Abstract

Why is critical discourse analysis (CDA) critical? CDA takes the position of those being excluded or suffering and, thereby, reminds the audience of modernity’s unredeemed promises. However, it seems as if critical discourse analysts have understood critique mainly against the background of their progressive consensus. That is: critical standards have been based on a conventionalist understanding of what is right or wrong. But this provides neither a theoretical nor a grounded notion of critique which has led to accusations of CDA being unprincipled. In this paper, I argue that especially Ruth Wodak’s discourse-historical approach (DHA), which draws on the Frankfurt School, could avoid this by referring in even more detailed ways to Jürgen Habermas’ language-philosophy. For this, the paper introduces and relates his categories to those of the DHA in order to explicitly outline an emancipatory and grounded concept of critique.

Keywords: Critique, discourse-historical approach, critical discourse analyses, Jürgen Habermas, validity claims.

1. Introduction: (How) is ‘Critique’ Grounded in CDA?¹

Throughout the last two decades CDA has become an established academic tradition – a development which has not challenged CDA’s pluralistic character (Wodak 2001a: 11, 2001b: 64; Martin and Wodak 2003: 5; Wodak and Weiss 2005: 124). Instead of a uniform school, van Dijk rather suggests that CDA should be understood as a heterogeneous movement. As such, CDA stands on the shoulders of giants – different giants. That is, CDA’s different schools are orientated towards different epistemological underpinnings, such as (Foucaultian) poststructuralism (Jäger 2001; Jäger and Maier 2009; cf. also Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999 but note their explicit anti-relativism), cognitive approaches (van Dijk 1998, 2001, 2009; Chilton 2003) and the Frankfurt School, in particular Jürgen Habermas.

The guiding question of this article, why CDA is critical, or rather, how CDA validates and grounds its own critical standards, is therefore not generally answerable. Rather, CDA’s different approaches understand critique in different ways due to their different underpinnings. Nevertheless, a shared understanding of critique exist: hidden power structures should be revealed,
inequality and discrimination have to be fought, the analyst has to reflect on his own position and make her standpoint transparent.

Even though all branches within CDA emphasis these points, that does not explain why their critique is particularly reliable or justified. We can notice the significance of this lack of justification by asking ourselves: why should CDA argue against discrimination, e.g. racism and anti-Semitism? Since the end of the Second World War and through an increasing awareness of the extermination of six million Jews, such positions have become more or less tabooed in most Western public spheres. This is especially true for academic communities, in particular in the humanities, which are often based on a progressive consensus and committed to a seemingly self-evident (more or less) humanist agenda. But can (or should) such conventions define our notion of critique? I assume that this alone is not convincing enough to justify CDA’s ambitious concept of a ‘socially transformative teleology’ (McKenna 2004: 9).² Rather, this lack has led to accusations of being biased and unprincipled (cf. observers like Hammersley (1997) or critics like Widdowson (1998, 2004) and Stubbs (1997)). Thus, a progressive consensus which is ‘biased – and proud of’ (van Dijk 2001: 96) taking a standpoint against discrimination has to theoretically justify its understanding of why particular forms of discrimination should be rejected. Let me be clear: I do not doubt CDA’s critical agenda which I, in fact, strongly support but I do think that its critical standards and praxis, taking a stance against hidden power relations and various forms of discrimination, need a foundation. In consequence, it is of crucial importance that critique, being CDA’s central category, is theoretically grounded.

Firstly, I will briefly recapitulate the ‘core CDA’ (Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak; cf. Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 454) which will evolve into a more detailed review of the DHA and its understanding of critique. Thereafter, I present Habermas’ universal pragmatics (later: formal pragmatics) in order to outline his language-philosophy which provides a – certainly not the only possible – foundation in support of a normative notion of critique. Afterwards, the article will link the two programmes and give a short example. Finally, I summarise this paper’s main claims.

2. Critique, CDA and the DHA

In order to outline the relevance of the problem I introduced, I will now briefly recapitulate three of CDA’s main proponents (cf. also Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000, McKenna 2004). I start with van Dijk who has since the 1980s investigated racism in the public sphere – taking an explicitly ethical stance (e.g. 1991, 1993). It can be argued that this is one of the great continuities in his work; from 1991 when he stated that ‘the anti-racist point of view (…) of this book need[s] no further justification’ (6) to 2001 when he claimed that ‘CDA is biased – and proud of it’. But his position has, at least partly, run into difficulties. In a recent article, van Dijk defined manipulation as ‘a form of illegitimate influence (…) against the best interest of the manipulated’ (2006: 360). He continues by pointing to CDA as having always argued against the (re)production of inequality, identifying this as part of the foundation of CDA (p. 364). However, these foundations are not yet theoretically justified. What
is ‘illegitimate’ and what is ‘in the best interest of the manipulated’? Van Dijk has most recently addressed the issue by noting that one of the problems of CDA

is the lack of theory about the norms and principals of its own critical activity, that is, a detailed applied ethics that allows CDA researchers to judge whether discourses or discourse properties, or their users, are ‘bad’ because they violate fundamental human rights. (2008: 823; cf. also 2009: 63)

