“Communicating Europe”: Analyzing, interpreting, and understanding multilingualism and the discursive construction of transnational identities

1. Introduction: who and what is ‘Europe’?

Who and what is Europe? For many citizens within, as well as outside its shifting boundaries, contemporary Europe has become the microcosm for the processes of identifying and of redefining identities (Wodak 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). ‘Constructing Europe’ may mean – for some – developing a new kind of transnational state which has its own currency, legal framework, values, social security system, and new institutions. For others, what is experienced as being European or as being outside of Europe is the result of multiple activities, some of them consciously planned as political, economic or cultural interventions, while others occur in the background and are more hidden and indirect (Busch – Krzyżanowski 2007; Krzyżanowski – Oberhuber 2007; Wodak – Weiss 2007). It is unsurprising that such developments are contradictory and conflicting (rather than harmonious), proceeding in ‘loops’ and partial regressions (rather than in a linear manner).

1 The text reprinted from STUDIES FOR GREEK LINGUISTICS 28 (Language and Society) with a kind permission of Professor Theodossia-Soula Pavlidou.
In this chapter, I seek to identify and analyze processes of identity construction within Europe and at its boundaries, while focusing primarily on the many (also contradictory) functions of multilingualism for processes of identification.²

This will be attempted firstly by studying focus groups with migrants entering the ‘Fortress Europe’; secondly, by investigating new forms of citizenship and language tests in EU countries; and thirdly, by analyzing stated aims and mission statements on the website of the new EU commissioner for multilingualism.

I will mainly be concerned with the following guiding questions and related assumptions:

- How are European processes of identity construction linked to multilingualism? Is multilingualism an essential part of Europe’s ‘diversity’? (How should we assess widely held beliefs about a generalized ‘necessitated’ convergence towards a sole lingua franca (ELF)?)
- Do patterns of linguistic change have an impact on the efficiency and fairness of different forms of multilingual communication? Who is included and who is excluded through language and where, how and why does this occur?

² For recent research on the discursive construction of European identities see Weiss (2002, 2003); Oberhuber et al. (2005); Wodak – Weiss (2004a; 2004b); Muntigl – Weiss – Wodak (2000); Strath (2006); Wodak – Puntscher-Riekmann (2003); Musolff (2004); Wodak (2005a, 2005b); Vicento (2005); Frans de Waal (2007); Oberhuber (2007); Krzyżanowski (2007); Strath – Wodak (2009); Krzyżanowski – Wodak (2007a, 2007b, 2008); Wodak – Wright (2006, 2007). In this chapter, I draw mainly on the data collected in two EU-funded projects: XENOPHOB (coordinated in Uppsala from 2003-2005) and DYLANT (coordinated in Lausanne from 2006-2011; see http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/265 for details) as well as on research conducted from 1997-2003, at the Research Centre “Discourse, Politics, Identity”, at the University of Vienna, and a more recent, related study, together with Norman Fairclough (2008). In both EU funded projects, I am the PI of the Lancaster-based team, the main research associate being Michał Krzyżanowski. I am very grateful to Johnny Unger (2006) and Susan Dray (2006) for allowing me to draw on some of the results and considerations of their pilot studies on language policies for Scots, and language and citizenship, respectively. I thank Jakob Engel for revising and editing the English language of this chapter. Of course, all responsibilities rest solely with the author.
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- How does the European knowledge-based society and knowledge-based economy (KBE) influence attitudes towards multilingualism? How have traditional values changed and what might such changes imply?

Although the genres mentioned above are all characterized by precise linguistic features and possess distinct textual functions, they are – and this is one of my central claims throughout this chapter – linked with each other through specific arguments, topics and topoi which are recontextualized from one public sphere to the other; they change and adopt meanings, lose functions and claim new ones, and together discursively construct several European public spaces for debates on the salience of multilingualism (Wodak forthcoming 2008a). This is what is meant by ‘doing Europe’: the on-going negotiation of meanings of Europe and its language policies in many different public spheres in a range of genres, and in many languages.

First, I focus on some theoretical approaches necessary to analyze the complexity of multilingualism in Europe while drawing on my Discourse-Historical Approach in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which is elaborated elsewhere in detail (Wodak 2001, 2004, 2008b; Reisigl – Wodak 2001). Pierre Bourdieu’s (1994) concept of the linguistic market, theories on the discursive construction of transnational identities and on inclusion and exclusion, as well as some considerations on the shift from values such as diversity to the values of the knowledge-based economy are also important in this context (Fairclough – Wodak forthcoming 2008; Krzyżanowski – Wodak 2007b). Second, I summarize some methodological considerations for the analysis of debates on multilingualism, and then proceed to the three case studies mentioned above. Finally, in my conclusions, I discuss the many arguments on the salience and changing values of multilingualism illustrated throughout this chapter.

2. Theoretical framework: identity politics and language policies – a critical approach to the study of multilingualism

2.1. The construction of European identities – a discourse-historical approach

In the construction of the “New Europe”, there are many complex issues to be coped with. For example, on May 31st 2005, following the French referendum
on the Draft Treaty of the European Constitution, the British left-leaning broadsheet, The Independent, presented a thought provoking diagram on its front page showing Europe at the junction of four different options: Constitutional Europe, Free Trade Europe, United States of Europe, and Multi-Speed Europe. These options relate to different dimensions, based on economic theories; state theories; and organizational theories, which are either fore- or back-grounded. In a nutshell, the Independent article comprised the ideological dilemmas of ‘doing Europe’ by presenting the different values (and associated metaphors) which could be used to define it.

Europe consists of different historical traditions, different nation-states with their respective histories, different cultures, different languages, different political, national, regional and local interests and traditional ideologies, different interest lobbies, different economic concepts, different organizations, etc. Among the 27 EU member states, some belong to the Schengen zone and to the Euro community, others do not; some have voted for certain treaties, others have not; some have colonial pasts, others do not; some have been among the losers of both world wars, others have not; and so forth.

The central issues for politicians, who have been dealing with these aspects of European identity formation, involve the re-organization, the legitimization and the representation of this enlarged Europe. Thus, some values have to be established or newly created, which allows for a more explicit legitimization. Identities are defined and constructed mainly by their common pasts, presents and futures, by narratives and collective memories that are constantly reshaped and negotiated, as we have extensively shown elsewhere (Wodak et al. 1999, Wodak – de Cillia 2007; Heer et al. 2003, 2008). Hence, the official ‘Europe’ has to find a new narrative, a new perspective or vision, perhaps some common ideologies, or even a utopia in which at least some European citizens would identify with and believe in (Wodak – Weiss 2004a, 2004b, 2007).

