I argue that a revised relativism problem can be advanced against Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism. Our ordinary moral discourse, which quasirealism seeks to explain and justify, includes features like sincerity, moral authority, and a judgement being better than another. I claim that if these are features of our moral discourse, then the quasi-realist must respond to relativism problems. If she does not, then her philosophical programme fails. I argue that Blackburn’s response to two forms of the relativism objection which I call Narrow Truth Relativism and Broad Equality Relativism fail. Nor, I argue, do his replies successfully defend the quasirealist against the revised relativism objection; that the quasi-realist must give a metaethical and not a first order reply to Broad Equality Relativism problems. Finally, I argue for my own theory, Ideal Quasi-Realism, which offers a solution to the revised relativism problem.

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