Like van Dijk, Fairclough too has made his political stance transparent throughout his career (1989: 5, 2009). He has furthermore, explicitly, problematised a lack of operationalisation of social theories in discourse studies (1989: 13). In an attempt to solve this problem, Chouliaraki and Fairclough aimed to ‘ground the move from ‘is’ to ‘ought” (1999: 35). Their book on Discourse in Late Modernity is probably the most elaborated attempt to provide CDA with a notion of critique capable of validating its own critical standards by bringing together social scientist like Anthony Giddens, Antonio Gramsci, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, Habermas, Karl Marx, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu (cf. also Fairclough 1995, in particular chapter 1, 3, and 6, for an excellent discussion). As beneficial as such a dialog might be in order to understand particular social wrongs, it causes substantial confusion when asked to provide a foundation for critique. These theories are often divided by fundamentally different epistemologies. As their disagreement therefore concerns essentials of their approaches, they cannot be brought together without compromising on their particular contribution to the central problem rightly raised by the authors: grounding the move from ‘is’ to ‘ought” (cf. Mouffe (2006) against Habermas or Habermas (1990) against Foucault to name just two conflict-lines).

Like other strands, Wodak’s DHA claims what ought and ought not to be. However, the DHA seems to be the branch within CDA which explicitly and coherently bases its critique on a foundational notion of emancipation. I will call this a strong programme of critique which consists of more than necessary self-reflexivity. In doing so, the DHA refers to the Frankfurt School as being its theoretical antecedent (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 26ff; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32ff, 2009: 88; Wodak 1996: 28-31, 2001a: 2, 9f; Wodak and Meyer 2009: 6f). But how its notion of critique is grounded in Habermas’ language-philosophy in particular and thus justifies its standpoint has seemingly not yet been elaborated in detail. I claim that even the DHA as an interdisciplinary endeavour should not simply sketchily refer to macro-theories like Habermas’ language-philosophy. It has to make this relation explicit in order to

- reject criticism of being unprincipled,
- avoid self-righteous blaming of other approaches as being not critical (Billig 2003), and
- avoid pitfalls of any established consensus easily becoming a non-reflective, dogmatic convention.
- Finally, a detailed investigation into Habermas’ programme and its concepts like social learning or failed learning processes could enrich the DHA’s methodological ‘tool-kit’. 
The DHA, being part of the ‘CDA movement’, shares the movement’s core orientation towards (a) critique based on (b) a pragmatic understanding of language, language in use.

The DHA understands critique as a demystifying force which tries to reveal power structures from the ‘perspective of those who suffer’ (Wodak 2001a: 10; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). It does not perceive itself as value-free but takes an explicit standpoint against various forms of discrimination which cause suffering. In taking such a perspective, it insists on a self-reflective stance, distance from the data (Martin and Wodak 2003: 6) and does not claim a self-righteous ‘know-that-all or know-it-better attitude’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 265). Rather, the DHA wants to provide new perspectives in order to make informed choices possible (Wodak 2001b: 65; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 265). This stance is adopted via a three dimensional concept of critique (Wodak 2001b: 65; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 32f, 268):

- **Immanent critique**: problematises contradictions in the text/discourse’ internal structure. This kind of critique can be ‘objective’ as semantic contradictions are perceivable by every competent language user.
- **Sociodiagnostic critique**: intents to demystify propagandist, populist, etc. discursive practices. This kind of critique takes a normative standpoint insofar as the critic refutes such positions.
- **Prognostic-/retrospective critique**: at this level, the DHA explicitly tries to transform the current state of affairs via direct engagement by referring to guiding principles such as human rights or the rejection of suffering.

Such a kind of critique cannot be text-based alone but must refer to society and its reproduction as a whole. The DHA is, thus, concerned with *language in use* and perceives discourse as ‘a form of ‘social practice’ [which] implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions and social structures which frame it’ (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). The pragmatic meaning of utterances, what is done with them within particular contexts, therefore, has to be critically investigated.

In order to critically identify what can be done with words and how they (re)produce exclusion and suffering the DHA refers to the Frankfurt School. Its first generation tried to ground their judgements by pointing to compassion (Horkheimer 1933), contemplative aestheticism (Adorno 1997) or a biological foundation of reason (Marcuse 1992) but ultimately failed to validate their critical standards (Habermas 1984: 374). However, a convincing foundation is necessary for the DHA which explicitly links its efforts to ‘prognostic critique’ and emancipation. Thus, it carries a higher burden of proof compared to (crypto-)normative or descriptive approaches. In other words: as the DHA claims a particular standpoint and goal of its criticism, it has to prove why its criticism is justified in order to make such strong claims. Critique, therefore, has to be grounded in order to justify its interventions.

It is Habermas who suggests a *theory of communication* which provides a foundation of critique by outlining immanent standards of language in use.
which reject discrimination and suffering. In line with this, Wodak quotes Habermas saying that ‘language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power (Habermas quoted in Wodak 2001a: 2, italic by the author). Language is also a medium of domination but Habermas does not reduce language to a tool of domination. Rather, he grounds his critical perspective in communicative interaction as ‘distorted communication is not ultimate; it has its basis in the logic of undistorted language communication’ (1974c: 17). In other words: the emancipator condition Habermas (and the DHA) is striving for is that of undamaged intersubjectivity.

