



Constructing Mexican Stereotypes: Telecinematic Discourse and Donald Trump's Campaign Rhetoric

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Abstract

In the field of mass communication, both telecinematic discourse and political rhetoric are social practices that interdiscursively reinforce cultural categorisations. The present paper discusses the ways in which ethnic stereotypes of Mexico are constructed and perpetuated by mainstream entertainment and the campaign rhetoric of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump. Adopting the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the study examines the TV series Breaking Bad and three recent feature films as well as public debates, interviews, and campaign speeches by Trump. Just as the series and films establish violent, unpredictable and morally deficient drug dealers and cartel bosses, Trump's rhetoric metaphorically frames Mexican immigrants and their government as treacherous criminals and thieves. In order to legitimise enhanced border security, Trump chiefly employs the discursive strategies of misrepresentation, moral evaluation, and mythopoesis. Thus, it becomes obvious that political populism may greatly benefit from biased preconceptions disseminated in popular culture.

Key words: Telecinematic discourse; political rhetoric; Critical Discourse Analysis; mass communication; election campaign; stereotype; context model; legitimisation; misrepresentation

1. Introduction

When Donald Trump announced his presidential candidacy at Trump Tower in New York City on 16 June 2015, he started his programmatic speech by naming several nations that from his perspective pose economic challenges or security threats to the United States. In addition to China and Japan, he particularly highlighted problems of drug trafficking and violence imported across the southern US border from Mexico. In this line of argumentation, he could firmly rely on existing negative images of Mexico, which had likewise been constructed by mass media and mainstream telecinematic discourse. Accordingly, the present paper intends to identify Mexican stereotypes perpetuated in US-American fictional television and feature films as well as in contemporary political rhetoric. On this basis, the study points out analogies of stereotyping in the two types of mass communication and examines the ways in which Trump's persuasive rhetoric aims at exercising political control. Thus, it will be demonstrated that an investigation of political populism can be fruitfully complemented by an analysis of mass entertainment, since 'popular

culture has to be understood as *part* of our politics' (Street 1997: 4, emphasis in the original).

In their seminal volume, Piazza, Bednarek and Rossi define the term *telecinematic discourse* as the 'integrated multimodal (verbal and visual) fictional narratives' (2011: 1) of television and cinema. In line with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), telecinematic discourse and political rhetoric are here considered as interconnected social practices (Wodak et al. 2009: 8). Along these lines, this paper utilises concepts drawn from both the Discourse-Historical Approach to CDA (Reisigl and Wodak 2009), which emphasises intertextual and interdiscursive relations, and the critical sociocognitive perspective on discourse (van Dijk 2009, 2014). With regard to persuasive campaign rhetoric, the focus will be on strategies of legitimisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 2007), which is a central technique for presidential candidates who proclaim the need for change in current political agendas. It will be shown that in order to achieve this goal, orators may employ one-sided misrepresentations of social or ethnic groups (Chilton 2004: 46), as they are analogously disseminated in telecinematic discourse. By comparing the two discourse types, the present paper intends to raise a critical awareness of how the two registers collaborate in establishing and perpetuating long-lived and deep-rooted stereotypes in a nation's collective memory.

Although ethnic stereotypes are caused by numerous sources such as online news platforms or social media, film and television are particularly suited to spread political messages owing to their strong emotional appeal and their enduring impact as enjoyable forms of popular culture. As John Street argues, interrelations between political processes and the entertainment industry are mainly 'founded on the passions that are generated both by politics and by popular culture' (1997: 3). For instance, such strong emotions may culminate in hostility towards particular ethnic groups.

One well-known example of an American president using popular imagery in order to appeal to the public is Ronald Reagan. During the Cold War, he used intertextual references to the *Star Wars* movie *The Empire Strikes Back* when he labelled the Soviet Union 'the evil empire' (FitzGerald 2000: 22). Similarly, after 9/11, president George W. Bush's war on terror was ideologically underpinned by movies which changed the image of stereotypical terrorists from Eastern European extremists to 'the Islamic/Arab fanatic' (Croft 2006: 270), such as Peter Berg's action thriller *The Kingdom* from 2007. It is therefore safe to assume that movies, even if they do not have explicit political content, are 'cultural stimuli that potentially address and modify the political attitudes and behaviors of audiences and society' (Christensen and Haas 2005: 4).

The investigation of stereotypes is furthermore supported by cognitive-linguistic prototype theory, which explains the ways in which human beings classify experiential phenomena with the help of mental categories (Taylor 2003; Geeraerts 2007). Regarding Mexicans on the American television and movie screen, a number of typical preconceptions were established already throughout the twentieth century (Ramírez Berg 2002), forming the foundation for continued stereotyping. In consideration of the multimodal quality of 'telecinematic' discourse (Piazza, Bednarek and Rossi 2011), this

study will concentrate not only on the verbal and nonverbal communication by the characters (Bednarek 2010) but will also take into account salient visual aspects of cinematography.

As for the telecinematic dataset on which the present study is partly based, the focus is on the crime and drama genre featuring illegal activities of drug trafficking by tightly organised cartels. A recent case in point is the series *Breaking Bad*, which was originally broadcast on the cable network AMC and is set in Albuquerque, New Mexico. In addition, the dataset contains three contemporary drug-cartel thrillers by the well-known and influential directors Ridley Scott, Steven Soderbergh, and Oliver Stone. The political section of the dataset comprises utterances by presidential campaigner Donald Trump in the form of speeches, interviews, and public debates between June 2015 and April 2016. The focus on Trump is due to the fact that he is the candidate who has rhetorically concentrated most dominantly on illegal immigration and security at the Mexican-American border (Blair 2015: xiv). By projecting social problems on an ethnic minority, he has been able to reach voters who feel underprivileged and are generally dissatisfied with the current political establishment. Confirmed by positive polling results (Hammond, Roberts and Sulfaro 2016: 871), Trump has continued his xenophobic approach, framing Mexicans as villains and outlaws in similar terms as fictional film and television. In addition, Trump himself is immensely experienced in entertaining a wide TV audience, since he acted as the protagonist of the reality television show *The Apprentice* on NBC from 2004 to 2015. Hence, it is worthwhile to examine his linguistic and discursive strategies of political polarisation against the backdrop of popular mass communication.

