202 THE STONES OF VENICE
though it requires certain delicate manipulations of paper and acid, and subtle calculations of time, in order to bring out a good result; so, neither would a drawing like a photograph, made directly from nature, be a work of art, although it would imply many delicate manipulations of the pencil and subtle calculations of effects of colour and shade. It is no more art * to manipulate a camel’s-hair pencil, than to manipulate a china tray and a glass vial. It is no more art to lay on colour delicately, than to lay on acid delicately. It is no more art to use the cornea and retina for the reception of an image, than to use a lens and a piece of silvered paper. But the moment that inner part of the man, or rather that entire and only being of the man, of which cornea and retina, fingers and hands, pencils and colours, are all the mere servants and instruments; † that manhood which has light in itself,
* I mean art in its highest sense. All that men do ingeniously is art, in one sense. In fact, we want a definition of the word “art” much more accurate than any in our minds at present. For, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as “fine” or “high” art. All art is a low and common thing, and what we indeed respect is not art at all, but instinct or inspiration expressed by the help of art.
† “Socrates. This, then, was what I asked you; whether that which puts anything else to service, and the thing which is put to service by it, are always two different things?
Alcibiades. I think so.
Socrates. What shall we then say of the leather-cutter? Does he cut his leather with his instruments only, or with his hands also?
Alcibiades. With his hands also.
Socrates. Does he not use his eyes as well as his hands?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. And we agreed that the thing which uses and the thing which is used were different things?
Alcibiades. Yes.
Socrates. Then the leather-cutter is not the same thing as his eyes or hands?
Alcibiades. So it appears.
Socrates. Does not, then, man make use of his whole body?
Alcibiades. Assuredly.
Socrates. Then the man is not the same thing as his body?
Alcibiades. It seems so.
Socrates. What, then, is the man?
Alcibiades. I know not.”
Plato, Alcibiades I. [p. 129].
[Version 0.04: March 2008]