

Relevance-Based Framework for Explicitation/Implication: A New Alternative

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Abstract: This paper will discuss an alternative way to approach the phenomenon of explicitation and implication in corpus-based research by using Relevance Theory. The concept of explicitation itself, which is generally understood as ‘the spelling out of information which is otherwise implicit in the source text’, has been of special interest in translation studies because of its elusiveness. Different methods have been applied in the study, e.g. by the use of the discourse-based concept of explicitness and the traditional encoded/inferred distinction. The studies, however, are somewhat difficult to compare since every study seems to have its own concept of explicitation. In this paper I’d like to propose my ‘scalar/categorical’ typology of explicitation/implication based on the Relevance Theory’s explicature/implicature. Based on my experimental analysis, this framework can better explain the phenomenon of explicitation/implication and may also bring all the different approaches together in its future research.

1. Introduction

The concept of ‘explicitation’ is generally understood as ‘the spelling out of information which is otherwise implicit in the source text’. ‘Implication’, on the other hand, is seen to consist of making what is explicit in the source language implicit in the target language. The notions of ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ are thus central in understanding the terms of explicitation and implication. In spite of this, however, there seems to be a strong tendency

to overlook them in describing explicitation and implicitation. Since there are actually different understandings of these more basic terms, it is no surprise that researchers have assigned different concepts of them on their studies of explicitation and implicitation.

As a consequence, as Englund Dimitrova (2005) has pointed out, the term ‘explicitation’ (and consequently also implicitation) seems to have become an umbrella for a host of different phenomena. In my view, however, this kind of situation makes the research on explicitation out of focus and thereby not very effective; in the first place because the studies are difficult to compare. Unless the key concepts are reinvestigated, the concept of explicitation/implicitation and the debate on it will remain problematic.

In this paper I’d like to demonstrate how Relevance Theory may be able to shed more light on the elusive nature of explicitation/implicitation and may also bring all the different approaches together in its future research. I will begin by explaining different concepts of explicitness/implicitness normally applied in explicitation/implicitation studies, and then compare them with the Relevance-based framework. Examples of analysis are taken from the comparison between John Steinbeck’s novel ‘The Grapes of Wrath’ and ‘Of Mice and Men’ and their translation.

2. General Descriptions of the concepts

Generally, a piece of information is considered to be ‘explicit’ when it is encoded in linguistic forms (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002). On the other hand, information is said to be implicit when it is recoverable only by inference. This use of the terms ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ seems to be only an informal alternative to the encoded and inferred and not based on a particular theoretical basis (Carston, 2002; Allen, 2009). Nevertheless this seems to be what has mainly been used in the description of explicitation in translation studies.

While the encoded/inferred distinction has been able to shed some light on some aspects of explicitation and implicitation, it does not represent the complex nature of interpretation. It gives an impression that as if encoded meanings do not need an element of inference for their recovery. The fact is the comprehension of any, including those encoded in linguistic forms, needs an element of inference due to the ‘underdeterminate’ nature of language (Sperber and Wilson, 1986; Carston, 2002). Languages are too weak to be able to encode all the humanly possible thoughts and therefore what are encoded in linguistic symbols cannot fully represent what is someone’s mind. In other words, our thoughts can never be fully explicit in our linguistic expressions. Considering this inferential, cognitive nature of interpretation, the encoded/inferred distinction is somewhat too simplistic to represent the explicit and the implicit.

Along with the encoded/inferred concept, however, there are other understandings about explicitness that have also come into play in explicitation/implicitation research, which are more of a degree than a categorical feature. In discourse analysis, for instance, Schiffrin (1994/2003) sees explicitness as a feature dealing with representation of referents. According to her (1994/2003:199), it concerns with ‘presentation of information that actually enables [the hearer] to correctly identify a referent, i.e. the lexical clues that allow [the hearer] to single out whom (or what) [the speaker] intends to differentiate from other potential referents’.¹

¹ Schiffrin (1994/2003) sees that explicitness can easily overlap with ‘definiteness’. ‘Definiteness’ itself concerns with ‘[the speaker’s] assumption that [the hearer] will be able to identify a single, specific entity to which [the speaker] intends to refer’ (Schiffrin, 1994/2003:199). ‘*My housemate*’, ‘*Christine*’, and ‘*the person I am sharing a unit with*’, for example, are definite. These expressions are more explicit than indefinite referents like ‘*one of my friends*’ or ‘*someone I met in the early 1990’s*’. However, in Schiffrin’s view, a definite referent like *she*, for instance, is not as explicit as any of the above expressions (including the indefinite ones), but more explicit than a zero representation (i.e. represented only by inference).

