{"id":7743,"date":"2019-05-22T16:00:10","date_gmt":"2019-05-22T16:00:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.lancaster.ac.uk\/fas\/psych\/glossary\/direct_realist_account\/"},"modified":"2019-05-22T16:00:10","modified_gmt":"2019-05-22T16:00:10","slug":"direct_realist_account","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.lancaster.ac.uk\/fas\/psych\/glossary\/direct_realist_account\/","title":{"rendered":"Direct realist account"},"content":{"rendered":"

In opposition to sense-data theory or indirect realism and subjective idealism (representationalism or what we perceive is determined by a psychological representation of the thing), it is James J. Gibson’s theory of perception according to which the structure of the world is directly available to perception (‘what you see is what you get’).  Thus, on this account, there is no need to postulate cognitive processes to interpret sensory input (i.e., for converting meaningless sensations to meaningful percepts) because the structure of the surroundings is objectively present in the available perceptual information, and waiting to be ‘picked up’ by one or other action-based perceptual system.  The historical roots of Gibson’s direct realism can be traced back to writings of Arab philosophers and scientists on optics in the 10th and 11th centuries such as Abu Al Nasr-Al-Farabi<\/a> (ca. 870-950) and Abu Ali Ibn Al-Haitham or Alhazen<\/a> (ca. 965-1040).  Later promoters of direct realism who had even more in common with Gibson included the philosophers Thomas Reid <\/a>(1710-1796) with his book An inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense<\/span> (1764), and Arthur O. Lovejoy<\/a> (1873-1962) who wrote Revolt against dualism<\/span> (1930).  The differences between the three theories of realism are captured by the apocryphal story of three baseball umpires<\/p>\n<\/p>\n