pursued a parallel battle against Royalist sympathisers in the colonies at around the same time. On 3 October 1650, the Long Parliament issued an act that totally forbade not only European but English commercial intercourse with the Royalist colonies of Antigua, Barbados, Bermuda and Virginia. In 1652 Sir George Ayscue set out with an English fleet to subdue Barbados. In the subsequent articles of settlement, Ayscue agreed that the colonists were free to trade with all nations that were in amity with England. Similar agreements were made with the other Royalist colonies when their submission followed. In 1654 Cromwell organised an expedition against the Spanish West Indies which resulted in the capture of Jamaica. There were clearly powerful economic motives behind this offensive considering that, during the Protectorate, the principal product of the West Indies was sugar closely followed by tobacco. However, Cromwell's reasoning was also deeply personal – an attack on the Spanish empire appealed to his nationalist outlook and his Protestantism. See Ashley, M. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, pp.132-6.

³⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxv, xxxiv.

whom were Scottish. Military tribunals that had often ordered capital or corporal punishment for theft, beggary and prostitution were replaced by regular civil courts. It does appear that many common Scots took confidence in this new system, pursuing law cases against their social superiors.³⁷ A general feeling existed even among Scottish people that the English rule of law was more merciful to the Scottish than the Scots had previously been to one another.³⁸

This was perhaps no more apparent than in the Scottish Highlands. The clan system, often viewed through a haze of romanticism, was patriarchal and authoritarian. Through bonds of kinship and mutual obligation, it allowed a large lower class to be controlled and exploited by a small aristocracy. In order to maintain their own power base through military might, clan chiefs tended to encourage as many families as possible to settle on their lands. This meant that the majority of the Highland population had insufficient land and struggled with rent arrears but were still emotionally attached to their territory.³⁹

One of the first acts of the new government of union was to offer an amnesty to all vassals and tenants who had followed their clan leaders or lords in opposing the English during the Hamilton expedition of 1648 or the recent war in the name of Charles II. Providing the common folk voluntarily put themselves under the protection of the Commonwealth within thirty days, their estates or means of survival would not be touched.⁴⁰

The English also had a subtler reason for promoting a sense of general political fairness. Even before the Glencairn uprising broke out, the government realised that the best method of decreasing Scottish protest was to mobilise popular opinion in its favour. In other words, to win the common people over to their side against the

³⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.53.

³⁸ For instance, see John Nicoll's *A Diary of Public Transactions*, quoted in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxviii, xxix.

³⁹ Whyte, I. and K. *The Changing Scottish Landscape 1500-1800* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p.154.

⁴⁰ Certain members of the nobility were also given legal immunity for former offences. For example, Lilburne requested Cromwell to grant the Laird of Mersington, Thomas Kerr, 'all possible favour that lawfully you may' because he had displayed great civility towards the English forces in the area. See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.77.

lords.⁴¹ After all, the more inhabitants who accepted political and military domination, the less expensive – in terms of finance and manpower – it would be to maintain that control.⁴² *Mercurius Scoticus* advised: ‘Free the poor commoners, and make as little use as can be of either the great men or clergy.’⁴³ Indeed, many measures proposed by the Declaration of the settlement had a double consequence: those that were aimed at destabilizing the social and political leadership of Scotland often favoured the common folk.⁴⁴

However, the English – in their position as foreign conquerors - were at an immediate disadvantage. The barbaric behaviour of substantial numbers of English troops during the recent war had left a bitter aftertaste in Scotland. There was a general feeling of discontent among the occupying soldiers who were campaigning away from home: the weather was extremely cold and they did not possess adequate provisions or shelter.⁴⁵ Although commanders forbade plundering and violence, the existence of a series of proclamations against looting suggests that the troops were inclined to ignore initial commands concerning that issue. The prolonged rampage at Dundee is an example of this: although Monck forbade violence after the first 24 hours of occupation, it did in fact continue for the best part of a fortnight. Moreover, although contemporary commentators such as Burnet and Nicoll did praise the discipline of the occupying army, its conduct was called into question in as late a time as late as the Glencairn rising. In the summer of 1653, Lilburne issued a number of proclamations threatening those who engaged in poaching, exhortation and sexual immorality with ‘severe punishment’.⁴⁶

Other sources of popular opposition were officially sanctioned. Ordinary Scottish people were not only expected to accept English dominance but to help pay for it. This took the form of free accommodation for the English soldiers and a financial contribution – the assessment or the ‘cess’. This government followed the Scottish

⁴¹ Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*. Volume 3 – 1653-1655 (London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903), p.86.

⁴² For a contemporary illustration of this notion, see Sir Thomas Urquhart’s tract *EΚΣΚΥΒΑΛΛΑΥΡΟΝ; or, the Discovery of a most Exquisite Jewel* published in 1652 and quoted in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xxvi.

⁴³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxxiv-xxxv.

⁴⁴ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.52-53.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.23.

⁴⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxxiii-xxxiv, 139, 142, 155, 162.

system in using parishes and presbyteries as the unit of collection and the burden on local populations was heavy.⁴⁷ In December 1651 Lambert and Deane appear to have ordered sums amounting to one and a half times the monthly maintenance of 1649-51 on Scotland. If applied to the entire country, this would have meant a burden of £13 500 stg. per month. It is unlikely that the Commonwealth was able to extract such a high rate, certainly not in every parish.⁴⁸

On 18 February 1652, the Commissioners decreased the general assessment to £10 000 per month. It is probable that officials in Scotland realised that the financial burdens on the Scottish people were unrealistically heavy. The Scottish assessment never covered the cost of garrisoning and its contribution towards the large navy, created by the Long Parliament, was insignificant.⁴⁹ However, as Ashley has argued, despite the actual yield of the assessments in both Scotland and Ireland failing to approach the amounts expected, this system of taxation must have been one of the most ably managed and prolific in the history of seventeenth-century public finance.⁵⁰

Added to the cess were sequestrations on the estates of those gentlemen who had not been granted lawful immunity by Cromwell. This property was often passed to high-ranking English officials who were posted in Scotland. For instance, Colonel Ingoldsby was given the property of Hamilton. Major General Lambert was assigned land which was valued at £1 000 stg. a year while Monck rented for half as much. Funding required to construct citadels, at places such as Inverness and Ayr, and smaller forts was also provided by sequestrations.⁵¹

The cost of troop maintenance and salaries was, despite reductions in August 1652, vast. In June 1652 there were eleven regiments of foot and seven of horse. To the cost of maintaining the army was added that of troop wages: in the early months of August 1652, the cost of salaries had amounted to £36 000 stg. per month. Even officials in

⁴⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.23-24.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.24.

⁴⁹ At the Restoration the navy was still three quarters of a million in debt. See Ashley, M. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, pp.47, 155-9. For a discussion of the status of the navy under the Rump see Worden, B. *The Rump Parliament 1648-1653* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.166-8.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.80.

⁵¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xxxii and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.87.

England who wholeheartedly supported the union, admitted that, in relative terms, Scotland suffered a greater fiscal burden than their own country and had not gained financially by being part of the Commonwealth. Set against this expenditure was the fact that genuine cases of hardship were often dealt with parsimoniously by the English government. After a devastating fire in Glasgow, those who lost their homes shared between them a sum of £1 000 stg.⁵²

It was not only the common people who suffered the financial burden of foreign occupation. Ironically, the establishment of a fair judiciary caused problems for a selection of the Scottish nobility. During the political instability of the previous years, many noblemen and clans-leaders had accumulated vast debts. The English restoration of peace – albeit superficially – meant that creditors began to push for payment. As Firth believes, the end of the debt amnesty was a contributing factor to outbreak of the Glencairn uprising.⁵³

Hostility towards a financial and military yoke was combined with religious objections to the union. Opposition by the Presbyterian clergy was highly influential on popular opinion.⁵⁴ By this time, the kirk had lost much of its former power as a result of bitter factionalism and noble dissatisfaction. At around 1650, the Covenanters – supporters of the 1638 National Covenant in defence of Presbyterianism in Scotland - had split into two main factions: the Protesters and Resolutioners. The Protesters were so named because they protested against the General Assemblies of 1650 and 1651 in which they were in a minority.⁵⁵ The Remonstrants were virtually identical with the Protesters. The second group, the

⁵² The author of a letter published in *Several Proceedings in Parliament*, 24 June-1 July 1652, admitted the sight of the burnt-out city drew tears from his eyes. Both English troops and natives of Glasgow lost loved ones and property in the blaze. ‘Some men, both Souldiers and others, have lost their lives in using their indevours to quench the fire. Many poor families that before lived well are now by this fire utterly undone, and brought to great extreamity. It would pitty the heart of any man almost to behold so sad a spectacle.’ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvi, 360 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.87.

⁵³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xxix.

⁵⁴ In the Highlands, there was significant Roman Catholic survivalism, aided by small numbers of Roman Catholic missionaries sent from Ireland and sponsored by Rome. Written comments by Michael Seymour to the author on 2 February 2002.

⁵⁵ The General Assembly was the governing body of the Church of Scotland which originated at the Reformation to represent the three estates of the realm.

Resolutioners, was rather more moderate than the extremist Protesters or Remonstrants.⁵⁶

The English Parliament hoped to employ this disharmony to its own advantage. Indeed, the army made no attempt to prevent high-profiled representatives of both factions meeting with the expectation that this would intensify their mutual hatred. Although both the Resolutioners and Protesters denounced the union in their official manifestoes, officials in Scotland hoped for the possibility of reconciliation with leaders of the latter faction. Lilburne expressed his belief that the Remonstrants were peaceably inclined as late as March 1654, believing their dislike of Charles II and links to Independency might permit an English alliance.

In February 1653, the English authorities had appointed a leading Protester, Patrick Gillespie, as Principal of Glasgow College. It is likely that Lilburne believed Gillespie's commitment to Presbyterianism was malleable and that he would be able to influence the rest of his church party.⁵⁷ More suggestive that the Protesters might sympathise with English rule was the fact that they - unlike the Resolutioners - failed to pray openly for the king and to support the Royalist insurgents. However, Lilburne underestimated Protester adherence to the Covenant which not only implied a wholehearted support of Presbyterianism, but also defended the institution of kingship.

The government's failure to exclusively support the Presbyterian order provoked the most direct source of clerical hostility. The Declaration concerning the settlement of Scotland gave Commissioners the right to oversee the running of universities, colleges and schools - in other words, wide-ranging powers to alter institutional aspects of the Presbyterian order that were contrary to the English rule of law. In February 1652, the Commissioners of Parliament declared that all worshippers - including those belonging to the Church of Scotland - who acquitted themselves in a 'peaceable and inoffensive' manner would receive official protection. However, the Scottish clergy viewed the protection of small groups of Anabaptist and Independent congregations

⁵⁶ The Resolutioners supported the Resolutions rescinding the exclusive policy of the Act of Classes.

⁵⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.101.

as intolerable.⁵⁸ While admirable in nature, the granting of religious tolerations had a subtler motivation. Just as many measures of the Declaration were aimed at weakening the power basis of the nobility and gentry, the English government also wished to undermine the status of the Presbyterian clergy.

When Presbyterian ministers fully realised the Commonwealth's stance on the issue of religion, their condemnation was loud and ringing. On 31 January 1651 the reaction to a letter signed by a number of Presbyterian clergymen illustrated the variance between English and Scottish religious thought. The English commentator of the missive viewed its authors as hypocritical and narrow-minded, describing how they:

vilifie the proceedings of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of England, and scandalize the practice of the officers of the Army in their most religious performances, and to perswade both to lett them have a liberty to tyrannize both over the bodies and soules of the poore people under pretence of giving them liberty of conscience, which cannot stand with the principles of any who are lovers of true freedome either to their outward or inward man.⁵⁹

Lilburne's decision to dissolve the meeting of the Resolutioners in the General Assembly at Edinburgh in July 1653 was condemned by both church parties. Lilburne had unusually acted on his own initiative after his letter to Cromwell of 12 July had received no response by the date of the gathering eight days later. He no doubt feared that the assembled delegates would seek contact with the Highlanders at a time when the insurrection was gathering momentum. After all, there was a widespread belief among English politicians that the clergy were largely responsible for encouraging the Scottish hostility that culminated in the late war. Lilburne himself regarded the Resolutioners with a blind antipathy, believing they were devoted to inciting the common Scottish people to revolt. Ironically, there is little evidence to suggest that the Resolutioners directly participated in the Glencairn rising.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xxxvi-xxxvii; Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.89 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.28.

⁵⁹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.33.

⁶⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.102, 105.

Lt. Col. Cotterell dissolved the meeting of the General Assembly by declaring that the delegates had received no lawful permission to meet. He forced them to relinquish their commissions and ordered them to leave Edinburgh by eight o'clock the following morning. A leading Resolutioner, Robert Ballie, complained to a London correspondent: 'Thus our General Assembly – the glory and strength of our Church upon earth – is by your soldiery crushed and trod under foot without the least provocation from us at this time either in word or deed.'⁶¹

With this act of force, the hope of finding Protester allies was forfeited. The Protesters were just as disgusted by the dissolution of the General Assembly as were its primary victims. Indeed, in rather farcical circumstances, several members of the Protester party were also in attendance at the disrupted meeting. They had intended to express their party's displeasure at the Resolutioners constituting themselves as a General Assembly but instead had found themselves being manhandled by Cotterell and his men. On 21 July, the Protesters duly complained in writing to the English government about the way in which it had dissolved the meeting of the General Assembly and its justification for doing so. Although the Protesters had no intention of admitting that the meeting of their church rivals was lawful, they did believe that representatives of the church should have wide rights to organise and conduct meetings without the authority or interference of English officers.⁶²

Lilburne's second open act against the church led to an even greater sense of understanding between Protesters and Resolutioners. On 2 August, the Commissioners for Visiting and Regulating Universities issued a proclamation that forbade praying for the king or preaching in his favour. The Protesters were now forced to make their positions in relation to Charles II more explicit: they chose to take part in the now illegal practice of praying for him. The fact that the English had little success in banning prayers for the monarch is suggested by a further proclamation of January 1654 again banning the practice.⁶³

⁶¹ Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.89-90.

⁶² Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.103-104.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.104.

Despite the inevitable attempts by the clergy to incite the Scottish people against the English authorities, the fact still remains that the majority of the community - regardless of their feelings towards English rule - still managed to tolerate it quite peacefully. Their involvement in civil affairs provides a good example of this compromise. In a way, the Scottish laity was torn between heeding the wishes of their ecclesiastical leaders and safeguarding their secular interests by accepting the orders of the English Parliament. The laity realised that compliance with the English was necessary if they were to maintain some degree of political and social power in their localities, alongside retaining more material effects such as land and property.⁶⁴

In January 1652, the Commissioners from Parliament issued summonses to the shires and burghs, requesting them to send representatives to Dalkeith to hear what was on offer concerning the settlement of Scotland. Each shire was to elect two deputies and each burgh one deputy⁶⁵ and, in theory, they would be granted a degree of independence. In reality, however, at Dalkeith they were expected to hear and accept what the Parliament required of them and their country.⁶⁶

Dow has discussed the elections in shires and burghs in order to illustrate the predicament of the laity. Indeed, controversy over these elections disrupted the Commissioners' timetable and resulted in a number of areas sending insufficient deputies or men with illegitimate commissions. In Edinburgh, for instance, John Denholm and James Fairburn were elected but Denholm, a member of the extreme Presbyterian party, refused to serve. The Commissioners from Parliament refused to accept only one deputy so William Thomson was elected in the place of Denholm. The English reported that many areas compromised by electing one deputy whose interests lay in maintaining the Covenant, and another who devoted himself to the business of civil affairs and the terms of the settlement.⁶⁷

Although hostility to the proposed union was widespread in Scotland, it would be misleading to suggest that it was comprehensive. As an English army officer commented shortly after the arrival of the English Commissioners at Dalkeith: "The

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.41.