If we look closely at Schiffrin's definition of explicitness, however, it is the hearer that actually determines the degree of explicitness since it is based on his/her point view. This is problematic since explicitness in this sense is thus very relative depending on the context and audience of the message. What is explicit to one hearer may not be explicit to another. Likewise, while in some context a more specific presentation of information may help someone to identify what the speaker has intended, in another context a more general but more familiar representation may be much more helpful for him/her. Apart from this, this reader-based notion of explicitness seems to be commonly used in daily context. Like for example, one may say that a message is delivered in figurative language, yet that person may say that the message is explicit enough to him/her to understand.

In metadiscourse analysis, explicitness has a broader concept, yet, researchers have different ideas on what may contribute to explicitness. According to Ädel, 'in fact it is easier to find consensus on what is implicit than on what is explicit (2006:28). Some researchers, for instance, would include typographical markers such as italics and boldface, while Ädel herself only takes the wording into account (2002:28). Here we can see that explicitness seems to be very broad- it might virtually count anything that comes into form as a contributor. Besides the verbal forms, this would also include punctuations, and metadiscourse markers as tones that serve to show emphasis.

Contrastive linguistics, which is closely linked to discourse analysis, seems to apply a similar type of explicitness. In Biber (1988), explicitness is contrasted with situation dependent meanings and is generally measured by type-token ratio, which can be closely associated to informativeness. Here the degrees of explicitness of a particular language are seen to depend on factors such as emphasis/focus and topicality in the information packaging, and thus goes much further than the encoded/inferred distinction of meaning. Focus may be signalled by a particular structure (e.g. cleft sentence, intensifiers like *very*,

even, etc), and also by tonal stress (see Leafgren, 2002). However, according to Leafgren, focus refers to semantically or pragmatically outstanding elements because they are ‘contrastive, surprising, or in some other way deserving a special attention’ (Leafgren, 2002:23)². Topicality on the other hand deals with ‘aboutness’ (Leafgren, 2002:27). This would depend whether the topic (normally the grammatical subject) is encoded or just left to inference.

From the above discussion we can see that the concept ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ are multi-notional and complex. Yet basically we can isolate three basic notions in the account of explicitness. The first is the one that is relative and depends on the part of the hearer/reader. This explicitness, however, seems to be just another way to refer to clarity. The other two types of explicitness are as follows:

1. Explicitness that is based on the traditional encoded/inferred meaning levels; categorical.

Explicit	Encoded
Implicit	Inferred

2. discourse – based; gradable

Explicit	Encodedness
	Informativity
	Specificity
	Topicality
	Focus
	Emphasis
Implicit	

² According to Leafgren (2002:23-4), ‘emphasis’ is the more general term of focus, in which focus refers to ‘significant emphasis on a particular element within the context of the information conveyed in particular clause.’

In discourse analysis (e.g. Schiffrin, 1994/2003), the two types of explicitness above are often combined in which the discourse-based explicitness occupies the encoded slot of the categorical encoded/inferred distinction. This is because the encoded/inferred distinction has been traditionally accepted as the explicit/implicit distinction of meaning levels:

Explicit	encoded: encodedness informativity specificity topicality focus emphasis
Implicit	Inferred

From the above diagram, what is inferred is automatically implicit, and what is encoded is explicit, but it has a degree of explicitness. Based on this categorization, we can say, for instance, that within the encoded area, expression A is more explicit than B, or B is more implicit than A. However, any expression in the implicit slot is bound to be more implicit than any of those from the encoded slot. Those in the encoded slot, however, are always more informative, more specific, etc. This combined system is very helpful when dealing with static explicitness in discourse analysis, yet it has also been used in research of explicitation, which has a dynamic nature. One study that applies the combination is that of Klaudy and Karoly (2003). According to them, explicitation occurs when:

- a. a source language (SL) unit with a general meaning is replaced by a target language (TL) unit with a more specific meaning
- b. the meaning of a SL unit is distributed over several units in the TL

- c. new meaningful elements appear in the TL text
- d. one sentence in the ST is divided into two or several sentences in the TT
- e. SL phrases are extended or “raised” to clause level in the TT

Implication, on the other hand, covers the following operations:

- a. a SL unit with a specific meaning is substituted by a TL unit with a more general meaning
- b. the meanings of several SL words are combined in one TL word
- c. meaningful lexical elements of the SL text are omitted in the TL text
- d. two or more sentences in the ST are combined into one sentence in the TT
- e. ST clauses are reduced to phrases in the TT

The above type of combination, however, is problematic in some cases of explicitation. This is because the inferred meaning that is spelled out in explicitation may be more general than the source item it has replaced. On the other hand, what is more general cannot be more explicit in this system. Let’s have a look at Kamenická’s example from the translation of David Lodge’s *Small World* into Czech (2007:48):

ST: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow, or any other airport, is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one. (*Small World*)

TT: Checking in passengers at an airport counter, whether in London or anywhere else, is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

In the example, 'Heathrow' is dropped and the more general term 'London' is encoded instead to improve the translation's readability for the Czech readers. In terms of the encoded/inferred distinction, this is just a case of explicitation of an implicit meaning, which happens to be more general. However, obviously this cannot fit the criteria of the combined system of explicitness, because to be more explicit in this model, the information needs to be more specific and more informative.