My theoretical and methodological approach to the topic of European Identities is discourse-historical (see below). In the following, four claims serve to set out an interdisciplinary framework to investigate the discursive construction of European identities:

- Firstly, I claim that something like a single unified identity for Europe should not and cannot be hypostasized in advance. On the contrary, the primary concern is to investigate the formation of different constructions, representations and images
of Europe in particular political, historical and cultural contexts. We all live with many different regional, local, national and European identities, which are constantly re-negotiated and co-constructed by different elites, social groups, and in everyday experiences.

- Secondly, a context-dependent negotiation of identities has to be assumed and discursively co-constructed in interactions. In the context of the European Union, shifting borders, new/old ideologies, languages and language conflicts, as well as new laws determine and restrict the possibilities of participation and access of EU citizens.

- Thirdly, I claim that the relationship between discourse, politics, and identity is characterized by new and frequently hybrid forms (see above). The processes of (economic) globalization on the one hand, and (social) fragmentation, on the other, are calling into question the established identities or identity constructions of groups, institutions, and states. New public spaces, media, and communication technologies have changed the basic rules for discourses.

- Along the same lines, we observe the standardization of regulations, laws, scripts, pictograms and forms, of curricula and medical protocols, as well as of literature. On the other hand there is a growing awareness and appreciation within Europe of local cultures, languages, and products. For example, the focus on “diversity” is an expression of a new ideology, of a multicultural society. However, we now also observe a focus on the knowledge-based society related to the knowledge-based economy, hence, multilingualism is changing its symbolic attributes from “diversity” to “necessary skills” for a knowledge-based economy.

Policy-making processes in Europe as such (for example on asylum and citizenship policies) are increasingly dependent on the ‘central’ institutions in Brussels and Strasbourg. However, the more the EU de-regulates in certain areas (e.g., free market policies), the more requirements for regulation are present in other areas (e.g., financial, monetary policies); not to mention the fact, that even deregulation processes have to be regulated.
Furthermore, the present discourses on Europe consist, as a rule, of the interplay between three respective goals and dimensions:

(a) Making sense of Europe (ideational dimension),
(b) Organizing Europe (organizational dimension),
(c) Drawing borders (geographical dimension).

It is the interplay of these three dimensions that determines the specific form of debates on European identities, as well as of policy processes in many other areas. The first dimension refers to the idea of Europe, its essence, substance or meaning. The second dimension reflects the question of how Europe shall be organized and which institutional forms of decision-making and political framework are appropriate for the future. The third dimension concerns the question of border-construction: who is inside, who stays outside?

With these three dimensions and goals, three forms of legitimizing the political construction of the EU (and its enlargement) are connected, which relate to specific topics and argumentation strategies (see below):

(a) Legitimization through idea (identity, history, culture),
(b) Legitimization through procedure (participation, democracy, efficiency)
(c) Legitimization through ‘standardization’ (of humanitarianism, of social standards, economic standards).

These legitimization strategies touch on essential problems of political representation. I will specifically focus on “drawing borders” and “legitimization through standardization” in the following examples on different functions of multilingualism in the European Union.

2.2. The linguistic market

The second main influence on my theoretical framework on multilingualism studies in this chapter is the work of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and in particular his metaphoric use of the terms market and capital to describe

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elements of linguistic interactions (see also Unger 2006, 2008). Furthermore, there is an indirect influence arising from Bourdieu’s impact on CDA as a whole, particularly in the area of power relations (Titscher et al. 2000). In the following, I will briefly summarize Bourdieu’s metaphor and make a few observations about some of the other concepts he developed, such as *habitus* and *symbolic violence*.

In Bourdieu’s view, a linguistic market exists “whenever someone produces an utterance for receivers capable of assessing it, evaluating it and setting a price on it” (Bourdieu 1993: 78).

![Fig. 1. Concrete elements of a linguistic market, according to Bourdieu (1993: 79; see also Unger 2006)](image1)

Figure 1 represents the *concrete* elements that come together to form a linguistic market. Figure 2, on the other hand, shows the *abstract* elements that constitute the value of a given utterance. While the concrete elements are familiar from many sociolinguistic models (and might be called the “social-psychological dimension” in the discourse-historical approach), the abstract elements are more specific to Bourdieu’s analogy. The laws of price formation, and how these come into being, are particularly interesting and explored later in this section.

![Fig. 2. Abstract elements that constitute the value of a given utterance, according to Bourdieu (1993: 80; Unger 2006)](image2)

The value of an utterance is always dependent on the immediate context. However, someone who is very competent at using a feature highly valued in
that particular market could be said to hold capital in that market (Bourdieu 1993: 80). Bourdieu states that those who hold the most capital need only speak to receive linguistic profit, irrespective of what they say. While this may be true in certain narrow contexts (his example is the liturgy in Catholic mass), and while there may be a general tendency for those with the most capital to have to worry less about what they say, perhaps Bourdieu exaggerates here. Particularly with respect to fields such as politics, where the topics of a text are frequently recontextualized, and any linguistic capital the speaker may have had is diminished.

Bourdieu points out that “there is a very clear relation of dependence between the mechanisms of political domination and the mechanisms of linguistic price formation that characterize a given social situation” (Bourdieu 1993: 80). He uses Quebecois and French/Arabic speakers in former French colonies as examples. In some cases, he writes, “linguistic struggles may not have obvious linguistic bases [...] and yet involve interests as vital [...] as economic interests in the narrow sense” (Bourdieu 1993: 81). In other cases, particularly Quebec, it seems more the case that the opposite is true, and that the linguistic elements of a struggle are at the forefront; however, in other contexts Bourdieu’s conjecture seems reasonable.

Capital, Bourdieu (1993: 81) states, holds value only on a certain market, and mainly it is those who hold the most capital who also have the most control over the rules of price formation and even over the existence of the market itself. Bourdieu mentions Latin speakers who, at their time of writing, were seeking to preserve their market, and hence the value of their capital, by trying to create new consumers for their linguistic products through the means of Latin education in schools. If we compare this example with the position of Latin speakers in the Middle Ages in Europe, it is clear they once held far more valuable assets – their capital was such that they controlled the spread of learning and even of information itself.