⁶⁵ Three of the larger burghs, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen, were granted two deputies each.

⁶⁶ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.36, 40.

Scotch people know not what to say to them now that they are comed: some are glad and some are mad now that they see we are in earnest, and that their power is like to change.”⁶⁸ Indeed, some constituencies greeted the early stages of union with genuine eagerness. The most enthusiastic assenters were Wigtonshire, Lanarkshire and Dunbartonshire and the burghs of Wigton and Rutherglen. These areas, along with the more moderately enthusiastic Buteshire and the burghs of Burntisland, Rothesay and Dumbarton, shared no obvious dislike for Presbyterianism, longing for toleration or related lay interests. Dow believes that the peculiarity of these areas in the west and south-west is more likely explained by extreme internal divisions in its communities. This is not the only time that the English were quick to benefit from local feuds and antipathies between different sections of Scottish society.⁶⁹

It is clear that the grievances that inspired the Glencairn uprising were economic and religious as well as political in origin. Although the majority of the Scottish community realised that compliance with the English authorities would be the safest method of bolstering their political and economic well-being, Scotland had been ravaged by the war and the subsequent occupation meant a heavy financial burden. The Parliament in England regarded the plight of everyday Scots with a distinct lack of understanding. They believed that their inauguration of political and administrative reform would limit the influence of the clergy, nobility and gentry on the lower classes. The English authorities regarded the Highlanders in particular with surprising naivety: although Lilburne suspected the Highlanders of plotting rebellion as early as February 1653, he had little idea that they were intent on opposition from the time of his first campaign through Highland territory at the end of the late war.

A Year of Preparation: June 1652 – June 1653

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.40.

⁶⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.34.

⁶⁹ As Dow has written, the only obvious similarity is that – apart from Burntisland – these places all lay in the west and south-west of Scotland which had experienced a history of cooperation with England. The Whiggamores in 1648 were followed by the Remonstrants of 1650 in their willingness to consider cooperation with the English in order to protect their own political standing. Moreover, this area also saw the birth of the Protesters. See Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.42-3.

Charles II maintained contact with his former subjects in Scotland after his disastrous defeat at Worcester. From his exile in Paris, he discussed with Highland chiefs the possibility of retrieving his regalia and personal belongings that had been left at Dunnottar Castle. The defeat of Dunnottar meant that the royal agent, Major-General Vandruske, who was sent to Scotland in March 1652 was forced to abandon the project. The exiled King, however, was encouraged by the onset of the Anglo-Dutch war and a missive sent three months later 'from diverse of the most considerable nobility' in the Highlands. As Dow has argued, Charles II and his supporters saw Scottish support as a useful backdoor which might eventually allow manipulation of the entire European sphere.⁷⁰

On 25 June Charles commissioned John Middleton as Lieutenant-General of Scotland, directing the nobles of Scotland to assist him in every possible way. Charles II explained to his leading supporters in Scotland that he had chosen Middleton because of his consistent loyalty, his military experience and skill, and his popularity among the Scots. However, like many men of his time, Middleton had fought both for and against the Royalist cause. He had supported Montrose when the latter had been a Covenanter and had also fought on the side of the Parliamentarians at Marston Moor. However, his later exploits were more pleasing to the King. He had become an Engager, fighting at Mauchline Moor and Worcester. He was imprisoned at Worcester but had escaped the tower in what seems to have been the usual disguise of the time - women's clothes - and had joined the King at St. Germain.⁷¹

Letters have survived between Sir Edward Hyde and Charles II's secretary, Sir Edward Nicholas, that praise Middleton's 'great modesty, courage and judgement'.⁷² Middleton's political connections with English royalists would have been viewed as potentially useful by an exiled monarch whose ambitions exceeded the rule of Scotland. On the other hand, Middleton was not an enthusiastic supporter of Presbyterianism and was never fully accepted by the Church party.⁷³

⁷⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.68-69 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xlii.

⁷¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.69 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.37.

⁷² At this time Hyde was living with Charles II in the role of chief advisor and general co-ordinator of the Royalist effort. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.53.

⁷³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xlii, 66.

The first task with which Middleton was faced involved gathering sufficient funding and resources to give the Royalists a chance of victory. He realised his best chance of revenue was from rich Scottish nobles living out of the country and from the courts of Europe. However, despite letters from Middleton and visits from his agents, only a paltry amount was collected on behalf of the King over the next few months. On 9 August, Charles II instructed Middleton to pursue contributions from the Dutch. However, soon after his arrival in Holland in autumn, Middleton fell seriously ill with tertian fever and royalist plots were temporarily suspended.

The cessation in activity irritated the most prominent Highland chiefs, notably Angus Macdonald of Glengarry who was acting chief of the royalist forces in Scotland. In July, he had sent a messenger, Captain Malcolm Smith, to the King, requesting commissions and limited assistance and stores. Smith arrived in Holland in October and had reached Paris by mid-November. He informed Charles that Glengarry, the clan Fraser, the lairds of Maclean and Macleod, the chief of Clanranald and many others had each vowed to raise an army of 1000 men. Others had promised a few hundred each.⁷⁴

On 20 December, Charles drew up a document detailing the appointment of six commissioners, including Glengarry, to act as a Council of War until Middleton was able to take command. In addition, they were granted the authority to appoint a provisional commander-in-chief. The letter also instructed the Highland chiefs to lay aside all personal jealousies that had hindered the royalist cause in the recent war:

You shall proceede in all your actions without any faction and personall animosityes, suppressing all antient grudges and differences which may have been formerly, and be heartily united with and to all who heartily desire to advance Our service, and to free your Country from the servitude it now suffers under, which being the common cause, is to be only and zealously intended, remembring that your enemyes will not make lesse use of any divisions and differences which shall happen amongst your selves for your owne destruccion, then of their armyes, and hope to compasse it sooner by the former than by the latter.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.69.

⁷⁵ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.69.

It is clear that these rivalries were present from an early stage in the Glencairn uprising. In August 1652, Charles II's secretary, Nicholas, wrote that although Glengarry had not the authority, military skill or wisdom to take command, he had no intention of bowing before Middleton. Moreover, it appears that Glengarry believed he should become the Earl of Ross as a reward for his loyalty and hard work. It is little wonder, then, that Charles viewed the drafting of commissions as a very sensitive business.⁷⁶ He decided to send the instructions to Middleton for his opinion before they were despatched to Scotland. Middleton objected to the notion of an interim commander so the proceedings were halted.

In late 1652 and the following months, Colonel Robert Lilburne, the acting Commander-in-Chief of the English forces in Scotland, became increasingly troubled by suspicions of a royalist uprising. Lilburne had succeeded Richard Deane as commander-in-chief of the English forces in Scotland in December 1652 as a temporary replacement until a more experienced officer could be spared from the Anglo-Dutch conflict. Lilburne himself admitted he was not the best choice but the fact that his military career had mainly involved duties in Scotland and the north of England singled him out as an obvious candidate.

Lilburne's military career had started around 1643 when he was appointed lieutenant in Richard Crosse's troop and, three years later, he was given a position as colonel in the New Model Army. After the first war ended in 1647 he was stationed in Northumberland to protect the county from moss-troopers. At the end of 1647 Lilburne was one of seven commissioners entrusted with the management of the northern forces and, by the summer of the following year, appears to have been acting as almost a second in command to Major-General Lambert. Lilburne's regiment took part in Cromwell's campaign in Scotland, losing a considerable number of men. Parliament rewarded him lands in Scotland to the value of £300 a year to reward his loyalty and efficiency.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp.xliv, 53.

In November 1651 Lilburne began his longest stretch in Scotland, taking part in the expedition to suppress mutinous Highlanders. It was at this time that Lilburne first came face to face with Glengarry who refused to acknowledge English authority. In December 1652 Major-General Deane was ordered to return home and appointed Lilburne to replace him in a provisional capacity. Lilburne would remain in Scotland until April 1654. Throughout his time in Scotland, he behaved with the soberness and conscientiousness that appears to have characterised the rest of his career.⁷⁷

On 22 January, Colonel Matthew Alured, governor of Ayr, informed Lilburne that Glengarry was trying to gain support for the royalist cause. Two days later, Glengarry was reported, probably by the governor Colonel Fitch, to have been at Inverness, organising a meeting to discuss military strategy against the English. It appears that Glengarry viewed this meeting as a failure in terms of attendance and enthusiasm but although most clan leaders were hesitant in offering open encouragement, they nevertheless did not prevent all members of their clan from joining the rebels. This would give their clan a good footing with whichever party prevailed. The main outcome of the rendezvous was the agreement to raise a 'flying army' of 1500 or 2000 men.⁷⁸

In the same month the English officials in Scotland received more evidence that the exiled King had not given up his chances of re-instatement. It was reported from Brechin that a messenger from the King had arrived in Fife, but had made his escape to the Highlands before the English were able to apprehend him.⁷⁹

By February, Lilburne realised that the royalist forces were gathering strength. He relied largely on information from the two main allies of the English in Scotland: the Marquis of Argyle and Sir James Macdonald of Sleat.⁸⁰ Glengarry's movements were sufficiently significant to be mentioned in *Mercurius Politicus*, under the dates of 5 and 12 February 1653:

⁷⁷ One of Lilburne's minor hobbies was objecting to scandalous officials. At one point he recommended that a sheriff should be removed from his position because he was 'too much addicted to tipping, and that which is called good fellowship.' For an expansion upon Lilburne's military career see Firth, C. *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*. Volume 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), pp.264-273.

⁷⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.79.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.79-80.

About three days ago, the Marquis of Argyle was with Colonel Lilburn, and yesterday he sent him a letter signifying the great and frequent meetings of Glengary with the other Highlanders and Islanders; but what the intent of their meeting may be, he saith he knows not.⁸¹

On 15 February, Sir James reported to Fitch that Glengarry and some other Highlanders 'intend to disquiet the peace of the Country' but assured him that he and his family had no intention of joining the rebellion. The underlining message of the letter was Sir James's hope that, should his lands be invaded by these men, the English would defend him.⁸² However, it is likely that both he and Argyle had more knowledge about the planned rebellion than they saw fit to reveal to the English forces.⁸³ After all, at this point, it remained more advantageous for both men to nominally support the English but, in reality, to hedge their bets. Lilburne certainly urged Argyle not to take neutral ground. In a letter dated 18 February, he requested that the Earl should employ his influence to prevent as many men as possible from joining the Royalist effort.⁸⁴

Lilburne appeared to view the royalist plots with little concern in the early months of 1653. In his letter to Argyle, referred to above, he declared 'nor doe I value much all that can bee done against us by such a rable'. However, he no doubt wished to appear confident in the face of an ally whose loyalty was always in question. His letters to Cromwell are perhaps more revealing. A day after his contact with Argyle, Lilburne wrote to Cromwell requesting more officers 'nott knowing ere longe what neede there may bee of them...' On 22 February, he informed him of his fears that the rebels were attempting to find support in Northern Ireland. This was an anxiety that the Council of State took seriously, employing vessels to patrol between the north of Ireland and the Western Isles.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.40.

⁸¹ *Mercurius Politicus* p.2248 quoted in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.79, n.2.

⁸² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.82.

⁸³ In a letter to Cromwell dated 22 February, Lilburne describes Argyle as protesting his ignorance at the notion that some of his clansmen were involved in the plot. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.88.

⁸⁴ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.85.

⁸⁵ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.85, 86 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.80.

In March, Lilburne's confidence was strengthened by the success of his armies in dispersing a meeting of 2000 Highlanders and his belief that the English defeat of the Dutch would dishearten the rebels.⁸⁶ On 16 April he reported that the success of the English fleet had checked the designs of the rebels and that the country was currently in a peaceful state. Three days later he reported that he found a great inclination among ordinary Scots to submit to the Government while the Highlanders' posture seemed only defensive in nature. However, he also warned Cromwell that England had not provided the means to encourage other inhabitants of the country to cooperate.⁸⁷

The apparent tranquillity of April lulled Lilburne into a false sense of security. On 22 April, Kenneth Mackenzie, the 3rd Earl of Seaforth, wrote to Charles II to declare that there were a great number of subjects willing to die for the King, including himself.⁸⁸ Like many of the leading men in the Glencairn uprising, Seaforth had a background in political dissent. His father had fought alongside Montrose. On 29 May, Seaforth expressed his loyalty by carrying out the first overt act of rebellion.⁸⁹ With the help of an agent of the King named Crawford, Seaforth captured a group of English sailors who had landed on the island of Lewis from a privateer, *The Fortune*, under the command of Captain Edwards.

Seaforth demanded that Edwards sacrifice his ship for use by the King's men. Edwards refused. The situation failed to escalate further – after some days of threats and deliberations, the sailors were released. Lilburne had retaliated by imprisoning the Tutor of Seaforth alongside other principal members of the Mackenzie clan, recommending to Cromwell that their chief's estates should be sequestered. A few months later, Colonel Ralph Cobbett with several war frigates landed on the island without resistance. Seaforth had, by this time, left Lewis for the mainland, leaving his illegitimate brother in charge. The English forces maintained a presence on the island, primarily because they suspected that the Dutch might send ships to the isles of Lewis

⁸⁶ It is likely that English victories did upset Royalist morale. The importance of Dutch aid in achieving success was viewed as paramount by the rebels and the English were aware of this belief. *Mercurius Politicus* for March 3-10 contains a letter from Dalkeith written on 1 March suggesting that the naval victories had halted the planned uprising. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.80, n.2 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.88.

⁸⁷ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.96, 122, 127.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.127-128.

and Mull carrying supplies for the Royalists, or worse, still try to obtain possession of these isles or of Shetland and Orkney.⁹⁰

On 31 May a meeting of royalist supporters, including Lord Balcarres and Sir Arthur Forbes, was reported to have taken place at Killin in Perthshire. This was followed by similar rendezvous on 3 and 4 June at Rannoch.⁹¹ On 16 June, announcements by Lord Balcarres and Sir Arthur Forbes took the form of a more formal declaration of war than Seaforth's exploits on Lewis the month before. Balcarres wrote to Lilburne explaining that since the articles of capitulation that he had concluded with the authorities in 1651 had been broken, he had retired 'somewhat further out of the way where he might have some more hope of freedom.' Two days later, Sir Arthur Forbes renounced his former surrender to the English.⁹²

Both Forbes and Balcarres gave the mountainous region of Lochaber as their address. Moy in Lochaber was to be the location of a meeting of 1 July organised by the Earl of Glencairn on 13 June. It is important to bear in mind that although it is possible to pinpoint the formal meetings that took place between leading Royalists, these were interposed with a number of smaller, less official gatherings. The Royalists were forced to take part in lengthy and protracted negotiations to foster support and formulate plans and their best chance of avoiding English confrontation in this period was to keep on the move.⁹³

The next event of major significance was the appointment of an acting commander-in-chief. Towards the end of 1652, a messenger from the 9th Earl of Glencairn, William Cunningham, had arrived at the court to offer service to Charles. Glencairn was a Lowlander who was one of the few Royalist Scottish noblemen at the beginning of the Civil War in 1642 but was later made Lord Justice-General by Parliament. In the early 1640s, he had been a member of the Hamiltonian party of 'royalist covenanters' and

⁸⁹ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.41.

⁹⁰ This fear was valid as Glencairn and Middleton had offered the Dutch ports and fishing stations on any island of their choosing. Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.41-42, Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.81, 93 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.xlix-l.