2. Dataset and Method

The TV series *Breaking Bad* (Gilligan 2008–2013), which depicts the development of a chemistry teacher into an unscrupulous crystal meth producer, is one prominent example of the highly acclaimed new category of ‘complex TV’ (Mittell 2015: 311–314). The series’ challenging complexity manifests itself mainly in the psychological portrayal of an ethically doubtful antihero, in intricate and non-chronological storytelling, as well as in highly original cinematography. Still, as this paper will demonstrate, the show is quite conventional in the stereotypical construction of the Mexican ‘Other’. The huge impact and popularity of this series not only in the United States can be measured by the high viewing figures and the great number of awards and nominations (Thomson 2015: 213–214). For the present study, all five seasons, which were broadcast over a period of six years and comprise 62 episodes of about 45 minutes each, were analysed with regard to Mexican stereotyping.

The three feature films included in the dataset were selected because they all deal with drug trafficking by Mexican cartels yet employ different approaches to the issue. In contrast to *Breaking Bad*, the award-winning thriller *Traffic* by Steven Soderbergh (2000) shows drug trade not only from the vantage point of DEA agents, police officers, users and dealers, but also from the perspective of politicians, in particular judge Wakefield, played by Michael Douglas, who is appointed head of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

By contrast, Oliver Stone's crime thriller *Savages* (2012), which is set in Laguna Beach, California, features two young US-American drug dealers who get involved in a violent conflict with the Mexican Baja Cartel, whose representatives loom large on the screen. Finally, Ridley Scott's *The Counselor* (2013) focuses mainly on the eponymous US-American cartel lawyer, while the cartel itself here chiefly appears in the form of subordinate henchmen. All instances of telecinematic discourse were investigated on the convenient and authoritative medium of DVD.

In addition to the data from fictional TV series and films, the dataset of Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric comprises five interviews, five debates of the Republican candidates, and five campaign speeches, starting with the announcement of his candidacy on 16 June 2015 and ending with his 'America First' Foreign Policy Speech on 27 April 2016 (see appendix). In particular these five speeches were selected because they mark decisive milestones in the development of Trump's campaign and received extensive media coverage. As far as interviews and debates are concerned, the dataset contains those instances which most prominently mention Mexicans and Mexico.

In total, the Trump dataset contains 204,609 words and was retrieved from a variety of online sources. Several of these documents are available in the archive of the website 'The American Presidency Project' (<<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>>), initiated in 1999 by John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters from the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Following the link 'documents' to the sections '2016 election documents' and 'debates', the user finds campaign speeches and presidential debates. The individual files contain information on the date and place of the events, usually signalled by an informative title (see appendix). Moreover, the transcripts provide paralinguistic annotations such as '[laughter]', '[applause]', or '[inaudible]'. Apart from this website, the Trump dataset contains online transcripts of speeches and interviews provided by news media outlets such as *Time Magazine*, *CBS News*, *MSNBC*, or the *Washington Post*.

The procedure of the qualitative analysis of both telecinematic and political discourse comprised four consecutive steps, inspired by the strategy suggested by Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 93–94): [1] identification: all appearances of Mexicans and Mexico were traced and singled out by a careful investigation of all episodes and documents. In the TV series and films, the focus was on key scenes which involve Mexicans or Mexican Americans. Along these lines, examples (1) and (2) in Section 5 feature the psychopathic Mexican drug dealer Tuco, who is here prominently introduced as the antagonistic Other in *Breaking Bad*. Similarly, example (4) is a pivotal scene in *Traffic*, since here high-ranking representatives of Mexico and the United States meet for a revealing exchange of ideas. While in telecinematic discourse Mexican characters are chiefly marked by their own utterances, as devised by the scriptwriters, political speeches contain utterances *about* Mexicans. Therefore, the analysis of the Trump dataset was supported by a keyword search for 'Mexicans', 'Latinos', and 'Hispanics'.

[2] Contextualisation: the utterances by Mexican characters on the screen and statements by Trump on Mexicans were related to their respective discursive situations (e.g. setting, speaker, addressees, topics). Thus, for instance, very

informal settings, as in examples (1) or (5), were contrasted with the rather formal encounters in examples (3) or (4). In the fictional TV dialogues, the external producer-recipient level was distinguished from the inter-character level. Although stereotypes are verbally constructed through the discursive behaviour of fictional characters, sociocultural stereotyping ultimately takes place on the producer-audience plane, which can then be compared to Trump's biased images of Mexicans.

[3] Interpretation: the individual passages were assessed with regard to their specific discursive functions. In the drug-cartel thrillers and in *Breaking Bad* the overt macrofunction of suspense-based entertainment needs to be derived from the speech acts by fictional characters, such as Don Eladio's suspicious invitation for a drink, which arouses curiosity in the viewers (example 3). The central intention underlying the Trump texts is political persuasion, as clearly visible in example (6). In both registers, stereotyping clearly supports the respective macrofunctions, although this process is more indirect and subtle in the telecinematic data than in the political speeches.

[4] Juxtaposition: the instances retrieved from political rhetoric were notionally correlated with all examples tracked in the television series and the films. The comparison of fictional character speech with Trump's political statements cannot simply be based on explicit overlaps of verbal cues. In order to make the datasets relatable, it is necessary to include the intermediate step of fictional characterisation: the utterances in the films and the TV series yield a set of stereotypical characters, which can then be compared to the Mexican stereotypes literally constructed by keywords in Trump's rhetoric. For instance, enforcer Lado (example 5) fits the label 'rapists' (example 6), while general Salazar (example 4) meets the attribute 'cunning' (example 14) (see Sections 5 and 6 below)

Representative extracts were chosen to illustrate the main findings. Since the analysis of the data showed recurring categories of stereotyping (see Sections 5 and 6), those examples were selected which most saliently and clearly epitomise particular stereotypes about Mexicans. Whenever a stereotype in the telecinematic data was realised through both a minor and a lead character, the latter instance was used. In the Trump data, extracts were singled out which give summaries of his central ideas. Simultaneously, the stereotypes found in the dataset were situated in the framework of traditional prejudiced images of Mexico (see Section 4). As regards the sequence of chapters in this study, telecinematic stereotypes (Section 5) are outlined before political stereotypes (Section 6) for two reasons: first, from the chronological perspective, the films and *Breaking Bad* preceded Trump's campaign, and second, in logical terms, the one-sided representation of Mexicans in fiction has, among other sources, prepared the conceptual ground for Trump's stereotypical images.