Thus, although the combined system of static explicitness provides more analytic insights in discourse analysis compared to the use of the encoded/inferred distinction alone, actually it does not really fit the dynamic nature of explicitation in Translation Studies. Of course, the combined system (and the discourse-based model alone) can still be used to analyse translated materials, but the backdrop is it can only describe the explicitness of the translation as a product, not in relation to the meaning shifts that have taken place in the translation.

3. The Explicit/Implicit Distinction by Relevance Theory

3.1. Why Relevance Theory?

There are different pragmatic theories on layers of meaning in interpretation, but we shall use the explicit/implicit distinction proposed by Relevance Theory (RT), which is chiefly based on Gricean view. It is attributed to Sperber and Wilson (1986) and elaborated by Carston (2002). I have chosen this theory especially because of its particularly strong cognitive view towards communication, which supports the crucial role of the translator's cognition in the translation process. Secondly, Relevance Theory also has a very non-literal approach towards explicitness, which is especially shown by its broad scope of explicitness to account for the crucial role of context in establishing what is said. In my view, this better fits the way translation studies generally deal with meaning in communication across

languages and cultures, which is normally treated as very context-sensitive rather than closely tied to the conventional meanings of the linguistic forms.

3.2. Relevance Theory and Its Principle of Relevance

Relevance theorists believe that human communication is governed by the principle of relevance. Here people's attention and thought are seen to be automatically geared toward information which seems relevant to them, i.e. when it has a connection with background information he/she has in his mind to yield conclusions that matter to him/her (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1987; Wilson and Sperber, 2004). 'To communicate' is 'to claim someone's attention, hence to communicate is to imply that the information communicated is relevant.' (Sperber and Wilson, 1987:697).

In addition, the degree of relevance is determined by two factors: contextual effects and processing efforts. The greater the contextual effects the hearer achieves, the greater the relevance of the text; but the greater the processing effort the hearer spends to arrive at these effects, the lower the relevance. It is therefore reasonable for the hearer to adopt the most accessible interpretation, i.e. that from the path with least effort, 'in the absence of contrary evidence', to fulfil his expectations of relevance. The cognitive processing of the communicative stimulus will stop when the expectation for relevance is satisfied (or abandoned).

3.3. The Explicature and Implicature as the Explicit/Implicit Distinction

Relevance Theory has the concept of 'explicature' and 'implicature' to represent the difference between the explicit and implicit. This distinction is a further development of H.P. Grice's notion of 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' (or 'implicature'), which has been an invaluable contribution towards the study of meaning and interpretation. The theory

has drawn a new line between semantics and pragmatics, which was traditionally represented by the encoded/inferred distinction.

Grice's concept of 'what is said' expands the explicit by including the contextual meanings that contribute to the utterance's sentence minimal meaning so the truth condition of the utterance can be determined (see Grice, 1967/1975). To understand the utterance 'They quickly ran to the bank', for instance, we need to refer to the context to determine what the words 'they' and 'bank' refer to. The pronoun 'they' could be people or just rabbits, and 'bank' may be a place where people save money or the land along the edge of a body of water. Without knowing the context we cannot understand what the words really mean.

As part of the implicated, on the other hand, Grice introduces what he calls 'conversational implicatures'. Unlike 'what is said', the implicatures are not only not encoded but also not directly communicated. When Ani, for instance, asks Budi, 'Are you going to gym?', Budi just says that he is tired. While Budi does not say yes or no, Ani can derive an implicature from what he says that he is not going to gym because he is tired. The recovery of this conversational implicature is based on what Grice calls 'cooperative principle', which consists of four maxims: quality, quantity, relation, and manner. In terms of the cooperative principle, the implicature of Budi's reply, for instance, can be seen to work on the basis of Maxim Relation. Budi would have infringed this maxim, if what he said were not relevant to Ani's inquiry. If Budi is being cooperative, then he is trying to answer Ani's question. Based on this, Ani can make inferences on what he is trying to communicate to her.

In Grice's theory, however, the implicated is not necessarily not-encoded. In this case, he sees connectives such as 'moreover', 'but' and 'therefore' belong to 'conventional implicatures' rather than to 'what is said' (Grice 1967/1975). He argued that they are implicatures because they represent higher order speech acts (e.g., adding, contrasting, and

explaining) while those in propositions are the basic ones, such as asserting, telling, and asking (Grice 1967/1975).

While Grice's above framework has given more adequate space to the role of context in meaning interpretation, Relevance theorists believe that too little attention has been given to its contribution to the recovery of the explicit content. Besides this, they also see Grice's category of conventional implicatures is problematic (Carston, 2002:118). In the first place, Carston believes, in cases where the connectives are already encoded, i.e., represented in verbal forms, why should the hearer need to recover it all by inference? Thus, in her point of view Grice cannot be right in saying that such an encoded meaning is implicated because implicature is retrieved purely by inference from 'what is said' (2002).