Bourdieu also gives an example which is very relevant to the present chapter and my case studies (Bourdieu 1992: 68): The Mayor of a town in Bearn speaks to the villagers in Bearnais, which they find “touching”. What Bourdieu is essentially describing is a situation which can only occur where people are diglossic, and where the amount of capital held by speakers of each language variety is highly asymmetrical. French is clearly the dominant language and were this not the case, Bourdieu (1993) points out the villagers would not find the Bearnais mayor’s use of Bearnais in a Bearn village “touching”. As Bourdieu puts it, “even if he [sic] has never heard ‘standard
Parisian French’ [...] the Bearn speaker is dominated by the Paris speaker and all his interactions, at the post office, at school, etc. He is in objective relationship with him” (Bourdieu 1993: 68). Bourdieu calls this a “relation of linguistic domination”, or within his extended analogy, a “unification of the market” (Bourdieu 1993). If we were to extend his analogy even further (albeit at the risk of breaking it), it becomes clear that when a market is unified, those products which hold less value on the market will be discontinued by their ‘producers’ (speakers) because they are not being ‘bought’ (valued) by ‘consumers’ (interlocutors).

If we apply Bourdieu’s approach to our topic “multilingualism in the European Union”, it is obvious, that some languages have more prestige or capital than others (e.g., English and French versus German or Lithuanian; see Krzyżanowski – Wodak 2007a). This capital has developed historically and synchronically, depending on the language ideologies connected to specific languages (see Wodak – Wright 2007a, 2007b), to the number of speakers, and to the prestige and position of the country where this language is spoken. However, the specific capital, of course, depends on the very unique interaction. Nevertheless, there is clearly a case to be made for the existence of more hegemonic and less hegemonic languages. Taking this argument further, we could even speak of a hegemonic multilingualism where only a few languages in the EU are regarded as salient such as English and French, and to a lesser extent German and Spanish (see Krzyżanowski – Wodak 2007a).

2.3. Multilingualism, language ideologies, and language planning

The equal status of all national languages as official languages within the EU and, theoretically, also as working languages has been repeatedly discussed since the founding treaties. In the same way, European multilingualism has been seen as an essential component in the future construction of a European identity/European identities, and in the preservation of societal and individual multilingualism. At least the knowledge of three languages (tri-lingualism) has repeatedly been declared an essential component of European politics by various European authorities in declarations of political intent on matters of language, education and pedagogy (e.g., Article 2 of the European Cultural Convention of 19th December 1954; “Recommendation 814 on Modern Languages in Europe” of the European Council on 5th October 1977; the KSZE final document of 1st August 1975; cf. Sch 1992: 359). Finally, in the
treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, the EU again committed itself to European multilingualism, which was echoed by the European Council of Ministers’ “Recommendation concernant les langues modernes 98/6”.

Multilingualism in Europe is, however, seen by many as overly elaborate, cumbersome, and as a competitive disadvantage (especially in particular areas such as science), in comparison, for example, to the USA (Ammon 1994). Demands have been repeatedly voiced for a common, dominant, European language (Zimmer 1997; Bertel Haarder, following Christ 1991: 21), or at least a single internal working language within the EU. International developments in language policy may support such demands, as there is meanwhile a tendency towards a never before experienced degree of hegemony. Such arguments are counter-weighted by recent experiences of linguistic differentiation that have led to the emergence, so to speak, of ‘new’ languages. What was, until recently, unified under the umbrella of Serbo-Croatian has now become Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

To provide a factual grounding for our analysis, some language statistics are necessary. Worldwide there are between 2500-8000 languages; in Europe, only several hundred languages are spoken (Grimes 2000). Haarmann (1993: 53ff) lists 76 autochthonous languages in Europe. Nevertheless, European languages belong to the most important languages in the world: 350 million people speak English as their first language, 250 million Spanish, 150 million Russian, 100 million German and 70 million French (meanwhile over 1 billion speak Chinese (Mandarin and/or Cantonese). About 1.6 billion people speak English as second or foreign language, 50 million German, 35 million French, and 30 million Spanish (de Cillia 2003: 232ff). English is the language of bureaucracy in 60 states (French in 30, Spanish in 20, German in 8), English is the official language in 16 multinational organizations, and French is spoken in 12. From an economic perspective (languages spoken in the business world), English ranks first ahead of Japanese, Chinese and German. In the sciences, English is clearly leading with 90.7% of publications in the Natural sciences written in English (Ammon 1999: 109). This implies a strong hegemony of a few languages, especially English, in our globalised world. This also implies that native speakers of English need to know very few foreign languages, if at all: 66% of the British speak only English!

For some, these numbers might suggest the model of one lingua franca, namely English, as a kind of leading language for Europe: 47% of all Europeans speak English, 32% German and 26% French as second language (de Cillia 2003; Phillipson 2005). These numbers, however, illustrate that not
everyone is prepared for English as *lingua franca* and that such a policy would create a further democratic deficit; a linguistic divide to match that of the digital divide. Moreover, these numbers do not include the migrants in European countries who speak many totally different languages. And of course all of these questions of language policy must also be seen in the context of EU-enlargement (in the years 2004, 2007), and thus the various issues cited are more acute now than ever before and are being discussed by an increasingly large segment of the public.

For the purposes of this chapter, let me briefly review the concept of *language policies* which is clearly related to the status of multilingualism in any given society; Following Herbert Christ (1995: 75), I view *language policy* as

> every public influence on the communication radius of languages, the sum of those “top-down” and “bottom-up” political initiatives through which a particular language or languages is/are supported in their public validity, their functionality and their dissemination. Like all policies it is subject to conflict and must regularly be reordered through constant discussion and debate.

(Christ 1991: 55)

The so-called *Leitsprachenmodell* (the language of the majority or of the dominant group should serve all communicative purposes) contradicts official proposals on diversity, intercultural communication and integration. Such a model, of course, also contradicts European language policies, which emphasize multilingualism, equality of languages and diversity. As Michael Clyne states, European integration was never intended to mean homogenization. One of its aims has always been unity within diversity and this should be one of its contributions to the world.

(Clyne 2003: 40)

It is certainly important to know the language of the majority or the context in which it is used; what is problematic from the perspective of diversity and integration is that the dominant language comes to be viewed as the only relevant language. Acquiring an hegemonic status and competence in this language is made compulsory for success (see section 2.2 on Bourdieu and implications for migrants in section 4). The ‘gate-keepers’, so to speak, request the national language; and the language issue, as has been proved in multiple
studies on migration in EU countries, is the one of most salient factors for
migrants in respect to access in employment, housing and education (Wodak –
Krzyżanowski – Ulsamer 2003; Blommaert 2005; Wodak 2007a; Delanty –
Jones – Wodak 2007).

