Away MAVE

The Distance Mode of MA in Values and the Environment at Lancaster University

Block 3: Holistic Environmental Ethics

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NB These materials do not represent the current (05/06) version of this module, and are offered here as only as an additional resource for students of environmental ethics.

	1. What is "holistic environmental ethics"?		2. Leopold: A Sand County Almanac
	3. The animal liberation/ environmental ethics debate		4. Individualist Responses to Holism in Environmental Ethics
	5. Ecosystems writ large: the Gaia hypothesis		6. Reconciling Positions
	6. Summary

What is "holistic environmental ethics"?

Holism, or collectivism, as it is sometimes called in this context, can mean a number of different things and can be interpreted in a variety of ways (and it is in these multiple interpretations that confusions can easily arise). In most general terms - and unsurprisingly! - holists or collectivists focus on wholes or collectives rather than individuals. The first question here, then, must be "what sort of wholes?" Some examples of the possible kinds of wholes are: family, community, society, state and in environmental ethics, species, ecosystem and biosphere. Generally speaking, again, such holism has two strands which are not necessarily related, but which are usually found together:

a) a descriptive strand, where the integrity or cohesion of the whole is emphasised
b) an evaluative strand, where the significance, and in this case the moral significance of the whole is emphasised.

This position contrasts with that of individualists, who often challenge the cohesion of such wholes and (thus) their value. You may remember, for instance, Margaret Thatcher's famous claim that "there is no such thing as society". There are, of course, collections of individuals, she was suggesting; but they do not cohere into a whole which we can talk about as some kind of entity. Sometimes this contrast is expressed in the following way: a collectivist or holist thinks that wholes are more fundamental than their parts, while an individualist thinks that parts are more fundamental than wholes.
An ethical holist will thus argue that wholes are morally considerable; and often that the whole has ethical priority over its parts. In social and political philosophy, this may mean espousing the view that the good of an individual can be sacrificed for the benefit of society. A thoroughgoing individualist would not concede this, maintaining that the individual good should never be sacrificed for, and may need protecting from, society.

So, if that's a sketch of ethical holism, what's holistic environmental ethics? Well, rather than beginning from individual organisms, holistic environmental ethics usually begins from ecosystems, or sometimes as we shall see, with an idea of "the land". Individual organisms are parts of this whole. As part of a whole, they are relatively insignificant. Their significance lies in what they contribute to the whole - their ecological function - rather than on whether they are rational, sentient etc. It is the system, not the individual which is of primary value. Indeed, this emphasis (as we shall see) may mean that some states which are of positive disvalue in many individualistic approaches to ethics are of positive value in holistic ethics - such as suffering and disease.
I want to begin this block by looking at what is often cited as the foundational work in holistic environmental ethics, Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1949) (I am not sure the description of the book as "the bible of the contemporary environmental movement" as it is introduced in the Zimmermann collection would withstand much scrutiny!)

Leopold: A Sand County Almanac

I recommend that you just sit down and read this book in a sitting or two. Far from being an academic tome, A Sand County Almanac is a collection of autobiographical and philosophical essays. It was taken up enthusiastically in the late 1970s and onwards by those who espoused a holistic version of environmental ethics. The most important parts of Leopold's text are reproduced in Zimmerman and form the first reading in this block.

Leopold works with a model, common to ethical writing, of a continually expanding circle of ethical concern. At one time, he suggests, slaves could be viewed as property and treated as one pleased. This is no longer the case. Similarly, he argues, in the past land could be treated how we pleased, and viewed entirely under the aegis of economics. Now, however, Leopold argues, it is time to consider our ethical relationship with the land. He goes on to maintain that what is needed is a new ethic which 'enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land'. His guiding principle is famously expressed 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise'. (These are usually the two sentences which students of environmental ethics remember forever!)
Straightforward though these 13 pages of Leopold's writing may seem, they are in practice anything but. In part, this is due to the unsystematic nature of his writing: he has, as it were, set a number of hares running, but never catches any of them. It is these complications that underpin a number of debates in recent holistic environmental ethics.