Because of the above issues (and several other problems not discussed here), Relevance theorists develop the concepts of 'explicature' and 'implicature' as an alternative to what is said and implicated. Unlike Grice's what is said, explicature is not as tightly linked to the conventional linguistic meaning. It is never fully explicit due to the underdeterminate nature of language and its explicit content is just a matter of degree (Carston, 2002). The implicature, on the other hand, it is never recovered by default like the conventional implicature.

Further, the concepts of explicature and implicature are formulated in the following rules (Sperber and Wilson (1986). Note that the term 'logical form' used here refers to 'a syntactically structured string of concepts with some slots of free variables, indicating where certain contextual values (in the form of concepts) must be supplied' (Carston, 2002:64). Practically this would be the semantic representation of the utterance.

1. An assumption communicated by an utterance U is *explicit* [hence an 'explicature'] if and if only it is a development of a logical form encoded by U .

2. An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit [hence an ‘implicature’].

Based on the above rules, unlike those in Grice’s account, RT’s implicatures are only implications that are derived purely from contextually based inference, hence also referred to as contextual implications. These implications can be further characterized into implicated premise and implicated conclusion (Carston, 2002:377).³ In light of this, Ani’s reply to Budi in example (2) may lead to him to infer, for instance, that there are snakes in the bush or, say, one may run into one in the area. By using these implications as a premise, he may arrive at an implicated conclusion that Ani did not join the bushwalking because being scared of snakes she did not want to be near to them or run into one in the bush. This implicature is considered ‘strong’ because its retrieval is important in order to understand the utterance. With further processing, Budi may also arrive at a ‘weak’ implicature, which is not essential for the understanding of the utterance, for instance, that Ani may not join any bushwalking.

Further, Relevance Theory does not treat metaphors and figurative language as a violation of any communicative maxim, but as ‘merely alternative routes to achieving optimal relevance.’ (Wilson & Sperber, 2002). In processing a figurative speech like ‘C’s a torch in the dark’, for instance, ‘there is no suggestion that the literal meaning must be tested first’ (Wilson & Sperber, 2002). In the circumstances, A will not likely to examine whether C is a torch or human, but expecting to get a reply to his/her question of how C has been doing in the team, he/she will instead be accessing his/her array of encyclopaedic knowledge of the qualities of ‘a torch in dark’, such as helping to show people ways which

³ For clarification, implicated premise and implicated conclusion sometimes are also referred to as contextual assumption and contextual implication respectively (see e.g. Carston, 2002:335-336, Wilson and Carston, 2006). The use of the generic term (i.e. contextual implication) to refer to implicated conclusion may be confusing for a new RT reader who would like to go into details as the term includes both types of implicatures.

otherwise hidden, prevent people from having troubles, etc. From this concept, A will be arriving at a range of similar weak implicatures such as that C has been very helpful to the team, that she has shown his/her team mates new options etc. In the interpretation of non-literal language, these weak implicatures all together are important to help construct a relevant interpretation but not individually required to understand the utterance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, Wilson and Sperber, 2004).

Unlike implicatures, explicatures come from two different sources, i.e. the linguistic forms used and the context. Thus they may be derived in two ways i.e., by linguistic decoding or by pragmatic inference (Carston 2002, Gutt 2000). Explicatures are therefore not closely tied to conventional linguistic meaning like Grice's 'what is said'. They involve more pragmatic processes to recover than just resolving ambiguities and reference assignment, i.e. the development or 'enrichment' of the 'logical form'. Take for example the following conversation:

(1) Budi: Did your husband volunteer for the environment association?

Ani (with a happy smile): He did.

In light of any theory of utterance meaning, Ani's short reply to Budi might communicate the following explicatures:

- (2)
 - a. Ani's husband volunteered for the environmental association.
 - b. Ani is happy that her husband volunteered for the environmental association.
 - c. Ani believes that her husband volunteered for the environmental association.

In a situation where the people are concerned with environmental issues, Budi might get the explicatures with the simple proposition 2a or the higher-level explicature 2c. In a context where Ani is a passionate environmentalist but her husband is normally not interested in her environmental activities, the explicature 2b may manifest to Budi (see Carston, 2002:119). Thus the concept of ‘explicature’ is wider compared to Grice’s ‘what is said’. In the above case, for example, it is not only limited to the minimal proposition of Ani’s reply, i.e. ‘He volunteered for the environmental association’ but also the development of it like 2b and 2c. We shall discuss the specific types of enrichment of explicature later in this chapter. In the discussion of ad hoc concepts we shall also see that enrichment may take place not only at the clausal level, but also at the level of words.

It is important to note that an explicature is not ‘a special kind of implicature ... that embellishes logical form in limited ways’ as Levinson claims (Levinson, 2000:238). As Carston (2002:148) argues:

[I]t is not the case that an explicature embellishes a logical form, pragmatic inferences do that; rather an explicature is a kind of representation that results from the pragmatic embellishment of a logical form.

