Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Discourses, Material Power and (Counter-)Hegemony

Ngai-Ling Sum, n.sum@lancaster.ac.uk

This “spot paper” proposes a new approach to political economy that takes the 'cultural' and 'scalar turns' seriously whilst retaining a strong commitment to the emergent material dynamic of capital accumulation. In particular, it advances a socio-cultural explanation of the economic-political activities involved in remaking and rescaling capitalism by focusing on the discursive and subjective aspects of capitalist restructuring and, especially, on their extra-economic dimensions of capital accumulation. In previous work I have called this approach 'cultural political economy' (or CPE) and this is the term used below (Sum 2003; see also Jessop and Sum 2006; Sum and Jessop forthcoming). CPE examines the economy in terms of economic imaginaries, their translation into hegemonic economic strategies and projects, and their institutionalization in specific structures and practices. More specifically, economic imaginaries discursively constitute economic objects and their associated subjects with different ideal and material interests and they can be studied in terms of their role alongside material mechanisms in reproducing and/or transforming economic and political domination. The translation of diverse economic, political, and social interests into effective agency in this regard depends not only on material resources and capacities but also on the ability to define and articulate identities and interests into specific accumulation strategies, political projects, and hegemonic visions in and across different scales. Thus agency has both material and discursive bases and, although economic power is grounded in control over economic resources and state power is grounded in coercion, struggles among competing forces and interests in these domains are normally waged as much through the battle for ideas as through the mobilization of primarily material resources and capacities. Success in these struggles typically depends on the capacity to articulate compelling visions that combine political, intellectual, and moral leadership with a flow of material rewards.

This paper uses CPE to explore the constitution of subjectivities, interests, and practices, the cultural construction of economic (counter-)hegemonic projects based on their selective articulation and mobilization, and the micro-
technologies of power that underpin these projects and practices. It draws on insights from critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992), state theory (Jessop 1990), disciplinary power (Rose and Miller 1992), new geography (Brenner 1995), the anthropology of everyday life and resistance (de Certeau 1985) and literary studies (Spivak 1988). Together these tributary approaches suggest that it is worth analyzing the production of hegemony in terms of six 'discursively-selective' moments, i.e., analytically distinct but empirically interrelated discursive and structural aspects of the variation, selection, retention, institutionalization, and embodiment of economic imaginaries and of possible resistance thereto. Even when hegemonic projects seem to create social unity and consensus, these are always partial, unstable, and temporary. For hegemony is vulnerable to de-stabilization at the personal, institutional, and macro-structural levels. On the personal level, the multiple subjectivities of individuals and the gap between discursive justifications and actual practices open a space for alternative conceptions of society and counter-hegemonic subjectivities. Similarly, on the institutional and macro-structural levels, because hegemonic projects exclude, marginalize, or suppress some identities and interests in creating an 'illusory community', space opens for subaltern forces to engage in tactics of resistance, demands for reform, and counter-hegemonic strategies.

**Towards a Cultural Political Economy**

**Discursive and Material Aspects of the 'Cultural Turn’**

Cultural political economy was developed in response to the 'cultural turn' in the social sciences in general and critical economics in particular. This turn usually refers to the discovery or intuition that language (or discourse) is a key feature, if not the key feature, of social life and should be given priority in its analysis. This is a valuable corrective to studies that naturalize or reify economic and political objects and categories and it promotes a better understanding of the micro-foundations of economic and political processes by focusing on the micro-politics of everyday life as well as on the complexities of broader hegemonic discourses that provide some over-arching unity to social formations. These strengths are often associated with failure to address the emergent structural features of economic and political orders and their dynamics, however, because the cultural turn lacks an appropriate set of concepts to deal with these issues. This makes it harder to understand the contradictions and conflicts inherent in capitalist social formations and their (il)logics. Accordingly, CPE seeks to address the discursive and material and their implications for the articulation of micro- and macro-power relations by advocating a constructivist approach that is commensurable with critical political economy.

A useful starting point in this regard is Jessop’s strategic-relational approach (or SRA). In its early stages (1982, 1990), this focused on the strategically selective nature of the structural contexts in which agents exist and act and argued that structures always privilege some strategies over others. Thus the SRA treats structures analytically as strategic in their form, content and operation; and actions are treated analytically as structured, more or less
context-sensitive, and structuring. It examines what Jessop terms 'structurallyinscribed strategic selectivities and structurally-oriented strategic calculation'. The former concept refers to how a given structure may privilege some actors, some discourses, some identities, and some strategies over others. The latter highlights how actors orient their strategies in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture, engage in strategic calculation about their 'objective' interests, and recursively select strategies through reflection, learning, and, indeed, forgetting. The SRA is especially useful in addressing the dialectic of path-dependency and path-shaping in hegemonic transformation. For, the reflexive reorganization of structural configurations is subject to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities; and the recursive selection of strategies depends in turn on individual or organizational learning capacities and on the 'experiences' resulting from the pursuit of different strategies in different conjunctures. This suggests that forces seeking to establish successful hegemonic projects should analyze the strategic contexts for their actions, engage in a stepwise transformation of the structural selectivities that may obstruct and/or facilitate the realization of the project, and promote individual and collective learning on the part of potential hegemonic subjects and subaltern forces so that they will share its values and objectives. It also identifies some of the basic structural and discursive mediations that affect the success of such hegemonic projects. Some of these concepts, arguments, and insights are elaborated in my own model below.

Jessop’s more recent development of the SRA integrates critical semiotic analysis to explore more fully the articulation and co-evolution of discursive and extra-discursive processes and their conjoint impact in specific contexts. Building on the three basic evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection-elimination, and retention, he presents three broad substantive arguments that are directly relevant to this spot paper. First, imaginaries and their associated objects/subjects should be seen as socially constructed, historically specific, more or less socially (dis)embedded in broader networks of social relations and institutional ensembles, more or less embodied ('incorporated' and embained), and need continuing social 'repair' work for their reproduction. In this context, he emphasizes that, while subjects and objects are often co-constituted, there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between them such that subjects always reproduce objects and/or objects always find appropriate subjects. Second, while eschewing reductionist approaches to social analysis, a discursively-sensitive SRA should still stress the materiality of social relations and highlight the constraints involved in processes that operate 'behind the backs' of the relevant agents. Third, he argues that only imaginaries that correspond, albeit partially, to real material forces in the existing or emerging political economy will become hegemonic. Other imaginaries will be silenced, surviving, if at all, on the margins of the dominant economic, political, and social order (Jessop 2004).