Consequently, references to Habermas’ ideal speech situation can be found (Wodak 1996: 28-31; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 261) in order to support the DHA’s standpoint. However, this relation needs further explanation. It seems to me that the DHA’s claim that it ‘can contribute greatly to answering the question of what are ‘good reasons’ because (…) [it] provides criteria, which enable one to distinguish between manipulative and suggestive procedures’ (Reisgl/ Wodak 2001: 265) is not sufficient. Undoubtedly, the DHA's tool-kit can greatly contribute to an understanding of how manipulation, exclusion, etc. are linguistically realised. However, I cannot see how the DHA provides criteria that enable one to distinguish between manipulative and suggestive procedures' and, by implication, emancipatory criteria itself. A rigorous reference to Habermas’ language-philosophy may well serve as such a foundation of the DHA's critique and would make its aims, e.g. deliberative democracy, transparent and accessible. It would answer the question why discrimination has to be rejected not only from a conventionalist point of view but a theoretically grounded perspective as well.

3. Jürgen Habermas: Language, Critique and Emancipation

3.1 The Differentiation of Language

The fact that the DHA refers to Habermas’ programme is reasonable as his philosophy is based on speech-act theory. Furthermore, Habermas’ approach can claim common ground with the DHA due to the legacy of the late Wittgenstein and his Philosophical Investigations (1968). Habermas adopts the concept of language games and its underlying assumption of rules we intuitively apply (Wittgenstein 1968, e.g. § 3, 71, 75, 567), claiming that if ‘Wittgenstein [had] developed a theory of language games, it would have had to take the form of a universal pragmatics’ (1971: 53). It is this theory of language games – in the form of universal pragmatics – which Habermas wants to reconstruct. He introduces a non-foundational universalism by rejecting first principles but at the same time provides a foundation for critique by uncovering universal rules and their emancipatory potentials within everyday communication which connect competent speakers (1976b: 9).

In order to reconstruct these rules, Habermas re-establishes hermeneutics as a science, providing an emancipatory, foundational, normative and cognitive theory which ‘validate[s] its own critical standards’ (1984: xxxix). As he
intends to do so by reconstructing deep structures of language, Habermas asks: what happens as soon as we start to communicate? Which deep patterns underlie intersubjective processes and are they normatively welcome? Before addressing these questions in section 3.3 and especially 3.4, let me first introduce Habermas’ broader research programme.

Habermas starts by observing ‘the linguification of the sacred’ (1987: 77): communication becomes more and more important in modern societies, hence, traditional norms and sacred authorities like holy texts are no longer unquestionable. As norms and authorities become evaluated in everyday talk, modern (wo)man increasingly self-produce society discursively.

[The] authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus. This means a freeing of communicative action from sacral protected normative contexts. The disenchantment and disempowering of the domain of the sacred takes place by way of a linguification of the ritually secured, basic normative agreement; going along with this is a release of the rationality potential of communicative action. The aura of rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticisable validity claims and at the same time turned into an everyday occurrence. (1987: 77)

This is part of an evolutionary process in which humans develop communication skills by freeing ‘pragmatic universals’ like personal pronouns, deictic expressions, performative verbs, non-performative intentional verbs and modal adverbs, etc. from bodily expressions and gestures (1971: 77ff). Thereby, they become more and more reflexive and aware of their own behaviour. This development leads to three kinds of demarcation from nature:

- A reflexive stance towards the objective world enables the demarcation of the Ego from the environment, the ‘real’ world of objects.
- The awareness of norms as being societal products enables the demarcation from the social world. The subject perceives itself as being able to make society.
- The subject becomes reflexively aware of itself, the subjective world, as they become able to see themselves from the perspective of a third person.

3.2 Types of Action

As soon as we are able to refer to the objective, the social and the subjective world we apply different kinds of action which are grouped in two separate dimensions: the social and the non-social. Non-social action does not connect individuals but refers to subjects who manipulate the objective world. Habermas calls this kind of action ‘instrumental action’, e.g. the use of technologies in order to gain primary products. Consequently, non-social action is teleological as it is goal-orientated: we do X in order achieve Y (1984: 85, 86f).
Social action follows this teleological paradigm as well but is more complex. If the agent’s calculation of success takes into account a second agent’s decisions, Habermas speaks of ‘strategic action’ (1984: 85, 87f). This mode of action is still purposive-rational by aiming to influence the other and follows the speaker’s perlocutionary intentions with regards to an objective world. That is, the propositional part of the utterance can be true or false and the agent’s goal-directed action might succeed or fail.

However, strategic action can also take the form of ‘constative speech acts’ if not oriented to purposive activity but conversation as an end in itself, e.g. ‘chatting, conversing, and arguing’ (1984: 327). In contrast to instrumental and strategic action, constative and the following two types of action are not orientated to success but consensus. They are orientated towards understanding and go thus beyond the purpose-rational model. Action which is not only orientated towards the objective- but also the social world is formed through common values of a group. Here, the speaker becomes a bearer of the group’s culture, interprets and reproduces it. This kind of interaction is ‘norm-regulated’ (1984: 85, 88ff). It is related to an established world of norms and values wherein action can be right or wrong, e.g. promises are expected to be kept but can be broken. Social action can also be orientated towards the subjective world. Referring to Erving Goffman (1971), Habermas speaks of ‘dramaturgical action’ as soon as we present ourselves in front of an audience (1984: 85f, 90ff). Dramaturgical action concerns the way we perform our subjectivity. Such action can only convince the audience if it seems authentic. For example: if X praises Y, this has to seem authentic – otherwise Y might feel offended. More generally speaking, X is successful if the audience accepts that X means what X says. Consequently, dramaturgical action has latent strategic features. However, it is different from strategic action as its expressions towards an audience have to claim truthfulness (sincerity) in order to succeed. It becomes strategic action only if the audience expects and anticipates purposive-rational action.