Again, the concept of explicatures is based on the view of the underdeterminacy thesis, in which communication is seen to always involve an element of inference to some degree since the language symbols cannot make all the human thoughts fully explicit.

Last but not least, different utterances may have the same explicatures, but with a different degree of explicitness (Carston, 2002:117):

- (3)
- a. My father put his watch on the table in the study.
 - b. He put his watch on the table.
 - c. He put it there.
 - d. On the table.
 - e. There.

Any one of the above utterances may be used in different contexts to express the same proposition. However, *by no means they have the same pragmatic effects since one would need different degrees of efforts to recover them*. People may give the same information in different degrees of explicitness because they intend different contextual effects to impart on the hearer's mind. Here the first three in the tables (3a, 3b, 3c) will require less inference to interpret compared to the rest of the utterances, and therefore are more explicit. The smaller the contribution of the context, the more explicit the explicature is.

Thus we see here, as Sperber and Wilson say, that explicitness is both classificatory and comparative (1986:182).⁴ It is classificatory because in terms of explicature, it defines what can be considered as explicit and implicit, but at the same time it is also comparative because it is gradable. This claim is very important for our project on explicitation because so far it has only been the explication of implicatures that has been addressed by relevance theorists. With the comparative nature of explicitness, we shall see in the next chapter that explicitation within explicatures is also possible.

⁴ As we look into relevance theory for an account of explicit/implicit distinction, we shall as well consider Bach's proposal of his middle category, i.e. 'implicature'.

4.2.4. Entailment in Relevance Theory and the Extension of Explicature's definition

A question we have not yet addressed is what is the place of entailment in Relevance Theory? As we have discussed before, in the Gricean pragmatics, entailments and conversational implicatures are separated as a two distinct types of meaning implications. While entailments are necessary logical consequences of the conventional linguistic meaning, implicatures are cancellable. In Relevance Theory, a sentence with more than one clause, each clause, which is an entailment of the source sentence, is categorized as an explicature. In the following sentence, the entailments 4(b) and 4(c) are considered as explicatures of 4(a):

4. a. Roger Federer won this year's Australian Open and was asked to do a walk of fame.
- b. Roger Federer won this year's Australian Open.
- c. Roger Federer was asked to do a walk of fame.

However, as Carston points out (2002:123), it is not the case with single clauses like what she has exemplified below:

5. a. (Confidentially) the judge is my father.
- b. The judge is a man.
6. a. (Unfortunately) I've bought some pork.
- b. I bought some meat.

In any semantic theory, 5(b) and 5(b) are the entailment of 6(a) and 6(a) respectively. Yet unlike the previous cases, in Relevance Theory, these entailments cannot be categorized as

explicatures because they are not the development of the logical form of the encoded meaning (Carston, 2002:123). Because of this, Carston expands the definition of explicatures to make it clearer:

An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an ‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form (Carston, 2002:124).

It needs to be made clear here that, borrowing Carston’s words (2002:123), ‘being a communicated entailment of the proposition expressed maybe neither necessary nor sufficient for qualification as an explicature’. This point about entailment is important because those who are unfamiliar with Relevance Theory might have an over-generalized impression that entailments belong to the area of explicatures. Yet, as Carston herself (2002/2010:16) states, the concept of entailment actually does not belong to Relevance Theory:

In my view, the concept of entailment and the concept of implicature belong to different explanatory levels, in fact different sorts of theory, the one a static semantic theory which captures knowledge of linguistic meaning, the other an account of the cognitive processes and representations involved in understanding utterances, so there is no reason at all why one and the same element of meaning should not fall into both categories.

In relation to example 6(b), it is also important to note that whether a particular sentence belongs to an explicature or an implicature of an utterance does not depend on the relative


resemblance or difference from the source utterance, but on the process how the meaning has been produced. A sentence is an explicature if the inferential process takes place at the level of the logical forms within the utterance. On the contrary, it will be an implicature if it is derived only by inference.

4.3. A New Typology of Explication and Implication


4.3.1. Explication

In order to apply the concepts of explicature and implicature on explication, we need to make some adjustment. This is because Relevance theorists working on translation normally only discuss explication of implicatures into explicatures, which is covered under the term ‘explication’. As we have discussed before, this is different from those based on the traditional encoded/inferred, in which explication covers shifts from the inferred to the encoded:


Traditional explication



Relevance Theory’s explication



If we have a close look at the above two diagrams, while the traditional concept of explicitation covers all areas of inferential meanings for the shifts to the explicit, there are areas of inference in RT that are not included in this concept. These are the inferential elements within the explicature:



The shifts within the explicature, on the other hand, are covered separately in the concept of expansion/completion/enrichment of the utterance’s logical forms. However, for the purpose of investigating explicitation in translation studies, it would be helpful if we expand the explication framework to include the shifts within explicatures. With this in mind, I would like to propose two types of explicitation as an alternative to the RT’s concepts of ‘explication’ and ‘expansion/completion/enrichment,’ i.e. ‘scalar’ and ‘categorical’ explicitations. It is worth noting that the traditional term ‘explicitation’ here is used because it is already familiar in translation studies and thus would make it easier to identify for research purposes.