The hegemony of economic imaginaries is reinforced where, as Fairclough (2003) suggests, they involve discursive chains\(^1\) that link many potentially mutually reinforcing forces, fields and genres of discourse. The dominance of poverty reduction programmes in neo-liberal discourse, for example, stems from their promotion by powerful actors on many scales, their combination of
different but complementary discursive genres, and their reliance on different fields of knowledge and intervention. Thus they mobilize the World Bank, IMF, the state managers of developed capitalist economies, think tanks, service-oriented NGOs, consultancy firms, and national and local governments in affected countries; they advocate poverty reduction in many interconnected genres (e.g., research studies, consultancy reports, speeches, official documents, policy statements, casebooks, practical guides, and popular handbooks) to build consensus around their (re)definition of poverty as an economic problem and its corresponding solution; and they draw on many types of expert, power-brokers, capacity-builders, enforcers, and grassroots workers. I elaborate this approach in terms of six moments of discursive-selectivity below (see Box 1).

Developing this argument further in relation to the present case study, I explore how actors on different scales are mobilized in support of regimes of truth that unite transnational historic blocs. Combining neo-Gramscian and neo-Foucauldian approaches is useful here because both stress the capillary and contingent nature of power – for Gramsci in the complex ensemble of civil society, for Foucault in the micro-physics of power. A neo-Foucauldian perspective (Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999; Curtin 2002) enables us to open the black box of hegemonic strategies and disclose the microphysics of power at work in the (re-)making of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. Of particular importance are the disciplinary bodies of knowledge that normalize and render particular strategies 'knowable' and calculable (Higgins 2001: 312). Foucault identifies two complementary sets of mechanisms in this regard. First, his analysis of the disciplinary society focuses on how power/knowledge circuits and matrices produce 'normalized' individuals through the combination of legal and moral norms with very detailed, highly structured, and tightly supervised training techniques and assignments. This external gaze is reinforced by the mutual gaze of the population as its members monitor conformity to existing standards and systems of power/knowledge. Second, Foucault's analysis of the control society focuses on governmentality as the 'conduct of conduct', i.e., the inculcation of self-observation and self-discipline. A key aspect of this is the acceptance of ethical standards that inform the sense of self independently of external standards and systems. Although some authors read Foucault's work on disciplinary and control societies as a periodization of power-knowledge relations (e.g., Hardt and Negri 2000), this paper prefers to interpret it from the viewpoint of alternative techniques for exercising power that can be combined in different ways in different conjunctures.

Let us consider how these mechanisms and their fluid social activities get regularized into more fixed and stable arrangements and coordinated with specific organizational practices. At the risk of being formalistic, this section now offers a heuristic device that locates these processes within the overall production of hegemony. This device is presented in terms of with six interrelated moments (see Box 1) that highlight the discursive selectivity (Hay 1996: 253-77) of social forces in the production of hegemony.
These three arenas help to map the sites where hegemonic and counter-hegemonic struggles take place. As yet I have not addressed how (counter-) hegemonic discourses are co-constructed and how micro-technologies of power contribute to (re-)making common sense. I now turn to these questions.
A. Discursive-Strategic Moment of Crisis-Induced Discursive Variation

- Faced with economic crises and pressures to restructure, actors at different scales and sites seek new opportunities for economic action;
- This often involves struggles and/or cooperation to remake extant objects of governance and/or introduce new objects;
- This involves a new repertoire of discourses and is most likely to succeed where a new discursive chain is established that reinforces these objects of governance in part through interdiscursivity (see below);
- It also involves the mobilization of new networks of actors.

B. Structurally-Inscribed Strategically Selective Moment (applied to discourse)

- The embedding of actors in different sets of social relations affects their capacities to deploy discursive chains to build new objects of governance through the selective articulation of diverse discourses and signs;
- Some actors find it easier to privilege these objects of governance (e.g., entrepreneurship, competitiveness, transparency, corporate social responsibility) and related bodies of knowledge (e.g., new public management)

C. (Inter-)Discursively-Selective Moment (applied to discourse)

- (Inter-)discursive chains select and limit what symbols or signs can be articulated, what meanings can be fixed upon a set of signifiers, and what relations can be established across different discourses to support or reinvent hegemonic objects, imaginaries and projects;
- Hegemonic discursive chains are mediated through key sets of economic, political and intellectual forces. Currently these include IMF, World Bank, WTO, World Economic Forum, states, think tanks, consultancy firms, philanthropic organizations, government bureaucracies, TNCs, business federations, chamber of commerce, standard-setting agencies, financial organizations, service-oriented NGOs, business media, business schools, consultancy firms, banks, media, etc.;
- These actors problematize, negotiate and co-construct hegemonic genres that operate in part via knowledging technologies;
- These knowledging technologies construct regimes of truth that normalize and discipline judgements;
- These technologies involve a set of knowledge, expertise, techniques and apparatuses:
  - Economic, management and legal knowledge (e.g., discourses on market, globalization, development, property rights, new public management);
Expertise (those occupying key positions as economists, management gurus, IMF/WTO officials, standard-setting agencies, lawyers, auditors);
Techniques (invoking logics of inevitability, classification, measurement, performance, monitoring, and judgements);
Apparatuses (e.g., standards, quality assessments, reports, codes, programmes, numbers, indexes, targets, guidelines, scores, etc.);

- These micro-technologies of control normalize and discipline thoughts, aspirations, decisions, and common sense and establish them in civil society (e.g., mass media, families and pop culture....)

D. Moment in the Remaking Dominant Subjectivities and Practices
(Constituting Subjects and Regulating Performance)

- To be successful, these discursive practices must reconfigure subjects and redefine subjectivities;
- Under the actual or imagined gaze of an authority or truth regime, subjects may refashion their identities and habitus by reflecting on these standards so that their conduct becomes and remains congruent with the new 'word order' (or 'index order'/number order');
- These forms of self-regulation encourage individuals and organizations to see themselves as subjects in ways that sustain and reproduce this order (e.g., competitive/world-class/entrepreneurial/mobile/flexible/ consumerist/cool);
- Agencies perform and repeat these neo-liberal subjectivities in mundane institutional events (e.g., talking, meetings, writings, seminars, adverts) and everyday practices (e.g., working, managing, discussing, debating, consuming, reporting); and
- Such disciplining by self-regulation and governing common sense at a distance is interventionist and self-disciplined in nature.

E. Moment in Consolidating and Re-Embedding New Social Relations

- These subjectivities and everyday practices also consolidate the new social relations entailed in the new projects, which become regularized through strategies, institutions and governance;
- The greater the range and scale of sites (hegemonic and sub-hegemonic locations) in which these resonant discourses and practices are selected and strategies are promoted, the greater is the scope for effective institutionalization and integration into stable patterns of structured coherence; and
- This contingent 'structured coherence' in social relations of production and consumption may result in a temporary mode of governance.