3. Mass Communication in Critical Discourse Analysis

Ethnic stereotyping is a phenomenon present in various discursive practices of mass communication, such as news broadcasts, literary texts, popular music, or social networking services. Telecinematic discourse and political

rhetoric, which also constitute forms of mass communication with the potential for stereotyping, are very different in their situational contexts but at the same time similar in their popular appeal and manipulative mass impact. In presidential campaign speeches, an individual in an institutional role speaks to multiple addressees with the typical aim of strategic persuasion and mobilisation of the electorate. Hence, election speeches belong to the ‘field of political advertising’ (Reisigl 2008: 253) and are geared towards emotional confrontations with political opponents. Such oratory is usually produced in a collective effort by writers, advisers, and spin-doctors, while the news media provide channels for significant extracts and soundbites intended for a wide audience (Wodak 2009: 24).

TV series and feature films are likewise developed by a team of creative producers and strive to appeal to a mass audience. Although the main purpose here is entertainment and viewers act as external ‘overhearers’ (Bubel 2008: 62) of the dialogue between fictional characters, the creators of TV shows and films also try to establish common ground and meet viewers’ expectations in order to achieve a financial success. As in the case of political rhetoric, telecinematic discourse relies on culture-specific cognitive preconceptualisations, so that these two types of mass communication may mutually reinforce ideological categories. In consequence, popular stereotypes may be utilised by populist oratory with the aim of exerting sociopolitical influence.

The presidential race of 2016 is aptly paraphrased as a ‘media spectacle’ in which real-life events are closely intertwined with new media entertainment (Kaklamanidou and Tally 2017: 21). Political agents and their activities have increasingly become a part of celebrity culture, since social media outlets feature them in similar ways as Hollywood stars. Along these lines, Douglas Kellner argues that ‘the celebrity status of politicians helps explain the success of Trump’ (2017: xx), as Trump had been known to TV viewers and readers of tabloids already before his candidacy. Hence, in order to discuss current political stereotyping, it is both fruitful and necessary to draw analogies with prejudiced images disseminated by the entertainment industry.

As regards interdiscursive relations in mass communication, explicit links between telecinematic discourse and political practices are established in two of the documents in the Trump dataset. When the renowned journalist Bob Woodward starts his interview with the question ‘where do you start the movie of your decision to run for president?’, Trump frames his candidacy announcement at Trump Tower in cinematic images, since for him ‘it looked like the Academy Awards. I talk about it. There were so many cameras’ (interview, 2 April 2016). In this intertextual analogy, Trump is literally conceptualised as an actor winning a prize, so that the similarity between the two social practices of acting and political manoeuvring becomes evident. However, Trump’s comparison is subverted by the fact that the profession of acting requires pretence and make-believe, as originally implied by Woodward.

Furthermore, in his speech to AIPAC (‘American Israel Public Affairs Committee’), Trump argues that ‘when you live in a society where athletes and movie stars are the heroes, little kids want to be athletes and movie stars. In Palestinian society, the heroes are those who murder Jews’ (speech, 22 March 2016). Conclusively, Trump here acknowledges the sociopolitical impact of

telecinematic discourse, thus creating a conceptual analogy between events on the movie screen and social conventions in a given community. According to this logic, the consequence is that when you live in a society where Mexicans are telecinematically framed as villains, nobody wants to be Mexican.

In his cognitive model of characterisation in fiction, Jonathan Culpeper (2001: 35) points out that comprehension is a combination of top-down inference processes based on the recipients' prior world knowledge and bottom-up effects of clues in the fictional discourse. These two sides dynamically and constantly affect and correct each other, since 'what you see influences what you know, and what you know influences what you see' (Culpeper 2001: 36). Hence, the discursive portrayal of Mexicans on the screen is likely to interact with recipients' preconceptions of Mexicans in mutually supporting ways.

Pop culture entertainment has such an impact on public attitudes and value judgements that Cortes speaks of a 'movie curriculum on race and ethnicity' (1992: 75). In other words, the narratives of fictional film and television have a strong educational influence on audiences, spreading preconceived ideas about social groups such as the Hispanic community in the US. Critical Discourse Analysis reveals and deconstructs such subliminal ideological frames.

According to the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), two central linguistic strategies for the biased construction and qualification of ethnic groups are 'nomination' by means of evaluative labels and 'predication' through the attribution of specific characteristics. Such discursive strategies, as listed by Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 94), will be identified in the data and analysed with regard to their linguistic realisation. In political persuasion, such techniques may be employed for the sake of legitimisation, which is of utmost importance for presidential campaigners who intend to convince the electorate of necessary political change. In turn, political legitimisation can be achieved by means of the four techniques of 'authorisation', 'moral evaluation', 'rationalisation', and 'mythopoesis' (van Leeuwen 2007: 92). It has been shown, for instance, that official documents aiming at immigration control mainly employ moral abstraction, followed by impersonal authorisation and finally instrumental rationalisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 104–111). Polarising political rhetoric, which aims to distance an ingroup from selected ethnic or social outgroups, typically relies on culture-specific moral value judgements (Schubert 2014: 322–323). In telecinematic storytelling, a central role is played by powerful narratives corresponding to the strategy of mythopoesis, which may portray actions of characters in an unfavourable light. Since fictional telecinematic discourse, like election rhetoric, offers one particular version of reality, 'representation and misrepresentation' are pivotal strategies of stereotyping (Chilton 2004: 46).

From the sociocognitive perspective of CDA, such biased or one-sided misrepresentations of ethnic groups contribute to the construction of cognitive 'context models' (van Dijk 2009: 73–75). These models not only mediate between discursive practices and social structures, they also control the production and processing of discourse, thus perpetuating prejudiced perceptions. When stereotypes are adapted from one social practice of mass communication to another, it is crucial to apply a '*knowledge device (K-device)*' that regulates the complex management of *Common Ground* shared

by participants' (van Dijk 2014: 54, emphasis in the original). Thus, for the development of ideological context models, Trump and his advisers can refer to culture-specific preconceptions that are to some extent reinforced and shaped by mainstream media entertainment. Accordingly, the present study intends to identify discriminatory context models and their discursive realisation (e.g. metaphor or syntactic topicalisation) in the dataset, pointing out that telecinematic and political discourse correlate significantly in this respect.