The first type, scalar explicitation, refers to explicitation shifts within the explicature. In terms of translation, this would take the form of the encoding (in TT) of inferred information from the source text’s explicature. This type is *scalar* because the inferred meanings spelled out are already explicit by category and therefore the explicitation only

makes them more explicit in terms of degree. This is possible because explicitness is also comparative in nature. An example of scalar explicitation can be seen in the following translation:

Anton to Sari: “Mau pergi ke mana?”

Will(inf) go to where?

Anton to Sari: “Where are you going?”

In the above instance, the Indonesian text does not identify the subject ‘you’ to refer to Sari and also the frame time of the event as the language is not based on the tense system. The English translation, however, encodes the subject ‘you’ and also the tense and aspectual markers of the verbs (‘are going’ and ‘asked’). Thus there are at least three shifts in the rendering, i.e. the encoding of ‘you’, the tense/aspect ‘are going’, and the past tense ‘asked’. These shifts may be considered ‘scalar’ because they are only a development of the ST’s forms and the target text still shares the same explicature as the source text. They make a case of explicitation shifts because the spelled out meanings are already explicit within the Indonesian context. However, they become more explicit in terms of degree when they are encoded in the English target text. The scalar explicitation, thereby, can be represented as the following:

$X \rightarrow X'$, in which X' is a development of the form X and is more explicit than X , and X' represents the same explicature as X does.

Scalar explicitation shifts may result not only from encoding of meaning that is otherwise inferred in the ST (and thus addition of new meaningful unit), but also specification, as long

as the shift is still a development of the ST's logical form. We shall discuss this later in section 6.3.3.

The second type, the categorical type of explicitation, is basically the same as the RT term 'explication'. This refers to shifts of meaning from the implicature to explicature and is categorical because it transforms the shifted meaning from one category to the other, i.e., the implicit to the explicit. Take, for example, the following hypothetical translation:

ST: 'Dinginnya!' kata wanita itu. ['So cold!' said the woman']

Ia segera menutup jendela besar itu dan meminta maaf. ['He immediately closed the big window and apologized']

TT: 'It's freezing! **Could you close the window, please?**' the lady said.

He closed the big window immediately and apologized.

The spelling out of 'Could you close the window, please' into the TT may be considered categorical because it is only an implicature of what the lady said ('So cold!'), but in the translation it is part of the explicature. Thus the information has moved to a different category. On the other hand, it may be considered an explicitation because it makes the spelled out meaning more accessible by being encoded (before it was inferred). Here the categorical explicitation may be notated as follows:


$X \rightarrow X'$, in which X is an implicature in the ST and becomes an explicature X' in the TT.

Now, taking both types of explicitation in mind, we can redefine the more generic explicitation as *shifts of meaning from the implicit to the explicit or simply to higher degree of explicitness*. This definition has more merit compared to the one based on the encoded/inferred distinction in that we can also see the more specific level(s) of meanings that are involved in the explicitation shifts besides the encoding of inferred elements.


4.3.2. Implication

If we have a look at the above case of explicitation, the scalar/categorical typology seems to work for explicitation, but how about implication? There seems to be an issue here with the application of this traditional term, which is similar to that of explicitation. This is because in Relevance Theory the concept of implication would only apply to the shift from the implicature to the explicature. Now let us compare the term ‘implication’ in the traditional sense and in the point of view of Relevance Theory:


Traditional process implication



Relevance Theory ‘implication’ (implication)



In the first diagram, the traditional concept of implicature covers shifts from the encoded to all the undivided area of the inferred (which in RT can be the enrichment or further interpretation of an utterance). In the RT diagram, on the other hand, it is only the categorical shift from the explicature to the implicature that would be covered by the concept implicature. In other words, it cannot cover all the shifts of implicature normally covered in the traditional description. Here the shifts from the encoded to the inferred area in the explicature, which are dealt with under ‘broadening/weakening’, are left out:



With the above issue, we need to expand the concept of RT ‘implicature’ to be able to include the scalar shifts to the less explicit degree within the explicatures. However, there is another problem here since we cannot retain the traditional term ‘implicature’ for these scalar shifts. This is because the implicit area in RT only belongs to the implicature, while the scalar shifts take place in the explicit area of the explicature. We therefore have to use another term, let’s say ‘de-explicitation’ to include all the phenomena. To ‘de-explicitate’ itself would mean ‘to shift a particular meaning from the explicit to the implicit or to simply lower its degree of explicitness’. With this new term, we could develop two types of

counterparts to the scalar and categorical explicitations, namely *the scalar and categorical de-explicitations*.