F. Counter-Hegemonic Resistance and Negotiation

- The resultant form of market-based governance is typically uneven in regard to state capacities, class, gender, ethnicity, nature, place, etc.
• Hegemony cannot abolish legitimacy problems, social exclusions, and contradictions and is therefore likely to continue to provoke resistance at a tactical and/or strategic level;
• In the latter case, subaltern forces may protect themselves by building alliances and solidarity networks with others who can change the status quo. Thus the self contests the neo-liberal truths and detaches itself from this truth regime;
• Counter-hegemonic discursive chains may emerge that transgress this regime through satirized subversions and/or promise of ‘justice’, etc.;
• This disarticulation allows for recomposition and the use of ‘human rights’, ‘justice’, ‘accountability’, and ‘sustainability’ as resistance symbols for counter-hegemonic struggles;
• These symbols mediate the emergence of a ‘politics of becoming’ (Novy 2005) that form alternative discursive chains that challenge the neo-liberal structure and governmentality;
• Actors in the hegemonic discursive chains may selectively appropriate some of their normative and ethical symbols to ‘re-moralize’ neo-liberal common sense by adopting languages and practices of ‘corporate social responsibility’, ‘stakeholdering’, ‘good governance’, ‘transparency’ and ‘democracy’;
• This negotiation and struggle for control over common sense is embodied in a deepening of the neo-liberal hegemony that I termed ‘new ethicalism’;
• The latter is based on promises of ‘accountability’, ‘civility’, ‘good governance’ and ‘partnership’ that facilitate a temporary alliance between international organizations, (supra-)states, TNCs, and service-oriented NGOs.

In short, new social relations can be reinforced insofar as devices exist that (a) privilege these discourses and their associated practices; and (b) filter out contrary discourses and practices. This can involve both discursive selectivity (discursive chains, identities and performance) and material selectivity (the privileging of certain sites of discourse and strategies of strategic actors and their modes of calculation about their ‘objective interests’, and the recursive selection of these strategies). Such mechanisms recursively strengthen appropriate genres, performance, and strategies and selectively eliminate inappropriate alternatives and are most powerful where they operate across many sites in a social formation to promote complementary sub-hegemonic discourses within the wider social ensemble on different scales (section 3.2).

Given the interwovenness of domination and resistance, we must abandon the view that the space of resistance mirrors that of domination. Resistance must be examined in its own terms rather than derived automatically from the nature and forms of domination. De Certeau and Spivak provide useful ideas for understanding resistance and the creativity of everyday life. For example, de Certeau (1985) argues that everyday life is the site of countless tactics of resistance to broader power relations. Whereas the dominant culture moves through ‘strategies’, practices that assume a base of operations, marginals must use ‘tactics’ – ‘calculated actions determined by the lack of a proper
locus’. This space of the tactic is the place of the other. ’Whatever one wins through tactics must be surrendered; any victory is only temporary’ (de Certeau 1985: 36-7). Spivak usefully indicates that tactics can include refusal to speak, resort to lies and secrets, and the rejection of names and labels imposed from above (1988). Tactics cannot in themselves produce major structural change but they can provide the basis for the emergence of social movements that combine tactics with longer-range, more encompassing strategies (see de Certeau 1985, Escobar et al. 1992).

The ’Scalar Turn’: from Global to Local and the Scales in Between

Contributions to the ’cultural turn’ in political economy of the kind reviewed above have often been insensitive to the question of scale. Some scholars concentrate on the global level (Cox 1987; Gill and Law 1988), others on the national and local (Jessop 1990; de Certeau 1985). Drawing on the new geography (Harvey 1996; Smith 1995; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 1999; Perkmann and Sum 2002; Jessop 2002), I now highlight the importance of scales and argue for a cultural political economy that is sensitive to this issue.

The scalar question concerns how different scales - global, regional, national and local – interact with each other. Much work in fields of interest to the DEMOLOGOS project has tended to focus on processes and patterns at one scale, e.g., either the local/national or the global. World systems theory and Robert W. Cox and several neo-Gramscian scholars prioritize the ’global’, as seen in their naming of their object of analysis as the ’world order’. Germain and Kenny (1998) question whether Gramsci’s work, which they claim is more focused on the politics of individual European states, can be transferred to the international/global level. But Gramsci was well aware of the interplay of forces at international, national and regional levels:

’International relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically unique combinations. A particular ideology, for instance, born in a highly developed country, is disseminated in less developed countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations. This relation between international forces and national forces is further complicated by the existence within every State of several structurally diverse territorial sectors, with diverse relations of force at all level’ (1971: 182; see also Jessop 2005).

Production of (Counter-)Hegemony

This review of the ’cultural’ and ’scalar turns’ is helpful for developing CPE, especially given the relativization of scale that has accompanied the crisis of Fordism, exportism, and import substitution industrialization and thus opened multiple spaces for the emergence and consolidation of neo-liberalism. This has profound implications for the process of ’production of hegemony’ as opposed to the ’hegemony of production. The former involves examining the processes and mechanisms in and through which ’political, intellectual, and moral leadership’ is won and secured in and across the differentiated and
dispersed organizations and institutions of civil society -- organizations and institutions that often exist and work across several scales.

Given my interest in how economic, political and intellectual actors compete across different scales to remake the objects of governance discursively and materially, it is worth distinguishing three mediating sets of arenas in this competition. They are: (1) international organizations/institutions; (2) super-and sub-states; and (3) (trans-)national civil society. Each set is typically multi-scalar (see Table 1).

Actors in the first two sets (e.g., IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization, UN, the US, local governments) are crucial intermediaries in (re-)structuring capitalist hegemony and consolidating the new common-sense within elites and among the masses. They have a significant discursive role in four key respects. First, they are sources of discursive innovation and hence variation. Second, they select resonant discourses, translate them into practices, and introduce them into institutions. Third, they contribute to the consolidation of these innovations through the recursive selection of discourses, practices, and institutional forms with the result that inappropriate variation is reduced and an appropriate degree of 'requisite variety' is established to support the structural coherence of economic activities. Fourth, they reinforce these changes by mobilizing elite and/or popular support behind the new discourses, practices, and institutional orders.

It is worth noting that these actors sometimes draw inspiration from actors in (trans-)national civil society (see below). Moreover, in certain conjunctures, even counter-hegemonic constructions may emerge from these circles. Examples include the Chief Economist of World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, criticizing his own organization for pushing policies rooted in the Washington Consensus during the Asian Crisis; the conflict between UN and WTO over intellectual property rights and biodiversity; and socialist-oriented programmes by some state leaders who challenge neo-liberalism (e.g., Brazil's Lula de Silva and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez). Despite these counter-hegemonic outbursts from within, international organizations such as WTO, IMF and World Bank and (super-)/(sub-)states largely function as sites for remaking hegemonic discourses and practices.