Needless to say, the far-reaching, negative implications of the
monolingual approach are not only situated in everyday and strictly social-
functional matters, since, as de Cillia suggests,

languages are far more than just media of communication [...] the
mother tongue is the central symbol of individual and collective
identity, a symbol which represents belonging to certain ethnic
group, to a certain language community

(de Cillia 2002: 8)

In addition, Clyne points to the fact, that

[I]n linguistic homogenization, it is the identity function of
language that is most severely damaged. That is the function that is
most closely connected to culture, personality and inter-personal
relations. Language maintenance and development need to be seen
as a human right.

(Clyne 2003: 41)

3. The discourse-historical approach – investigating inclusion and
exclusion through hegemonic multilingualism

The Discourse-Historical Approach in CDA adopted here is three-dimensional:
after having first established the specific contents or topics of a specific
discourse, the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies)
are investigated. Thirdly, the linguistic means (as types) and the specific,
context-dependent linguistic realisations (as tokens) are categorized and related
to both prior levels. The entire framework and methodology of the discourse-
historical approach are elaborated elsewhere (see references quoted above).
Thus, in this paper I will restrict myself to presenting some salient features
which are necessary to analyze inclusion/exclusion through hegemonic
multilingualism in specific genres and texts.
It needs to be emphasized at this point that the discourse-historical approach, since its inception, has always included the analysis of the broad and narrow contexts, in reference to Cicourel’s (1992) approach to context (see Wodak 1996). Moreover, in such an analysis, historical developments as well as structural norms and institutional frames are accounted for.

When investigating discriminatory discourses, five heuristic questions are relevant when approaching a specific text or textual sequence:

1. How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
2. What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
3. By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the inclusion/exclusion, of others?
4. From what perspective or point of view are these labels, attributions and arguments expressed?
5. Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they even intensified or are they mitigated?

Table 1. Relevant questions for the analysis of “US” and “THEM”

Following these questions, we are especially interested in five types of discursive strategies, which are all involved in positive self- and negative other-presentation. These discursive strategies underpin the justification/legitimization of inclusion/exclusion and of constructions of (multilingual or monolingual) identities. By “strategy” we generally mean a (more or less accurate and more or less intentional) plan of practices, including discursive practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal.4

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4 All these strategies are illustrated by numerous categories and examples in Reisigl – Wodak (2001: 31-90). Owing to space restrictions, it would be impossible to present all these linguistic devices in this paper.
Table 2. Discursive strategies for positive self- and negative other representation

- Referential strategies or nomination strategies serve to construct and represent social actors. This is done in a number of ways: membership categorization devices, through metaphors and metonymies, and synecdoches, in the form of a part standing for the whole (pars pro toto) or a whole standing for the part (totum pro parte) are most relevant.

- Social actors as individuals, as group members or as entire groups are linguistically characterized through predications. Predicational strategies may, for example, be realized as evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates.

- Third, there are argumentation strategies and a fund of topoi through which positive and negative attributions are justified.
For example, it can be suggested that the social and political inclusion or exclusion of persons or policies is legitimate on specific grounds.

- Fourth, the perspectivation, framing or discourse representation by means of which speakers express their involvement in discourse, and position their point of view is important.
- Finally, intensifying strategies, on the one hand, and mitigation strategies, on the other, qualify and modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of utterances.

In the following short case studies, I will apply this methodology when analyzing modes of inclusion and exclusion through ‘hegemonic multilingualism’ in selected European discourses.

4. “European everyday experiences – migrant voices”

The first example illustrates some major tensions which exist in all public and private spheres across Europe. In this case study, I focus on a topology and membership categorization based primarily, but not exclusively, on language competence – language competence in the national language of EU member states. The choice of this criterion (and case study) illustrates everyday life and migrant experiences in terms of EU exclusion/inclusion policies.

While investigating immigration policies in eight EU countries (Austria, France, Italy, Sweden, UK, Cyprus, Poland, Germany) language policies turned out to be one of the main ‘gate keeping devices’ in integration and in the possible acquisition of citizenship. In focus group discussions which were conducted about a range of topics, language competence was perceived as salient by most participants in the discussions.

As part of the fieldwork, while investigating the so-called “Voices of Migrants” (Delanty – Jones – Wodak 2002), we organised a set of five focus groups with migrants in each of the aforementioned eight EU countries. In Austria, Turks, Sudanese and South Africans working in international organizations, Poles, and South Tyroleans were selected according to the country/region of their origin, gender as well as their educational status.

Migrants in all of the investigated groups brought language (and its social importance) into the discussions.
One day here in school I went into this room because I had to do some ironing (.) and a girl who was standing vis a vis of us said ahm (.) I was talking to her [F2] hey start speaking German (.) hey that’s none of your business what I am talking (.) I really wanted to kill her (.) it’s none of her business what I am talking.

In this scenic account, the young girl, an Austrian citizen of Turkish origin, explains her rage in situations when her native language is not accepted. Such incidents were told over and over again in stories as example of every-day racism. The account in example (1), however, does not depict the events clearly; we do not really find out if the girl resisted, started to argue or really told the Austrian girl what she was thinking – or if the direct speech occurred as fantasy in her mind. Often enough, young people just become silent. They are silenced by such discriminatory, excluding utterances.

As some of the migrants emphasized very emotionally, without a proper knowledge of German it is almost impossible to acquire a decent job, or to do well in the Austrian educational system (speak as we do and you will survive). The bilingualism of migrants is seen as a janus-faced feature which especially depends on the languages concerned. Furthermore, bilingualism is often reflected in an intermixed use of German and the mother tongue which generally is judged in a negative way by Austrians (speak as we do and you will belong to us).