Constatve, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action only reflect three isolated relationships to three different worlds which refer to three different validity claims: truth, rightness or truthfulness. It is only in Habermas’ final category, ‘communicative action’, that language in use is no longer orientated towards one isolated world but forms a threefold, reflective relation to the world (1984: 86, 94ff). For Habermas, this kind of action is rational because speakers coordinate their interaction by raising claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness which can be criticised and justified, refuted or accepted. Seen as isolated modes, they are limit cases of communicative action (...). In each case only one function of language is thematised: the release of perlocutionary effects, the establishment of interpersonal relations, and the expression of subjective experience. By contrast, the communicative model of action (...) takes all the functions of language equally into consideration. (1984: 95)

Only if a speaker raises all three validity claims together in one speech-act do we speak of communicative action. Communicative action does not dispense goal orientated action but is dominated by an egalitarian and cooperative attitude (1984: 94) which makes it rational. In consequence, rationality, for
Habermas, is not linked to a particular content but rather to an egalitarian and cooperative form of the argument. Thus, communicative action has to be separated from communication. In order to avoid misunderstandings, Habermas insists that the communicative model of action does not equate action with communication. Language is a medium of communication that serves understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their particular aims. (1984: 101)

3.3 Speech Act Theory and the Binding Force of Validity Claims

Due to the developmental process through which humans achieve a reflective stance towards the objective, the social and the subjective world, three types of action emerge. Habermas links these types of action to criticisable validity claims with a potential for rational action on which grounded critique becomes possible.

In order to understand the ability of these three claims to create social bonds, Habermas turns to John Austin’s speech-act theory. Following Austin (1975), Habermas assigns a binding force to what he calls propositionally differentiated speech. Propositionally differentiated speech is constituted by a double structure of natural language, being both ‘a performative clause and a dependent clause with propositional content’. While the performative clause, being the illocutionary element, establishes an intersubjective relationship between speakers, e.g. ‘I hereby assure you...’, the propositional clause relates to objects (or states of affairs) about which they communicate, e.g. ‘...that this decision is dangerous’ (1971: 74).

In contrast to Austin, Habermas does not focus on constative (true:false) speech-acts alone. Rather, the binding force of performative clauses can rest on three different validity claims: (a) a truth claim (Austin’s constative element), (b) a rightness claim (normative utterances have a force too, they can be right or wrong) and (c) a truthfulness claim (referring to the degree of honesty in our daily self-representation). Communicative action implies a mix of these three validity claims whereby normally one aspect stands out (1976b: 66f). Whenever we raise a claim, e.g. ‘I hereby say that he is there’ (truth), ‘I hereby claim that killing is bad’ (rightness) or ‘I hereby promise to come back’ (truthfulness), we might get caught in an argument, have to justify and debate the claim and, thereby, accept the ‘peculiar constraint-free force of the better argument’ (1984: 28) in order to coordinate our action. Only results of such processes can be called rational. Due to the fact that validity claims are rooted in communication itself, the emancipatory idea of flourishing and undamaged intersubjectivity, provides a foundation from which we can criticise damaged intersubjectivity and distorted communication.

Raising such criticisable claims is based on ‘the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects’ (1976b: 9). The fact that competent speakers switch intuitively between the performative and the propositional levels of language creates the ‘generative power of speech acts’ (1976b: 34f). It establishes a (vulnerable) social bond which provides more than the transmission of information. It is of crucial importance to understand that through the
creation of such social bonds, via successful illocutionary acts and criticisable and justifiable validity claims, rational behaviour is achieved.

Strategic utterances, e.g. a lie, have to be understood as a ‘derivative of action orientated to reaching understanding’ (1976b: 1). Thus, strategic action can only work on the basis of a counterfactual deep structure which is orientated towards mutual understanding. We have to assume that the other’s utterance is driven by truth, rightness and truthfulness – otherwise the social fabric would not work and even lying would lose its sense. Habermas, of course, acknowledges the existence of a ‘gray area’ (1976b: 3, cf. also 1996) between the two extremes of communicative and strategic action. But this does not affect the main idea of formal pragmatics: we are always already in language, thus, operating on the normative grounds of communication. Having thereby reconstructed universal conditions of possible understanding, Habermas perceives validity claims and their binding force as ‘the point of departure for a critical theory of society’ (1971: 103).

3.4 The Ideal Speech Situation: An Unavoidable Idealisation

In most cases, misunderstandings and open questions can be solved on the ground of a common lifeworld. A lifeworld forms the totality of the groups’ knowledge and symbolic understanding in which the language users was socialised. We always act within such a set of symbolic structures and can never step outside. As soon as participants discuss contested issues which are not covered by such an intuitive, common understanding, they raise validity claims by arguing for and justifying their opinion. It is in this context that Habermas initially presented the idea of an ideal-speech situation (ISS) – consisting of four elements: free access, equal rights, absence of coercion, and truthfulness on the side of the participants. In such a state of affairs pure communication action would be realised. The ISS has evoked widespread criticism as being idealistic and out of touch with real world conditions. Although some of Habermas’ earlier explanations have fuelled such misinterpretations (cf. 1971, 1972), he has since the beginning at the 1970s clarified that it is a misunderstanding to ‘hypostatize the normative content of general presuppositions of rational discourse into an ideal model of purely communicative social relations’ (Habermas 1997: 322).