(Trans-)national civil society is a more ambivalent arena. It is a site in which hegemonic common sense is secured as well as an arena for contestations in which a 'war of position' might be fought for counter-hegemony. The doubled and contested nature of civil society, first identified by Gramsci on the national scale, also exists transnationally. For example, whereas service-oriented NGOs are part of the extended (super-)state; movement-oriented NGOs engage in counter-hegemonic cultural struggles. This ambivalence is especially marked in times of crisis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediating arenas</th>
<th>Actors embedded in the mediating arenas</th>
<th>Nature of discourse</th>
<th>Examples of micro-technologies of power</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International/ Organizations and institutions</td>
<td>IMF, WTO, World Bank, UN, OECD, G8, NAFTA, APEC, etc.</td>
<td>Mainly co-constructing hegemonic discourses (with legal domination) Some elements of counter-hegemonic challenges from within and across different organizations</td>
<td>Mainly deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society (see Table 2 below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Supra-)/(Sub-) States</td>
<td>Governments on different scales (e.g., European Union, national/local governments), ministries, departments, quangos, special committees, local agencies, etc.</td>
<td>Mainly co-constructing (sub-)hegemonic discourses (with legal &amp; coercive domination) Some elements of counter-hegemonic challenges within and across different states</td>
<td>Deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society (see Table 2) Regional/national/local governments negotiate and translate these knowledging technologies to their contexts (not necessarily without resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Trans-) National civil society</td>
<td>World Economic Forum, International Chamber of Commerce, standard-setting agencies, MNC think tanks, philanthropic organizations (e.g., Ford Foundation), business federations, financial</td>
<td>Both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic Constructions</td>
<td>Deploying knowledging technologies of globalization, development, new public management, governance, and civil society (see Table 2) Deconstructing these</td>
</tr>
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(including private authority) organizations, consultancy firms, professional bodies, management/law schools, trade unions, schools, churches, political parties, NGOs, newspapers, TV programmes, Internet blogging, social movements, forums (e.g., World Social Forum), cinemas, art, and popular culture, etc. technologies and giving well-articulated or fragmented alternatives (e.g., 'Another World is Possible')

Using counter-hegemonic strategies/ tactics that include mass gatherings, demonstrations, alternative publishing, carnivals, music, films, folklore, rumours, gossips, sabotage, murmurs, silences, lies, etc.

(Source: Author's own compilation)

Production of Hegemony

In face of the current crises, actors in the three arenas of power compete to construct innovative symbols and objects of governance that might mediate the rebuilding of capitalist hegemony. CPE ascribes key roles to the discursive chains that link the three arenas across different scales and the actors that build these chains by connecting diverse objects of governance and subject positions (see box 1 and 'A' in diagram 2). This is easier for some actors than others. In particular, given their position in dominant organizations at key scales of economic, political, and intellectual organization (e.g., IMF, World Bank, WTO, International Chamber of Commerce, World Economic Forum, influential business schools, major trade departments, think tanks, consultancy firms), members of transnational elites can select and privilege certain economic imaginaries and their corresponding objects of governance (e.g., 'globalization' and 'competitiveness') and mobilize networks to support their promotion and institutionalization (see box 1 and 'B' in diagram 2). The role of organic intellectuals and other leading figures is important here insofar as they re-contextualize the new discourses and imaginaries in ways consistent with the new accumulation strategy and/or hegemonic project. Such figures problematize, co-construct and circulate marketized and/or managerialized discourses (e.g., 'globalization as inevitable', 'market is best, 'trade as an engine for democracy') that limit public choices and constrain public opinion (Goeddertz and Kraidy 2003: 81). They may also articulate and thereby reinforce such discourses to more socially-oriented codes such as 'accountability', 'global governance', 'poverty reduction', etc. Finally, they help to filter out notions and discourses that oppose or weaken them. These various discursive practices are framed, articulated and combined in complex ways across different sites and scales. In general, they are fused as a
complex but largely complementary 'word order', within which actors at different sites and scales negotiate, translate and articulate a new common sense to suit changing times. In true hegemonic fashion, this aligns elite and public interests, drawing on technologies of power that govern at a distance (see box 1 and 'C' in diagram 2).

These technologies of power and their disciplinary techniques, which underpin the changing nature of neo-liberalism, can be interpreted in terms of an emerging move from 'new constitutionalism' to 'new ethicalism'. For Gill, 'new constitutionalism' is a juridico-political strategy that disconnects economic policies from democratic accountability. He tends to miss the role of economic, political and intellectual forces across different scales in shaping and pursuing this strategy (1995). Together these forces form discursive chains that combine the discourses on 'globalization', 'development' and 'new public management' and thereby disconnect economics from political accountability. While detailed case studies are beyond this paper, these managerially inflected neo-liberal discourses can be shown to normalize and discipline judgements through various techniques.

First, the knowledging technology of 'globalization' universalizes marketized and entrepreneurial frames. Some of these market identities can be found in official documents associated with the 'Washington Consensus', the 'structural adjustment programme', neo-classical economics, business management, business press, etc. This body of economic knowledge is presented as neutral and this helps to insulate it from democratic scrutiny. This universalization and neutralization of neo-liberalism encourages actors to identify with the market, free trade, privatization, entrepreneurship, and consumerist regimes of truth. These are narrated in terms of universal rationalism, growth, development, and progress for all. Mediated through bio-political practices, this can make resources and bodies available for subsumption by globalized production, financialization and consumption. Among its forms are flexible labour, the entrepreneurial self, workfare/competitive bodies, financial speculation, and the embrace of lifestyle consumption (see Table 2).