Consider the following in your own reading:

1) How does Leopold envisage the place of individuals in his land ethic? He presents it as a principle of ethical extension: human ethics are extended to include the land; the land ethic does not replace human ethics. But what happens where human ethics and the land ethic come into conflict - in the case of high population growth, for instance?
2) What exactly does he mean by saying that humans are "plain members and citizens" "only a member of a biotic team?" Is he suggesting that it's inappropriate for humans to manage land, for instance?
3) This issue is exacerbated by looking at the different models Leopold uses to describe the land. Sometimes he calls it a "fountain of energy"; sometimes a "community" and sometimes an "organism". But these models present quite different pictures of land and human relationships with it. For instance, if "the land" is an organism, are humans then just organs? What might the implications of this be?
4) Leopold several times uses the language of "biotic right" in the context of species he views as key to the survival of ecosystems. But what exactly does he mean by "right" here?
5) On p. 97-98 Leopold raises the idea of land health. This has proved one of the most controversial areas of holistic environmental ethics, as we shall see. Think about what "land health" might mean, and how one might go about making sense of it.
6) What are "integrity, stability and beauty"? How can they be measured? Are they appropriate criteria for assessing ecological right and wrong?

Interpreting Leopold

The interpretation of Leopold has recently become controversial in environmental ethics. J Baird Callicott, whose work we shall shortly be considering, championed Leopold's writing in the 1980s, publishing a collection of essays called Companion to a Sand County Almanac (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press 1987). These essays interpret Leopold as adopting a holistic, non- anthropocentric approach. But more recently Bryan Norton (1996) in his essay "The Constancy of Leopold's Land Ethic" (in Light and Katz (eds.) Environmental Pragmatism (London: Routledge) p. 84-102 argues that whilst Leopold did consider the biotic community to be a organism, he also considered that humans "must and should" manage it; and that ultimately, as parts of the biotic organism, human and biotic interests would coincide.

Whatever one thinks about these different interpretations, Leopold's stress on the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community contrasts strikingly with the individualists we looked at in Block 2. First, the community as a whole, rather than the individual, is the focus of moral significance; it is viewed as valuable in itself, not just as a collection of valuable individuals. Secondly, ecological qualities such as integrity and stability are of primary value. Such qualities cannot be valued in individualist approaches where individual living organisms or their experiences are the whole locus of value.
It is this contrast of holistic with individualist environmental ethics which has led to some of the most controversial publications in environmental ethics - sometimes called the animal liberation/environmental ethics debate (a title adopted for a useful collection of essays on the subject edited by Eugene Hargrove).

Web Resource

A useful site on the land ethic, with tributes to Leopold:
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/LandEthic_Quotes.cfm

Discussion about applying the land ethic today:
http://www.aldo.org/

The Animal Liberation/Environmental Ethics Debate

This debate was kick-started with the publication in 1980 of J. Baird Callicott's paper 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' (originally published in vol 2 of the journal Environmental Ethics, but subsequently reprinted in a number of environmental ethics collections.)
Callicott begins his article by discussing the way in which the animal liberation debate had been set up in the 1970s. He suggests that it had been seen as a debate with two sides: between those who argue that animals lack particular qualities (eg language, rationality, sentience, self-awareness etc) and thus moral standing; and those who argue that animals do have these qualities, and therefore do have moral standing. Callicott characterises this as a debate between moral humanism and humane moralism. But Callicott wants to suggest there's a third position, the land ethic derived from Leopold's writing, which emphasises the importance of the biotic community. And, he maintains, this position is seriously in tension with animal liberation.

Callicott characterises the land ethic as maintaining that the ecological whole is the ultimate measure of moral value. Indeed, the primary human duty is protection of the biotic community or organism as a whole, even where this means considerable human sacrifice. The value of individual organisms lies in their ecological function; and so the well-being of individual organisms should be considered inasmuch as they contribute to the ecological whole. Thus the value of individuals is context dependent, relating to their function and significance in the whole. If they are vital to the ecosystem - members of what are sometimes called "keystone" species - then they are of very high value. If they are not significant to the system, or they are very common, or their role can easily be performed by another organism, or there are too many of them, then their value is much diminished. This implies, for instance, that the value of an individual varies in relation to how many others there are, what it does, and so on.