On the other hand, many migrants described the importance of speaking and using their own native language. Their native language was the crucial factor shaping their individual and collective identities as well as allowing them to keep various modes of belonging with other members of their ethnic, religious, cultural or national group. What includes them in their own group seems to exclude them in the host country. As one participant states:

(2.0) I have a cultural heritage I have a long history I have a language (.) which I want to keep I want to (.) [...] (1.0) I want to HAVE them and this is my property (.)
Example (3) illustrates the heated discussion in the focus group of Turks:

(3) Extract [3]

ENE-M3: yeah BUT what I know of-from people who who have studied here who are living here I think they have they have a lot of difficulties in getting jobs in their fields I-I-II know that many foreigners who studied here in the Austrian universities but they cannot get jobs in their fields although they speak German well they know aam-that language and you find that people doing completely different jobs from one who studied IT or medicine but he can be a taxi driver

ENE-Mi: (unintelligible 2.0)

MK: yeah

ENE-M3: I do not think that is easy for non-Austrians to get jobs even if they ARE qualified and even if they even if they have Austrian citizenship

The issues of language and citizenship are related to each other in this sequence. The *topos of definition* is applied: who counts as ‘Austrian’? Not even somebody who has Austrian citizenship and speaks German, because s/he ‘looks different’. Implied are other (racialized) membership categories, such as looks, skin colour, etc. Example (3) illustrates how cultural definitions of identity are constructed in everyday life and determine access and inclusion or exclusion. Moreover, we hear how even qualifications and education do not suffice as membership criteria. The meta-distinctions are stronger – they seem to divide people along biological-racist lines where rational arguments and even legal requirements remain ineffective.

(4) Extract [4]

F1: For example once on the Donauinsel we were (.) together (.) with her (.) and (0.5) eh an Austrian she was on bike and I think her her son was there (.) and she just stops and says look sweetie, there are
eh Tschuschen [derogatory term for guest workers, usually from eastern Europe] they are Aust- eh thingy foreigners (unread.0.5) just call them this and this (.) and we look at her and we were so disappointed and then she started shouting and so on

F2: No she she had kind of a seat behind her and there was her child like she had I think (.) and she had ehm (.) eh the bike in her hand or something I can’t remember (.) and she goes really sweetly to the child look sweetie yes that ehm und right away I thought eh she wants to say something say something nice (.) because she also said it loud so we could hear it well she goes they are Tschuschen say Tschuschen to them (.) and the child just gazes calmly

Narratives and stories occur frequently in focus group discussions. Such everyday experiences allow insight into discrimination scenarios that migrants come across so frequently. Elsewhere, we have discussed exclusion experienced by female migrants and narratives from focus groups conducted in other countries in more detail (Krzyżanowski – Wodak 2007b).

In example (4), the two accounts focus primarily on derogatory labelling and disappointed expectations. The label ‘Tschusch’ (stemming from the Slavic root for ‘foreign’) is employed spontaneously by Austrians (Viennese) meeting Turkish migrants, once on the Domauinsel, a leisure park in Vienna, and once in the tram. Both times, there was no obvious trigger for the abusive and offensive remarks. And both times, the migrants were taken by surprise. The scenic and direct reliving of the experiences, in very emotional and affective intonation, depicts the deep disappointment and the pain which was inflicted by these remarks. Moreover, it becomes very clear that in both incidents, the passers judged the migrants and categorized them by their looks, and not by any other criteria; nor did they probably overhear them talking in a foreign language (though they might have in the tram).

In the first story, the process of socialization into stereotypes and prejudice is depicted explicitly: the mother actually conveys to her child how these people should be labelled and that they are different, i.e. foreigners. Thus the topos of definition and predication strategies are employed explicitly. The mother concludes her lesson by starting to scream at the ‘foreigners’. Rarely do we encounter such vivid descriptions of the recontextualization, and of the explicit and public transfer of prejudice and stereotypes.

In the second case, a shift of styles is indicated which takes the migrant by surprise. She remembers that the Viennese woman was first very friendly
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and then changed her style and again explicitly taught her child, how to label the ‘foreigner’ as ‘Tschusch’.

(5) Extract [5]

F3: Well in secondary school (. ) my form teacher spoke with me (0.5) well he asked if we had to wear the headscarves and so on whether we can’t take it off and so on and I said no that is our religion like this (0.5) and well he didn’t want that he wasn’t that xenophobic but (0.5) he wanted that we remove the headscarf (unread.0.5) he was just asking (0.5) apart from that everything was OK in secondary school (unread.0.5) I didn’t have any problems because of the headscarf but on the street (. ) is not like that

Mi: There you have problems (. ) because of the headscarf

F3: Yes (0.5) mostly yes

Mi: How (1.5) stupid comments or

F2: Yes

F3: Yes for example like on the Donauinsel (0.5) what she now (unread.0.5)

F5: For example eh one month ago or thereabouts eh I was with her I think we went to the loo (. ) and there was someone by the stairs and said headscarf mafia

Mi: Mhm

F4: I wear a headscarf for about about six months I have well (unread.2.0) I was with my mother hospital (.) there was one I know one nurse or something what also (unread.1.0) headscarf mafia

Mi: A So [I see/aha]

F4: I often hear that (. ) yes

F2: Famous headscarf mafias ((laughs)) (1.0) and there you have to dress all in black I mean why do you wear red and why do you wear white

In example (5), another ubiquitous topic is addressed which illustrates the Europe-wide discussions about the so-called headscarf worn by some Muslim women. In this account, the girl first narrates her school experiences where she employs a disclaimer (it was not that bad in school, the teacher was not really xenophobic) and then continues to present another incident where she was
labelled as belonging to the “headscarf mafia”. A new predication is thus created which is negatively connoted because the mafia is perceived to be criminal; hence it can be inferred through an argumentative fallacy that this label implies that everybody wearing a scarf must be criminal (topos of definition). It is not only language, but the habitus of migrants, their ‘looks’ and their dress (i.e. the colour of their dress) which are stigmatized. In this case, the scarf is clearly linked to a different religion and marked as a sign of non-belonging. Indexicality comes into play.

Examples (4) and (5) imply a whole range of topologies of exclusion. Starting out from the obvious – the different language – many other symbols are then marked as foreign and different. The consciously created difference is subsequently labelled as negative, employing predicational and argumentative strategies. ‘Foreigners’ or ‘being foreign’ is discursively constructed through language, looks, dress, and colour; i.e. habitus. Children are taught by their parents to perceive and remember these semiotic indicators and how to label them discursively.