⁹¹ See Mercurius Politicus pp.2536, 2546. Quoted in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.144.

⁹² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.146-147 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.43.

⁹³ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.82.

had opposed sending a Scottish army to England. In 1648 he had supported the Engagement⁹⁴ for the rescue of Charles I and thus lost his Parliamentary position and his earldom the following year.

Like many Royalists and Engagers, Glencarin was able to make a political comeback in March 1651 when he was appointed to the committee that managed the affairs of the army. He stayed behind in Scotland during Charles II's invasion of England in order to raise new levies and, in October 1651, was connected with Loudoun's attempts to summon Parliament at Killin. Until his appointment as commander-in-chief of the rebel army he seems to have maintained a rather low profile.⁹⁵

On 4 March 1653, Charles sent Glencairn a commission appointing him outright commander-in-chief during Middleton's absence. Again interpersonal rivalries led to the appointment being made in secret. The King informed his new commander-in-chief that if it seemed as if the Highlanders would voluntarily accept his leadership, he should show them a commission similar to that of December. In the new commission the names of Seaforth, Balcarres, the laird of Pluscardine and Glencarin himself were added to the previously selected six commissioners, and they were instructed to select a commander. Charles added his personal recommendation in Glencairn's favour but told the Earl that if the Highlanders refused to accept him, he should hand over his royal commission. Perhaps in spite of, rather than as a result of, Charles's clumsy attempts at diplomacy, Glencairn was duly elected leader in late June or early July.⁹⁶

Caught between Two Fires: The Dilemma of the Scottish Community

The hopes and activity of the Royalists were dependent upon the amount of support they were able to muster among chieftains, nobles and lairds, and the ordinary people

⁹⁴ On 26-7 December 1647, representatives of the moderate Covenanters agreed at Carisbrooke to invade England on the behalf of Charles I on the condition that he accepted presbyterianism in Scotland and give it a three-year trial in England.

⁹⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.295.

⁹⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.99. Glencairn was not forced to produce the secret commission but did use it at a later date, when inter-personal rivalries obliged him to justify his leadership.

of Scotland. It appears that the majority of the Royalists' fellow countrymen preferred to remain neutral until it became more obvious which side stood the better chance of victory. The course of the Anglo-Dutch war was, therefore, an important factor. This policy of fence-sitting was one which Argyle himself favoured, but his prominence in Scottish politics meant he was forced to either publicly submit or to declare outright war.⁹⁷

It is unlikely that a Royalist victory would have been advantageous for Argyle. He had been a high-profiled Covenanter and had opposed both Charles I and, later, the military schemes of the King's son. His traditional hostility to the house of Hamilton – to which Glencairn was related – meant that he would be placed in a precarious position should Charles II be restored by means of the 1653 uprising. Moreover, Argyle had financial reasons for supporting the occupying power. Argyle and his shire had been experiencing long-term economic difficulties. In October 1652 the inhabitants of Argyllshire had been pressured into agreeing to pay their assessment but from the summer of the following year, Argyle was regularly requesting an abatement. He also probably hoped that by co-operating with the English, the enormous debts he had contracted on behalf of Scotland during the 1640s would continue to be repaid by public taxation.⁹⁸

One of the main reasons why the case of Argyle has received such attention both from contemporaries and historians is the fact that though the Earl ultimately decided to side with the English, his son was actively involved in the uprising. This not only led to a filial breach but provoked vehement division within the Campbell clan.

Whether or not Argyle supported the English in his heart will perhaps never be determined. Although he did obediently inform Lilburne at the first signs of the rebellion, Sir Robert Murray informed Charles that Argyle was acting purely out of necessity and that, should the time be ripe, he would willingly join the King's cause.⁹⁹ Certainly Lord Lorne had pre-empted this sentiment as early as 1649 when he begged their Majesties not to suspect that his father approved of the trial and execution of

⁹⁷ Fence-sitting was arguably a characteristic response of a wider Interregnum public to all forms of conspiracy. Written comments by Michael Seymour, 2 February 2000.

⁹⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.91.

Charles I. However, his letter to the royal couple continued by promising to serve Charles II, even if his father was ‘aneemie to Monarchicall Government’.¹⁰⁰

Lorne’s own loyalties – though perhaps not entirely unwavering – were certainly less ambiguous. On 14 April 1653 Lorne wrote to Charles to assure him of his ‘constant loyalty and affection’ and his desire to actively promote the royal cause. On 2 November Charles – in a set of instructions to Captain Shaw – mentioned that he was pleased with Lorne’s and his younger brother’s professions of loyalty and that he expected the inhabitants of Argyllshire to follow their example.¹⁰¹

Contemporary commentators on the politics of prominent Scotsmen such as Gilbert Burnet and John Nicoll have suggested that Argyle and Lorne were actually engaging in a complex political collusion in order to secure their family against total ruin no matter which side prevailed in the long run.¹⁰² Such ploys were not so outlandish or peculiar to Scottish society at the time but, in the case of Argyle and Lorne, there is little evidence to support the suspicion. Although Argyle’s biographer, Willcock, believes that Argyle’s sympathies with the Parliamentary party in England were thorough and based upon well-grounded principles, it seems more likely that practical reasons of self-preservation motivated the Earl’s political loyalties at this time. Lorne, on the other hand, does seem to have been a Royalist from the first. It is not convincing to employ his later opposition to Charles II as evidence of collusion because this hostility was borne out of disappointment in the rule of the restored monarch. Certainly, at the time of the Glencairn uprising, Charles II had little doubt of Lorne’s sincerity and later rewarded him by saving the earldom and his family’s property when his father was executed in 1661.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.88, 161, 134.

¹⁰⁰ Lorne’s biographer, Willcock, believes that his subject had become newly of age when he wrote this letter. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xlvii and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.22.

¹⁰¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.120, 254.

¹⁰² Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.23.

¹⁰³ See Paterson, R.C. *No Tragic Story*, pp.13, 15-16 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.23. Willcock, who has also written a biography of Argyle, believes that Lorne’s monarchism may have been a teenage reaction to the counter views of his father. “Those who hear one side of matters very much insisted upon are often inclined from intellectual weariness to revolt from it, and to think sympathetically of its contrary; and if they have inherited any of the force of character displayed by their parents they are likely to manifest it in promoting what the latter would have abhorred.” It is perhaps relevant that both of Argyle’s sons supported the King. See Willcock, J. *The Great Marquess*, p.288.

While Lorne was assuring Charles II that his father was a supporter of monarchy, Argyle was writing to Lilburne about the politics of his eldest son. Both sets of correspondence provide a real insight into the strength of kinship and clan ties in Gaelic society and illustrate the potential damage arising from familial political divisions.¹⁰⁴ It was Lorne's overt acts of disloyalty that gave Argyle the impetus to declare his open support of the Parliamentary cause.¹⁰⁵ Argyle's letters to both Lilburne and Lorne, therefore, can be viewed as sharing the same goal: to demonstrate loyalty to the Commonwealth. Argyle's aim was to emphasise to the English commander that he was not only personally committed to the Commonwealth but that he had attempted to curb the seditious movements of his son.

Probably on 20 July 1653, Argyle wrote to Lilburne to inform him of a heated confrontation that had taken place between him and Lorne two days earlier. '...I desired to know if I was cleare in my owne family, whereupon I cal'd for my eldest sonne, that I might put him to it (as I did) to declare to mee if he was free from engagements with these people now stirring, and that he would assure mee he would never engage with them.' Lorne informed his father that he had not resolved to join the rebels but would not promise never to do so. Argyle admitted that immediately after this interview, Lorne rode to Glenurquhay in order to meet with Sir Duncan Campbell of Auchinbreck, McNaughton and Sir Arthur Forbes among others.¹⁰⁶

Included with this correspondence was a copy of a letter to Lorne in which Argyle vowed to disinherit him should he continue to disrupt the peace of the country. The fact that this note was intended for English consumption suggests that it was as much a protestation of loyalty to Cromwell as it was a paternal warning:

...if yet for all this God harden your heart to your owne destruccion and tryall or trouble of others, Then let all the guiltinesse and prejudice that may follow such waies fall on your selfe, and cleave to you and your adharents and noe other belonging to you; And let all the curse and judgements pronounced in God's word against disobedient children to

¹⁰⁴ See MacInnes, A.I. *Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788* (Phantassie: Tuckwell Press, 1996), especially pp.111-112.

¹⁰⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.92.

parents come upon you and pursue you til they overtake you, and let nothing you take in hand prosper, for you are a crosse (I may say a curse) to your father and heaviness to your mother, if you continue in your waies.¹⁰⁷

Whether or not this letter represented his true feelings towards his son, Argyle's actions, from this time onwards, did impress the English more than his words. In the late summer and early autumn of 1653, he not only provided regular information to the English about the movements of his son, but provided military assistance to the English army.

In August, the English army – led by Col. Cobbett – invaded the isles of Lewis and Mull, partly as a response to Seaforth's earlier exploits on Lewis. The army landed on Lewis on 20 August where they met with little resistance and proceeded to establish garrisons at Eilandonan Castle in Ross-shire and Stornoway.¹⁰⁸ Mull, however, was under the control of Maclean of Duart, an ardent royalist sympathiser. On hearing of the English threat, Maclean accompanied by Glencairn, escaped to Tiree. At this point Argyle stepped in to use his influence with the islanders of Mull, convincing them to submit to English domination, to pay their assessment and to withhold rent from Maclean. A further garrison was then established at Duart Castle.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, when Cobbett was obliged to return to the Lowlands by land as a result of a storm that wrecked his three vessels, Argyle again provided assistance. He ensured that Cobbett and his men were safely guided through Argyllshire to Dumbarton, personally conducting them to Loch Goyle. Viscount Kenmore, who had hoped to utilise the situation by embarking on a surprise attack, acknowledged the involvement of 'oure unnaturall cuntriman' in thwarting his plans.¹¹⁰ Argyle also warned Col. Reade of a possible encounter in the western parts of Stirling in early September.¹¹¹ Significantly, the Royalist leaders regarded Argyle as a base traitor. At the end of

¹⁰⁶ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.165-166.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.166-167.

¹⁰⁸ See Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes* (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1856), p.65.

¹⁰⁹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.94 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.186-187, 202-203.

¹¹⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.94.

1653, Glencairn wrote to Charles II's agent, Major Strachan, demanding that, above all, he desired a royal warrant declaring Argyle a traitor. He requested, in addition, a number of unaddressed letters intended for various clan chiefs, "assuring them that his Majesty will deliver them from under those bonds and yoakes which Argyle has purchased over their heads."¹¹²

Within Argyle's own clan, Campbell of Glenorchy was one of the chief clansmen who chose to follow his chief's lead in accepting English rule and appears to have suffered from Royalist looting as a result. On 14 September 1653, Lilburne ordered that Glenorchy should have his assessment abated for a further six months – in addition to a previous six months of abatement – to reward him for not acting against the Commonwealth.¹¹³ On 21 July 1653 Argyle informed Lilburne that most of the inhabitants of Argyllshire were following his policy towards the English rather than that of his son. However, he did acknowledge that Lorne's 'desperate designes' had convinced a handful of gentlemen, namely McNaughton, Colin Campbell of Strachur (Straquhurre), Ardchattane, and most prominently, Sir Dugald of Auchinbreck.¹¹⁴

High-ranking Campbells were not the only prominent figures in Scotland who faced such a dilemma. Many members of the gentry and nobility found themselves in a similar no-win situation. If they supported the rebels, their property might be sequestered by the English or devastated by English troops. If they co-operated with the English authorities, their lands and houses faced potential plunder by resentful, desperate bandits.¹¹⁵ It seems, therefore, that personal ideological commitments were often less motivating than the protection of material interests.

Even men who were later viewed as some of the most determined supporters of the King showed signs of hesitation in the first year of the rebellion. For instance, in mid-June when Glencairn summoned members of the Highland nobility to a meeting at

¹¹¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.203.

¹¹² It seems that Glencairn's attempts to vilify the Marquis of Argyle may have been part of an attempt to quell conflict among the rebel leaders by focussing all hatred on the Campbells. Of course, this had the double effect of dismissing Lorne's contribution to the cause. See Stevenson, D. *Alasdair MacColla and the Highland Problem in the Seventeenth Century* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1980), p.273 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.308-309.

¹¹³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.222.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.168-169.

¹¹⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.90.

Lochaber, John Macdonald, (Glengarry's brother), Macneill of Barra, Maclean of Lochbuy, and Argyle's son, Lorne, all failed to attend. Macdonald and Macneill justified their absence by informing Glencairn that his letter had arrived too late for them to make the journey in time. Lorne used a similar reason but added that he had neither horses nor servants to allow him to travel. Maclean of Lochbuy, meanwhile, gave no explicit reason for not attending.¹¹⁶

Sir James Macdonald of Sleat chose to follow a similar path of co-operation as Argyle. He decided to comply after a period of uncertainty during which the Royalists in exile considered him a firm supporter of their cause.¹¹⁷ However, when Sir James wrote to Colonel Thomas Fitch in February 1653 to inform him of Glengarry's movements, he also indicated that the English would have to reward him for future support. In other words, his decision to co-operate was ultimately dependent upon his material interests and safety rather than political beliefs.¹¹⁸

The Earl of Atholl had lands in Perthshire that were under threat by both the Royalists and the English armies. It is likely that Atholl wished to support the Royalist cause but his tenants failed to heed the Royalist demand to pay their assessment to them rather than the English. Glengarry viewed this act of disloyalty with severity, threatening Atholl with plunder in reprisal. At this point, Atholl decided he stood to lose more from his neutrality than otherwise and immediately wrote to Charles II, declaring his allegiance and apologising for his former silence. However, until November the Earl remained a rather low-profiled supporter of the Royalist cause.¹¹⁹

Atholl's dilemma was echoed in the behaviour of his tenants and the wider Perthshire gentry. Both groups made it clear that they would rather co-operate with the English than risk their short-term material well-being. Landholders who lived on the Highland-Lowland divide were particularly aware of the risks posed by marauding bands of Highland insurgents who had little respect for their property or land. On 15

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp.87-88.

¹¹⁷ In December 1652, Sir James was appointed one of the king's commissioners in Scotland and as late as May 1653, he may have attended a Royalist meeting in the northern Highlands. See Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.89.

¹¹⁸ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.82.

¹¹⁹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.88 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.141, 183-184.

June, several members of the Perthshire nobility and gentry residing at Blair presented an engagement to Lilburne, promising not to act against the government.¹²⁰

Though he was far from an ideal military commander, Lilburne proved himself an able politician during the Glencairn rising. He realised at any early stage that English policy towards the Scottish people – namely, the demands of the assessment, the inflexible enforcement of the laws of debt and the forfeiture of property - was contributing to material hardship and providing fuel for the rebellion. On 21 June 1653, Cornet Robert Baynes wrote to his cousin, John Baynes, about the state of the community at Dalkeith during the current occupation:

Land is here exceeding cheap – much to sell, none to buy, besides the assessments take up above a 5th part of the rents throughout Scotland, and the people are so generally poor in some parts, all their stock being lost, that they are not able to pay for lands (I mean tenants) so much as formerly by 1/3.¹²¹

Lilburne realised that the most effective way of suppressing the rebellion was to improve the material positions of ordinary people. This led to a policy that represented, at times, a rather clumsy mixture of coercion and conciliation.

The issue of assessment was particularly problematic: on the one hand, taxation was necessary to maintain the army and its fortifications in order to fight the Glencairn uprising; on the other, it provided one of the primary sources of popular hostility utilised by the Royalists. A second difficulty to be considered was the fact that the English army was, to a certain extent, reliant upon the Scottish nobility and gentry to help them collect the cess. The devastation caused by the rebels' campaign meant that it was increasingly difficult to raise the full yield of taxation.