Second, the knowledging technology of 'development', which is currently expressed through 'globalization' discourses and practices, is often premised ideologically on unreflecting acceptance of 'modernization theory'. The latter is narrated as a story of progress along a linear evolution along the path already trodden in Western Europe and/or the USA. It encourages actors, especially in developing countries, to aspire to become modern (if not 'western'), scientific, rational, democratic, and competitive and to aim to move closer to global, if not 'world class', status. Relevant techniques include naming, universalizing, categorizing, establishing hierarchies of economies, and exploiting the greater prestige of 'western' experience over others, deploying metaphors (e.g., 'gaps between North and South', 'catching up by the South') and rhetorical devices (e.g., 'growth', 'technology'/science', 'progress'). These discursive devices make individuals responsible for realizing 'progress' and seeking remedies from 'poverty' and 'deprivations' (see table 2).
Diagram 2 Production of (Counter-)Hegemony on Different Scales

**Production of hegemony**

**Tactical hegemonic counter-hegemonic practices (micro)**

**Counter-discourses on different scales (macro)**

- **Conditioning Social relations**
- **Remaking subjectivities and practices**
- **Certain objects of governance**
- **The discursive chains operate through technologies**
- **Sub-hegemonic translation of hegemonic discourses**
- **Competing discursive innovations for intellectual and moral leadership**

**A**

- **Based on the recursive selection of discourses and practices**
- **Strategies are promoted and institutionalized**

**B**

**C**

**D**

**E and F**

**Ideas/ideologically-inscribed discourses**

**Institutions**

**Material power**

**Hegemony of Production**

(Source: Author’s own compilation)

Key (for boxes in italics):
Third, the knowledging technology of 'new public management', which is tied to economic discourses and practices, monitors actors by creating technical targets such as 'performance', 'efficiency' and 'reporting'. It subjects actors to specific administrative norms, rules and standards that are linked to 'world-class', rational, professional or ethical principles (e.g., 'competitiveness', 'transparency', 'efficiency'). It creates both quantitative-calculable and qualitative-ethical spaces where economic activities can be included in the universe of managerial rationality and surveillance. Private and public actors are expected (or even contractually obliged) to internalize these norms and engaged themselves and others in regular reporting, auditing, and disclosing behaviour that deviate from these norms. This is enabled by innovative practices such as benchmarks, reports, indexes, best practices, managerial guides, and checklists.

Diagram 3 The Remaking of Neo-Liberalism from 'New Constitutionalism' and 'New Ethicalism'

These three overlapping micro-technologies normalize and discipline thoughts, aspirations, decisions, and common sense. Under the neoliberal-managerial-audit gaze of gurus and experts, actors perform and repeat these neo-liberal subjectivities through mundane institutional events (e.g., talking, meetings, writings, seminars, advertisements) and everyday routines (e.g., working, managing, discussing, and debating). However, hegemony cannot abolish social exclusions and legitimacy crises, contradictions within and among international organizations, (super-)states, and civil society. This allows counter-hegemonic movements to remobilize on behalf of human rights and challenge the neo-liberal structure and governmentality. Alternative discursive chains based on human rights, sustainability; and accountability is formed and civic activism from Seattle to Porto Allegro challenges such hegemony. Actors in the hegemonic discursive chains attempt to selectively
appropriate some of these normative and ethical symbols to 're-moralize' the economy. This can be seen in the languages and practices of 'corporate social responsibility', 'stakeholdering', 'good governance', 'transparency', and 'poverty reduction' since the late 1990s. This constitutes the move towards 'new ethicalism'⁵ (see above), which can be interpreted as an ethico-managerial strategy to reconnect economic policies with moral norms (see diagram 3). On this point, it is important to refer back to Gramsci, who highlighted the ethico-political dimensions of hegemony. This 'new ethicalism' is underpinned by two norm-based micro-technologies of governing.

First, the knowing technology of 'governance'/accountability' in (inter-) national and public policy arenas promises better results than simple reliance on anonymous market forces or top-down command. Particularly important is the emphasis on incorporating civil-society actors (e.g., MNCs, NGOs and citizen's movements) into international organizations and national governments and on negotiating their differences through dialogues at various scales. On the local and national levels, this is narrated in terms of 'private-public partnership' and 'good governance'; globally, we find notions such as 'global governance' and 'Global Compact'. These governance discourses take (changes in) the civil as their entry point and aim to get actors to identify with 'ethicalized' norms (e.g., 'transparency', 'accountability', 'rule of law', 'partnership', 'stakeholdering', 'poverty reduction'). Of particular importance here is the discourse of 'good governance', which originates in an attempt to explain why neo-liberalism did not succeed in African societies in terms of their lack of liberal practices and institutions and draw appropriate neo-liberal lessons from this failure. 'Good governance' is presented as the means whereby states in Africa (and elsewhere) will push back primordial and patrimonial structures and become efficient, transparent and accountable. The rule of law and respect for private property are thus expected to unleash latent 'entrepreneurial spirits'. This mix of the modernization and neo-liberal market paradigms is expressed managerially and technically in recent policies promoted by the World Bank, the UNDP, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. These emphasize the 'capabilities of the state', benchmarking of 'good practices' based on norms of transparency, etc. On a wider scale, the rhetoric of 'global governance', which seeks to counter the 'negative consequences of globalization', promotes a 'world ethos' under schemes such as the Global Compact. The latter calls for relevant actors to become 'partners' who 'dialogue' and 'learn' to become ethical corporations. In general, such 'governance' etho aim to establish systems of managing and self-control to further 'transparency' and 'efficiency' through auditing and management (see table 2).
Table 2: Knowledge/Power that Underpinned the Neo-Liberal World Order since 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge and power</th>
<th>Disciplinary technologies and rationalities</th>
<th>Examples of Discursive Practices</th>
<th>Selfhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Economic-based knowledge | • Universalization and neutralization of the market frame  
• Essentialization of neoliberal economics and the global scale (e.g., globalization is integration of markets, globalization as inevitable, globalization benefits everyone)  
• Acceptance of modernization theory  
• Normalization of progress  
• Hierarchialization of economies  
• Naming of the ‘Third World’ and/or ‘Failed States’ | Speeches, policy documents, (international) laws, scholarly journals, interviews, official and/or consultancy reports, press conferences/releases, books by politicians and business gurus, statistics, news reports, TV progs, commercial publications, advert, slogans, indexes, | Marketized, globalized, entrepreneurial, consumerist, and flexible self |
| 1) Market/Globalization | | | |
| 2) Development | | | Growth- and progress-oriented self |
| Administrative-based knowledge | • Managerial rationalities  
• Rational disciplining through performance, disclosure, accountability, etc.  
• Surveillance through technical standards and norms | Speeches, policy documents, brochures, standards, audit reports, best practices, benchmarks, performance indicators, indexes, managerial guides, checklists, scorecards, etc. | Rational, calculating, and responsibilized self |
| 3) New Public Management | | | |
| Norm-based Knowledge | • Universalizing and homogenizing ethical norms  
• Standards, norms and ethics as sources of meaning and disciplining  
• New ethical norms include ‘human rights’, ‘partnership’, ‘stakeholdering’, ‘accountability’ and ‘corporate citizenship’  
• Universalizing and homogenizing through democratic and civilizing norms (e.g., ‘community’, ‘trust’, ‘empowerment’, ‘cosmopolitan-ism’, ) | Speeches, policy documents, laws, compacts, NGO reports, debates, best practices, checklists, consultancy/newspaper reports, standards, best practices, codes, checklists, etc. | Co-operative, accountable, and professionalized self |
| 4) Governance/Accountability | | | |
| 5) Civility | | | Civil, active and responsibilized self |