Thus, the value of rare/functionally vital parts/members can trump the value of common/functionally redundant parts. In the interests of biodiversity, it is more important to protect an individual of an endangered species than an individual of a common species, even if the individual of the endangered species is not sentient, and the individual of the common species is. So, for instance, when the growth in the hungry non-native rabbit population in Western Australia threatens the existence of a rare native Australian wild grass species, the rabbits should be killed to protect the grass. Even where endangered species are not involved, if large numbers of one species (eg deer) are threatening the stability of the ecological community as a whole, then hunting may be required. This remains so even if hunting involves suffering as well as killing. The most essential species (such as the pollinating honey bee) are more important than, for instance, higher mammals which play a far less vital role in the biological community. This clearly reflects on human beings, who are not only not vital to the system, but who actually destroy it. Indeed, Callicott suggested that the more misanthropy there is in an ethical system, the more ecological it is, and that the human population should be, in total, about twice that of bears!
The land ethic also suggests that moral consideration should be given to (some) plants. The ecological community is dependent on plants, insects etc for its flourishing; so they must be taken into account in moral decision-making even where this means hardship/suffering for sentient animals. Obviously this is not true of all plants (not, for instance for alien species which are not important to, or even harmful to the ecosystem). This directly clashes with (for instance) both Singer's and Regan's basis for moral considerability, since neither would understand plants to be sentient nor subject-of-a-life.

These reflections on the land ethic led Callicott into further doubt about ethical individualism in the form of animal liberation. A land ethic, he maintained, recognises the importance of predator/prey relationships, and acknowledges - even celebrates - death, suffering, disease and decay. These are part of the food chain and that which keeps life going. Animal liberationists and utilitarians in general regard pain as the worst bad possible. But pain is essential to the ecological system which could not operate without it. Denial of ecological embodiment (eg discomfort with predation), Callicott argued, denies evolutionary and ethical continuity.
Weighing into animal liberation even more, Callicott argues that the idea of "liberating" domesticated animals is an absurd one anyway. Domesticated animals are human creations - and ecological disasters. Singer's parallel with the liberation of slaves/women etc completely breaks down. Most domestic animals, being unable to survive on their own, would die if liberated. Their species would become extinct. Others might go feral, compete with wildlife and possibly eliminate it, which would be ecologically disastrous.
It is views such as these which led to a rift developing between holistic environmental ethics and the individualistic positions of animal liberationists.

Exercise

You don't really need me to tell you that you should have a go at answering each of these questions and if you get carried away with one particularly or think you have an inventive answer - send it to the discussion site

Some Individualist Responses to Holism in Environmental Ethics

Unsurprisingly, some fairly heated responses to papers such as Callicott's have emerged from individualists, most particularly from Tom Regan. These fall into two broad (but linked) categories:

a) Defending the individual
b) Attacking the idea of holism

a) Defending the individual
Tom Regan in the Case for Animal Rights p. 359-363 famously describes approaches like those of Callicott and Sagoff as environmental fascism. He uses this label because one interpretation of fascism is of a political philosophy willing to sacrifice the individual for the needs of the whole. The land ethic, Regan claims, is an ecological version of this. Furthermore, Regan suggests, presumably these writers intend human beings to be seen as part of the land community or land organism. Separating them off would seem very peculiar for a position which claimed to be ecocentric. But if humans are included in the land community, does this mean that they can be sacrificed for the good of the ecosystem? Can you, Regan asks, allow the good of the community to outweigh an individual's rights? This implies that holistic ethicists would sacrifice a human life for a rare wildflower! Regan argues that the "rights view cannot abide" ecological holism as it draws conclusions so radically opposed to the right to life of those who are subjects-of-a-life, and, further suggests the protection of organisms and non-living things who are not rights-bearers.

b) Attacking holism
A whole range of further questions, which we shall look at briefly in this module, and which will be considered in more depth in the module Land as Community, concern whether an ecosystem (and even more so, a species) can be thought of as 'a whole' at all. Critics have argued that ecosystems cannot be said to have 'better' or 'worse' states, that it is impossible to identify criteria of land health; that qualities such as 'diversity' 'stability' or 'integrity' cannot be fixed on as 'good states' for ecosystems. Ecosystems are constantly in a state of change; it isn't clear what is better or worse for them. But without being able to identify a good state for them, how can it be clear what behaviour towards them is ethical or not, nor when it is appropriate to sacrifice individuals in their interests? Are ecosystems the kinds of thing which can have interests at all?
In order to explore this further, let's look at a more detailed exposition of the land ethic by J.Baird Callicott, and consider some of the claims he makes for it.