Initially, Lilburne employed a system of ad-hoc measures as rewards or encouragements to various shires. In February 1652, he granted the people of Badenoch, a district in Inverness-shire, an abatement of the assessment for a month 'because I know nothing will encourage them more than their owne particular

¹²⁰ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.145 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.89.

¹²¹ Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.59.

advantage.¹²² He then embarked on a more far-reaching policy aimed at alleviating the financial burdens of the Scottish people. In the summer of 1653 he ordered a revaluation of all the burghs and shires in the country in order to correct the relative amounts of assessment attained from each region. A conference in Edinburgh of July – attended by one or two gentlemen from each locality – agreed that the total amount of tax should be reduced from £10 000 per month to £8500. Despite the fact that the English government failed to support Lilburne’s initiative or answer his complaints, by late January 1654, only £6000 per month was actually being collected.¹²³

Assessment abatements continued to be employed as rewards to those who displayed particular co-operation. For example, the Marquis of Argyle, Sir James Macdonald of Sleat and the laird of Glenorchy all had parts of their cess waived. In addition, Lilburne also considered granting compensation to those people whose land and property had suffered at the hands of Royalist insurgents. In February 1654 he recommended using sequestered estates of leading rebels to recompense trustworthy Scots. He also suggested that all loyalist countrymen should be exempt from sequestration themselves.¹²⁴

To alleviate the burdens of heavy debt, Lilburne recommended that Judges should have the authority to defer legal proceedings in certain cases. In December he formally proposed that sentences should be moderated, execution of Judges’ decreets should be postponed, and creditors should be obliged to accept land as payment for debts or for the interest on debts. Moreover, he recommended that all sequestrations and forfeitures should be cancelled except for those ruled on a handful of leading offenders. However, the Council of State did not take note of Lilburne’s advice concerning debt and sequestrations until, respectively, 16 May and 12 April 1654 when he was no longer commander-in-chief of the English forces in Scotland.¹²⁵

Although the greatest instrument of the Royalist forces was arguably their nationality, their constant attempts to procure money, men and supplies often alienated the local

¹²² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.95 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.90, 99, 109.

¹²³ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.109-110.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.111-112.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.112-113.

population. In July, the laird of Grantully was ordered to hand over his house to the insurgents. The Royalists also seized so many horses to the extent that the English were forced to order all horse-owners to either sell or lend their horses to the occupying army. By the latter half of 1653, the rebels had embarked on a policy of attempting to force communities to pay their cess to them rather than the English. Perhaps inspired by Lilburne's approach, the Royalists also favoured a more diplomatic approach at times. For instance, Kenmore ordered the population of Crieff to relinquish three-quarters of their assessment payment to the Royalists but keep the last quarter for themselves. It seems that these tactics were successful as Lilburne complained in December that only half the assessment could be safely gathered.¹²⁶

When Glencairn was appointed acting commander-in-chief, it is uncertain how many Royalists were actively following his lead. Firstly, because the Royalist forces were split into small bands, it is difficult to estimate their total number. Secondly, it appears that the English tended to underestimate the strength of their enemy while the Royalists themselves exaggerated their numbers. The latter group, of course, were determined to convince potential foreign allies that they were worthy of financial support. In August, it seems likely that the combined forces of Lorne, Glengarry, Glencairn, and one of the Maclean chiefs amounted to a paltry 1300 men.¹²⁷

Lilburne was convinced, even at as late a stage as April 1653, that the inhabitants of the western shires – along with members of the Protestant church party – were willing to accept English rule. He was no doubt swayed by the fact that the west and south-west of Scotland did not cause much trouble for the English army and perhaps believed that the division between Highlanders and Lowlanders was such that they would never unite against a common foe. However, it appears that Lilburne's belief in the loyalty of the western men was misplaced. The nature of the rising meant that the Royalist forces had their bases in the Highlands. Lowlanders who were living alongside English forces had little choice but wait for a surge in the rebellion before they could show support for its leaders.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp.83, 108.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp.82-83.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p.100.

To a certain extent, Lilburne must have realised the extent of the powers of the Highland chieftains. In July 1653 he enforced old Scottish Acts of Parliament in order to make chiefs responsible for the behaviour of their tenants and clansmen. The intention was to give communities responsibility for the activities of all of their members. Furthermore, restrictions were placed on the movements of people in order to prevent, in particular, beggars and vagabonds making their way into the Highlands to increase the Royalist forces. Lilburne also sanctioned measures ensuring that strangers who entered towns in order to stir up Royalist feeling could be easily detained.¹²⁹

These attempts to enforce loyalty by controlling the Scottish population were largely unsuccessful. It is true that from the summer of 1653 onwards, gentry from a number of shires and districts did voluntarily offer engagements of loyalty to the occupying force. For instance, the gentlemen of Renfrewshire and Argyllshire gave a promise to remain loyal to the Commonwealth in August 1653 which they extended to the entire population of their shires. However, the number of repeat proclamations concerning movement restriction suggests that the English army was not managing to successfully suppress the Royalist threat.¹³⁰

The people of Scotland were placed in a difficult position throughout the Glencairn rising. Nobody was certain whether or not English rule would prevail although, considering the resolution of men such as Argyle, Royalist defeat seemed the best bet. However, predictions of future victory did little to shield the common folk of Scotland from present upheaval. If they supported the Royalists they stood to lose English assistance; if they proved their allegiance to the Commonwealth they risked their property and livelihoods. Those who remained neutral, meanwhile, could rely on the protection of neither party. In many cases the rebellion led to entire communities losing large sums of money, horses and supplies. Moreover, when Monck and Middleton finally arrived on Scottish soil to do battle, both men ordered the destruction of vast amounts of crops and fertile land. This was intended both to prevent enemy troops from utilising the land, and to punish members of the Scottish

¹²⁹ Ibid., pp.106-108.

¹³⁰ Ibid., pp.106-108.

community who were deemed to be disloyal. In other words, the worst was still to come.

The Height of the Uprising: July 1653 – April 1654

From July 1653 onwards the rising began in earnest. *Mercurius Politicus* reported that on 27 July the standard of Charles II had been set up at Killin in Perthshire:

On that day 40 horsemen well mounted, with swords and pistols, went by the house of Donne (6 mile from Sterling) towards the Highlands. And on the 28 Sir Mungoe Murray went thither in the night, and Kenmore with 100 horsemen crossed the water of Clyd, and went by Dundreth towards Killin, and is returned into the south to raise more forces; for they intend speedily to attempt against us. On the 30 Glencairn was at Maggrigors house in Loth Kennoth, and listed three men there, to each he gave 2s. 6d., and sent them for the Lowlands, there to be in readiness, and return upon notice. All possible care is used to receive him if he comes into these parts. Bohauty is a place of no strength, but the best of the three ways out of the Highlands. On the 31 July in the night divers horsemen went through Stratherne by the house of Oadoth into the Highlands.

As Willcock has written it is difficult to give any kind of connected narrative of the guerrilla warfare that took place in Scotland from the summer of 1653 to the following thirteen or fourteen months. On 6 August Lilburne informed Cromwell that he believed that the rebels were intending ‘suddaine action’ and that they were daily joined by Lowland stragglers and men from Ireland.¹³¹ Of course, at this point the Royalists still hoped that the arrival of Middleton with large numbers of men, supplies and finance from the Continent, would prove to be the decisive turning point in the struggle. A similar hope that the Dutch fleet might render aid was quashed by its defeat on 31 July at the hands of Monck at the battle of Texel.¹³²

¹³¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.186n, 190 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.47.

It appears that the first Royalist gathering place was the in region between Lochaber and Inverness. On 13 August Lilburne wrote to Col. Thomas Reade, the governor of Stirling, that Glencairn was not far north of Badenoch and heading towards Inverness and that he was joined by around 1200 men including Lorne and Glengarry. Lilburne added that the inhabitants of Badenoch and Atholl had refused to join the rebels. However, it seems that as far south as Stirling was at risk from the insurgents. A few days later, in a letter to Cromwell, Lilburne reported that Kenmore and the Tutor of Macgrigar had retreated to the Hills after attempting to stir up support in the area between Dumbarton and Stirling. Another group of rebels were in Frazers' country to the east of Inverness. It seems that the rebels were capitalising on rumours which suggested that Middleton and the Duke of Gloucester were to land on 20 August at Portpatrick with 10 000 men.¹³³

On 18 August, Lilburne wrote that the news of the Dutch defeat had provoked the rebel forces to disperse from Bonnywher near Ruthven Castle in Badenoch. Lorne and M'Lean (M'Clane) had returned to their own territories in Argyllshire and the Isle of Mull respectively. Glencairn and Glengarry had travelled in the direction of Lochaber while the Macgrigars had travelled to the west of Stirling. The rumour that the Highlanders had dispersed is illustrated in a letter from Argyle to Lilburne dated 30 August 1653. He passed on the information that only Kenmore, McNaughton and Lorne were still 'bent on mischief'.¹³⁴

It seems that the insurgents realised they were insufficiently strong to engage in open combat so had temporarily broken up into marauding bands and had travelled to various parts of the country. On 3 September, Argyle reported that Lorne and his cousin Kenmore were in Menteith, a few miles to the west of Stirling, Glencairn was on the Isle of Mull and Seaforth had returned to his territory in Kintail. Col. Reade, the governor of Stirling, attempted to pursue Lorne and Kenmore but with little success. A skirmish took place at Aberfoyle at which both sides declared victory. Reade only managed to kill two or three of the insurgents for the remainder quickly

¹³² Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.91-92 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.47.

¹³³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.194-195.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.196, 197-198n.

retreated into the Hills where the lack of provisions and approaching nightfall had stopped the English army in their tracks.¹³⁵

Why could Lilburne's forces not make quick work in dispatching the Royalist enemy? The main reason the Royalists were not immediately defeated is that they rarely engaged the English troops. Like Monck in the previous Scottish campaign, Lilburne's attempts to surprise the rebels were usually unsuccessful and he was forced to accept a war of attrition.¹³⁶ The strategy of the Royalists was to avoid outright confrontation in favour of attacking small parties of the enemy and engaging in sudden raids. The native Scots had the geographical advantage, being more familiar with the challenging Scottish territory and able to retreat into the mountains when necessary. The conflict then took the form of a kind of guerrilla warfare, focussing on the Highland territory. Such tactics were also useful in enabling the Royalists to divide their men and, therefore, keep apart feuding Highland leaders.

Moreover, the Scottish community, albeit for the greater part unwilling to commit to open rebellion, refused to inform the English of the rebels' movements. In November 1653 Lilburne was complaining of the 'secret contrivements and encouragements the generality of this people affords [the Royalists]'. In another report of the same month he writes that even victims of the Royalists' plunder refused to provide intelligence and that every appearance or victory of the enemy seemed to heighten the spirit of the Scottish people.¹³⁷ This is perhaps the greatest indicator of the feelings of the majority of native Scots. Encouraged by every Royalist victory, the ordinary people of Scotland were illustrating their innate hostility to their foreign conquerors.

In Parliament it was feared that a Scottish uprising might spur the English royalists into action. Although limitations of space render it impossible to discuss royalist activity outside of Scotland in any depth, it is relevant to give some indication of how the Glencairn uprising was viewed by English Royalists. Did the supporters of the King in England actively help their political brethren in the north? Underdown has

¹³⁵ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.203, 204 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.50.

¹³⁶ Kenyon, J. & Ohlmeyer, J. (ed.) *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.315.

¹³⁷ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.271, 273.

written a narrative of Royalist conspiracy in England between the years 1649 and the eventual restoration of monarchy by Monck and the moderates in 1660. He argues that although their plots were without exception unsuccessful, a full understanding of the Revolutionary era demands a study of the conservatives as well as the revolutionaries. 'The Royalists were the most intractable internal problem of every government between 1649 and 1660; none could establish itself permanently without either assimilating or suppressing them.'¹³⁸

The year 1653 was a gloomy time for most English Royalists. In March Daniel O'Neill observed that: 'There is no talke of Presiberian nor Royalist at present.' The following month, Crowell's expulsion of the Rump Parliament failed to initiate any kind of Royalist action. Underhill has written that the defeat at Worcester was followed by a period of Royalist quiescence that was greater than even the failures of 1648 and the execution of Charles I initiated. The best the Royalists in England could hope for before the summer of 1653 was to furnish the exiled court with information about their activities; to send money for the King's upkeep, and to protect the lives of his leading councillors.¹³⁹

The court in Paris continued to be plagued by damaging rivalries and intrigue, and it was rumoured in England that any financial contribution given to the exiled King would be frittered away in frivolity and extravagance. Moreover, supporters of the King feared the espionage of the Council of State, namely the activities of a number of agents. For instance, Joseph Bampfield provided invaluable information to John Thurloe who was appointed secretary to the Council of State in 1652 and was particularly effective in gathering intelligence. Bampfield had been a colonel in the

¹³⁸ Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960), pp.vii-viii. Underdown's beliefs concerning the importance of the Royalist threat must be tempered by the argument that a more damaging, albeit less dramatic, challenge to Interregnum parliaments was their inability to overcome popular indifference. For instance, the ill-fated Rump Parliament was unpopular to the extent that even its own members shared little more than the desire to sit in it. In January 1650 the act for the national subscription of the engagement was passed which imposed a test of loyalty to the Rump. Initially aimed at Levellers, it quickly targeted royalist and Presbyterian opposition to the regime. The apologists for the test, particularly John Dury, argued that the Rump should be obeyed even if it was a bad government. This subordination to a de-facto government was highly influenced by the loyalist sentiment, elevated to a political theory in the Rump period, that a bad government was better than no government and that the best way of altering the current regime was to influence things from within. See Worden, B. *The Rump Parliament*, pp.26, 44, 87, 228-9.

¹³⁹ Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660* , pp.56, 63.

King's army and had served as a royalist spy during the war in London. He arrived in Paris in September 1653 and was able to send large quantities of information to Thurloe in England. Although he continued his involvement in Royalist circles until at least 1655, he provided a persistent source of anxiety for the King who always doubted his loyalty.¹⁴⁰

However, by choosing policies of incomplete repression or half-hearted conciliation, the regimes of the Interregnum failed to smother support for the King. The political instability in the summer of 1653 encouraged Royalist hopes for a turn in fortune. As in 1649, it was inhabitants of counties in western England who led the Royalist revival. In August 1653 a plot was uncovered to seize ports in the west, starting with the garrison at the Dorset town of Poole and extending as far as Portsmouth. The leading agent in the plot was Robert Phelips of Montacute, who had been involved in the royal escape after Worcester. The Cromwellian authorities were aware of the existence of a plan even before the arrival of Phelips in England in early July. He was duly imprisoned in the tower but it was not long before he escaped.¹⁴¹

After the discovery of the western plot, the English Royalists again played at quiescence until the exploits of their Scottish counterparts provided further scope for optimism. The adventures of Colonel Wogan, described by Underhill as 'romantically improbably' injected some life into the Royalists and provided some publicity value.¹⁴² In November 1653 Colonel Edward Wogan sailed from France into England where he recruited twenty-one men in London and rode off with them to join Glencairn.¹⁴³

Edward Wogan was the third son of Nicholas Wogan of Blackhall, County Kildare. In March 1645, at around the age of twenty, he was commissioned as Captain in a crack regiment in the New Model Army. However, the release of Charles by the Scots seems to have marked the beginning of his support for the King. He was ordered to take his troop into Worcestershire in October 1647 and await its disbandment. Wogan

¹⁴⁰ Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660* , pp.60-3. See p.37 for Bampfield's involvement in Scottish conspiracy and the quarrel between Balcarres and Glencairn.