(Source: Author's own compilation)
Second, the knowing technology of ‘civility’ encourages institution- and capacity-building through activities such as ‘good governance’ in developing countries and global governance worldwide. These activities aim to get actors to accept democratic and community norms expressed in notions such as building ‘citizenship’, ‘stakeholdership’ and ‘partnership’. This discourse mirrors the paradigmatic shift away from the state and the market. It preaches ‘rights’, ‘trust’, ‘responsibility’, ‘cooperation’, ‘democracy’, ‘ethics’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘cosmopolitanism’. Individuals and organizations are encouraged to identify themselves with these moral dispositions and through their self-discipline and self-management to maintain order and stability. These routines require individuals to be self-conscious, responsible, civil, and self-regulating. However, the position of these ‘free subjects’ is highly ambivalent. Civil society is socially empowered through voluntary associations, aids, and social service programmes (e.g., workfare schemes in developed countries, micro-credit initiatives for women in developing countries; global NGO advocacy schemes); however, these programmes are, at the same time, means of social subjection in which actors are turned into subjects of codes, standard of excellence, administrative rules of the programmes. This mode of subjectification tends to produce a particular version of the liberal self (e.g., a privatized and techno-entrepreneurial citizen who is income-generating and rule-abiding towards civil projects) and reduces social-political questions to technical ones that are more consistent with the neo-liberal project.

The five overlapping technologies – comprising economic, administrative, and norm-based mechanisms – considered above are stitched together by diverse actors in the three mediating arenas (see Table 1) and promote neo-liberal subjectivities through the enacted routines and mundane practices. The resulting ‘passive revolution’ shapes a new ‘popular collective will’ and helps to contribute to neo-liberal hegemony. Gramsci formulate the principle that underlies this result as follows:

‘... analyzing it in all its molecular phases ... [interaction] repeated an infinite number of times and which in their gigantic unity represent this work from which is born a collective will of a certain level of homogeneity ...’ (Gramsci translated by and cited in Thibault 1991: 212)

These infinite molecular interactions combine into an 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' that generates a collective will of a certain level of homogeneity within heterogeneity. Thus the micro-worlds of social power are related to the macro-level of hegemonic order through ‘technologies of power’. By focusing on the (un)sophisticated, the ethical, mundane, and the technical, we can more easily reveal how Gramsci’s ‘unstable equilibrium of compromise’ and Foucault’s ‘microphysics of power’ interact to produce hegemony and self-discipline. A discourse perspective shows how such temporary unities or linkages are created in and through discursive chains, discursive selectivity and diverse technologies of power. Thus the many representations of the neo-liberal world order operate in part through disciplinary technologies that involve a set of knowledge, expertise, techniques and apparatuses (see Table
These ways of knowing help to discipline self and other by framing issues and imposing rules of conduct. These processes of object formation and creating knowledge about the objects (e.g., universalization of the 'neoliberal market') help to redefine actors' identities, subjectivities and desires (e.g., 'cooperative partnership', 'world class companies', 'flexible workers', 'ethical corporations') (Perry and Maurer 2003) (see box 1 and 'D' in diagram 2).

Such hegemonic identities are echoed and repetitively performed and thereby selected by international organizations/multinational firms/transnational elites-statesmen/academics/businessmen/individuals in mundane institutional events and routine everyday practices (see 'D' in diagram 2) (on finance, see Langley 2003; Sum 2005). This shared discoursing about practices means people 'come to understand their situation according to a similar language and logic' (Rose and Miller 1992: 184) and the 'feel of the game' (Bourdieu 1990: 52). An important part of this institutional consolidation and production of shared understandings is the effective embodiment of ideas and practices in the habitus (and hexis) of leaders and led alike in different organizations. Shared behaviour and desires integrate those concerned and others in webs of commitment 'within which are articulated all those dreams, aspirations, schemes, strategies, and manoeuvres of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions by acting upon their will, their circumstances or their environment' (Rose and Miller 1992: 175). While this may constitute the habitus (and hexis) of everyday life for many actors, they may not fully comprehend how these relate to economic domination and, indeed, through repetition and recursive selection, contribute to that structural coherence that supports continued accumulation (cf. Jessop 2004).

This is possible when there are an increasing range and scale of sites resonant these discourses, recursively select these practices, and repeatedly promote the strategies that get institutionalized into patterns of structured coherence (see box 1 and 'E' in diagram 2). This can be seen in the way that the neo-liberal hegemonic project centres economics, squeezes out politics, and embraces ethics. The first two processes are partly underpinned by the three interrelated technologies of 'globalization', 'development', and 'new public management'; the latter process is partly inscribed by the two interrelated technologies of 'governance' and 'civility' (see table 2). These knowing technologies and their resulting subjectivities create a twofold mode of power. For individuals and organizations are governed by (a) a 'new constitutionalism' that institutionalizes 'disciplinary neo-liberalism' and are also integrated into a new layer of governmental power through (b) a 'new ethicalism' tied to an imagined moral leadership (see diagrams 2 and 3).

The resulting neo-liberal discipline-governmentality mode of power does not operate through a simple discursive determinism. There is nothing automatic about subjectification or hegemony – actors always have space to resist and, indeed, to innovate in ways that escape any domination-resistance binary. At stake are complex processes of domination, translation, negotiation and resistance through strategies and/or tactics. In this regard, hegemony and subjectification involve negotiation between hegemonic, sub-hegemonic and
counter-hegemonic forces across different sites and scales. In short, hegemony and new identities are best seen as temporary, provisional, and unstable.

Some practices are more firmly anchored and more influential than others. They include those at the centre of antagonistic social relations and those that enact constitutive rules that define fundamental social entities (Swidler 2001: 87). There are also divergences between discourses and practices, between scripted invocations of what an embodied self should be like and the particular performances of self that individuals fabricate for themselves in their everyday lives. It is in these gaps, or perhaps the constitution of these gaps, that we find many of the negotiations and alternative conceptions of society and counter-hegemonic subjectivities (see box 1 and ‘F’ in diagram 2). This is where neo-Foucauldian work needs enriching by taking account (as Foucault suggested) of the potential gaps between discourses and rules of governance at specific sites. Given the diffused nature of these gaps through all spaces, there is no primary scale at which (counter-)hegemonic discourses are best constructed. Instead the most suitable scale is historically contingent. This does not mean that the choice of scale can be 'arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed' (Gramsci 1971: 362). Depending on the conjuncture and actors’ analyses of strategic contexts as well as of the gaps between discourses and practices, (sub-)hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses can emerge from global, regional, national and local scales.