He has constantly repeated that it is not simply an idealised situation he is striving for as social practice in day-to-day life is not going to correspond to such a model. But he insists that we have to counterfactually assume that the other is not manipulating us (cf. endnote 6). That is, we have to assume that the other raises claims which are true, right and truthful and even if such experiences are like ‘islands in the sea of practice’ (1982: 235), claims of truth, rightness and truthfulness are necessary, reciprocally anticipated conditions of social life. And whenever we mean what we say, we raise exactly the same claims. The necessary implicitness of these validity claims in speech acts (section 3.3) is a condition we are not even free to reject. Communication is obviously not always driven by communicative action and Habermas acknowledges that. However, it is impossible to imagine a society which is not based on validity claims. Without these, societies simply cannot exist as ‘the grammatics of our language would in the end have to collapse’ (1993: 102). It is therefore that communicative action is neither solely an empirical
phenomenon like Gottfried W. Hegel’s ‘always already in place’—*Weltgeist* nor simply a regulative Kantian idea.7

Therein lays Habermas’ idea of social transformation which provides a foundation for critique: he is not assuming an ideal state, that is, he does not simply state how it ought to be. Rather, formal pragmatics illustrates that we interact on the basis of a weak idealisation, that is, that we already practice such an ideal to a limited degree. Thereby, Habermas outlines which kind of practices are ‘right’ as they are a ‘natural property’ of human interaction and are therefore justified. Thus, critique which aims to strengthen settings which are more inclusive and egalitarian can be seen as grounded as they realise a tendency, a weak idealisation, we cannot deny in the first place. Of course, such a weak idealisation is often betrayed. Still, it enables an immanent transcendence which is strong enough to ground critique. And although settings which realise this immanent transcendence probably, e.g. deliberative democracy (1996: 287-328; Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 263-271), do not enable pure communicative action, they certainly favour debate based on the ‘force of the better argument’ as validity claims can be raised and refuted in a rather unrestricted manner.

### 3.5 Social Evolution and Moral Learning

Although we now know how critique can be grounded, let me finally outline some of additional concepts which are of significance for the DHA. In order to understand the development of modern societies and the freeing of emancipatory potentials immanent in communicative practices, Habermas reconstructs Historical Materialism as a form of social evolution. In contrast to neo-Darwinist ideas of evolution in sociology (Schmid 1987) as well as system-theoretical evolutionary approaches (Luhmann 1978), Habermas points to the *social* character of evolution. That is: the ratio developing between distorted and undistorted forms of communication within a group. Hence, he provides a non-reductionist, non-biologist interpretation of human evolution which explains why certain societies develop more rationally, i.e. in a more egalitarian and cooperative way, than others.

Evolutionary learning leads to the adequate adaption of societal worldviews to resolve existing problems societies face. Such problems are mostly solved by instrumental differentiation and adoption, e.g. new technologies. These cognitive-theoretical learning processes have to be balanced by moral-practical learning processes based on communicative action which can only warrant normatively successful social integration.

Moral learning processes expand and institutionalise egalitarian and universal forms of communication. Thus, successful social integration happens at three different levels: it is about the linguification of traditions at the cultural level, formal procedures at the societal level and the development of highly abstract ego identities at the personal level. Habermas and his colleagues have tried to prove this by pointing to the evolution of (a) religious worldviews: from closed, mythical to more open, polytheistic worldviews and, finally, individualistic, universally orientated monotheism (Döbert 1973), (b) the law: the development of a positive, formal, universal, legalistic law which materialises post-conventional structures of consciousness (Habermas 1976a) and (c) class societies: from mythical, archaic to traditional, hierarchical to
modern class societies based on (never fully realised) ideas of legitimisation through consent (Eder 1973).8

Habermas insists that this must not be understood in terms of a teleological model. Although evolution is directed to a certain degree, it is reversible and interruptible (1975: 140f). On the one side, ‘learning processes – through which we acquire theoretical knowledge and moral insight, extend and renew our evaluative language, and overcome self-deceptions and difficulties in comprehension’ (1984: 22). On the other side, these new ‘organisational principles’ (1975: 153) also create new problems (1975: 164f). Solutions for these problems are not automatically based on unrestricted communication but can be pathological too.

3.6 Pathological Communication

Social learning takes place through communicative action which is based on rather universal and egalitarian forms of communication. Thus, critique must reveal what distorts communication and makes a lifeworld dysfunctional. Such pathologies derive from a deformation of the lifeworld (1987: 142ff) due to an instrumentally biased rationalization which negatively affects the reproduction of shared meaning. Following Freud’s conceptualisation of the abnormal, Habermas adopts the term pathology in order to describe such conditions. Normal conditions are those in which a subject is able to deal with conflicting situations and perform the proper exchange of arguments. Through such a normative conception of Ego, pathological communication gets defined as unconscious distortions of the structure of communication itself via suppression and self-defence mechanisms (1974b, 1984: 21). For example, the colonization of the lifeworld works against the free development of a strong Ego through pressure generated by capitalism on families which hinders the reproduction of shared meaning (1987: 318, 386ff). At an individual level, the resulting distortion leads to ‘the overburdening of the internal organization of speech in terms of the pressure exerted by problems that stem from conflicts of identity and that initially overtax the external organization of speech’ (1974a: 169).

On a collective level, identities become uncertain, societal orders lose legitimisation and individuals lose motivation or even become psychopathological.