¹⁴¹ Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660* , pp.57, 67-70.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p.71.

¹⁴³ Woolrych, A. *Commonwealth to Protectorate* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.323.

decided to desert Parliamentary service and instead to move his body of mounted men – along with some Worcestershire Royalists - some 300 miles into Edinburgh. It is possible that, on the way, Wogan and his men carried out a coup against Carlisle Castle, releasing a number of Royalist prisoners.

After acting as part of the advance guard in Hamilton's abortive expedition of 1648, Wogan escaped to Scotland and then returned to Ireland where he was ordered to raise a regiment of horse by the Marquis of Ormond. During his attempt to recapture Fort Passage, Wogan was taken prisoner and sent to Cork to await trial by courts-martial. His subsequent escape illustrates the extent of his charm and persuasiveness as his gaoler went beyond turning a blind eye and actually accompanied Wogan back to Ireland. After rejoining Ormond, Wogan eventually accompanied him to France. He then returned to Scotland where he joined Charles II at Stirling and took part in the unsuccessful invasion of England. Indeed, Wogan assisted Charles's escape from the battlefield at Worcester. He spent 1652 with the King in Paris and, the following year, became involved in the uprising in Scotland.

As soon as Wogan heard rumours of Glencairn's rebellion, he asked Charles for permission to leave for Scotland. It seems that the King, who was fond of Wogan, was initially reluctant to agree. However, he soon signed a number of dispatches addressed to Royalists in England commending Wogan and, moreover, permitted him to take a number of volunteers based at the court. To avoid confrontation with Cromwell's men whose intelligence reports led them to believe that Wogan would travel through Lancashire, he instead rode up the East coast with the intention of recruiting in Durham and Northumberland.

Wogan and his party left Paris on 3 November 1653 and reached London where they dressed in the uniform of Cromwell's cavalry to avoid detection. It was rumoured that he managed to recruit 200 men in the capital but, according to a letter Wogan wrote to Ormond, he had only obtained 21 additional supporters. The small band set out for Barnet Heath on 21 November and, covering around 25 miles a day, reached Durham nine days later. His decision to rest in Durham was reversed at the news of a Royalist success. As he wrote to Ormond on 3 December:

...our stay must not be long here, because the Highlanders have fell upon some of our quarters neere Edeenburgh (bold rogues) and cut neere a whole regiment offe, so that postes are speeded to London for fresh troopes, which will be the cause that we shall not rest and refresh our horses so long here as we did intent, but must make haste wee can possible to our regiments, to which place God in his infinite mercy send us safe.¹⁴⁴

It was an attack at Falkirk, referred to below, that had spurred Wogan to continue his journey. Realising that reinforcements would probably soon be arriving from England, he gave up his intention to recruit in Durham and Northumberland and set off on 4 December. A party of horse was despatched from Newcastle to apprehend them but was driven back. Wogan and his men also managed to capture small parties of Cromwellians on their way, taking eighteen men outside Berwick, and driving through the town in broad daylight. In the Lowlands, with the informal help of a number of moss-troopers, they captured a number of Lilburne's men and entered Peebles on 9 December. Wogan was able to persuade a number of dissatisfied moss-troopers to join his band permanently.

When Wogan advanced into Glencairn's headquarters at Loch Tay, he had – according to Captain John Gwynne - around one hundred supporters. Glencairn welcomed the Irishman and granted him a commission to raise a regiment of horse. In a letter dated 6 February, Clarendon wrote to Middleton that Wogan had reported his troops were 'above 1 500 horse and 8 000 foote'. He led his new regiment in a number of successful raids into Lowland territory thus winning the respect of Highlanders. Indeed, it was when Wogan's career had reached another pinnacle that an injury ended further adventures. During a skirmish with English troops from the Brazen Wall Regiment near Drummond and Weems, he was wounded in the shoulder by a sword-thrust.

Wogan certainly made a favourable impression on the Scottish Royalists with whom he fought side by side. John Graham of Deuchrie, who accompanied Glencairn throughout the rebellion, wrote of his valour and courage:

¹⁴⁴ Maurice, Sir Frederick *The Adventures of Edward Wogan* (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1945), p.153.

The colonel himself was unfortunately killed in a rencounter he had with the brazen-wall regiment of horse; but notwithstanding of the deadly wounds he had received, he rooted the troop, and killed the commander thereof, though it was said, that in all the civil wars they never had been beat. This brave gentleman had his wounds healed over: but from what cause I know not, they broke out again, and occasioned his death, to the great regret of all who knew him.¹⁴⁵

It was at Wemyss Castle where the surgeon, Robinson, failed to save Wogan from gangrene.¹⁴⁶ He died on 4 February 1654 at the age of twenty-four and was buried with a state funeral at the Church of Kenmore.¹⁴⁷

Wogan's adventures in Scotland are particularly significant because of his and his recruits' nationalities. Although he was certainly not the only non-Scottish Royalist who fell during the Glencairn uprising, his presence during the rebellion provides immediate evidence of a connection between Scottish Royalists and those in England.¹⁴⁸ After all, the month in which Wogan arrived in London was probably the same month that the leaders of the royalist conspiracy in England formed the 'Sealed Knot', a central committee formed in secret to direct the planning of Royalist conspiracy in England.¹⁴⁹ However, Wogan's involvement in the Scottish rebellion also illustrates that English Royalists viewed events in Scotland as a major hope of royal Restoration. As for Wogan, as Underhill has written, his venture might serve as an example for similar projects, but little more could be expected of it.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ Graham, J., of Deuchrie, 'An Account of the Expedition of William the Ninth Earl of Glencairn, as General of His Majesty's Forces in the Highlands of Scotland, in the Years 1653 and 1654' *Miscellanea Scotica* Vol. 4, 1820, pp.66-7.

¹⁴⁶ Captain Peter Mews, a royalist agent accompanying Middleton, compiled a narrative of the early part of the campaign. He wrote that, because Wogan's wounds were not serious, he must have died at the hands of an ignorant or villainous surgeon. Mews adds that Middleton passionately lamented the death of Wogan as did all those who fought alongside him. See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate: Letters and Papers Relating to the Military Government of Scotland from January 1654 to June 1659* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1899), p.120.

¹⁴⁷ Maurice, Sir Frederick *The Adventures of Edward Wogan*, pp.157-159. For Lilburne's account of the Wogan expedition see Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.296-297.

¹⁴⁸ There were other English men fighting with the Scottish rebels. One such man, Captain Goodfellow, was killed during a skirmish between Middleton's and Monck's forces in June 1654. See Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.75.

¹⁴⁹ Woolrych, A. *Commonwealth to Protectorate*, pp.321-322. For an account of the objectives and six members of the Sealed Knot see Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660*, Chapter 5, pp.73-96.

¹⁵⁰ Lilburne highlighted the fact that the Royalists in Scotland were communicating with their English counterparts in a letter to Cromwell in September 1653. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.227 and Underdown, D. *Royalist Conspiracy in England 1649-1660*, pp.71.

Lilburne feared that if the Royalists gained any real successes, their supporters – in Scotland, England and overseas - and would increase in number. His desire to show that he was capable of dealing with the crisis was hampered by his conviction that there were insufficient troops in Scotland attempting to quell the rising. His correspondence with England, therefore, displayed an uneasy mixture of optimism and anxiety. His letters to Cromwell are filled with pleas for more men, more ships, more money. However, the English Parliament was preoccupied by other concerns, particularly during the period of the Dutch war.

Even after the war had ended, the changes which followed the expulsion of the Long Parliament on 20 April 1653 and the conflict which led to the break up of the Little Parliament at the end of the same year disrupted the administration. As Firth has written, with three different Councils of State in one year, no continuity of policy could be expected.¹⁵¹

There were around 12 000 foot soldiers and 2 200 of horse officially stationed in Scotland. These were considerable numbers and of excellent quality, rivalling any force the Scottish government had launched against Montrose. However, through economic necessity, the troops had been reduced to their lowest possible strength. One of the most serious shortages was the deficiency of horse. On 24 December Lilburne wrote that there was not more than 1200 or 1300 fighting horses in the entire country. It is little wonder he resorted to seizing horses belonging to Scottish civilians. Moreover, many officers – believing the times to be quiet – had returned to England. Of the ten colonels and majors of the regiments, only one major had remained in Scotland.¹⁵²

The insufficiency of force was compounded by the fact that Lilburne was bound to protect a large number of garrisons. His troops were therefore divided among these bases and in various houses and castles along the Highland frontier. Moreover, the construction of new fortifications was threatened as Lilburne was struggling to find

¹⁵¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.lii.

¹⁵² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.1, 305 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.92, 94.

labourers' wages. The soldiers' allowances were similarly several months in arrears and the stock of available ammunition was dangerously low.

Alongside maintaining garrisons, the English strategy involved guarding routes between the Highlands and Lowlands which might be used by raiders, preventing more individuals joining the rebels, and suppressing bands of moss-troopers – as the English termed all small bands of mounted men carrying on partisan warfare in the Lowlands - on the Borders.¹⁵³

By September the English effort was aided by the re-emergence of one of the greatest sources of weakness in the Royalist camp. Traditional enmities were resurfacing and were judged by observers such as Robert Baillie as a major obstacle to Royalist victory: 'behold inward division doth hazard all at the very beginning.'¹⁵⁴ Although the cause of Charles II had promoted a sense of hitherto unheard of unity between Lowlanders and Highlanders, the traditional rivalries between clans of both regions had never been fully suppressed. Highlanders regarded themselves as having the greatest authority and freedom in Scotland while the Lowlanders wished to secure themselves from the 'barbarous cruelty and treachery' of their Highland brethren.¹⁵⁵

The Highland chieftains were, therefore, reluctant to serve under Glencairn, a Lowlander but, ironically, it was a fellow Lowlander, the Earl of Balcarres, who brought the hostilities to a head. Balcarres was already under suspicion because of his association with Col. Joseph Bampffield who was rightly suspected of being an English agent by the King. However, it appears that Balcarres's opposition to Glencairn was founded on personal dislike rather than political discord. In July and August the pair exchanged a number of biting letters concerning Glencairn's leadership. Balcarres then attempted to convince Lorne, Seaforth and Atholl that the

¹⁵³ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.48 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.xix.

¹⁵⁴ Laing, D. (ed.) *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*. Vol. 3 (Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, 1842), p.250.

¹⁵⁵ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.185. Smout has explained the origins of the division between Highlanders and Lowlanders. The ultimate rift between both regions was inspired partly by cultural factors. By the fourteenth century, English had become the universal language in the Lowlands but the Highlanders spoke Gaelic. Smout, T.C. *A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830* (London: Collins, 1969), pp.34, 42-4. For a discussion of the differences in Highland and Lowland life see Hopkins, P. *Glencoe and the End of the Highland War* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., c.1986), pp.11-12.

Royalists should be ruled by a committee rather than commanded by one man. Glencairn was then forced to produce his royal commission which stifled any debate. The feud, however, continued even after Balcarres left Scotland for the Continent in the spring of 1654.¹⁵⁶

A second rift had arisen from Lorne's quarrels with his own cousin, Lord Kenmore, and with Glengarry. Lorne also resented Glencairn's command and, along with Balcarres and a few others, had written to Charles to express his discontent. When Glencairn realised he had been crossed, he sent Glengarry to arrest Lorne. Not surprisingly, when the two men met, they were prepared to fight and parted 'great enemies' just as Campbells and Macdonalds had been for generations. Indeed, it is possible that Glencairn sent Glengarry to arrest Lorne in order to take advantage of a long-standing feud.¹⁵⁷

In September and October, Lorne and Kenmore attempted to gain support in the former's home region of Argyllshire. The community in Campbell territory refused to follow Argyle's instructions to take up arms against the rebels and for a time it seemed that they might succeed in challenging English control over the entire area. A major episode in the Argyllshire venture was the Royalist attempt to win over the people of Kintyre in October 1653. Events in Kintyre led to Lorne's dispute with Kenmore and illustrate how clanship loyalties were capable of testing the dedication of even the most stalwart of Charles's men. A number of Lowland settlers who had supported the Presbyterian cause and enjoyed the special protection of Argyle lived in the peninsula of Kintyre. They had been joined by a group of Remonstrants under the leadership of William Ralston. When Lorne and Kenmore had attacked Kintyre, the Lowlanders failed to get support from either Argyle or English forces stationed at

¹⁵⁶ Dow calls Bampfild John rather than Joseph. Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.96.

¹⁵⁷ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.220, 222 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.98. John Graham's narrative of the quarrel between Lorne and Glengarry differs slightly. He describes Lorne leaving Glencairn and his party at Badenoch on 1 January, 1654. Hearing of his desertion, Glencairn sent Glengarry in pursuit. Lorne had intended to head for Ruthven Castle in Badenoch but Glengarry overtook him and arrived first. Realising he was in danger, Lorne slipped away with his horse, leaving his foot to the mercy of Glengarry's men. Glengarry subsequently sent a party of horse to follow Lorne but only managed to capture about twenty of his horse. All the captured officers and soldiers of Lorne took an oath of allegiance to the King and were given back their arms. However, within a fortnight, all of them had left Glencairn's camp and were never seen again. See Graham, J., of Deuchrie, 'An Account of the Expedition of William the Ninth Earl of Glencairn', pp.65-66.

Ayr. Therefore, they had little choice but surrender the Castle of Lochheid which they had previously fortified. Perhaps because this land lay within his family's sphere of interest, Lorne was generous in formulating terms of capitulation. Kenmore was so incensed by this apparent leniency that he rode off to lodge an official complaint with Glencairn.¹⁵⁸

In September, while Lorne and Kenmore were occupied in Argyllshire, Glencairn attacked Falkland, kidnapping an officer, Captain Penne, and four or five of his soldiers who were guarding timber. Lilburne believed a number of inhabitants of Falkland aided the insurgents. Sir Arthur Forbes negotiated the release of the prisoners with the English army, demanding the sum of £80. Around the same time around 300 Highlanders attacked the town of Dumbarton, killing two soldiers and taking two prisoners.¹⁵⁹

After their quarrel at Kintyre, Lorne and Kenmore split up and made their way back into the heart of Scotland separately. Lorne had travelled to the neighbourhood of Glenurquhay where he had spent much of his childhood.¹⁶⁰ Kenmore made his way to Dumbarton and stole horses from Lowlanders in surprise night-time attacks. On 12 November, Lilburne informed Cromwell that Sir Arthur Forbes had launched an assault on the community at Kirkentilloch and, on the same night, Kenmore boated over the River Clyde and kidnapped Sir James Hamilton for complying with the English.¹⁶¹

By mid-November the danger posed by the rebels had certainly extended to the Lowlands, far away from the hills. On 15 November Lilburne reported that three captains and a number of officers belonging to Captain Overton's regiment had been

¹⁵⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.84, 94-95, 96-97 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.243, 257.

¹⁵⁹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.231 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.94.

¹⁶⁰ It was customary for young children of important families to be 'fostered' away from home by a kinsman of the family. The initial objective of this tradition – which appears to have extended into all classes of Scottish society – was to encourage bonds of affiliation between adults. Sir Colin Campbell, the 8th Laird of Glenurquhay, had committed himself to raising Lorne. However, Sir Colin had died in 1640, years before the Glencairn uprising, and the current Laird of Glenurquhay preferred the friendship of Argyle to that of his eldest son. See Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.5, 54.