Production of (Sub-)Hegemony

Central to the scalar nature of these discursive chains is how these 'molecular processes' stretch across the hegemonic and sub-hegemonic axis (diagram 2). Far from being purely top-down, there are continuing exchanges between the hegemonic and sub-hegemonic sites. Leaders/entrepreneurs/academics in the top transnational organizations and institutions, such as international organizations/institutions, states, elite corporations, well-funded think tanks, and world-class business/law schools, develop globalized symbols and discourses. These may then be transferred to other scales and sites. This process is mediated in turn by regional/national/local leaders who have trained to think through elite theories/discourses, such as neo-classical economics and theories of development. Typical figures here are academics, politicians, bureaucrats, think tanks, professional organizations who have learnt to 'speak the language' through years abroad under scholarship schemes, worked in international organizations, attended international conferences, participated in international fora, collaborated in research, staffed government and non-government organizations in their own countries, read academic and business bestsellers/reports, and so on. Such exchanges often depend on strategic calculations by regional/national/local intellectuals and institutions about how best to exploit new opportunities to advance their ideal and material interests.

They become active purveyors and adaptors of global economic discourse and technologies of power by making them relevant and anchoring them in specific regional/national/local cultural contexts (Peet 2000; Sum 2003). They
can therefore be seen as sub-hegemonic nodes of translation of global trends and as centres of persuasion that may promote glocal convergence. Martin-Barbero (1993) refers to this translation as 'hegemonic echo'. Such processes legitimate and customize ideological power through local-contextual practice and common sense. This echoing through translation and negotiation of hegemonic meanings includes processes such as extending, re-phrasing, hybridizing and technicalizing the meanings of buzzwords that can be (re-)embedded in the regional/national/local contexts. Often, these individuals and institutions gain status and material rewards as part of the so-called 'world class' in line with how quickly the latest hegemonic discourse can be co-constructed, repeated, re-thought and translated into regional/national/local policy, documents, and the mundane practices of everyday life.

This extension, modification and hybridization of meanings is often conflictual but even this may strengthen the overall consensus around the hegemonic project and build transnational support. For sub-hegemonic actors, aspiring to become 'world class', may re-interpret and adapt the hegemonic discourse in ways compatible with the survival of the overall project. Novel discourses may emerge from these sub-hegemonic power centres and reverberate to the hegemonic sites, where they are absorbed into the hegemonic codes (Peet 2000). Such ideological exchanges reinforce the ties between hegemonic and sub-hegemonic nodes through a multiscalar interdiscursive space. This involves interaction between actors with global horizons of action and those with more regional/national/local horizons and leads to the continuous co-constructing and negotiating (sub-)hegemonic codes and practices in the 'integral world capitalist order'. This new 'word order' and associated practices represent a dominant 'worldview' that not only has underlying structural class relevance but is also ethnic-, gender- and place-biased. These codes and practices are naturalized as 'good sense' by shared ways of thinking, talking and performing. It is by creating such mutuality and reciprocity across different scales and sites that power becomes productive and secures the structural coherence of economic activities.  

Production of counter-hegemony

Despite the appearance of social unity and consensus that successful hegemonic projects create, this is always a temporary, as well as illusory, unity. On the personal-as-political level, the multiple subjectivities of individuals and the gap between discursive justifications and actual practices opens space for alternative conceptions of society and counter-hegemonic subjectivities. On the institutional and macro-structural levels, the marginalizing nature of hegemonic projects means that some identities and interests are always excluded and suppressed. The latter involves not only those who lose out on class grounds but also those who are oppressed on gender, 'race', ethnic, territorial, and other grounds (Bakker and Gill 2003: 66-82; Rupert 2003: 186). Thus, hegemony remains vulnerable and is always prone to instability. It provides the space and opportunity for different social forces to intervene in these struggles and give a new form and content to the hegemonic project by deconstructing their technologies of power and offering
alternatives (see table 1). Conflict over language is the struggle to transform the hegemonic common sense.

Discursive chains work here too -- creating the scope for other frameworks of meaning and counter-hegemonic mobilization. The resulting struggles and their ‘politics of becoming’ (Novy 2005) are based in class, social movements and popular culture (see box 1 and ‘F’ in diagram 2). Social forces such as critical intellectuals, trade unions, movement-based NGOs, feminist/anti-racist groups, writers/journalists, grassroots workers/campaigners, alternative artists, peasants, and cyberpunks often voice alternative agendas at global, regional, national and local levels. They engage in ‘wars of position’ (long-term, strategic, institutionally-mediated) and ‘wars of manoeuvre’ (short-term, tactical, and more direct) to resist hegemonic control. Agencies of resistance cut across global, regional, national and local levels and their activities can be found in different sites. They range from macro-resistance such as organized movements/forums to micro-resistance that can be found in the practices of everyday life (see below and diagram 2).

On the global level, milieux for movement actions include transnational protests (e.g., anti-globalization campaigns since Seattle), alternative social forums (e.g., World Social Forum, European Social Forum) and (trans-) localized struggles (e.g., the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas). Their activities are co-ordinated via the Internet and resistance is performed on the streets and other public spaces. Associated but not exclusive to these loosely-organized movements, alternative media are also sites of resistance. Organic intellectuals offer counter-hegemonic narratives and often get published by alternative presses (e.g., Pluto Press, South End Press, Third World Network, Veinto Siglo, Zed Books), pamphlets, charters, forum testimonies, press releases, magazines, paintings, radios, films, graffiti, folklore, poems, songs, banners, chat rooms, open publishing on websites (e.g., Indymedia), cyberwatch monitoring sites, and TV channels (e.g., Telesur). Thus, the targeted oppositional readerships/audiences are exposed to alternative symbols and means of receiving and imparting information that aim at social change. They are complex agents of counter-hegemonic power that use skills and sites belonging to communities normally excluded from mainstream modes of distribution.

As for the subaltern and the marginals who cannot escape the social milieux that marginalizes them, de Certeau (1985) and Scott (1985) discussed ‘tactics’ and ‘weapons of the weak’ respectively in the resistance of everyday life. For de Certeau, tactics are used by those who lack solid institutional and/or spatial advantages and must therefore defend or promote their interests by engaging in a permanent ‘war of manoeuvre’ by seizing (or creating) opportunities and by using speed or time to throw entrenched powers off balance in order to gain what often prove to be merely temporary advantages. He argues that the oppressed must try to insinuate themselves in particular contexts in ways that produce transient victories – they must always be ‘on the watch for opportunities that must be seized “on the wing”’ (de Certeau 1985: 35). They must continually manipulate events and be prepared to take short-term and decisive actions to gain a tactical advantage. Scott examined ‘everyday forms
of resistance' such as foot dragging, dissimulation, gossip, rumour, humour, linguistic tricks, and sabotage as the weapons of the powerless groups. Thus everyday life is a continuing battle of wits and a site of micro-resistance in which the (un-)structured and covert activities of the liminal seek to accommodate power while simultaneously protecting their interests and identities (on 'tactics of the weak' in the information age, see Sum 2003). Spivak also calls our attention to the 'speak-ability' of subalterns and to how their various silences may be forms of agency and resistance.