The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic

In this article, Callicott moves fast through a wide range of areas and controversial claims, which form planks of his development of the land ethic. The first set of planks concern the evolutionary origin of ethics:

a) Ethics emerged biologically (rather than from God's direction or entirely through reasoning powers).
b) The context of this emergence was as part of natural selection. Bonds of affection between kin and small social groups/communities promoted survival. It was these bonds which led to the development of 'ethical' behaviour.
c) Ethics therefore rest on feelings or sentiments rather than rationality or God
d) Valuing is thus subjective and anthropogenic, the product of human emotion.
Callicott needs to affirm something like this in order to build the rest of his case, which goes something like this.
e) Ethical responses are inextricably linked to communities, since that is the context in which they evolved.
f) What different groups have understood to be their 'community' has varied over time, and thus so has the circle of ethical concern. Recently, in some senses at least, humans have begun to view the whole human world as their 'community' and hence within the circle of moral concern.
g) Knowledge of ecology suggests that humans are not only part of a human community, but also part of an interdependent biological community, in which they are embedded.
h) If more people were ecologically literate and realised this fact, they would recognise the land as their community and respond to it ethically, as Leopold suggests. Evolutionary theory presents us with "a sense of kinship" with fellow creatures; it's appropriate to include them in the sphere of moral concern.

This kind of argument, for Callicott, will serve as the conceptual foundations for the land ethic. It should be noted, though, that this account of the origin of community ethics in evolution is highly controversial.
For much of the rest of this article, Callicott provides arguments as to why the biotic community should be valued as a whole, rather than responded to as a number of individual plants and animals.
On p. 114 he introduces what he calls "the express moral precepts of the land ethic":

"Thou shalt not extirpate or render species extinct; thou shalt exercise great caution in introducing exotic and domestic species into local ecosystems, in extracting energy from the soil and releasing it into the biota, and in damming or polluting water courses; and thou shalt be especially solicitous of predatory birds and mammals".

Two key questions you may want to consider are raised by this:

1) Do these precepts automatically follow from the land ethic?
2) Are they ethical absolutes, or can you think of occasions when following them might itself be unethical?

He goes on to consider how the land ethic can be reconciled with human ethics and concerns for individual non-humans. This involves him in suggesting that we live in what are sometimes called "nested communities" - our families nest in our local communities, which nest in national communities, which nest in biological communities and so on. The ecological community is just one further level of nesting. And it is not new for there to be conflicts between levels, though resolving such conflicts may be "difficult and delicate" Callicott suggests (but his position is modified here from the one he adopted in "Animal Liberation: a triangular affair"!) In fact, Callicott provides us with little to go on at all to resolve such conflicts. Can you think of some kinds of "adjudicating principles" which might help in responding to these conflicts?

Callicott concludes the article with discussion of two further problems. One we have encountered before: is the land ethic anthropocentric, prudential, about human wellbeing? Or is it genuinely non-anthropocentric, thinking of the land as having intrinsic value? You can read Leopold for yourself and come to a view about what Leopold might have thought. In terms of more general formulations of the land ethic, it could be formulated either anthropocentrically or non-anthropocentrically - or combine elements of both, the approach Callicott takes at the end of the article.

The second problem is a troubling one which recurs in myriad forms in environmental ethics, and centres around where humans are to be located in relation to "nature". If humans are to be defined as part of nature, "plain citizens" of it, not superior to it, then where does human morality fit? Other animals don't try to preserve endangered species, or express concern about animal suffering. Yet if humans are defined out of nature, what role do they have? Doesn't this just lend itself to ideas of humans as "apart from" nature, perhaps as superior to it, or as managers of it? You will want to think about this problem in more depth during the course of MAVE.
So far, we've considered holistic ethics in relation to ecosystems. This in itself is tricky, because the dividing line between one ecosystem and another is rarely clear. Thus, it's not surprising that work exists which doesn't begin by dividing ecosystems up, but treats the entire Earth as, if you like, one ecosystem (or sometimes, it is suggested, one organism). James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis is the most well known example of this.

Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofacism

The conceptual foundations paper is helpful for filling out Leopold's germinal idea, but in the updated volume there is a new paper by Callicott that addresses Leopold but also responds to the claims of some individualist responses that concern for wholes is a form of ecofascism.