¹⁶¹ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.265.

set upon at Falkirk. Two of them were captured but the rebels were cautious and only entered one house. Two more soldiers were taken at Kilsyth, to the west of Falkirk, and the houses of Johnston of Warriston and Lord Dundas were plundered in the immediate neighbourhood of Edinburgh. Atholl meanwhile had, by this time, openly thrown in his lot with the Royalists and was active in his area of Perthshire. By this point, Lilburne was betraying his own anxiety and the increasing hopelessness of the situation:

...hardly any parte of the Cuntry is free from those nightwalkers, who continew praying upon Gentlemen's horses, and by their secret wayes conveys them to the hills where they have riders in readiness, and beside many younger brothers and desperate persons that privately steale to them, well mounted and fitted for service, nor doe they want the companie of divers, both English and Irish, and that my intelligence speakes them somewhat numerous... I assure your Lordshipp... there is a necessity of some more forces to helpe to stope this currant, unlesse we run too greate a hazard in these southern parts, or by drawing off force from other parts northerly we give those cuntries wholly to the Enimie.¹⁶²

It seems that by late November the authorities in England were taking the Scottish threat more seriously for, on 23 of that month, the Council of State appointed a committee of seven of its members, including Cromwell, to discuss the situation with Major-General Lambert and other relevant officers. By this time the Royalists had reached as far south as Galloway and Carlisle and Lilburne requested that Lambert arrange the transfer of six or eight regiments of horse from the borders. By the end of the month the gates of Edinburgh were shut at nightfall to prevent rebel parties slipping into the town.¹⁶³

In December Royalist activity spread even further south. At the beginning of the month a party of armed men seized horses within four mile of Berwick but released a number of prisoners. Other parties were active in Dumfriesshire and Galloway.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.270-271, 273 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.95.

¹⁶³ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.276 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.96.

¹⁶⁴ Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, p.286

However, to avoid confrontation with the English army, the main body of Royalist troops, around 1000 men, including those under the command of Glencairn, Lorne, Kenmore and Glengarry retreated northwards to the region of Badenoch, to the south of Inverness. This retreat could hardly be considered a victory for the occupying forces; it was just another frustrating example of their inability to engage their enemy.

More cheering for the occupying forces was news of two minor victories. On 10 and 12 December Captain Lisle of Colonel Rich's regiment surprised Lord Kinoule and took over thirty prisoners and on 30 December Kinoule and a number of his men were captured at Glamis.¹⁶⁵ On 12 December Sir Arthur Forbes and around a hundred horsemen were defeated in an attack led by Captain Hart at Borthwick Brae near Langham. Lilburne again requested reinforcements from Lambert, employing intelligence from Captain Scrope of Col. Overton's regiment who had been a prisoner of the rebels for some weeks. Scrope believed the Royalists had around 8000 men at their call but Lilburne admitted this was probably an exaggeration. In January, the English estimated that the number of men in arms was more likely between 4 and 5 000.¹⁶⁶

Lilburne continued to request reinforcements throughout December, particularly recommending that ships be sent to guard against Middleton's landing. By Christmas the English commander believed that, providing he was given additional men, the best course was to pen the Royalists up into the hills. Otherwise, he warned that the only option would be to withdraw into garrisons and relinquish the Highland territory to Charles's supporters. Lilburne's correspondence went largely unanswered: his lack of weight in government circles was compounded by the authorities in England being preoccupied with matters which were seemingly more pressing. At the end of the year, Lilburne had clearly had his fill of life as commander-in-chief of the forces in Scotland. On hearing the news that a new officer was to fill his post, his only reply was that: 'Mee thinkes Monke's spirit would doe well.' The authorities in England considered appointing John Lambert and Edward Whalley before they settled for

¹⁶⁵ Kinoule escaped from Edinburgh Castle with several other men in May of the same year. See Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, p.113.

¹⁶⁶ Forbes escaped after the skirmish at Borthwick Brae and £100 was offered to anyone who could provide information leading to his capture. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.302, 303, 305n, 306. and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.84.

Lilburne's recommendation. Although it was over three months before Monck would arrive in Scotland, in the meantime two regiments of horse, those of Whalley and Lambert, and one of foot were despatched to Lilburne's aid.¹⁶⁷

At the beginning of 1654 Glencairn's rebels plundered the shires of Moray and Nairn, stealing from wealthy men in the area. On 18 and 19 January they overran the home of Alexander Brodie of Lethen, Lethen House, terrifying the local people with their coarseness and brutality. Indeed, the behaviour of the Royalists appears to have taken a turn for the worse perhaps as a result of the influence of the young Marquis of Montrose who had taken over Lorne's command. A number of other influential men joined the rebels at the beginning of the year, including Lord Charles Gordon, the Earl of Mar, Lord Forrester, Lord Dudhope and the Earl of Selkirk.¹⁶⁸

February was a gloomy month for the Royalists: Colonel (later Major General) Thomas Morgan scored a number of victories against Glencairn and Kenmore at Cromar, chasing the latter to Kildrummy. The castle at Kildrummy had been fortified by the insurgents but was seized by Morgan. Colonel William Daniel was enjoying similar success in Perthshire, capturing over one hundred men under the command of Atholl and Forbes at Dunkeld. Lilburne was cheered by this apparent 'mouldering away' of the Royalist cause.¹⁶⁹

Furthermore, the long-awaited arrival of Middleton was beset with disappointment. Middleton had been lingering in Holland for some months in the hope that the Anglo-Dutch peace settlement would fall through and that Holland would decide to actively support the Scottish rebels. On 27 January, Charles II, perhaps anxious to prevent more inter-clan rivalry, instructed him to embark for Scotland. At the end of February, news finally came through that Middleton had landed at Tarbatness. However, rumours that Charles II was with him and intended to lead his supporters in person proved unfounded. Moreover, hopes that Middleton would bring huge supplies of men and ammunition were also disappointed. Middleton was accompanied by around

¹⁶⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.84; Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, pp.286, 289, 295, 304, 305, 308 and Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.63.

¹⁶⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.85; Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.13, 15, 19, 41, 67, 82.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.85-86.

eighty followers, including Sir George Monro, Lord Napier, General Dalziel and Ludovic Drummond, and a quantity of ammunition that was described by the English as 'nott many more than ten horse load.' Middleton's own expectations about the success of the uprising had been falsely raised by overly optimistic reports sent to the Continent by the Highlanders.¹⁷⁰

The arrival of Middleton does seem to have encouraged the insurgents. On 23 March, Lilburne reported to Cromwell that 'there are risings in all Countries in considerable numbers', and that '[i]t will bee necessary that provision bee made for the worst that can happen.' His main worry was that the sporadic manoeuvres into the Lowlands would lead to this area being permanently overtaken by the rebels. It was a soothing fact that the current rebels showed no more signs of being able to win over the Lowland clergy than had Montrose before them. Lilburne therefore viewed risings in Galloway and Dumfries in the latter days of the month with immense shock and apprehension.¹⁷¹

Certainly, at the beginning of the year royalist forces were increasing. In April, Lilburne estimated that the combined forces of Glencairn and Middleton had reached 4000 while Montrose, Lorne and other scattered parties made up another 1300 or 1400. At the end of the month, Monck believed Middleton commanded 5000 men.¹⁷²

A major weakness in the Royalist camp was the fact that Middleton's arrival had actually provoked rather than subdued leadership quarrels. To celebrate the commander's landing a dinner was given by Glencairn at Dornoch in March. Glencairn was willing to accept the leadership of Middleton which was supported by royal commission. However, the appointment of Sir George Monro, a professional soldier with a reputation for arrogance and brutality who had fought in Scotland and Ireland, as second in command was a huge snub to the provisional commander. Glencairn's defensive boasting during the meal provoked Monro whilst the latter made the mistake of expressing a favourable opinion of Lorne.

¹⁷⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.85-86 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.99.

¹⁷¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.86 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.101-102.

¹⁷² Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.xviii-xix, 74, 92.

John Graham of Deuchrie's account of the meal unsurprisingly favours Glencairn. In his version, Monro dismissed the Royalist army as 'nothing but a number of thieves and robbers'. Glencairn prevented Glengarry from attacking Monro and, at the bidding of Middleton, made peace with Monro. However, the next morning a duel took place between the two men during which Glencairn slashed Monro over the left hand and forehead and had to be held back from killing him by his servant. Middleton regarded the dispute with disapproval and, to avoid further clashes, took Glencairn with him when he left the camp a fortnight later.

The breach between Glencairn and Monro widened in the following week after another dual took place in their names. Captain Livingstone, who had travelled to Scotland with Monro, and an associate of Lord Napier named James Lindsay, challenged one another over Monro and Glencairn's quarrel. Lindsay killed Livingstone and was subsequently arrested and executed. Glencairn was troubled by Lindsay's death and travelled southwards soon after.¹⁷³ It is likely that Glencairn's belief that his labours as acting commander had gone unrewarded also contributed to his decision to leave the Royalist army shortly afterwards. Glengarry was also causing problems, this time almost coming to blows with Atholl. It was unlikely, as Middleton had suggested, that the King would travel to Scotland to personally head the insurrection if discipline could not be maintained.¹⁷⁴

Lilburne reported the Royalist quarrels to Cromwell on 20 April and, two days later, General Monck arrived at Dalkeith to take over the command in Scotland. Robert Lilburne was at last released from a responsibility that had proved to be so troublesome.

¹⁷³ Graham, J., of Deuchrie, 'An Account of the Expedition of William the Ninth Earl of Glencairn', pp.73-4.

¹⁷⁴ Despite personal appeals by his supporters, there is little evidence to suggest that Charles was ever seriously considering leaving the safety of his court in Paris. Captain Mews observed in June 1654, "... if [the King] will not move untill there be no danger, he must resolve never to enjoye his Kingdomes." Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.99-100; Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.63-65 and Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.xxiv, 126.

Monck and the Scottish Community

The career of George Monck, later the 1st Duke of Albermarle, is representative of the political confusions and vacillations within seventeenth-century politics. In a climate rife with sudden changes in affiliation, it was less notable that Monck had started his military career as a Royalist, fighting on the King's side until his capture at the Battle of Nantwich.¹⁷⁵ Monck served Cromwell faithfully and effectively, supporting the accession of his son, Richard, as Protector in 1658. He had already seen action in Scotland, playing a minor role in the defeat of the Scottish army at Dunbar on 3 September 1650 and leading sieges of Tantallon Castle and Blackness in early 1651. After Cromwell pursued Charles across the border in August, he ensured the submission of Stirling and St Andrews and then the conquest of Dundee.

In many ways, Lilburne and Monck shared many beliefs regarding the most effective governing of Scotland, rendering the periods of their command a time of continuity rather than change. Like Lilburne, Monck was convinced that the Parliament in England should formulate Scottish economic and political reform with a mind to reducing sources of popular unrest. He also advised leniency in assessment demands and reductions of penalties against leading Royalists. However, Monck displayed a ruthlessness not exhibited by Lilburne, being prepared to cut off and starve Highlanders of their supplies by the ruthless destruction of bystanders' crops and pasture.¹⁷⁶

Monck carried a greater authority in English governmental circles than Lilburne could ever hope to muster. Partly as a result of his reputation and partly as a consequence of events in England taking a turn for the better¹⁷⁷, Monck had a larger and better-supplied army at his disposal alongside wider civil powers. In June the Council agreed that £30 000 be sent to assist the army in England even though the money failed to

¹⁷⁵ Throughout the remainder of his career as a supporter of Cromwell, Monck was courted by the King in exile and, in the face of political chaos and military pressure, he was to secure the return of the Stewart dynasty in 1660.

¹⁷⁶ See www.scotwars.com

¹⁷⁷ The Barebones Parliament in England had been replaced by the more effective Protector and Council and the Anglo-Dutch war was virtually at an end. Monck's instatement in Scotland provides an indication that the authorities in England were finally taking Scottish unrest seriously. They realized that his demands for assistance could not go unanswered and, in return, he provided them with a leadership they could place their full trust in. See Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.116-117.

arrive until September. (Even when the money did arrive it was insufficient as, throughout Monck's campaign, he was never able to meet the arrears of pay let alone other miscellaneous costs of battle.)

In terms of reinforcements, Whalley's and Lambert's regiments of horse which had been promised to Lilburne were active in Scotland in time for Monck's summer campaigns and they were joined by Col. Pride's regiment of foot and seven companies of Sir William Constable's, and Col. Hacker's regiment of horse.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, in April and May the shipping of a further 1000 men from Ireland under the command of Col. Matthew Alured, a former governor of Ayr, was arranged. They were initially intended to garrison the area around Lochaber that had proved strategically important for the Royalists in the past. However, on 8 May, Monck instructed Alured to establish a new garrison at Inverlochy. The Irish troops had arrived at Lochaber by 14 June but before this Alured was removed from his post on suspicion of disloyalty and was replaced by Col. William Brayne.¹⁷⁹

Monck was able to rely on a number of competent officers who were already stationed in Scotland. Col. Thomas Morgan, who was to play such a vital role in Monck's campaign, was already active in the area from the southern shore of the Moray Firth to the far north. Morgan had great experience in the field, scoring a number of high-profiled victories in the final days of the first civil war. In the early days of May he was causing Middleton much difficulty by restricting his opportunities 'to spoil and raise levies'.¹⁸⁰ Colonel William Daniel, who had already achieved success in Perthshire in the month preceding Monck's arrival, commanded the garrison at St. Johnston's (Perth). Captain John Hill was the governor of Ruthven Castle in Badenoch and Colonel Thomas Fitch was governor of Inverness. Brayne,

¹⁷⁸ For descriptions of the movements of the various regiments placed in Scotland during Lilburne's and Monck's campaigns, see Firth, C. *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*. Volumes 1 and 2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). The collection edited by J.Y. Akerman, *Letters from Roundhead Officers written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes*, is also useful in expanding upon the activity of Lambert's regiment in which Adam Baynes had a troop stationed at St. Johnston's (Perth). Baynes was a financial agent for this and other northern regiments and in September 1654 he was a Member of Parliament for Leeds. He was therefore permitted to remain in England. Officer absenteeism was a particular problem during Lilburne's time in Scotland.

¹⁷⁹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.118 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.73.

¹⁸⁰ Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes*, p.68.

who had replaced Alured in Inverlochy, was careful to maintain friendly relations with Argyle.¹⁸¹

The Council of State also considered a number of suggestions initially proposed by Lilburne during Monck's first months in Scotland. Formulated at the beginning of April, Article 13 stipulated that anyone who could be proved to have encouraged his friends or relatives to take part in the insurgency by means of supplying horses, money, food or arms should be fined. On 3 May Monck's powers were extended to allow him to imprison the father or master of any man who acted against the Commonwealth. However, Monck pre-empted this decree by issuing a comprehensive proclamation just a day later. He also offered rewards to anyone who could capture or kill a leading Royalist, particularly Middleton, Atholl, Seaforth, Kenmore and Major General Dalziel. A conciliatory streak was added by a clause which promised a pardon for all rebels who agreed to submit within twenty days, providing they had not committed an act of cold-blooded murder or were not on the authorities' most-wanted list. Those who had been injured or who had property seized by the Royalists were promised reparations out of the rebels' own estates.¹⁸²

Monck was officially received into Edinburgh on 4 May by the provost and magistrates of the city, who celebrated his arrival with a banquet and fireworks display. Alongside his proclamation regarding those who connived to help others oppose the Commonwealth, four ordinances passed by the Council on 12 April were publicly declared. Monck announced the establishment of the Protectorate in Scotland and proclaimed the Ordinance of Union which ruled that the Scottish people were no longer under the allegiance of the late King and that they had a right to send thirty representatives to sit in the Parliament at Westminster.¹⁸³ The union implied a number of other advantages such as free trade between Scotland and England and a promise that no taxes would be levied on Scotland that were not proportionable to those on the

¹⁸¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.124-125.