Thus viewed, hegemony is unstable and contingent. It relies on continual struggles to build coalitions and compromises in and between dominant and subordinate social groups. Especially in times of hegemonic crisis and intensification of underlying contradictions, splits within the power bloc may require changes that articulate hegemonic interests with those of potential allies. Some changes may involve passive revolution rather than the active mobilization of popular forces. For example, hegemonic social forces may shield themselves counter-hegemonic discourses by establishing the authority of experts, repeating a given discourse, organizing discourse as subject areas in university, and silencing unacceptable discourses through various means. They can also capture counter-hegemonic discourses by subsuming them into broader categories and neutralizing resistance through the co-optation of radical intellectuals and potential leaders of subalterns by grants, institutional recognition, building partnership, and invited visits to the global heartland of 'worldview' production. Tamed forms of their subversive views and criticisms are often absorbed/retained in mainstream discourses in a process analogous to 'passive revolution'.

This absorption and incorporation of counter-hegemonic elements from different scales and sites enables at least some re-balancing of the deep social tensions in global capitalism. This process often involves deliberate de-radicalizing of alternative worldviews and their absorption into a modified version of the dominant worldview (Gramsci 1971: 279-318); and/or the humanizing of the dominant worldview in a partial move towards an alternative worldview by injecting stronger ethico-political elements that stress rights, inclusion, social-ethical responsibility, or empowerment (on finance, see Sum 2004). In this regard, hegemony is (re-)produced by accommodating the widest possible coalition of interests within the existing social relations where fundamental contradictions remain unresolved. With contradictions unabated and union/social movements as well as individuals seeking to resist economic and political domination at many sites and scales, we can observe a coexistence of 'war of manoeuvre' and 'war of position'. This challenges hegemonic coalitions from below by a combining timely frontal assaults with a longer term strategy concerned to mobilize support from multiple bases of power and to gain influence in cultural institutions in civil society (e.g., World Social Forum). Such strategies indicate that hegemony is never complete and that the production of hegemony is a continual struggle to create consensus in an asymmetrical, unequal system.
Conclusion

This 'spot paper' advocates a more discursive and processual understanding of capitalist restructuring. It argues for a CPE that reproblematises political economy by taking the 'cultural' and 'scalar turns' seriously but not one-sidedly. It stresses the constitutive role of discourse and subjectivity in the economic as well as extra-economic dimensions of capitalist restructuring rather than treating the cultural as somehow external to the economy. It also stresses the crucial role of the extra-economic -- which is material as well as cultural – in producing capitalist hegemony. Both aspects of the material-semiotic nature of capitalist political economy involve structurally, strategically, and discursively selective structural-agency linkages that operate on all scales from the micro- to the world market. Examining these linkages involves mapping innumerable 'molecular phases' and interactions that are 'repeated an infinite number of times' at different sites and scales. To help map these sites, I have introduced three mediating arenas of power as material-discursive sites that serve both to condense social relations and to normalize and negotiate hegemony. These are: (a) international organizations and institutions; (b) supra- and sub-states; and (c) (trans-)national civil society. I have illustrated this in terms of how neo-liberal hegemony is being promoted by diverse cross-cutting discursive chains underpinned by five knowing technologies. More specifically, I have shown how these processes are helping to constitute a 'new constitutionalism' mediate by 'new ethicalism'.

CPE also takes a scalar turn in emphasizing the multiplicity of scales and interscalar processes involved in producing (counter-)hegemony. The three above-mentioned mediating arenas in hegemonic negotiation also cut across these scales. I highlighted two negotiation processes in this regard. First, there is the complex negotiation between hegemonic and sub-hegemonic actors over the hegemonic 'word order' and its instantiation on different scales. Sometimes, sub-hegemonic actors largely adopt global discourses and thereby act as nodes in relaying these to regional/national/local levels. However, they may develop novel discourses that reverberate from these sub-hegemonic power centres to the core hegemonic sites and get absorbed into the hegemonic codes. Indeed, effective hegemony typically depends on the participation of (sub-)hegemonic actors in building discursive chains and co-constructing hegemonic discourses. This involves a wide range of discourses and genres, from abstract theories, explanations and reasons for conduct through technical codes, standards, and indexes to more emotional, experiential, and moral discourses. Second, negotiations and readjustments occur more or less continuously between (sub-)hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces. A 'popular collective will' can never be completely formed because some forces are always excluded or marginalized. This provides a permanent reservoir of resistance and a permanent potential for the development of counter-hegemony and politics of becoming on different scales and sites. This is most noticeable in periods of crisis, especially when the crisis involves more than limited economic issues and is translated into the political and ideological spheres. In these circumstances, dominant groups can either seek to recuperate hegemony by negotiating with the subalterns and/or resort to brute force. Where this leads to a successful recuperation of
an institutionalized compromise without serious threat to fundamental social relations, we can talk, with Gramsci, of a 'passive revolution'. But such a hegemonic reconstitution of the social order may prove temporary and the outcome could be continual struggles in and across different sites and scales.

Bibliography

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**Endnotes**

1 For Fairclough, discursive chains link different genres of discourse together and involve systematic transformations from genre to genre (2003: 31-2).

2 These include sciences, administrative techniques, and normative criteria.

3 Intellectuals are organic in two senses: they are organic members of key (inter-)national institutions and civil society and they help to organize, including organizing language, discourses and interpretive frames that fix meanings (Ives 2004: 45).

4 Re-contextualization, which is a concept developed by Bernstein (1996), is the modification of discourse to fit into the moral and social context of the acquiring conjuncture. Discourses thereby become resources in constituting and maintaining certain social relations.

5 Given my attempt here to Gramscianize Foucault, the term 'ethics' in 'new ethicalism' connotes macro-level political, intellectual and moral leadership. However, there is also a micro-morality of power relations through which the discourses of community and responsibility reconfigure individuals as both self-responsible and subordinate to and unify under some moral commitment.

6 Some of these ideas originated from Iedema (2003: 43-46).

7 The discussion so far focuses on the making of economic consensus and the interactions between different scales. Space limits prevent discussion of the Frankfurt School and British Cultural Studies here. They concentrate on other cultural sites such as cultural/pleasure industries, consumer cultures and the built environment – all of which are important in constructing and negotiating hegemony (Kellнер 2002: 31-58; Jenkins 2003: 65-85).