4. Traditional Stereotypes of Mexico

Cognitive-linguistic prototype theory has shown that experientially acquired categories are marked by a prototype at their centre and fuzzy boundaries at their margins (Rosch 2000: 3–6). According to the 'principle of cognitive economy' (Evans and Green 2006: 255), prototypicality enables human beings to categorise and classify entities encountered in everyday life. If the prototype refers to a concrete, visually perceptible object or living being, the similarity approach of prototype theory is relevant (Croft and Cruse 2004: 82). For instance, the repeated representation of similar images may result in a prototype, such as the portrayal of Mexicans as bandits or Latin lovers. Alternatively, if no visual images are available, as in entirely verbal political speeches, prototypes are constructed through lists of attributes, so that the more criteria an individual item meets, the closer it will be to the prototype.

Prototypes, which are constructed in an unconscious, unobtrusive, and automatic way, may in some cases evolve into social stereotypes. As Lakoff points out, stereotypes are commonly the 'subject of public discussion' (1987: 85), owing to their blatantly derogatory and openly offensive character. Ramírez Berg adds that a stereotype involves ethnocentrism and prejudice, so that he defines it as '*a negative generalization used by an in-group (US) about an out-group (THEM)*' (2002: 15, emphasis in the original). Thus, stereotypes not only have a classifying function but also explain and preserve social distinctiveness, which in turn justifies group-related practices (Ramírez Berg 2002: 28). As a result, stereotypes are 'a mechanism employed by the dominant society to rationalise its behaviour toward subordinate groups' (Limón 1992: 4). From the perspective of social psychology (Schneider 2004: 22–23), stereotyping is the result of both individual experience and mental templates offered by the culture people are socialised in. Such culture-specific perceptions are conveyed by parents, teachers, peer groups, institutions, and by the mass media, whose influence has steadily grown over the past decades.

In his study of Latinos in Hollywood movies, Ramírez Berg (2002) distinguishes between six fundamental stereotypes. He enumerates them as three male-female pairs, which are '*el bandido*' and 'the harlot', the 'male buffoon' and the 'female clown', as well as the 'Latin lover' and the 'dark lady' (2002: 66). In traditional Western movies, the unshaven Mexican bandit was outwardly marked by scars, missing teeth, and oily hair. He spoke broken English with a heavy accent and was 'irrational, overly emotional, and quick to resort to violence' (Ramírez Berg 2002: 68). Two more recent incarnations of the bandit are the 'Latin American gangster/drug runner' with a different outer appearance and 'the inner-city gang member' (Ramírez Berg 2002: 68),

yet these are merely superficially different manifestations of the vicious bandit. In social scientific terms, traditional Mexican stereotypes may be summarised by the descriptors ‘present time oriented’, ‘immediate gratification’, ‘machismo’ and ‘nonachiever’ (Limón 1992: 3). When attributing these features to ethnic groups, Hollywood usually does not differentiate between Mexicans and Mexican Americans.

However, such negative perceptions of Mexican-origin people were not originally invented by mainstream entertainment but were already propagated in the nineteenth century by European-American historians. In line with the Manifest Destiny ideology, Mexicans were typically labelled as ‘indolent, immoral, hedonistic, cruel, vindictive, and bloodthirsty’ (Martínez 2001: 56). Hence, this long history of stereotyping is evidence of the fact that prejudiced context models, owing to their dynamic and socially adaptable nature (van Dijk 2009: 66), can be passed on across generations and even centuries within a given culture.

5. Mexican Stereotypes in Breaking Bad and three Feature Films

In the drama and crime series *Breaking Bad*, Mexicans and Mexican Americans mainly appear as drug-related gangsters. In particular, the stereotype of the cartel member is subdivided into three main categories, which are marked by a specific discursive behaviour and cinematographic depiction. These different types can be distinguished by isolating typical speech forms used by characters in the ‘surface structure of the text’ (Culpeper 2001: 37), while stereotypes are ultimately constructed at the external producer-recipient level.

First, the traditional stereotype of the irrational and violent Mexican villain is perpetuated in the extremely impulsive and choleric Tuco Salamanca, who is originally hired as a drug distributor by the protagonist Walter White and his accomplice Jesse Pinkman. Owing to his erratic outbursts, Tuco serves as a counterpart to Walter White’s rational and scientific approach to the drug business. When Tuco first appears in his dark and secured home base, he wears a snake-skin shirt and a so-called ‘grill’ on his upper teeth, which frame him as a notorious drug dealer. He uses a Bowie knife to sniff crystal meth and is lit from one side in gloomy film noir style (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 106, 0:26:09). While Jesse, who wants to start a criminal business with Tuco, is insecure and apprehensive, Tuco’s language is characterised by affective interjections (‘booyah’) and aggressive slang (‘take a bump’, ‘hit it’) when he asks Jesse to sniff the crystal meth first (example 1).

- (1) TUCO. Take a bump.
JESSE. No worries, man. I’m no cop.
TUCO. I said hit it.
JESSE. All right. (*sniffs meth*)
TUCO. (*sniffs meth, laughs*) Booyah! Wow! This kicks like a mule with his balls wrapped in duct tape! (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 106, 0:26:15)

When Walter and Jesse meet Tuco at a junkyard in episode 107, Tuco provokes an absurd argument with his bodyguard No-Doze and brutally beats him to death. Before his assault, he shouts irrational repetitions ('I'm relaxed'), agitated imperatives ('look!'), the expletive 'damn' and the Mexican Spanish slang expression 'Orale, homes' ('alright, friends'), followed by lunatic laughter (example 2).

- (2) TUCO. Are you saying that I'm stupid?
 NO-DOZE. No. Come on, Tuco. I'm just saying.
 TUCO. (*screams*) No, you're just speaking for me! Like I ain't got the damn sense to speak for myself! Is that it? Is that what you're doing?
 NO-DOZE. Tuco.
 WALTER. Hey, why don't we all just relax, huh?
 TUCO. (*laughs*) Heisenberg says relax. Orale, homes. I'm relaxed. I'm relaxed. I'm relaxed. (*beats up NO-DOZE*) Damn, man! Look at that! Look! Yeah. That's messed up. Okay, Heisenberg! Next week. (*laughs*)
 (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 107, 0:43:53)

In this stereotypical register of Hispanic gangster talk, Tuco's utterances are the informal and colloquial equivalent of 'rhetorical showpieces' (Culpeper 2001: 38) in Shakespearean plays, so that Tuco's lexical choices immensely contribute to his characterisation. Accordingly, these features trigger bottom-up comprehension processes that model Tuco as an extremely confrontational individual at the producer-recipient level. After this irrational act of violence, a medium close-up shot shows Tuco as an uncivilised, screaming animal pointing his bloody fist towards the camera. His actions contradict his declaration that he is 'relaxed' (example 2), so that he is presented as unpredictable, in contrast to matter-of-fact protagonist Walter White, whose surname is a reminder of his Caucasian ethnicity.