¹⁸² Lilburne's advice regarding the position of debtors was also followed, although the law was not officially altered until 16 May. If debtors were unable to satisfy their creditors, then judges could impose a period of temporary suspension of the debt or force creditors to accept land in lieu of cash. Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.119.

¹⁸³ For a discussion of the political affiliation and backgrounds of the twenty-two MPs elected in August 1654 see Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.148-153.

English side. Tenures entailing vassalage and servitude were abolished and tenants were to pay for their land by rent only.¹⁸⁴

Another ordinance concerned the establishment of courts baron in each locality that were to meet once in a three week period. Their powers extended to determining, by means of a jury vote, all pleas arising out of contracts, debts, promises and trespasses where the amount sued for did not exceed forty shillings stg. and where the question of freehold or title to land was not in dispute.¹⁸⁵

The third ordinance was the Act of Pardon and Grace which, like the establishment of the courts baron, affected the powers of nobility and gentry over the lower classes. The Act declared that a general pardon would be extended to the people of Scotland for previous crimes and that all fines and forfeitures imposed after 1651 were to be abolished. A number of rebels, including all the leading protagonists in the current insurrection, were specifically named as being exempted from pardon; the estates of twenty-four people were immediately forfeited to the Commonwealth and a further seventy-three were fined.¹⁸⁶ Other rebels who went unnamed, such as Macdonald of Glengarry, were ensnared by a clause that excluded all those who had taken up arms against the Commonwealth since 1 May 1652. This clause contradicted the comprehensive proclamation issued on 4 May which promised to pardon unnamed rebels providing they submitted within twenty days.¹⁸⁷

Although lawyers and traders had reason to approve of the new measures, it appears that the majority of the population in Scotland were more taken with the coercive measures of the ordinances rather than their conciliatory clauses. In his diary, Wariston referred to 'every body's dissatisfaction with theses proclamations', and their resentment of the ruinous clauses in the Act of Pardon and Grace. Monck also targeted the clergy in an attempt to curb the moral support they gave the rebels. He

¹⁸⁴ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.120-121 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.103-104.

¹⁸⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.119 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.104.

¹⁸⁶ The severity of the vast majority of these penalties was later mitigated in the face of an enormous popular outcry. See Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.157-159.

¹⁸⁷ The fourth ordinance was formulated 'for settling the estates of several persons in Scotland to the uses herein expressed.' Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.122 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.104.

prohibited their meetings and, in March 1654, renewed the ban on praying for the King. However, Monck was aware of the need for a long-term religious settlement in Scotland. He rewarded the royal burghs for their loyalty to the Commonwealth by permitting them meetings throughout 1654 and 1655.¹⁸⁸

Monck's policy regarding the assessment also had much in common with that of his predecessor. To Whitehall's expectation that Scotland yield the full £10 000 of its payment, Monck plainly refused, arguing that this demand was not only imprudent, it was simply impossible. He continued Lilburne's policy of organising local committees to reevaluate the assessment burden in a number of shires. Monck employed the previously rather ad-hoc tactic of abatement more officially. He ensured that anyone who had aided the English campaign or had suffered at the hands of Royalists received compensation. A number of victims received a direct cash payment rather than an abatement.¹⁸⁹

Monck was in a much stronger position than Lilburne had been when he arrived to take command in April 1654. He had the respect of politicians in England who realised he would demand their active support and attention. However, he also had the wisdom to utilise suggestions previously proposed by his predecessor. This meant that although Lilburne left Scotland feeling more dejected than victorious, he had still left his mark on Scottish politics. Moreover, Lilburne had already weathered the peak of the storm: when Monck arrived on Scottish land in April 1653, Glencairn's rising was already losing momentum.

Monck versus Middleton: the Defeat of the Royalists

When Lilburne requested reinforcements from Cromwell, his pleas were tempered by his desire to appear in control of the rebellion. Monck, however, had little to gain from presenting the situation in optimistic terms on his arrival in Scotland in April

¹⁸⁸ A further means of rewarding loyalty lay in the selection of Scottish officials. For instance, in 1654, Monck personally recommended that Sir James Macdonald of Sleat should be appointed sheriff and commissary of the Western Isles. Many JPs appointed at the end of 1655 were men who had displayed unwavering loyalty to the Commonwealth. Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.123, 146-148 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.105.

1654. Therefore, his correspondence stressed the danger posed by the insurrection before making demands for money, supplies and men. On his arrival he reported to Cromwell that ‘the designe of this insurreccion is more universall than I expected’, and that the threat extended right down to the borders with England.¹⁹⁰

Monck was justified in his gloomy presentation of the situation. On 11 May, John Baynes complained to his cousin, Captain Adam Baynes, that: ‘The country people show themselves our enemies on all occasions, now and then we lose a horse’.¹⁹¹ Monck was prevented from embarking upon his summer campaign by the dryness of the spring as there was no grass for his horses in the north. He occupied himself with attempting to prevent more volunteers and their horses joining Middleton in the north. Although Cromwell had sanctioned Monck’s right to imprison fathers of men who had joined the rebels, it seems that the commander – perhaps as a result of discouragement in Whitehall – was loathe to take such a step. This measure did, however, deter younger sons from joining the Royalists in order to ensure that their family would have at least one member on the winning side, no matter what side. A complementary policy of sealing up the passes between the Lowlands and Highlands was the more straightforward method of depriving the rebels from further supplies and forces. This would, Monck hoped, have the further benefit of penning in the Royalists in an area where they had less opportunities for enemy evasion.¹⁹²

On 10 May Monck left Dalkeith and marched to Stirling where he remained until 14 May. Two days later he was at Cardross Castle and then moved back towards the east to Kilsyth where he stayed until 25 May. As soon as new pasturage grew, he made his way to Buchanan Castle near the banks of Loch Lomond. He ordered that the boats of the loch that had been or might be employed by the Royalists should be burned. Another tactic was to lay traps of ‘crows’ feet’ – a four-spiked instrument designed to lame horses – in fords which could not be otherwise secured. Monck established four additional troops of horse near Glasgow to seize any Royalist forces who travelled into the Lowlands. From Buchanan, Monck returned to Stirling for a short time before

¹⁸⁹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.154-156.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.124.

¹⁹¹ Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.71.

¹⁹² Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.120, 124 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.105-6.

reaching St. Johnstons by 2 June. Along with the establishment of Brayne's forces at Dunstaffnage, these preliminary activities and the agreements with Argyle were intended to secure the line of the Forth.¹⁹³

Like Lilburne, Monck realised the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the Marquis of Argyle. Soon after his arrival in Scotland, he arranged a meeting with the Earl at Kilsyth. Argyle had again proved his loyalty to the Commonwealth by refusing to allow Glencairn, who was making his own way through Scotland after his quarrel with Monro, enter Argyllshire.¹⁹⁴ Argyle assured Monck that he would cooperate with Col. Brayne's garrison at Inverlochy. Monck evidently trusted Argyle to a considerable extent for he permitted him to raise and arm a force of 100 men to defend his territory.¹⁹⁵

The Royalists were still cause for concern at this point. In a letter dated 25 May, Cornet John Baynes described to his cousin how the rebels had taken advantage of Col. Daniel's temporary absence from St. Johnstons by attacking the town, killing a man or two, and seizing forty horses. A number of prisoners detained in Edinburgh Castle who were destined to be sent to Barbados escaped from prison at this time and rejoined the Royalists. However, in a letter a few days later, Baynes comments that: 'Some of the rebels begin to dislike the business, and have submitted themselves.' No doubt word of Monck's preliminary activities had made its way into rebel camps in the Highlands.¹⁹⁶

Monck's second concern was securing the line of the Tay. After Morgan achieved the decisive victory against Middleton, Monck wrote a first-hand account of his movements entitled 'Narrative of Proceedings in the Hills from June 9 to July

¹⁹³ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.65-66; Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.124 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, pp.106-7.

¹⁹⁴ John Graham gives a rough description of Glencairn's movements after he had left the Royalist camp. He received a warm welcome at Kintail by the commander appointed by Seaforth and stayed a few days to refresh his men and horses. He then marched to Lochbroom and on to Lochaber. From Lochaber he travelled to Lochrannoch and onward to Loch Tay, to the church town of Killin. At Killin Glencairn became severely ill and could therefore only manage short journeys. His final destination was the castle of Rosedoe at Leven which belonged to the Laird of Luss. Graham, J., of Deuchrie, 'An Account of the Expedition of William the Ninth Earl of Glencairn', pp.75-6.

¹⁹⁵ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.124-125.

1654'.¹⁹⁷ This began with his departure from St. Johnstons on 9 June with two regiments of horse and three and a half of foot. He seized a small castle on an island at Loch Tay held by the Royalist captain Donald Robertson. After leaving a small number of men in occupation on the island, he reduced Weem Castle and Balloch, on the site of the present-day Taymouth Castle. Garth Castle then submitted without much resistance.¹⁹⁸

On 14 June Monck received a report that the rebel leaders had organised a meeting to take place near Loch Ness so he headed in that direction, stopping off at Ruthven Castle on the Spey. At this stage Monck planned to convene with Col. Morgan but by 20 June – when the latter received word about the projected meeting - Monck had already left Ruthven in pursuit of Middleton. Morgan had also been following Middleton, travelling south from his camp at Dornoch. In early June Middleton had withdrawn to Sutherland with a body of men but had managed to elude Morgan's troops and leave the area. On 14 June Morgan passed through Inverness and, a day later, had confronted a party of 400 Royalist forces under the command of Drummond, Irvine, Mercer, and the Earl of Selkirk. The Royalists were defeated and on 17 June Morgan went on to take a small garrison on an island in Loch Tarff.¹⁹⁹

Monck had received intelligence that Middleton was positioned in lands belonging to the clan of Macdonald of Glengarry. According to Baynes, at this time Middleton had divided his forces, sending the foot to Kintail where they were expected to sail for Skye, and the horse to Lochaber. Middleton himself travelled towards Kintail, probably intending to retreat to Sutherland or Caithness. Monck certainly believed that Middleton was heading far north as on 1 July he ordered Morgan to march into

¹⁹⁶ Daniel had left St. Johnstons on an expedition to pursue a body of Royalist forces, during which he took thirteen prisoners and twenty horses. Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, pp.71, 73.

¹⁹⁷ Reproduced in Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.149-53.

¹⁹⁸ The terms of capitulation imposed on Robertson and his men on the island of Loch Tay were, according to John Baynes, generous. On 11 May Baynes wrote of his intention to accompany Monck on his summer march and had joined his regiments by early June. Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, pp.69, 73, 74; Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.125-6 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.107.

¹⁹⁹ See Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.126 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.75.

Caithness – an order that was subsequently rescinded due to a change in Middleton’s location.²⁰⁰

On 20 June Monck left Ruthven for Kintail, taking a detour through Cluny, Glenroy and Inverlochy. Once in the territory of the Camerons of Lochiel, he ordered that houses be burnt to punish those who had joined the rebels. From Inverness he travelled further north, reaching the head of Loch Lochy on 23 June. Here he convened with Argyle and Brayne and was informed that the Camerons had recently killed over 60 of the latter’s forces from Ireland. Leaving Brayne with a powerful force at Inverlochy, he set off for Glenmoriston. On the way he met with Morgan and ordered him to the head of Loch Ness in order to cut off Middleton if he fled in that direction.²⁰¹

Arriving in Glenmoriston on 24 June, he marched towards Kintail where he stayed from 26 to 29 June. Hearing that Middleton’s horse was making its way to Glenelg, even further west, he set off through Seaforth’s Mackenzie lands to Loch Alsh. Monck continued his policy of destruction throughout Macdonald of Glengarry’s territory, between Loch Lochy and Glenmoriston, and land belonging to the Mackenzie clan. It was this scorched earth policy of pillage and arson that made it impossible for the Royalists to sustain their opposition. In other words, Middleton’s success in eluding the English army brought about widespread ruination for his homeland.²⁰²

The Scottish community was unlikely to arouse sympathy from the English forces who were also suffering as a result of Monck’s determination to engage Middleton. As John Baynes wrote to his cousin on 29 June:

To give you account of our daily marches since my last from Riven is too tedious, and to give it exactly for our way is almost incredulous. Since Tuesday was se’ennight we have not rested one day, nor scarce any part of a day in our way for 8 days past. We have not found man, woman, or child

²⁰⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.126 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.78.

²⁰¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.126-127.

²⁰² Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.127 and Gardiner, S.R. *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1656*, p.107.

at their homes, all being either in arms or in remote places with their cattle. At their return they will have new houses to build and corn to seek, which will be a means to quiet them, or nothing.²⁰³

The Royalist forces were also losing heart. In early July, it was rumoured in the English camp that Middleton had declared to his attendants that he would rather be executed than continue with his campaign, constantly marching and evading, and receiving little encouragement from the Scottish people in general.²⁰⁴

On 1 July Monck met Morgan at Glenstrathfarar, about twenty miles west of Inverness, his intended destination. On 3 July Monck had arrived at Dunain to the south of Inverness where he received fresh intelligence concerning Middleton's movements. The Royalist commander had been seen at Blair Castle near Atholl accompanied by a force of 4000 horse and foot on his way to Dunkeld. It was reported that Kenmore and Atholl were with him. Therefore Morgan – who had been ordered on 1 July to Caithness – turned away from the far north and headed towards Braemar.²⁰⁵ Other leading Royalists were attempting – with little success – to obtain provisions and volunteers in Skye and Lochaber.²⁰⁶

Middleton, however, failed to fall into the English trap and was instead reported to be at Dunkeld with the intention of heading for Loch Lomond. By 7 July Monck had returned to Ruthven and three days later had reached Weems Castle in Atholl. During a short respite at Weems, Monck ordered a body of men under Col. Okey to explore the surrounding area. On 10 July, they subsequently collided with around 800 Royalist troops raised by the Earl of Atholl. Okey's men managed to take four prisoners and severely wounded two more men but the Earl escaped and sent warning to Middleton, who was now in the area to the west of Loch Earn, that Monck was closing the gap between them.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.78.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.81.

²⁰⁵ Captain Robert Baynes had arrived in Scotland by May 1654 and had accidentally engaged a body of Royalists at the castle at Braemar on 16 May. Both sides were reluctant to engage the enemy and retreated. Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.76.

²⁰⁶ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.127.

²⁰⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.127-128 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.82.

On 12 July Monck resumed the pursuit, marching to Lawers on the north side of Loch Tay. Here he was informed that Middleton who had, on the previous day, been as close as Finlarig at the head of the loch, had then reached the territory of Campbell of Glenorchy. On 14 July Monck followed, marching through Glen Dochart to Glen Lochy where, on the evening, he finally attained his first glimpse of Middleton's men. Monck's narrative says that a number of Royalists were seen marching to Glen Strae to the north of Loch Awe, but both armies were divided by a distance of around five miles and by a very high hill. The Royalist forces managed to disperse before Monck's men caught them. One of the larger groups headed towards Loch Rannoch while Middleton's force – reduced from 3000 to 1200 men - aimed for Badenoch. They had little idea that Morgan was waiting for them at Ruthven Castle.²⁰⁸

On 15 July, in order to allow his exhausted troops a respite from the chase, Monck headed east to Strath Fillan where he had another meeting with Argyle. By 17 July he had returned to Glen Dochart where he wrote to Cromwell, requesting that Argyle be officially permitted to raise his own force in support of the English effort. Two days later Monck was at an English army camp at Kinnell in Breadalbane, at the head of Loch Tay. He intended to let Morgan score the decisive victory against Middleton but, in the meantime, sent a number of scouting parties to gather intelligence. On 19 July, one of these groups was spied by the Royalists who, in their eagerness to avoid Monck, bumped right into Morgan who had travelled from Ruthven to Dalnaspidal at the northern tip of Loch Garry.²⁰⁹

The long-awaited encounter appears to have taken the English by surprise. Middleton's foot, numbering 1200, had separated from his horse and they were around 4-5 miles apart. It was the Royalist horse that the English first encountered at Dalnaspidal. The first instinct of the Royalists was to immediately retreat but the narrowness of the path allowed the English to capture over 300 of Middleton's 800 horses. As Morgan reported: 'We presently put them to the Rout, persued them about six miles, and forced them to disperse three waies.' The English also seized a number of important documents, including the commander's dispatches and commission, and

²⁰⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.128 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, pp.82-83.