Social pathologies are not to be measured against “biological” goal status but in relation to the contradictions in which communicatively intermeshed interaction can get caught because deception and self-deception can gain objective power in an everyday practice on the facticity of validity claims.9 (1987: 378)

However, in contrast to conservative critics, Habermas does not understand rationalisation as automatically causing lifeworld deformations. Rather, the rationalization of the lifeworld can set free new opportunities for the well-being of humans and re-enchant our world (1987: 313f). As society is a product of struggles (in the widest sense), the direction rationalisation can take is open – this is where critical social sciences and in particular the DHA can step in.
4. Habermas’ Formal Pragmatics Supporting the DHA?

4.1 Theory…

We can now conceptualise how formal pragmatics can affect the DHA. Habermas’ concept provides a theoretical basis for critique which is foundational and normative as it is grounded in interaction. He can do so, because his reconstruction reveals the very basics of communication: every communicative act contains a bit of idealisation, of undamaged intersubjectivity. Thus, the possibility of emancipation is built into any meaningful conversation. The way in which new meaning is created via the justification, acceptance or refusal of validity claims (truth of a proposition, normative rightness and personal truthfulness) therefore gives information about the level of distortion.

However, in order to make Habermas’ language-philosophy applicable, we have to be aware that the ISS cannot serve as a point of departure – as Habermas himself has become increasingly aware (section 3.4). It is hard to imagine to what extent a linguistic or sociological analysis could benefit from comparing real texts with an imagined ISS: after all, real texts always fail to meet the standards of an ISS. In contrast, analyses should draw on Habermas’ more basic concept of validity claims in order to deal with real existing texts. As Habermas noted himself, validity claims and their immanent striving for cooperation ‘transcend any local context; at the same time, they have to be raised here and now’ (Habermas 1990: 322). Normally, speakers perceive their argument as being true, right or truthful while hearers have other beliefs and must be convinced by the first person (with better arguments). Such praxis is still orientated towards truth, rightness and truthfulness based on the assumptions of formal pragmatics. However, it is the interaction between the first- and the second person alone, their claims and justifications which generates a (always fallible) dynamic towards truth, rightness and truthfulness (2003: 45). Before giving an example, I will now summarise previous findings with regards to Reisigl and Wodak’s three dimensional model of critique.

Immanent critique refers to text-internal contradictions and is more or less independent from the investigator’s point of view. For example, an argument is contradictory from a logical point of view if the speaker brings forward two logically opposing opinions. To that extent, Habermas’ stance does not necessarily affect this kind of critique. However, he has outlined an immanent critique of texts. For example, inconsistency as well as ignoring others’ arguments might signal wider societal (or individual) communication pathologies (1974a).

Sociodiagnostic critique intends to demystify discourses, e.g. rightwing populism. Accepting a progressive consensus, critique of such populism might seem unproblematic and comprehensible but could be perceived as biased, as being not able to ‘validate its own critical standards’, from another position. An explicit reference to Habermas’ formal pragmatics alleviates such reproaches as particular texts, e.g. a speech by a politician, can be checked with regards to claims it raises. Are these claims justified, are they true, right
and/or truthful? To what extend do they support or prevent rational understanding and undamaged intersubjectivity?

In the case of **prognostic-/retrospective critique**, critique intends to transform conditions. The DHA has already pointed to Habermas’ concept of **deliberative democracy** which rests on an open, taboo-free extension of communication. Tendencies pointing in this direction illustrate a process of successful learning. Insofar, current conditions and the development of discourses can well be criticised prognostically against the backdrop of such a concept of democracy. At the same time, prognostic critique is always linked to retrospective critique which asks: *what* should we remember (in order to achieve a more deliberative community)? Consequently, critique has to promote an inclusive self-critical reference to one’s own tradition, e.g. the recognition of one’s own (wrong) past, instead of exclusionary chauvinistic narratives (1974b: 121).

### 4.2 … and Practice

Although I argue that the theoretical benefits (the foundation of critique) are of major importance, I will now illustrate how Habermas’ concept of validity claims could become part of a discourse-historical analysis. Being aware of the sophistication of the existing discourse-analytical tool-kit, such would explicitly implement the theoretical benefits of a social theory which is able to provide foundations for emancipatory critique and enable new perspectives on texts. In the following, I will try to outline such a perspective. However, due to space-restrictions, I am not able to provide a detailed analysis. Neither the historical context nor intertextual and interdiscursive relations are introduced. Neither are topoi operationalised nor strategies of *nomination*, *prediction*, *argumentation*, *perspectivation* and *intensification/mitigation* discussed (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2009; Wodak 2001b). Rather, the aim is to describe directions such an implementation might take.

The text below represents about half of a newspaper article which was published during the debate over the war in Iraq in 2002/03 in Germany. It was published by the leading (conservative) broadsheet, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) under the title *Happy Days* (Klein 2003). Generally, the German debate was similar to other European debates as most comments were highly sceptical towards George W. Bush’s aims and claims. The FAZ, being a conservative newspaper, took a slightly different position and did not fully reject Bush’s plans. However, the article is of particular interest as it points to a new, counterintuitive and highly subtle strategy to construct a positive self image by confessing guilt. By arguing that the in-group (Germans) learnt the bitter lessons from the Second World War and the extermination of six million Jews, the Germans constructed as morally superior to those having, allegedly, not learnt these lessons (for more details on what I call a rhetoric of judge-penitence, cf. Forchtner forthcoming a, b):