After it is clear that Tuco's bodyguard is dead, Walter explains his intention to leave with the hesitant utterance 'Oh, I – I just think we're done here' (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 201, 0:09:28). Tuco's reply 'You're done' literally repeats Walter's lexemes but reinterprets them in an ambiguous and menacing way, so as to intimidate Walter and Jesse. In addition, he throws Jesse to the ground, which is shown in a low-angle shot, emphasising Tuco's physically superior position to the TV audience. As a result, Tuco thoroughly embodies the negative stereotype of the violent Mexican drug dealer, as it is likewise perpetuated by Donald Trump (examples 6, 7 and 8 in Section 6).

Second, *Breaking Bad* establishes the stereotype of the silent and thus impenetrable and inexplicably dangerous Mexican, who in the series appears in two versions. On the one hand, there is the stoic and emotionless killing machine in the form of the twin brothers Leonel and Marco Salamanca, who communicate only nonverbally. Although they act like twin 'Terminators' (Thomson 2015: 55), they are deeply religious, crawling through the dust in expensive suits to the Mexican deity Santa Muerte (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 301, 0:02:21). Cinematographically, they are portrayed as larger-than-life characters in a high-angle over-the-shoulder shot, looking at a girl that appears disproportionately tiny (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 301, 0:23:14). The physical scenery they move in is a yellowish Mexican desert, a seemingly void and lawless place, eerily reflecting their menacing appearance. Through this image of unfeeling machines, Mexicans are ultimately dehumanised, so

that no empathy on the viewers' side is evoked. Conclusively, protective initiatives against Mexican citizens appear advisable, such as the wall propounded by Trump (example 13).

On the other hand, their elderly uncle Hector 'Tio' Salamanca is paralysed, sits in a wheelchair and is no longer able to speak, probably owing to a stroke or a muscle disease. His main forms of communication are extreme facial expressions, heavy breathing, and a bell attached to his wheelchair, which he can ring with his right index finger. Hector is as unpredictable as Tuco, for he prefers to hide his alert mind and unique mode of communication to strangers, as in the sequence when Walter and Jesse are abducted and brought to Hector's house by Tuco (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 202, 0:36:54). The inter-character dialogue between Tuco and Hector Salamanca is therefore impaired, since the latter can only react to *yes/no*-questions by ringing the bell, while more complex conversations are impossible. At the producer-recipient level, this can be seen as a metaphor for Mexican communicative deficiencies, fulfilling similar functions as forms of non-standard English in earlier films. Thus, the stereotype of the 'inarticulate' bandit (Ramírez Berg 2002: 69) is taken to its extreme, and it becomes obvious that characterisation at the level of surface structures is also possible through the idiosyncratic *absence* of character speech forms (Culpeper 2001: 35). Throughout the series, Hector's ringing of the bell usually is a nonverbal act of aggression directed against adversaries of his family and fellow cartel members. Along these lines, this mode of communication is eventually equated with suicide and murder, as Hector detonates a bomb hidden under his wheelchair in order to kill himself and his archenemy, the ruthless Chilean-born meth distributor Gustavo Fring (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 413, 0:36:09). Since facial expressions are Hector's only way of conveying emotions, his countenance is frequently shown in close-ups.

Third, in contrast, the Mexican cartel boss Don Eladio resembles the stereotypical Mob boss of Mafia films, who is usually very eloquent and superficially charming. In this way, characterisation is strongly supported through top-down inferencing carried out by experienced viewers of crime thrillers. Don Eladio's body language is overly welcoming and amiable when he touches and embraces his partners, yet he is as unpredictable and two-faced as the other stereotypical Mexicans in other instances. In one scene (example 3), he receives an exquisite bottle of Tequila by Gustavo Fring and appears delighted, but his words imply a constant and ambiguous menace.

- (3) DON ELADIO. Let's see what's in here. No, impossible! Zafiro Añejo! Look at this. Even the bottle is a work of art. It's perfection! Perhaps it's too good to share. What do you think, Gustavo?
 GUSTAVO. It's yours to do with as you choose.
 DON ELADIO. I choose to drink it! (*to a servant*) Careful. That's beautiful stuff. If you spill a drop, I'll cut off your hand. (*laughs*) (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 410, 0:37:50)

When Don Eladio talks about sharing the Tequila, he hints that the drink might be poisoned, so that he implicitly asks Gustavo to join him in drinking. Furthermore, the jocular warning that he might cut off his servant's hand is another subliminal threat. His ensuing death, actually caused by poison in the

Tequila, is shown by an extreme low-angle shot, reminiscent of his formerly superior status. Eventually, his face is viewed by the camera from below inside the pool, further emphasising his literal and metaphorical downfall (Gilligan 2008–2013, episode 410, 0:42:21). In sum, this character represents the stereotype of the devious and impenetrable Mexican leader that cannot be trusted (example 14 in Section 6), so that ethnic separation from the group to which he belongs seems preferable.

As salient scenes with diverse key characters will demonstrate, feature films both perpetuate and adapt conventional stereotypes of Mexicans as well. Anticipating the cinematography of *Breaking Bad*, the thriller *Traffic* (Soderbergh 2000) clearly distinguishes between the two neighbouring countries by means of colour-coding. In the establishing shots at the beginning of the film, Mexico is immediately shown in grainy yellowish images, appearing as a lawless, deserted and chaotic dust bowl to the television viewers. In contrast, the world of US jurisdiction is depicted in cold blue tones, marked by clear structures in courtrooms and administrative buildings, so that any contact between the two areas appears undesirable. One essential topic of the film is corruption, which is addressed in a key scene in which the US politician Wakefield meets the Mexican general Salazar (example 4).