²⁰⁹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.129.

around 25 prisoners. The English went on to pursue the Royalist foot in the direction of Lochaber. Middleton was badly wounded and his horse was captured, but he escaped on foot and, a week later, was reported to be in Sutherland.²¹⁰

By dramatically reducing the number of horses Middleton had at his disposal and dispersing the rest, Morgan had ensured that the Royalist force could no longer pose any kind of real threat to the English in formal battle circumstances. The foot soldiers were badly trained and poorly equipped – after the engagement at Dalnaspidal, the only form of resistance left to them was a continuation of guerrilla warfare. The Royalist troops who had failed to remain with the main body and had evaded capture were left vulnerable, in unfamiliar territory and without their mounts. Many foot soldiers fled in the direction of their homes; others were set upon by resentful members of the local community.²¹¹

Monck was determined to pursue those who had failed to disband. Even though the main body of rebels were in no state to engage the English in formal battle, they were still able to challenge English authority by means of plunder and skirmishes. Like the English army, Middleton's men continued to burn and pillage Scottish land and committed acts of brutality on any lone English soldier they happened upon. On 20 July Monck left Kinnell for Glen Lyon where he ordered a party under the command of Major Tobias Bridge to round up escapees around Loch Rannoch. After capturing a number of prisoners and supplies under the Earl of Atholl, Bridge rejoined Monck who, by 21 July, was near Weems. Two days later Monck was at St. Johnstons and, by 28 July, had reached Stirling.²¹²

In August Monck and his men marched in the southern Highlands, continuing to destroy crops and property particularly in Aberfoyle in the area of Perthshire and Loch Lomond in Dunbartonshire. Although Monck's forces were able to threaten the security of a number of Royalist leaders including Glencairn, Atholl and the Marquis of Montrose, Middleton was well out of his reach in Caithness. Morgan was then ordered to complete his reduction of Middleton's army while two frigates, the

²¹⁰ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.129-130; Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.66-67 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, pp.83-84, 87.

²¹¹ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.130.

Assistance and the *Sparrow*, were dispatched to track the coastline between the Pentland Firth and Inverness. They were intended to prevent Middleton obtaining foreign supplies and protect English merchant vessels from Royalist attack.²¹³

Morgan failed to engage Middleton at Caithness and pursued him on to Eilandonan. He did, however, succeed in obtaining the surrender of the rebel supporters in Caithness who were eager to avoid the destruction ordered by Monck. The practice of sending prisoners who were taken during military confrontations to the Barbadoes was a huge deterrent to many small parties of rebels who started to submit during August.²¹⁴ Leading rebels were also given a clear incentive to surrender their arms. If they were willing to give Parliament a sizeable sum to guarantee their intentions to co-operate with the English, they were permitted to retain their estates. Moreover, they would no longer be exempt from the clemency extended by the Act of Pardon and Grace. Endorsing an idea initially put forward by Lilburne, the defeated rebels were also given permission to raise regiments for military service abroad. The first of the leading Royalists to surrender was the Earl of Atholl on 24 August. Five days later Glencairn submitted and was followed on 14 September by Kenmore and at the end of the month by Montrose.²¹⁵

However, this did not signify a complete victory for the English. Partly as a result of Glencairn's surrender, the reputation and activity of Lord Lorne had increased in the summer of 1654. In the autumn Charles had sent word to Middleton to discourage him from relenting. On 12 September, Monck reported to Cromwell that a supply vessel containing 600 bags of biscuits, 10 tons of cheese and a considerable amount of ammunition had been seized by Lorne and a handful of his men. They had attacked the ship when it was being unloaded on the shore in front of Argyle's house. The local population seized the provisions that were not carried off by the rebels. On 15 November it was reported that Lorne and his party – accompanied by the respectable

²¹² *Ibid.*, pp.130-131.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p.131.

²¹⁴ Kenyon, J. & Ohlmeyer, J. (ed.) *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638-1660*, p.315.

²¹⁵ None of the leading rebels took advantage of their new right to levy regiments for service overseas. Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.132-133 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, pp.98, 100.

Earl of Loudoun, late Lord Chancellor of Scotland – had stolen into his father’s territory to seize cows.

Monck was clearly furious at Lorne’s activities. In his letter of 12 September, he commented that: “I cannot finde but that the Marquesse of Argyll is rightous though the Countrey more incline to his sonne then to him.’ By this time, the hostility between Argyle and Lorne was to such extent that the former had applied to the English authorities for protection. The well-known Resolutioner, Robert Baillie, wrote of Argyle’s widespread unpopularity: “The people’s great hatred lyes on him above any one man, and whatever befalls him, few does pitie it: at this very time his state is very staggering.”²¹⁶

However, Monck was so suspicious of Argyle’s involvement with the Royalists that he threatened to withdraw his orders for a garrison at Inveraray. Certainly members of Monck’s entourage were convinced of Argyle’s guilt: John Baynes wrote to his cousin on 9 September that the Argyle had ‘pretended’ the vessel would be safe and that ‘his name is Archgyle’. It is unlikely that Argyle was guilty of double-dealing at this point: after all, he had remained loyal to the English when it seemed less certain that they would victor over the Royalists. The population of Argyllshire was also more inclined to ensure their material well-being than Monck gave them credit. Lorne’s cow-stealing activity led to much resentment and, at one stage, he was wounded in the neck after his companions decided they had more to gain by capturing him to present to the English. It is unsurprising that the Royalist disagreement that had proved so disruptive in the early months of the revolt was increasing during a time of defeat, hunger and the onset of winter.²¹⁷

Monck was aware that although the English had managed to suppress this rebellion, it had increased the destitution and resentment already experienced by many Scottish people. From August 1654, when he requested the continuation of the garrison at Lochaber, Monck stressed the importance of securing against further revolt by maintaining a strong military presence in Scotland. Many garrisons were established

²¹⁶ Laing, D. (ed.) *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, p.288.

²¹⁷ Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.67-69; Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.133-134 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.97.

at country houses or castles taken from the Royalists or offered by owners loyal to England. At the beginning of October Monck warned Cromwell against reducing the total number of forces in Scotland. At this stage Monck also began to show signs of frustration at the remaining Royalist resisters. In October he was granted the power to execute any man engaged in rebel activity who had already promised to comply with the English. However, in January 1655 Whitehall disagreed with his suggestion that all remaining the insurgents should be executed when captured.²¹⁸

Towards the end of October, Argyle – probably as a result of his need to prove his loyalty to Cromwell – drove Lorne out of his territory in Argyllshire. As John Nicoll recorded in his diaries, ‘And now seing bluid hath bene drawin betuix the father and the sone, ane can hardlie imagine they ar in spourt, or that thai can be reconcealit upon easie termis.’²¹⁹ Monck expected more, however, and in December suggested that Argyle organise a rapprochement with Lorne as a first step in the latter’s capitulation. The first reconciliation meeting between Argyle and Lorne took place at Inveraray and was also attended by the high-ranking Campbells who had remained loyal to the clan’s head. Lorne was given the terms of a proposed settlement but refused to sign until he had discussed the situation with Middleton.²²⁰

In December Lt. Col. Irvine and the Earl of Seaforth surrendered their arms and, by the beginning of the following year, several of the second rank of royalist leaders had been captured, including Kinoule, Dudhope, Sir Mungo Murray and Lt. Col. Mercer.²²¹ Middleton was still at large but his supporters had decreased to less than 100. On 15 December he voluntarily opened negotiations with the English, sending three mediators from his camp to Monck’s headquarters. By 8 February the terms of the settlement had been agreed on. Unlike the previous settlements which had been rather lenient in nature, Middleton and the remaining leaders – Dalziel, Drummond, Lord Napier and Sir Robert Moray – were ordered to relinquish their entire estates apart from one-fifth which would be put aside for the upkeep of immediate family members. Alienated by such harsh terms, the rebels refused to sign and on 10

²¹⁸ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.134-135.

²¹⁹ Nicoll, J. *A Diary of Public Transactions and Other Occurrences* (Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1836), p.140.

²²⁰ See John Nicoll’s *A Diary of Public Transactions*, quoted in Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, pp.69-70 and Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.136.

February returned to their hideaways in the hills. Middleton travelled to the territory of Macleod of Dunvegan in the Isle of Skye.²²²

From December 1654 to March 1655, Monck was troubled by seditious activity among the English. The so-called 'Overton' plot was alleged to have taken shape right under the commander's nose. Although Robert Overton's supporters and those who had taken part in the royalist upheavals in Dorset and Wiltshire did little to threaten the existence of the regime, they did, as Monck commented on 20 March, cause the Scots 'to prick upp their eares, and have thoughts of riseing againe'. Middleton was reported to be planning a meeting with Lorne, Macleod of Dunvegan, McNaughton and a variety of others. However, just as news of the English rebellions enlivened the remaining Scottish Royalists, reports of defeat encouraged their surrender.²²³

It is easy to discern in the individual settlements imposed on Royalist leaders Monck's attempts to secure Scotland from further revolt and to utilise personal and inter-clan rivalries. On 10 September the negotiations with Seaforth were successfully brought to an end. Unlike the leaders who had surrendered before him, Seaforth and his clan were given the right 'to carry their armes for their owne defence against broaken men and theeves within their owne bounds'. This represented not only a means of inducement but established the circumstances whereby influential Scots could support the English in peace-keeping activity. Moreover, Monck employed a system of bribes and threats to encourage certain rebels to aid the capture of their Royalist comrades. In April 1654, Monck promised Lorne better terms if he apprehended Co. McNaughton. Similarly, McNaughton would benefit if he captured Cameron of Lochiel who would likewise be rewarded for the apprehension of Macdonald of Glengarry.²²⁴

Although attempts to use Lorne, McNaughton and Cameron of Lochiel to bring about more surrenders ultimately failed, other attempts were more successful. Monck sent Argyle's kinsman, Sir James Campbell of Lawers, to the Isle of Skye to pressurise

²²¹ Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers*, p.106.

²²² Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.138 and Akerman, J.Y (ed.) *Letters from Roundhead Officers written from Scotland and Chiefly Addressed to Captain Adam Baynes*, pp.111-112.

²²³ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, p.139.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.137, 139.

Macleod to turn against Middleton. Macleod initially refused but in March when his own people refused to support his stance, he had little choice but to surrender. Negotiations with Macleod were prolonged and the articles of agreement were not signed until 29 May. Macleod's submission was the final straw for Middleton who, demonstrating admirable concern for his colleagues, advised Lord Reay and Lorne to begin negotiations.²²⁵ An agreement was concluded with Reay on 18 May and with Lorne, McNaughton and Cameron on 17 May.²²⁶ Two days later the Earl of Selkirk signed a treaty. Macdonald of Glengarry did not agree to terms until the end of the same month and was granted an unofficial pardon for all hostilities committed after 1644.²²⁷

Middleton himself refused to surrender and in April escaped to the Continent where he renewed his efforts to bring about a royal Restoration. However, the English Parliament was more concerned with the continuation of violence and general unrest in the Highlands than with Middleton's political machinations. On 8 May Monck referred to the stubborn disobedience of the Highland clans. He regarded Cromwell's and the Council's orders of July and August concerning the reduction of the army establishment with concern. On 7 September he wrote to President Lawrence:

Wee have already quitted as many guarrisons as possibly wee may with safety; the rest that are now kept must necessarily bee repaired and provided for; otherwise wee shall leave some part of the Country without any forces, and by that meanes loose people willbee apt to get together againe, seing those Country men are still forward to waite for an opportunity to doe the same, and want not advice or incurragement from Charles Stewart to doe it.²²⁸

²²⁵ Relations between Middleton and Lorne were exceedingly friendly at the end of the uprising. In a letter dated 31 March 1655, Middleton praised Lorne's conduct during the campaign. On 17 April, from his Parisian hide-out, Middleton wrote to Lorne to express regret at not being able to meet with him before his departure. See Willcock, J. *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times*, p.73.

²²⁶ Lorne returned to his family home but it appears that relations between him and his father remained strained at the very least. A kinsman of the family, Alexander Brodie of Brodie, visited Rosneath at his time and commented on "the incurable wounds that were in the family by difference, implacableness, unsubmitiveness, humour, asperitie, etc., and by other burdens." He rather tactlessly complained to his hostess of her husband's unwillingness to forgive and forget, and of her son's continuing defiance. However, when Argyle was arrested after the restoration of the King, Lorne did attempt to obtain his father's release. See Willcock, J. *The Great Marquess*, pp.297-8, 314.

²²⁷ Dow, F.D. *Cromwellian Scotland*, pp.139-140.

In September 1655 the largest indicator of the relaxation in the military dominance of Scotland was the establishment of a Council for Scotland to oversee the civil government of the country. Its proposals reflected the influence of Lilburne and Monck on Scottish political and administrative life. It is unlikely that the reforms of the Council would ever have been initiated had the Glencairn rising had never taken place. Although an English majority were more active in formulating policy, the lives of Scottish people were no longer solely in the hands of foreign occupiers.

The Parliament in England continued to carefully watch the activities of the former Royalist rebels. Lord Broghill, the President of the Council for Scotland, was always convinced that Lorne and Glencairn in particular could not be trusted and was plagued by constant rumours of sedition. Confiscating any correspondence they could lay their hands upon from Charles Stewart, the English authorities had a habit of arresting the leading members of the Glencairn uprising when they suspected the resurgence of a fresh plot. In November 1656 Lorne, Seaforth, Glengarry, the Earls of Selkirk and Lord Forrester were all imprisoned, only being released on payment of substantial security.

Although it seems that Charles's energies lay in organising an invasion of England with foreign help, in early 1657 Parliament ordered that all Royalists involved in the Glencairn uprising must declare an oath of allegiance to the present order and renounce the exiled King. Lord Lorne was among a number of former rebels who refused to take the oath and was subsequently imprisoned in Edinburgh Castle and not released until the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. The rise in his fortunes coincided with a decline in those of his father: the Marquis of Argyle was beheaded on 27 May 1661 on a charge of treason.²²⁹

²²⁸ Ibid., pp.141-142.

²²⁹ Monck gave evidence against Argyle during his trial. In the years immediately following the Glencairn uprising, Monck's attitude towards Argyle dramatically changed. In March 1659 he declared, "... truly I thinke in his Heart there is noe Man in the three Nations does more disaffect the English Interest than hee..." His hostility to Argyle is probably explained by his belief in evidence suggesting the Marquis had been playing both sides during the uprising. Moreover, Argyle had been revealed in an attempt to extract money from the English government when, in fact, he owed it about £35 000. Firth, C.H. *Scotland and the Protectorate*, pp.lx-lxi, 411, 412, 414-5. It appears that the severity of Argyle's fate softened the hostility of many of his contemporaries. Baillie wrote, "However [Argyle] had been much hated by the people, yet in death he was much regrated by many, and by none insulted over." Laing, D. (ed.) *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie*, p.466.

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