

3rd Lancaster Game Theory Conference (LGTC2017)
17th – 18th November 2017: Lancaster University Management School (LUMS)

Programme

Day 1: Friday 17th November 2017

Venue: Lancaster House Hotel Conference Centre (Room: Training Room 1)

11:00 – 11:30 Registration and Welcome

11:30 – 12:15 **Plenary Talk 1 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

[Martin Pesendorfer](#) (London School of Economics)
Monopoly pricing with reference dependent willingness to pay

12:15 – 14:00 **Lunch + Poster Session 1**

[Marco Serena](#) (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)
Level-k reasoning in reciprocal beliefs

[Jain Embrey](#) (Lancaster University)
A generalised theory of decision making; illustrated by application to human capital development

[Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar](#) (Lancaster University)
Public good provision, sanctions and corruption

14:00 – 15:30 **Regular Session 1 (Chair: Orestis Troumpounis)**

[Chris Wallace](#) (University of Manchester)
Information acquisition and use by networked players

[Sinem Hidir](#) (University of Warwick)
Information acquisition and credibility

[Ludovic Renou](#) (Queen Mary University of London)
Information design in multi-stage games

15:30 – 16:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:00 – 17:30 **Regular Session 2 (Chair: Aurelie Slechten)**

[Toomas Hinnoaar](#) (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Dynamic common-value contests

[David Rietzke](#) (Lancaster University)
Robust comparative statics in contests

[Martin K. Jensen](#) (University of Leicester)
Limited rationality and macroeconomic theory

17:30 – 18:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

18:00 – 18:45 **Plenary Talk 2 (Chair: Alexander Matros)**

[Philippe Jehiel](#) (Paris School of Economics and University College London)
Investigation with forgetful liars

18:45 **Departure for conference dinner (LH Hotel)**

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Day 2: Saturday 18th November 2017
Venue: Lecture Theatre 1 (LT1), LUMS Building

09:30 – 10:30 **Regular Session 3 (Chair: Robert Rothschild)**

[Anna Bogomolnaia](#) (University of Glasgow)
Fair mixtures of public outcomes

[Indrajit Ray](#) (Cardiff University)
Any outcome is an interior equilibrium in a market

10:30 – 11:00 Break (Coffee and Tea)

11:00 – 12:30 **Regular Session 4 (Chair: Konstantinos Georgalos)**

[Kirill Pogorelskiy](#) (University of Warwick)
News sharing and voting on social networks: an experimental study

[Tatiana Mayskaya](#) (Higher School of Economics)
Implications of overconfidence on information investment

[Kaustav Das](#) (University of Exeter)
Strategic experimentation with competition and private arrival of information

12:30 – 14:15 **Lunch + Poster Session 2**

[Ludmila Matyskova](#) (CERGE-EI, Charles University)
Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

[Konstantinos Protopappas](#) (Lancaster University)
Competing for advantage: a two-stage contest

[Nina Bobkova](#) (Bonn Graduate School of Economics)
Knowing what matters for others: information choice in auctions

14:15 – 15:45 **Regular Session 5 (Chair: Sonali SenGupta)**

[Andriy Zapechelnyuk](#) (University of St. Andrews)
A delegation approach to persuasion

[Ryan Kendall](#) (University College London)
Decomposing models of bounded rationality

[Maria Kozlovskaya](#) (Aston University)
Signalling expertise in markets for credence goods

15:45 – 16:15 Break (Coffee and Tea)

16:15 – 17:00 Plenary Talk 3 (Chair: Alexander Matros)

[Peter Hammond](#) (University of Warwick and Stanford University)
Statistical equilibrium for large games of incomplete information

17:00 **Farewell**