- (4) SALAZAR. But you must understand that [i.e. the war on drugs] is going to be a very difficult task because of the corruption in the police force. [...]
 WAKEFIELD. On another note, General, we were talking about supply. What about demand? What are your policies toward treatment of addiction?
 SALAZAR. Treatment of addiction? Addicts treat themselves. They overdose, and then there's one less to worry about. (Soderbergh 2000, 1:25:41)

Here the statement about corruption is both opaque and hypocritical, since Salazar himself secretly works for the Juárez Cartel, which is, however, known only to the viewers. As a consequence, this plot detail contributes to negative stereotyping exclusively at the producer-recipient level, whereas it remains hidden on the inter-character plane. The general's conceptualisation of 'treatment' of addicts is depicted as cynical through cues in the textbase, so that Mexican drug policy appears not only different but downright deficient. Through their treacherous behaviour, agents of Mexican politics and law enforcement are likewise close to the prototype of the bandit category, extending this biased 'context model' (van Dijk 2009: 73) to higher social classes as well. Moreover, in his two utterances, the general uses pretexts and evasion, so that he meets the stereotypical Mexican attributes of indolence, cruelty and immorality. Along these lines, top-down inference processes will contribute to Salazar's characterisation whenever knowledgeable viewers mentally activate images of Mexican politicians previously gained from other fictional discourses or news media.

In the film *Savages* (Stone 2012), cartel members loom large on the screen, while the political sphere is generally backgrounded. One prominent representative of the Baja Cartel is the enforcer Lado, played by Benicio del Toro, who enters the houses of his victims disguised as gardener. In the

present scene (example 5), he tortures and finally kills a self-righteous lawyer who is responsible for an extended imprisonment of Lado's boss.

- (5) LADO. He figures you owe him fifteen years of his life.
 LAWYER. Okay, I got it. [...] I got money. How much does he need?
 Name a price.
 LADO. He doesn't want your money. He wants your years. How old are you, exactly?
 LAWYER. Forty-two. But what ...
 LADO. Roberto says to shoot you in one knee, make you 52. (Stone 2012, 0:16:08)

In this dialogue, Lado is intentionally opaque, blending the frame of the verb 'owe' not with financial matters but with the lawyer's life span, so that his age is metaphorically conceptualised as a physical entity. Appearing erratic and unpredictable like Tuco (examples 1 and 2), Lado enjoys the rising fear and despair of his victim, who tries in vain to respond to the enforcer's demands in the predictable way by offering money. Lado's unpleasant character is further underscored by his dishevelled outer appearance, so that he is quite a prototypical reincarnation of the bandits of traditional Western films.

The cartel leader is the wealthy, posh and well-groomed Elena Sánchez, played by Salma Hayek, who fits the stereotype of the elegant drug kingpin (Stone 2012, 01:29:22). In this way her character enriches the bandit category by introducing a woman into this patriarchal domain. As a consequence, the moral depravity attributed to Mexican leaders also by Trump (examples 15 and 16) is here extended in a gender-neutral way.

In *The Counselor* (Scott 2013), the cruel and secretive realm of drug cartels is chiefly portrayed from the perspective of the US protagonist. Towards the end of the film, when the counselor's kidnapped fiancée is about to be killed by the cartel, he receives a telephone call by a pseudo-sympathetic senior cartel member, who informs him about the imminent murder in poetic words. The cartel representative introduces the Spanish poet Antonio Machado as a 'lovely poet. Machado was a schoolteacher and he married a young, beautiful girl. And he loved her very much. And she died. And then he became a great poet' (Scott 2013, 01:30:53). In this way, the brutal murder of the counselor's lover is framed as a romantic love story with a positive final outcome. Hence, a stark contrast is established between the appalling criminal energy and the superficially cultivated and sophisticated appearance. Accordingly, this scene portrays Mexican cartel leaders as merciless, insidious, and deviant in their communicative behaviour and moral standards. As in examples (3) and (4), this appearance contributes to the stereotype of the untrustworthy Mexican boss, who is likewise constructed by Trump in example (14).

6. Mexican Stereotypes in Donald Trump's Campaign Rhetoric

Trump's principal aim during the primaries was to be elected the Republican presidential nominee, which he tried to achieve with the Mexico-related arguments of stricter trade regulations, immigration laws and border control

through the erection of a wall. In order to achieve legitimisation for this political programme, Trump established a xenophobic context model of Mexico on the basis of three main issues: (a) crime caused by illegal immigration, (b) problems in trade and economy, and (c) deceitful actions of the Mexican government. The topic of crime was prominently established directly at the beginning of his announcement speech in the form of example (6), which was abundantly quoted in the news media and drew tremendous attention to Trump's political agenda.

- (6) When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people. (speech, 16 June 2015)

The proper noun 'Mexico' is here used in a metonymic way, denoting the national government, as the ensuing pronoun 'they' seems to imply (see also example 14 below). In this manner, Mexican immigrants are framed not as agents but as passive objects expelled by a malicious leadership. Furthermore, Mexico is viewed from a negative perspective through the recurring particle 'not', so that an opposition is constructed between the emitted Mexicans and the present audience members. In a kind of *captatio benevolentiae*, Trump's valued supporters are equated with the 'best', and the corresponding deictic second-person pronoun 'you' is repeated for the sake of emphasis. The inclusive first-person plural pronoun 'us' is introduced, denoting the ingroup threatened by the third-person outgroup 'they', which comprises both the Mexican government and the immigrants. This polarising categorisation is then specified through an enumeration of stereotypes in emphatic paratactic parallelisms. Just as the particle 'not' occurs in three consecutive clauses, this list consists of three apodictic statements that underline the derogatory message. By attributing the nouns 'drugs' and 'crime' to the immigrants in the strategy of 'predication', they are discursively disqualified as outlaws, which is reinforced by the technique of 'nomination' (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 94) in the form of the noun 'rapists'.

While these assertions are presented as hard facts, the final disclaimer that a minority of the immigrants are 'good people' is hedged through the indefinite pronoun 'some', which singles out a small subset of the respective population, and through the epistemic comment clause 'I assume'. Along these lines, Trump's moral devaluation of the Mexican outgroup in contrast to the American ingroup has a pronounced legitimatory effect. At the same time, Trump adopts a common populist approach, causing fear in an anti-intellectual way by constructing scapegoats responsible for salient social problems (Wodak 2015: 2).

The stereotype of the criminal drug dealer directly reflects the Salamanca family in *Breaking Bad* (examples 1 and 2) and cartel representatives in the feature films discussed in Section 5. In addition, the character Lado in *Savages* is a rapist (Stone 2012, 1:55:42), and in *The Counselor* it is insinuated that the protagonist's abducted fiancée is murdered and raped by cartel members (Scott 2013, 1:44:11). In this way, telecinematic discourse provides a justifying foundation for Trump's allegations. As examples (7) and

(8) below show, Trump continuously reinforces such conceptualisations before and throughout the presidential primaries.