He begins by outlining the historical/conceptual origins of the land ethic by showing that what Leopold does is take Darwin's explanation of how ethics emerges as an evolution of our behaviour essential for surviving in social groups (Darwin being originally influenced by Hume's idea of natural sentiments) and adds to that idea an ecological twist from the community model of ecologists like Charles Elton. Leopold's approach is unusual because it circumvents many of the developments in ethics, such as social contract theory, and returns to an original, or rather a Humean, strand in Darwin's thinking. Hume did not ignore individual pleasures but did speak up for what he called a "more publick affection". This attention on the whole rather than the parts is what makes the Land ethic work so well for conservation and why it is so widely respected by conservationists, but does it really work as an ethic. Conserving the whole might sometimes require, e.g., culling animals.

A number of writers made the, seemingly obvious, point that the 6 billion human beings alive today are having a devistating effect on the land commnity and so from a land ethic perspective they should have their numbers reduced by killing a large proportion of them. This, they claim amounts to a form of ecofascism.

Think

can you anticipate how Callicott will get around this claim.

basically he does this by pointing out that Leopold, in arguning for an expansion of the ethics we have - the respect we have for humans - expanded to more entities. Concern for the land does not replace concern we have for one another it grows out of it. This, of course, throws up a number of problems regarding prioritising.

Question

Callicott gives an example of prioritising with the 'old-growth forest quandry'.
Does this work? Responses to the discussion site, and please see if you can shape your answer as a response to one already there (of course the first one to reply can start the ball rolling!)

Ecosystems writ large: the Gaia hypothesis

While most of the work in holistic environmental ethics has focused on ecosystems the 'Gaia hypothesis', and the host of metaphysical and ethical questions raised by it, concerns the entire Earth. The 'Gaia hypothesis' originated in the work of scientist James Lovelock in his book Gaia: a new look at life on Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979) and The Ages of Gaia (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982). But perhaps the most concise summary of Lovelock's hypothesis is, found in his paper "Geophysiology - the Science of Gaia" which he presented to the annual conference of the American Geophysical Union in 1988. Here he describes 'Gaia theory' as:

"about the evolution of a tightly coupled system whose constituents are the biota and their material environment, which comprises the atmosphere, the oceans and the surface rocks. Self-regulation of important properties such as climate and chemical composition, is seen as a consequence of this evolutionary process."

So the basis of Lovelock's scientific contention is that the Earth, as a whole, can be described as a living system. The evolution of biological life is coupled inseparably with the evolution of the physical surface of the earth and the chemical composition of the atmosphere. The so-called 'inanimate' parts of the Earth, he argues, are like the bark of a tree or the shell of a snail: an essential part of a living system. Lovelock argues that life on Earth shapes its environment, both the atmosphere and its physical surroundings, in order to maintain conditions comfortable for the continuance of life. The atmosphere and temperature of the Earth are kept, by the living organisms on it, as near to a constant, or in biological terms, to homeostasis, as possible. Where there are external threats to this homeostasis - such as by the impact of huge asteroids which are frequently cited as the cause for several mass extinctions in the history of the planet - living organisms respond by a series of what Lovelock calls 'feedback mechanisms'. As an example of such a mechanism at work, Lovelock points out that since the Proterozoic period, between 1 and 2 billion years ago, the sun has become at least 30% and perhaps 50% hotter. Yet the temperature on Earth has remained relatively constant, and continued to support life. Lovelock contends that the relative constancy of the Earth's temperature is caused by feedback mechanisms operated by Earth's living organisms.

To illustrate this, Lovelock created, in The Ages of Gaia a computer model which he entitles 'Daisyworld'. In its simplest form, Daisyworld is a planet rather like ours, but which has alive on its surface only black and white daisies. Lovelock assumes that these daisies can survive only between temperatures of 5 and 40o C. Below this temperature range, it is too cold for daisies to grow; above it, the climate is too hot. As in our solar system, over millions of years, the heat of the sun slowly intensifies. Initially, when the sun is cooler, black daisies predominate. Being black, they can absorb the sun's heat, and not only keep themselves alive, but retain the overall temperature of the planet at a level above 5C. As the sun gets hotter, however, white daisies, by the process of natural selection, become increasingly common. With their ability to reflect sunlight, they can keep both themselves, and the surface of the planet cooler and at a relatively constant temperature. There will still, of course, come a point where the sun's heat is such that, even with the entire planet covered in white daisies, their reflectivity is not enough to keep the planet viable for life. At this point, the feedback mechanisms cease to function, and Daisyworld becomes a deserted, barren planet. The effect of the living organisms however, purely by natural selection, has been to keep the temperature of the planet between 5 and 40C for a much longer period than would have occurred on a barren planet, which would have been colder initially and passed 40C much sooner.