Similar results were detected in the other seven countries, which cannot be elaborated in this chapter because of space constraints. However, it is obvious that the concepts of monolingualism and homogeneity are tied to the nationalistic and even chauvinistic attitudes of the ‘real’ Austrian, the ‘real’ Dutch, and so forth, to stereotypes and prejudices of belonging and non-belonging, and thus to strategies of inclusion and exclusion. Aliens, foreigners, ‘others’ are not welcome; they do not belong and are excluded (even after having acquired citizenship) and even if the economy would profit from their presence. The dimension of inclusion and exclusion thus touches on a central topos of all EU discourses and cuts across the nexus of all EU identity discourses (Wodak 2007b, 2007c).

5. Citizenship and multilingualism

In the following, these subjective, personal experiences of migrants are linked to the official level of language and citizenship policies. Such a contrast allows the exposition of the many inherent contradictions in the search for European identities and related values. Recent changes in political, religious and social relationships between communities worldwide have contributed to a situation in contemporary Europe where states are now addressing the meaning of the term ‘citizenship’. Parameters for determining exactly who is (or can become) a
‘citizen’ are at present unresolved, with little consensus across nation states. Two established criteria for determining citizenship, which are common in policy discourse, are birthplace and bloodline (Weil 2001). However, with the recent appearance of new states in Europe and the flow of populations across state boundaries, a new criterion centred on proficiency in the official language(s) of a state has emerged. Unlike the former two criteria, this is an attribute that can be acquired and has come to be seen as central to facilitating ‘integration’ (cf. Carrera 2006). A corollary of this citizenship criterion is that an acquired language criteria requires measurement in order to determine the level of an individual’s proficiency.

Recent research into European citizenship policies (but not specifically the language aspect of them) argues that governments tend to approach immigration as either a threat or an opportunity (Baubock et al. 2006; Modood – Triandafyllidou – Zapata-Barrero 2006). With regard to language, a general trend identified in a first pilot survey conducted by Susan Dray (2006), whose results I am summarizing below, is that states that wish to encourage immigration (e.g., Romania, Poland, Hungary) will place less emphasis on language and assessment, than states that perceive immigration as a problem (e.g., Austria, Finland, France, Germany). Language (and assessment procedures) may be employed as an instrument of control with language tests being legally required of some ‘groups’ but not others.

At present there is no consensus in Europe on the minimum level of proficiency in an acquired language. States are working independently to establish their own thresholds, drawing on a range of alternative solutions. For example, in Austria and Finland, where language tests are enforced by law, language assessment criteria correspond to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) (Council of Europe, 2001). However, the baseline standards in the two countries are different. Furthermore, in some countries there is no formal language test. In Greece, for example, command of Greek is assessed during the ‘citizenship’ interview. Currently, there is preliminary information on all 26 European states.5 Some examples illustrating the variety of approaches and social contexts involved are summarized in Table 3.

5 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Federal Republic of Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>The ‘integration agreement’ (2003) obliges applicants for permanent residence (except asylum seekers and refugees whose status is regulated under different laws) to complete a Deutsch-Integrations-Kurs ‘German Integration Course’. Those who can prove their knowledge of German are exempt from taking the course but there are no specifications for proving or evaluating linguistic ability (de Cilia – Wodak 2006). Applicants are required to reach Level A1 of the 6 levels identified in the CEFR within 100 sessions of 45 minutes. Applicants must pass the test within 18 months of arriving in order to have 50% of their costs paid for by the Austrian government. If the applicant continues to fail, does not take the exam or does not attend the course, they can be subject to fines and eventually lose their residence permit (Reider 2003). This is the first time that the Austrian government has given financial support to immigrants for learning German.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>A stipulation of the Czech Citizenship Act is that an applicant can “prove his or her Czech language proficiency”. A pilot project entitled “Selection of Skilled Foreign Workers” was launched in 2001 to test the future of a larger scale immigration policy aimed at facilitating immigration. Although, initially, desirable immigrants were considered to be “linguistically and culturally akin ethnics”, since 2004 the opportunity for ‘experts’ to emigrate to CR has been increasingly extended to nationals of more countries (Culda 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Currently there appears to be no established test despite an intention to implement a “new certification for migrants” by the end of 2005, which would test competence in French after a French course of 200-500 hours. The test was to be obligatory for citizenship and for a carte de residence. In 2005, however, further developments heading towards a US-style points-based system of immigration was being investigated in which knowledge of languages would be an element.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Germany’s new immigration law (2005) requires a “satisfactory knowledge” of German in order to become a German citizen by naturalisation. In the absence of language proficiency certificates, authorities can request that the applicant take a language test. The exact test procedure is not clear. Draft ‘citizenship’ courses, however, are currently under debate. These are based on the US system, and aim to teach and test applicants on the German constitution and culture. They implicitly require knowledge of German. Germany also has a “law of return”, which grants people of German descent (Aussiedler) the right to settle in Germany, subject to a language test. The purpose of this test is to identify applicants as being legitimately German and knowledge of dialect is preferred over ‘correct’ or standard German. This test consists of a brief series of oral questions to test understanding, vocabulary and ‘fluency’ (McNamara 2005).

Netherlands Applicants for Dutch citizenship who are resident foreigners in the Netherlands must have lived there for 5 years and must demonstrate a “sufficient command” of Dutch. For those outside of the Netherlands, the “civic integration examination” requires a “fundamental knowledge of the Dutch language and Dutch society” (IND n.d.). It is an oral test held in the applicant’s home country. There are no courses available but there is an “education pack” costing 65 euros. The test costs 350 euros.

Poland Resident foreigners may apply for naturalisation after 5 years in Poland. A new Repatriation Act became effective in 2001 restoring citizenship for those who had been displaced during communist rule and the Second World War. To qualify under the repatriation law a person must demonstrate that a parent, grandparent or two great-grandparents had Polish citizenship. There is no explicit mention of a language test.

Table 3. Summaries of 6 approaches to language assessment for citizenship in Europe.

The current situation in Europe is a patchwork of solutions to an array of perceived ‘citizenship’ problems, which show varying degrees of familiarity and awareness of language assessment practices. Dray’s (2006) pilot survey found no information about how language assessment was developed in any of the countries where language tests are implemented.