The USA has assembled to eradicate the evil of the world root and branch. Every American who carries his heart on his right sleeve feels the unconditional “now” of this mission. (…) We have played “Punch, Devil, Policeman” long enough in Europe. The puppets went all around. Germany has held its hand in the mould of the Prince of Darkness quite enough. And the worst thing is: we can even still remember it. The USA will not forgive us for exactly that: we
know the game which is to be played. (…) The USA must not forgive us for that! The tunnel vision of the American commanders is starting to flicker irritatedly. Europe, however, is experiencing happy days: in the eye of American paranoia, there where their pupil is really black, our truth also sparkles. (Klein 2003)

Analysing validity claims in written texts cannot primarily focus on the content of raised claims as we are unable to follow the development of the debate and the justification of its arguments. We shall, rather, analyse the form of arguments, in particular the form of its justification. That is: does the text enable an undistorted exploration of differences; does it allow an open and critical discussion? Or does it serve the construction of boundaries which lead to closed worldviews?

The section starts with plain assertions: it is the US which is actively engaged ‘to eradicate’ (auszurotten) ‘the evil of the world root and branch’ which is described as an ‘unconditional “now”’. This truth claim suggests that ‘the’ US or ‘every’ American share these beliefs – it certainly does not enable a differentiated debate over US politics or the pluralist character of its society. There is a potentially crucial qualification to this interpretation as Klein refers to Americans carrying their heart on their right sleeve. We do not know the intention of the author and neither do we know how this vague qualification is understood by different audience. What can be said is that Klein has generalised before (The USA’) and, more substantially, predicated this entity by linking it to ‘eradicate’ which in German carries clear associations to Nazi-policies of annihilation. I thus argue that for at least parts of the public this qualification does not encourage differentiation. Such generalisations close the argument through an argumentum ad hominem which (in)directly attacks the other’s character, in this case as being fanatical (‘unconditional “now”’).

After this characterisation of the other, Klein constructs the in-group. The author does not refer to glorious and heroic pasts – the way communities generally construct a positive self image. Instead, he stresses guilt, evil and shameful aspects by pointing to the ‘devil’ and the ‘Prince of Darkness’. Again, this is primarily a truth claim as it refers to historical evidence. However, it also carries a rightness claim as the acknowledgement of an inglorious chapter of the nation is supported (Confessions of guilt frame the official discourse in Germany’s public sphere but this claim is certainly contested in some conservative circles which demand an end to self-critical debates). Subsequently, another truth and rightness claim is raised in the next two sentences: historia magistra vitae, we ‘still remember’ and ‘know the game’ which refers to actually existing public debates, educational efforts, etc. But it is also based on a common understanding that it is right that German society remembers and makes confessions of guilt part of its identity as such an self-understanding creates a more inclusive public sphere by recognising the other’s suffering. However, the text does not stop here but proceeds in order to instrumentalise these confessions.

The text’s final sentences illustrate this instrumentalisation in order to construct a negative other as morally inferior. Klein does so by implicitly suggesting a successfully accomplished German-European learning process. He constructs the knowledge of the in-group’s past as a virtue (‘we know the game’ thanks to our dark past) and raises a truth claim regarding the reaction of the US: they ‘must not forgive us’. Again, this also includes a claim to what
is not right: they are not only irritated by our development, but suffer from ‘paranoia’ and fall into a ‘tunnel vision’ trap. Here, as in the whole article, the separation to the US, is emphasised through the use of active voice. They are paranoid, etc while we are facing our dark past. But ‘paranoia’ and a ‘tunnel vision’ even point to a general pathologisation of the whole group characterised, the Americans. Through the use of an argumentum ad hominem, communication becomes distorted again. Klein concludes this passage with a rightness claim, implying that Europe’s position is built on the right experience (‘our truth’).

The analysis of a written text makes the evaluation of the author’s truthfulness impossible as readers have no access to gestures or the mimic of the author. Instead, I suggest understanding the text’s clarity and accessibility as alternative ways to make sense of truthfulness in written texts. In this case, this leads to a critique of the heavy use of metaphors which evoke associations which might counteract rationality (e.g. ‘root and branch’, ‘puppet theatre’, ‘Prince of Darkness’, ‘tunnel vision’). They create an extremely coherent text which comes close to a fairy tale: an evil other introduced at the beginning (the narrow minded US), a hero which had to work through a valley of tears (Germany, Europe and its evil self) and a happy end (Europe’s truth). Such an extremely suggestive structure leaves little space for an undistorted exchange of arguments. In consequence, it becomes much harder for the audience to reflect on the text and raise critical questions.

Let me emphasise again that this necessarily brief interpretation can, of course, be disputed but that, here, the analysis was not an aim in itself but only served to illustrate the potential use of Habermas’ categories for an empirical analysis. Taking into consideration the form of Klein’s validity claims, it can be said that this text is tendentially non-rational. ‘Rational’, as defined above, is the raising of validity claims which can be critically questioned in an open, inclusive way. This is not the case in this text. Its fixed narrative does not encourage a learning process but reveals a pathological structure. To what extend such an argument is part of a wider discourse over the war in Iraq and affects the social evolution of German society cannot be answered here. However, on the basis of the above, such a text can be criticised. Neither solely due to subjective opinions nor because such stark generalisations collide with a progressive consensus (although both are good reasons as well). Rather, the arguments’ distorted structure blocks the emancipatory power of intersubjective understanding.