Scalar de-explicitation is simply the reverse of scalar explicitation, which can be seen in the following back translation from the previous rendering:

Anton to Sari: “Where are you going?”

Anton ke Sari: “Mau pergi ke mana?”

Will(inf) go to where?

The English text encodes the subject ‘you’, which refers to Sari, and marks the verb by the present continues tense, meaning that the event described is taking place at the time of focus and the event is in progress. The Indonesian text, however, leaves these meanings to context, and therefore they move from the encoded to the non-encoded level of the explicature. This shift may be considered scalar because the omission of ‘you’ is just a development of an individual form of the explicature. It is a de-explicitation because the TT becomes less explicit than the ST (making the reader work more on inference). It is important to note here that the de-explicitation may not only result from omission, but also from less direct inference (e.g. ‘the people’ to ‘them’), change of non-figurative to figurative expressions, and generalization. The scalar de-explicitation, thereby, can be represented as follows:

$X \rightarrow X'$, in which X' is a less explicit form of X and X' represents the same explicature as X does.

An example of the categorical de-explicitation, on the other hand, can be seen in the following back translation of the previous rendering:

ST: 'It's freezing! Could you close the window, please?' the lady said.

He closed the big window immediately and apologized.

TT: 'Dinginnya!' kata wanita itu. ['So cold!' said the woman].

Ia segera menutup jendela besar itu dan meminta maaf. [He immediately closed the big window and apologized].

The Indonesian text does not translate the request of the lady, but simply leaves it to the context as an implication to her complaint that it was cold. This is only my own example, but in translation this could be done for some reason, for instance to make the translation shorter or to get some extra contextual effects. In this case, the direct request has undergone a categorical de-explicitation, which moves the message from the explicit category (explicature) to the implicit one (implicature). This shift can be represented in the notation below:

$X \rightarrow X'$, in which X is an explicature in the ST and becomes an implicature X' in the TT.

Practically the categorical explicitation will involve the omission of the whole proposition of the explicature, but the meaning can still be inferred as an implicature.

It is important to note that one single translation may simultaneously involve both categorical explicitation and de-explicitation. In fact this is mostly the case in translation data of this thesis, which shall see later in the analysis. Consider the following example:

ST: “Give you what, George?”

“You know God damn well what. **I want that mouse.**” *Of Mice and Men*, p.13

TT: “Apa yang kuberikan, George?”

“Keparat, engkau mengerti betul apa. **Berikan tikus itu.**” [Give me the mouse]. (*Tikus dan Manusia*, p.14)

The shift we are looking upon is the translation of ‘I want that mouse’ into ‘*Berikan tikus itu*’ (‘Give me that mouse’). The spelling out of ‘Give me that mouse’ in the TT is a categorical explicitation since it is an implicature of ‘I want that mouse’ in the ST. On the other hand, there is also a categorical de-explicitation, because the meaning ‘I want that mouse’ in the TT becomes an implicature of ‘Give me that mouse’, which is now the TT explicature. Thus what happens in the translation is actually a swap of status between the ST’s explicature and implicature.

4.3.3. Generalization and Specification in the Scalar/Categorical typology

In Klaudy and Karoly’s categories of explicitation, specification is classified into explicitation while generalization belongs to implicitation. According to Klaudy and Karoly (2003), specification itself refers to the replacement of a SL unit of a more general meaning with a TL unit of a more special meaning. Generalization, on the other hand, is defined as a replacement from an SL unit with a more specific meaning to a TL unit with a more general meaning. These shifts take place at the lexical and phrasal levels.

But how are their positions in the scalar/categorical typology? From a closer look, we seem to be able to see finer details of specification and generalization shifts. While in Klaudy and Karoly’s typology every specification and generalization will lend themselves

to explicitation and implicitation respectively, it is not the case in the scalar/categorical model. Let's first have a look at the examples of specification below:

	a. Budi bought chicken at the halal butcher's.
	b. Budi membeli dada ayam di toko daging halal. (Budi bought chicken breast at the halal butcher's.)

Suppose the translator wants to make his/her rendering more informative and the additional information is specified somewhere else in the context, she/he could make a specification like in the above example. Here the noun 'chicken' is rendered into 'chicken breast', which is a development of the logical form. Because of this, the shift is a scalar explicitation. But let's have a look at another example:

	a. Budi bought chicken at the halal butcher's.
	b. Budi membeli ayam halal (Budi bought halal chicken).

In the above example the noun 'chicken' is rendered into Indonesian as a more specific noun 'halal chicken.' This rendering is, however, only part of the implicature of the source text. This is because the information 'halal chicken' in sentence b is just a deduction from the context. In other words, it is only a categorical explicitation and does not really contribute to the informativity since the truth cannot be guaranteed.

From the two examples, there are two different types of specification. One belongs to the scalar explicitation and contributes to the increase of informativity and the other is categorical and does not contribute to the increase of informativity since the status of the information is still cancellable. This distinction can only appear when the target text is

examined in its relationship with the source text. This seems to indicate that translation texts need a different tool from that applied in non-translation texts.