This ad hoc development of policies regarding citizenship initially occurred with little engagement with existing academic debates (cf. Fowler 2002). Academic critiques of the CEFR (e.g., Alderson 2004; Fulcher 2004), for example, have been ignored in the policy arena, where the
Framework is uncritically applied to language proficiency standards. Academic awareness and activity surrounding the issue of developing language tests for citizenship is continuing to grow. Amongst this work are research on the ideologies of language that underpin citizenship legislation (e.g., Milani forthcoming; Piller 2001), and the role of language rights in democratic citizenship (Starkey 2002). Whilst there has been some policy response to academic work in the area of language tests for identity (i.e. the establishment of citizenship by descent) in the form of a set of guidelines (proposed by linguists and adopted by a number of international professional organizations; McNamara 2005), this test addresses only those claiming rights on the basis of their ethnic heritage. Thus, this is only one dimension of the way in which language is used to determine citizenship. These debates are likely to become more common with increasing academic activity in the field. An indication of this trend is the fact that the Association of Language Testers in Europe dedicated a daylong forum to the topic of language assessment and citizenship at its annual conference (ALTE 2005). In addition, the Council of Europe has identified, and is currently addressing, the issue of language regarding “adult migrants”.

Incidentally the situation is similar in English-speaking countries outside Europe, where immigration and citizenship are central national concerns. In the USA proficiency in English is not a requirement for citizenship, although the USA has developed a new naturalization test of which English language proficiency is a component. In New Zealand, the IELTS test, initially designed to assess language proficiency for study purposes, is now used to assess the English proficiency of migrants. In Canada and Australia, ‘points’ are awarded according to the applicant’s level of language proficiency and these contribute to the selection process. In Canada these points are awarded at interviews by an untrained immigration officer (McNamara 2005). In Australia they are awarded after a language test is taken. Proposals for developing a points system based on the US model are well advanced in the UK and in Germany, and are also under consideration in France.

6. From “unity in diversity” to “necessary multilingual skills” – a rebranding of multilingualism

The European Commission has used the term “inclusive society” in several documents, for example in the Report on Education from the Portuguese
Presidency (2001) and in the White Book on the Cognitive Society, September 2001. The White Paper on European Governance from July 2001 considers the “opening” of the European Society as one of its most important goals (Wodak - Wright 2006, 2007). In all these papers, multilingualism has been quite suddenly acknowledged as a necessary “skill”, not only as a salient “European value”. Multilingualism has also become the agenda of the Commissioner for Education and Culture (Jan Figel, Slovakia); since 1/1/2007, the EU-Commissioner for Multilingualism (Leonard Orban, Hungary) is involved in trying to implement new language policies which would be linked to employment policies such as life-long learning and the development of multiple social knowledge-based skills in Higher Education (http://ec.europa.eu/Commission_barroso/orban/index_en.htm).

Higher education strategy is closely associated with other dimensions of EU strategy. The EU Lisbon Council (2000) adopted as a “strategic goal” for the EU “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”. The Presidency’s conclusions referred to the implications for education in general (“Europe’s education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of the knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality of employment”) and higher education in particular. Member states were called upon to “define, by the end of 2000, the means for fostering the mobility of students, teachers and training and research staff both through making the best use of existing community programmes (Socrates, Leonardo, Youth)\(^6\), by removing obstacles and through greater transparency in the recognition of qualifications and periods of study and training; to take steps to remove obstacles to teachers’ mobility by 2002 and to attract high-quality teachers”. A “European research area” was also proposed, as well as dedicating greater attention to “lifelong learning”. As will be illustrated, all these aims have acquired the status of ‘flagwords’ with positive connotations which draw on other EU policy papers, such as the White Paper of European Governance (2001) or policies combating

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\(^6\) Leonardo, Socrates and Youth are mobility programmes for the exchange of students and staff around EU universities. “The Leonardo da Vinci programme, for example, is part of the European Commission’s new Lifelong Learning Programme and is designed to build a skilled workforce through European partnerships. Leonardo funds overseas work placements and the development of training materials with the objective of improving the provision of Vocational Education and Training (VET) across Europe”. See http://www.leonardo.org.uk (downloaded March 2, 2007) and similar websites of the EU for more details of these programmes.

As Fairclough and Wodak (2008) have illustrated in their analysis of the Bologna Declaration and the Bologna Process, the Lisbon Declaration (2000) set out a new “open method of coordination” as “a means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals”, a “fully decentralized” approach in accordance with the principle of “subsidiarity”, with the Union acting as a “catalyst”. The “open method of coordination” involves, inter alia:

- setting guidelines for the EU combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
- establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different member states and social sectors as a means of comparing best practice;
- translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting measures that take into account national and regional differences (thus developing National Action Plans);
- periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning processes.

The importance of texts in this ‘open’ and ‘decentralized’ method of governance is obvious. The key policy and supporting documents of the Bologna Process (which are constantly identified as such as new documents are added) contain the “guidelines”, “goals”, “indicators”, “benchmarks”, “timetables” and “obstacles” as well as “challenges” and the process of “translating” the guidelines into national and regional policies is a process of producing more texts. The “periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review” entail a further proliferation of texts in the process of re-branding policy areas of the EU.

This method of governance is constituted by, and leaves behind, a very substantial ‘paper trail’. This suggests that analysis of texts and more specifically a discourse-historical approach in detecting the genesis and archaeology of policies by analyzing the recontextualization of strategies, arguments, topoi, and so forth, is an important part of any analysis of the
interaction of European, national and regional or institutional scales of governance in bringing about coordination on the European level in policy areas such as HE (see above). But it also suggests the importance of analyzing social processes of negotiation, compromise and conflict in the production and the production and interpretation of key policy documents.

As other detailed analyses of policy papers drafted in EU organizations and committees have shown, such as in the *Competitiveness Advisory Group* (CAG; Wodak 2000a, 2000b) and in the European Parliament (Wodak forthcoming 2008a), as well as debates analyses of the European Convention (Krzyżanowski – Oberhuber 2007), the flagwords and *topoi* which are recontextualized in the *Bologna Declaration* stem from other policy areas and have a long history in EU policy making. Muntigl – Weiss – Wodak (2000) studied policies dedicated to combating unemployment for a 1997 meeting of the European heads of state (this meeting was dedicated purely to the subject of combating unemployment in the EU; see also Straehle et al. 1999). In all these debates, speeches, policy papers and interviews, the same *topoi*, arguments, legitimation strategies and flagwords were used as were later used in the *Bologna Declaration* and in the new policy documents and policies dedicated to multilingualism (see below).