- (7) The fact is, since then, many killings, murders, crime, drugs [*sic*] pouring across the border [...]. (debate, 6 August 2015)
- (8) Our big problem is not only people coming in, and in many cases the wrong people, it's the tremendous amount of drugs that are coming in. (debate, 25 February 2016)

In August 2015, Trump diagnosed that illegal immigration had thrived ever since the announcement of his candidacy two months earlier (example 7). The discursive qualification of Mexicans is here complemented by the additional attribution of 'killings' and 'murders'. The multal quantifier 'many' in collocation with the metaphorical verb 'pouring' here constructs the image of large and unstoppable quantities. In example (8), Trump legitimises the projected wall on the border by equating illegal immigrants with drugs, since he employs the same personifying predicate 'coming in' in both cases. With the pejorative attribute 'wrong', a moral category is introduced that does not allow for fuzzy boundaries and aptly contrasts with the implied *right*, so that the persuasive force in favour of the US ingroup becomes obvious.

Furthermore, in a speech at the end of 2015, Trump underlines these notions through exemplary mythopoesis, referring to the murders of Jamiel Shaw in 2008 and of Kathryn Steinle in 2015. Both were reportedly shot by Hispanic immigrants in California (speech, 30 December 2015). In the context of ideological campaign rhetoric, the strategic generalisation of such instances in line with telecinematic Mexican violence (examples 2 and 5) adds up to a powerful narrative.

The most frequently addressed issue of Trump's Mexico-related campaign rhetoric concerns economic relations and trade across the border, framing Mexico in immoral and villainous terms as well. As far as employment is concerned, Mexico is conceptualised as a thief, likewise situated in the category of criminals. Thus, in example (9), the personified 'Mexico' appears as a bandit that actively 'takes' US-American businesses and jobs. The syntactic position of 'Mexico' as the subject contributes to the biased context model in which this nation appears as a dangerous aggressor (van Dijk 2009: 73). When Mexico is metaphorically labelled 'the new China' here, respective Asian stereotypes of economic hostility and exploitation are transferred to Central America.

- (9) And, in my opinion, the new China, believe it or not, in terms of trade, is Mexico. [...] So Mexico takes a company, a car company that was going to build in Tennessee, rips it out. (speech, 16 June 2015)

In the following three examples, further metaphors are constructed in order to locate Mexico in the stereotypical villain category. In (10), the US economy appears as a naïve and helpless toddler whose candy is stolen by an older child. This is reminiscent of Jesse Pinkman's wide-eyed and faint-hearted behaviour towards macho drug dealer Tuco (example 1), who violently takes away the crystal meth that Jesse brought to their meeting. Similarly, Mexico is conceptualised as the notorious school bully who 'is eating our lunch'

(example 11), which insinuates that the US leaders are too weak and timid to defend national economic interests. Example (12) contains the harshest metaphors in the form of the verbs ‘killing’ and ‘destroying’, portraying Mexico as a ruthless and murderous enemy, so that the history of Mexican casualties at the common border is not only negated but even ideologically inverted. In sum, all these metaphors are efficient means of ideological ‘nomination’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 94) and construct a denigratory context model of Mexico (van Dijk 2014: 55) in Trump’s representation.

- (10) Our jobs are being taken away from us like candy from a baby. (interview, 2 April 2016)
- (11) I’m going to bring jobs back. I’m taking them back from China, I’ll bring them back from Mexico – which, by the way, is eating our lunch, both at the border and with economic development, Chris. (interview, 30 March 2016)
- (12) You look at countries like Mexico, where they’re killing us on the border, absolutely destroying us on the border. They’re destroying us in terms of economic development. (speech, 2 March 2016)

In particular, example (12) is interdiscursively related to telecinematic discourse, since the TV series *Breaking Bad* and the feature films discussed earlier show the literal killing of US citizens in the border region, such as the decapitation of the counselor’s fiancée (Scott 2013, 1:45:05). This is suited to support Trump’s line of argumentation, according to which Mexican aggression must be answered by containment at the border, which he intends to secure with a wall financed by Mexico. However, when he uses the ambiguous words ‘they will pay in one form or another’ (example 13), the verb *pay* can be interpreted in a metaphorical way of retribution, reminiscent of the colloquial style in conventional Western and Adventure movies.

- (13) We have a trade deficit with Mexico, \$58 billion a year. The wall is going to cost approximately \$10 billion. Believe me, they will pay in one form or another. (interview, 30 March 2016)

A relevant intertextual link to this extract is present in *Savages*, since cartel boss Elena Sánchez similarly uses *pay* in an equivocal and threatening way towards her apparently disloyal employees Lado and Alex: ‘First of all, those \$3 million? (to Lado and Alex:) You’re gonna pay for it. (to Alex:). Yeah, you, too.’ (Stone 2012, 1:28:20) As the viewers learn a few minutes later, Alex will actually pay with his life, since he is shortly after tortured and murdered by Lado and the Baja Cartel (Stone 2012: 1:40:18).

The third major issue in Trump’s rhetorical account of Mexico is its government, which is conceptualised as crafty and cunning, outsmarting the Obama administration, so that Trump establishes a twofold polarisation. In comparison to the ruling elite in the United States, Trump presents himself as *intellectually* superior, while in opposition to the Mexican government, he appears as *morally* superior. The Mexican leadership is therefore placed in a similar category as cartel boss Don Eladio or General Salazar (examples 3 and 4), who are immoral, corrupt and covetous leaders, as already implied by Trump in example (6). In example (14), Trump uses the strategy of

‘predication’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 94) by attributing the adjective ‘stupid’ to the Democratic US government and by relating the boosted comparative forms ‘much smarter, much sharper, much more cunning’ to the Mexican leadership. Clearly, these latter intellectual qualities have negative connotations of disrespect, aggression and deception.

- (14) Our politicians are stupid. And the Mexican government is much smarter, much sharper, much more cunning. And they send the bad ones over because they don’t want to pay for them. They don’t want to take care of them. (debate, 6 August 2015)

By including himself in the semantic extension of the first-person possessive determiner ‘[o]ur’ (example 14), Trump situates himself outside the category of the presumably gullible and unsuspecting US politicians. His allegation that the Mexican government is not willing to invest in social problems directly echoes the statement of General Salazar in *Traffic*, who points out that ‘[a]ddicts treat themselves’, thus refusing to take responsibility for the national drug problem (example 4). In this way, the traditional stereotypes of Mexican indolence and immorality are clearly perpetuated. Simultaneously, the Mexican immigrants are here discursively qualified by the morally disparaging attribute ‘bad’.