5. Concluding Remarks

This article started by claiming that CDA offers a forceful approach to analyse and criticise discrimination and suffering. However, it seems as if critique has mainly been understood against the background of a progressive consensus. As CDA raises strong claims by linking its critique to emancipatory conditions of undamaged intersubjectivity, such a programme of critique has to be theoretically justified. Habermas provides such a foundation by reconstructing unavoidable, universal presuppositions of interaction – the often counterfactual striving for truth, rightness and truthfulness. Because his research program is able to show that living together demands a,
counterintuitive, idealisation of everyday interaction, we can ground ‘the move from ‘is; to ‘ought’. Critique which strengthens those properties which are necessarily part of our interaction as well as criticism takes side against inequality and unjustified exclusion therefore enables rather unrestricted debates and is thus theoretically justified.

In consequence, it is assumed that people are able to learn through the establishment of collective meaning based on the force of better argument. This happens via universal and egalitarian processes of interaction. In contrast, processes of constructing collective meaning can also become pathological if communication becomes distorted. As the DHA is interested not only in the analysis of isolated texts but in the longue durée, the concepts of successful and failed learning processes could be fruitfully applied in investigating series of discourses concerning one topic over a long period. This would reveal developmental tendencies in the group’s discursively constructed self-representation. Hence, discourse analysis becomes a necessary, even inevitable tool to criticise distorted communication.

By making explicit and develop those already existing links between Habermas’ language-philosophy and the DHA, this paper suggested that a more explicit implementation of Habermas’ theoretical categories enlarge the DHA’s appeal. Understanding critique against such an extensively theoretical background would enable the eclectic empirical tool-kit of the DHA even more radically to investigate discursive practices which are, as the DHA has successfully shown again and again, too often distorted. It is such a notion of critique which anticipates

the claim to reason announced in the teleological and intersubjective structure of social reproduction themselves (...) [which again and again] is silenced; and yet in fantasies and deeds it develops a stubbornly transcending power, because it is renewed with each act of unconstrained understanding, with each moment of living together in solidarity, of successful individuation, and of saving emancipation. (Habermas 1982: 221)

Notes

1 I would like to thank Ruth Wodak and Andrew Sayer for the insightful discussions around this paper. Remaining mistakes are my own. The author is a recipient of a DOC-fellowship of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and an ESRC studentship at the Department of Linguistics and English Language at Lancaster University.

2 As I defend such a teleology from an explicitly foundationalist point based on ideas of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization, and given the limited space of this article, I will not discuss poststructuralist approaches within CDA (e.g. Jäger 2001; Mair and Jäger 2009). While their empirical critique of hegemonic power/knowledge nexus (Foucault: 1981, especially 92-102) has been impressive, they fail to exemplify why their critique is directed against particular power/knowledge nexus at all. After all, dominant as well as oppressed power/knowledge nexus are rooted in power. In other words: power is neither good nor bad – it is productive of everything. It is hard to see why even the ‘ethical turn’ of the late Foucault has satisfactorily clarified this (Foucault 1983, 1984). Thus, poststructuralist analyses in support of particular countervailing powers are
ultimately based on the analysts' voluntarism. Insofar, such analysis can well be described as 'crypto-normative' (Habermas 1990: 276).

In the following paper, all quotations – as long as it is not stated differently – refer to works of Habermas.

In *How to do things with Words*, Austin initially introduced constative and performative utterances. While the former refer to objective true: false conditions of an utterance, e.g. ‘This table is round’, the latter can be happy: unhappy as they try to achieve something, e.g. ‘I herewith baptize this child’. Later, Austin realised that constative utterances too have performative elements and dismissed this separation. Instead, he introduced a new one: utterances now consist of locutionary (the semantic representation of X), illocutionary (one does X by saying Y) and perlocutionary aspects (the effect on the hearer).

At a first glance, this seems to restrict the Habermasian model to a small amount of standard utterances. However, even if symbolic/nonverbal utterances lack the propositional aspect of a speech act, they, nevertheless, are often criticisable too as they simply call to mind the propositional content of the presupposed norm (1976b: 37).

Thus, Habermas accuses poststructuralism of a *performative contradiction*. If every use of language is indeed only one more power-contaminated action, why should we believe in their particular attempt to enlighten us about the ideological character of modernity? In other words: ‘I hereby tell you, that truth does not exist’ is a contradiction in itself as the speaker raises the claim of truth in his utterance while he/she simultaneously rejects the idea itself (Habermas 1990).

Therefore, not only academics conduct communicative action. Besides the fact that especially this group contest their communication symbolically, e.g. via sentence-construction or the use of foreign words, formal pragmatics is concerned with the *practical knowledge*, ‘the *intuitive* knowledge of competent subjects’ (emphasis added).

Due to his focus on Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development (Piaget 1970, 1977), Habermas initially perceived individual learning processes as running ahead of social learning, as ‘peacemakers of social evolution’ (1975: 162). Such a restriction to the individual dimension does not seem beneficial to describe social phenomenon (Eder 1988: 321-387). Since then, Habermas himself has moved away from his initial position and now explicitly outlines intersubjectivity as the medium of development and learning (1995, 2003). For a detailed review of this change, cf. Strydom (1992).


For the use of fallacies in the DHA cf. Reisigl and Wodak (2009). However, it is important to note that implementing fallacies might help evaluating truth claims but cannot clarify what is right or wrong. In other words: fallacies can serve as a tool in CDA in order to reveal how certain claims distort communication but they cannot define distortion itself. Thus, even the fruitful implementation of fallacies does not answer why fallacies should actually be criticised.

**References**