Now, how about generalization? My test on cases of generalization shows that they do not always result in less explicit text in relation to the source text. Consider the following examples:

a. She likes to go to Sidney and Melbourne.
b. Ia suka pergi ke dua kota besar (She likes to go to two big cities).
c. Ia suka pergi ke kota-kota besar (She likes to go to big cities).

In the above rendering, sentence b is an impoverished explicature of the English text, hence scalar de-explicitation. Here the cities are not specified but just translated into more general information ‘two big cities’. It only makes the information regarding the cities less explicit in terms of degree within the explicature. Unlike sentence b, however, sentence c is a deductive generalization of the English sentence a, and therefore is an implicature of sentence a. Because of this it is a case of categorical explicitation, in which the implicit becomes explicit in terms of its category.

It is interesting here that a generalization does not necessarily result in a de-explicitation. On the contrary, it may be a case of explicitation when it is a deductive inference. This is what makes these categorical shifts of explicitness often ‘irreconcilable’ with the general notion of explicitation in the traditional approach based on the encoded/inferred distinction. This latter type, combining the discourse and meaning level explicitness, seems to assume that explicitation is identical with increase of informativity. The fact is not every meaning element in the inferred area is more specific than that encoded in the explicature and as result its encoding to the explicature does not necessarily increase

the informativity of the rendering. The case is, however, different with the finer distinction of meaning levels within our pragmatic analysis and seems to be able to explain Kamenicka's case of Heathrow/London discussed earlier in this thesis (Chapter 2). Let's have a look again at the case. The example is provided below for convenience:

ST: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow, or any other airport, is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one. (*Small World*)

TT: Checking in passengers at an airport counter, whether in London or anywhere else, is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

To analyze the texts, we need to divide them first into its two sub-propositions, in which each is an explicature of the main text (see Carston, 2003). The source text can be divided as follows:

ST1: The job of check-in clerk at Heathrow is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one.

ST2: The job of check-in clerk at any other airport is not a glamorous or particularly satisfying one.

The target text, on the other hand, consists of the following sub-propositions:

TT1: Checking in passengers at an airport counter is not an attractive or particularly satisfying job.

TT2: The air port counter is in London or anywhere else.

If we look at ST1 and TT1, TT1 seems to be an implicature because of its deductive generalization that checking in passengers at any airport is not rewarding. Thus the translation is a case of categorical explicitation. This, however, would have remained a version of the explicature, if it had been rendered into ‘checking in passengers at the airport counter...’, in which the shift only makes it less explicit in terms of degree. The second proposition of the rendering ‘The airport counter is in London or anywhere else’ is not a development of the second ST’s logical form. The second ST proposition has actually been deleted and the rendering is an implicature of the whole source text. This is because Heathrow is not the only London airport, and thus the translator has made a deductive generalization of the information available in the source text’s explicature. The rendering is therefore a case of categorical explicitation.

The above findings are different from Levinson’s (1988) view of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs). Levinson believes that generalizations like in the above cases (and particularizations) will automatically produce implicatures. Relevance Theory, on the other hand, sees that there is no ‘system of default inference rules to generate implicatures’ (Carston, 1995). According to her, what Levinson sees as generalized and particularized implicatures are more of a development of what is said (or explicature in RT’s terms). Again the distinction between explicatures and implicatures is determined by the derivational process. Both explicatures and implicatures requires inference; The difference is while in explicatures the pragmatic element is to fill in and adjust the semantic scaffolding provided by the linguistic expression used, the derivation of implicatures are purely pragmatic (Carston, 1995, 2002).

With its feature in dealing with specification and generalization, *our new typology can also combine the discourse and meaning-level types of explicitness within one unified account of process explicitation*. Here the shifts within explicatures are concerned with

discourse explicitness in which the shifts are identical with increase or decrease of scalar explicitness. The categorical explicitation, on the other hand, covers those shifts resulting from deductive generalization and specification that are not necessarily linked to decrease/increase of informativity.

5. Conclusion

From our above discussion, the scalar/categorical typology is more accommodative towards different types of shifts considered to represent the phenomenon of explicitation and implicitation in translation and more consistent in their classification. It also provides a more analytical tool to investigate translation shifts in relationship with the source text. Compared to other pragmatic alternatives of the explicit/implicit distinction, the RT-based differentiation gives an extended limit of the explicit by recognizing the importance of the context's role in the interpretation of the explicit meaning. In my view, this stance is more consistent with the cognitive and indeterminate nature of meaning interpretation in communication. While in Relevance Theory's area of the implicit is a bit broad (since it does not differentiate between cancellable and non-cancellable implicatures), this can be easily fixed in order to explain explicitation and de-explicitation. In my view, the most central point relevant for these two phenomena is the new demarcation between the explicit and the implicit.

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