The final two extracts construct the Mexican leader stereotype by means of the anthroponym of the former Mexican president Vicente Fox (2000–2006). When the debate moderator quotes Fox’s statement that Mexico will not pay for the ‘effing wall’ (debate, 25 February 2016), Trump attacks Fox at the metalinguistic level (example 15).

- (15) This guy used a filthy, disgusting word on television, and he should be ashamed of himself, and he should apologize, OK? (debate, 25 February 2016)
- (16) I watched the ex-president of Mexico, the arrogance of this man. [...] Vicente Fox, first of all, he used a word that you should never have — if I ever used that word you folks would’ve never, ever, ever let me get away with it. (speech, 2 March 2016)

The adjectives ‘filthy’ and ‘disgusting’, which are reminiscent of repulsive Mexican villains on the screen (example 5), are here attributed to Fox’s choice of a taboo expletive. From the discourse-historical perspective, this type of predication serves as a powerful discursive (dis-)qualification. Analogously, these qualities are used for the pejorative moral evaluation of the speaker Vicente Fox himself, thus serving Trump’s aim of legitimisation through polarisation. In addition, this practice entails the legitimatory strategy of inverse authorisation, as the former Mexican president serves both as a synecdoche for his people and as a deterrent example. Extract (16) furthermore attributes ‘arrogance’ to Fox and frames him as an offender who will probably ‘get away with’ his verbal gaffe in Mexico, as opposed to Trump, who would allegedly accept the consequences of inappropriate verbal profanity. As examples (14) to (16) have shown, Mexican leaders are also located in the stereotypical category of treacherous and depraved bandits.

7. Conclusion

The analysis has demonstrated that ideological context models which are constructed through the perpetuation of Mexican stereotypes in telecinematic discourse may provide an argumentative foundation for political campaign rhetoric. While the stereotypical characterisation in films and TV series needs to be analytically derived from fictional character speech and cinematographic cues, biased images in the Trump texts are overtly displayed. Mainstream entertainment employs stereotypes chiefly to meet the cultural expectations and preconceptions of a mass audience for the sake of commercial success. Owing to interdiscursive relations between the two types of mass communication, Donald Trump's persuasive strategy can rely on common ground regarding biased cognitive configurations of Mexico, as they are already known from popular multimodal storytelling. In US-American TV series and feature films, Mexicans are typically minor figures who have the function of individuating and characterising the respective US protagonists. Similarly, in the present campaign rhetoric, Trump distinguishes himself and raises his profile through stereotypes of the denigrated Mexican outgroup.

Despite their high artistic merit, the TV series *Breaking Bad* and selected feature films from the drug-cartel thriller genre perpetuate the negative stereotypes of the sleazy, uncouth and psychopathic drug dealer on the one hand and the well-groomed, pseudo-cultivated, and superficially polite cartel boss on the other. Framed as the ethnic Other, both models are not only deficient in moral and ethical standards but also unpredictable, hiding true intentions behind ambiguous ways of communication. Trump's rhetorical conceptualisation of Mexico likewise refers to two main social strata, in particular to illegal immigrants and to the Mexican authorities. In terms of political issues, he concentrates on imported crime, the US-Mexican trade deficit, and the supposedly treacherous Mexican government. In all three areas, the bandit stereotype is highly salient, for in addition to the image of the drug trafficker, Mexico is framed as a thief stealing businesses from the United States and as the origin of socially deprived individuals that are deliberately deported to the United States. Trump's central linguistic device is conceptual metaphor, construing Mexico by way of domains from the area of crime and ethical deficiency.

Donald Trump's rhetoric aims at gaining legitimisation for immigration reforms and enhanced border security, which are at the centre of his campaign and political agenda. In addition to one-sided misrepresentation, he chiefly makes use of negative moral evaluation and occasional mythopoesis, telling cautionary and deterrent tales that give rise to fear and xenophobia. Thus, by analogy with the distinctive use of screen colour in telecinematic discourse, Trump's polarising oratory has the function of verbal colour-coding, painting an utterly bleak picture of Mexico. Accordingly, the present juxtaposition of TV series, films and politics has provided additional evidence of the fact that pop culture entertainment and populist rhetoric are mutually reinforcing social practices.

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Appendix: Dataset of Donald Trump's speeches, interviews and debates

<i>Text type</i>	<i>Title or place</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>URLs (all last accessed on 16 May 2016)</i>	<i>Words</i>
SPEECH	Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President	16 June 2015	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=110306 >	6,545
	Speech in Hilton Head, S.C.	30 December 2015	< http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-buzz/article55604115.html >	12,508
	Super Tuesday Victory Speech	2 March 2016	< http://time.com/4245134/super-tuesday-donald-trump-victory-speech-transcript-full-text/ >	6,051
	Speech to AIPAC	22 March 2016	< http://www.timesofisrael.com/donald-trumps-full-speech-to-aipac/ >	2,342
	'America First' Foreign Policy Speech	27 April 2016	< http://time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/ >	4,703
INTERVIEW	'60 Minutes' on CBS News	27 September 2015	< http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-60-minutes-scott-pelley/ >	3,657
	'FOX News Sunday' with Chris Wallace	18 October 2015	< http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/10/18/full_replay_and_transcript_donald_trump_with_fncs_chris_wallace.html >	4,224
	Meeting with the Washington Post editorial board	21 March 2016	< https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/03/21/a-transcript-of-donald-trumps-meeting-with-the-washington-post-editorial-board/ >	11,663
	'MSNBC Town Hall' moderated by Chris Matthews	30 March 2016	< http://info.msnbc.com/_news/2016/03/30/35330907-full-transcript-msnbc-town-hall-with-donald-trump-moderated-by-chris-matthews?lite >	12,172
	Washington Post with Bob Woodward and Robert Costa	2 April 2016	< https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/04/02/transcript-donald-trump-interview-with-bob-woodward-and-robert-costa/ >	18,683
	DEBATE	Cleveland, Ohio	6 August 2015	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=110489 >
Simi Valley, California		16 September 2015	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=110756 >	34,794
Boulder, Colorado		28 October 2015	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=110906 >	21,698
Houston, Texas		25 February 2016	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=111634 >	24,903
Detroit, Michigan		3 March 2016	< http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=111711 >	21,340
TOTAL				204,609