Thus, “life-long learning, flexibility, benchmarks for assessment, challenges through globalisation, mobility”, and so forth were proposed to combat unemployment and to create and secure European competitiveness, at least seven years earlier. More importantly, the argumentative chain which served to essentialize both “globalization” and “competitiveness” as quasi ‘naturally given’ and thus necessarily pre-conditions for any change on the EU level, could be made explicit and analyzed in their genesis and their impact on subsequent developments (see Wodak 2000a, 2000b). Therefore new employment policies seem to have constituted the basis for HE policies, relating economic policies very strongly to educational policies – and hence, multilingualism. Speeches in the European Parliament in the year 2000 by the then-president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, voiced and recontextualized precisely the same goals and *topoi* as building blocks of the 21st century and as the European values to be endorsed (among other traditional values, such as “freedom, democracy, justices, diversity, and social welfare”).

Hence, it appears to be the case that the so-called traditional European values which constituted and constitute European identity narratives were extended to embrace new values, stemming from neo-liberal policies. Such a new set of values was seen to ensure the EU’s competitiveness in relation to the
US and Japan (again, a repeatedly uttered topos) (Wodak – Weiss 2001). This previous research suggests that the Lisbon Strategy and the Bologna Process form part of the official discursive construction of European identity narratives, securing and legitimizing standardization and the implementation of new policies, on the one hand, and a new value set, on the other hand. Such a discourse-historical analysis explains why the Bologna Process and many other attempts in other policy areas seeking to standardize policies in all nation states cause so many tensions: national identity constructions and national traditions, as well as Weltanschauungen collide with trans-national strategies and aims, and thus lead to hegemonic struggles over values, discourses and social practices as well as to nationally context-dependent recontextualization and policies of (language) implementation (Wodak 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Furthermore, emotionally-laden national and European debates become better understandable because conflicts over identities, traditions and values touch on deeply entrenched nationalistic attitudes and ideologies (see Oberhuber et al. 2005). I will come back to these points in the discussion and conclusions of this chapter.

Below, one screen-shot of the above mentioned website – “Many people speaking many languages” – effectively illustrates the new rhetoric on multilingualism, which is now tied to the competitiveness and globalization rhetoric, and contains many of the features detected in other policy areas related to the KBE.

Languages are fundamental for Europeans wanting to work together. They go to the very heart of the unity in diversity of the European Union. We need to nurture and promote our linguistic heritage in the Member States but we also need to understand each other, our neighbours, our partners in the EU. Speaking many languages makes businesses and citizens more competitive and more mobile.

The European Commission needs to deliver results for citizens, and we need to communicate with you in a language you can understand. Promoting multilingualism is an excellent way to bring European citizens closer to each other. To give you access to information and to contributing your views.

Learning languages leads to better understanding. Interpretation and translation can help you participate in the activities of the EU and read the publications of the EU. Promoting multilingualism in
the different policies of the European Union, such as culture, education, communication and employment is at the centre of my objectives. I want to make a real contribution to the competitiveness of the European economy.7

When analyzing the mission statements also published on Orban’s website, we encounter the following shift in meanings: Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted by EU leaders in 2000, says

that the Union shall respect linguistic diversity, and Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on a number of grounds, including language. Together with respect for the individual, openness towards other cultures, tolerance and acceptance of others, respect for linguistic diversity is a core value of the European Union.8

After stating the core values of the European Union, the mission statement continues by emphasizing necessary “life-skills” for all European citizens and relates these closely to employment and mobility:

The ability to understand and communicate in more than one language – already a daily reality for the majority of people across the globe – is a desirable life-skill for all European citizens. Learning and speaking other languages encourages us to become more open to others, their cultures and outlooks; it improves cognitive skills and strengthens learners’ mother tongue skills; it enables us to take advantage of the freedom to work or study in another Member State.

It is thus not surprising that the 6th framework integrated EU project on language policies – DYLAN – points to and mentions all the necessary flag-words tied to KBE in its project outline and application (which was obviously a successful strategy to get funded). I quote a few paragraphs as an illustration below, which explicitly tie the ‘old traditional values’ associated with multilingualism to the ‘new’ values tied to the knowledge-based economy and

competitiveness discourses; in this way, the acquisition of foreign languages can be justified with new arguments – arguments which spell out that knowledge of languages are an asset in our globalised world and part of successful employment strategies:

The DYLAN Integrated Project addresses the core issue whether and, if so, how a European knowledge based society designed to ensure economic competitiveness and social cohesion can be created within a European Union that is linguistically more diverse than ever before. The overarching objective is to demonstrate that, in this respect, the linguistic diversity prevalent in Europe is potentially an asset rather than an obstacle. It (the project) will show in what ways and under what conditions the distinct modes of thinking and acting carried by different languages can promote the creation, transfer and application of knowledge. [...] One of the preconditions for such processes to occur is that citizens become multilingual. Therefore, the project will provide support for the EU’s orientations to language education, and particularly for the view that foreign languages constitute one of the most important “new basic skills” citizens need in order to take an active part in the creation of a European knowledge based society.

(DYLAN: Language Dynamics and Management of Diversity EU-Sixth-Framework Integrated Project [IP])

7. Conclusion – inclusion/exclusion – access/participation/legitimization

Summarizing, I propose a heuristic model (see Figure 3), which grasps the basic tensions and antinomies detected in all three examples above and which thus could serve as a general framework for research on European identities and the development of a hegemonic multilingualism.
Apart from the clear newly-established functions of multilingualism as part of the competitive European knowledge-based economy, multilingualism possesses other, contradictory functions illustrated in the first two examples in this chapter: gate-keeping functions and the construction of inclusion and exclusion. Hence, the dimension of inclusion and exclusion cuts across all the examples analyzed in this chapter. The general concept of insiders and outsiders seems salient in all domains, in and between societies, in cyberspace, in every day conversations, and in organizational discourses (Wodak 2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Niklas Luhmann (1997) claims that the social sciences do not have a precise description and analysis of the processes of social inclusion and social exclusion. He defines inclusion and exclusion as the two vital meta-distinctions of our times: certain social groups lead parallel lives; the social problems thereby transcend the traditional values of justice and democracy.
Only those who feel themselves to be included still adhere to democratic values. However, inclusion and exclusion are not to be considered as static categories: the person who is excluded today may be included tomorrow, and vice versa. Although membership can always be redefined, important ‘gatekeepers’ decide who will have access: new laws, new ideologies, new languages, and new borders – in Europe and elsewhere. Mostly it is not up to individuals to define or redefine their membership: this depends on structural phenomena of exclusion. The desired ‘opening-up’ of the European Union, the greater participation and democratization, therefore still has to overcome some essential obstacles if it is to reunite the so-called parallel lives.

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