Although the Earth is, of course, far more complex than Daisyworld, Lovelock contends that similar feedback mechanisms occur. Climate is regulated not only by the reflectivity of the land surface and of clouds, but also by the composition of the atmosphere - an increase in carbon dioxide, for instance, warming the earth by the so-called 'greenhouse effect'. Similar feedback mechanisms act to keep the sea at constant rather than increasing salinity, and oxygen at 21% of the atmosphere, a level high enough for fires (all important in forest ecology) to occur, but not so high that any flame would kindle continental conflagration. For millions of years the Earth has thus responded to external changes such as asteroid impact and increased solar heat by evolutionary processes involving the evolution not only of species but also of their environments.

In this sense, Lovelock contends that the Earth behaves like a single living organism, in that the flora and fauna on Earth act together to regulate the climate and temperature of Earth in order to produce the best conditions for life. (Usually, Lovelock uses the term "organism" metaphorically, but sometimes he writes as if he thinks the earth is actually an organism). Lovelock argues that this regulation of the Earth is not a teleological, or purposive process, and dismisses all suggestions that Gaia might be conscious or have a deliberate aim - something which he argues is borne out by the model of Daisyworld. Thus Lovelock, ostensibly at least, has not himself developed 'Gaia' into a thoroughgoing metaphysical or ethical system, (although periodically, he uses language which suggests this). However, there is no doubt that the Gaia hypothesis can have important ethical implications, although these are dependent on the interpretation of Lovelock's hypothesis which is adopted.

Lovelock himself argues that the Earth is not fragile, and that it has survived many potential crises in the past by adapting to changed conditions. This may mean that the Earth moves to new equilibria, but that life still continues. He suggests that the Earth may have 'vital organs' which, while possibly essential for life on Earth to survive at all, are certainly essential for the Earth to continue at its current equilibrium. These vital organs, he suggests, may be the tropical rainforests, deep sea algae and prokaryotic bacteria. Their destruction could mean that Gaia moves to a new equilibrium; an equilibrium which may support some kind of life, but which would not support human life. With this background, the ethical implications of Gaia are not focused around protecting Gaia herself (she is well able to tend for herself!) but rather on the preservation of human beings from the devastating consequences of a new equilibrium. Therefore, actions that might force Gaia to a new equilibrium - such as global warming by an increase in atmospheric CO2 - should be avoided since it may ultimately lead to the destruction of human beings. This provides an anthropocentric reason for the protection of Gaia, and could support the development of a holistic anthropocentric environmental ethic.

Other groups have, however, developed different ethical conclusions, loosely based on the Gaia hypothesis. These highlight the living organismic nature of the Earth, and, in contrast with Lovelock, stress its fragility. This can result in holistic ethical stances where the 'wellbeing of the planet' is put before the wellbeing of individual human beings. More radical versions of these views argue that a reduction in human population is an ethical necessity. Such plural ethical interpretations make clear the ambiguous position which Lovelock's hypothesis may hold in environmental ethics.

Web Resources

Noel Charlton, one of our Postgraduates has created a resource page on Gaia here

A basic introduction is here

A page that compares interpretations is here

Reconciling Positions

The preceding blocks have described a range of different, and sometimes conflicting, positions adopted by those working in environmental ethics - in particular there seems to be a rift between the individualism of animal liberation positions in contrast with the holism of some environmental ethics. (It should be remembered, however, that there are individualist environmental ethical positions and that animals are still morally relevant to holistic environmental ethics). Several strategies are possible to deal with these concerns. One is just to, as it were, bite the bullet, and maintain either that only individuals or only ecological wholes are of moral significance. We have already looked at a number of philosophers who adopt this view. A second is to develop an approach to environmental ethics which takes both individual and holistic concerns into account in one form or another. A third is to adopt some form of moral pluralism, which I will explain further shortly.

One central environmental philosopher who allows for both individualist and holistic values is Holmes Rolston whose views are laid out in his systematic work Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1988).

Rolston argues that there is objective value in the natural world, both in individuals and in systems. The baseline of individual value is the telos of each individual organism. Every organism has a good of its own, and is thus a holder of value, even if not a beholder of it. To this extent, Rolston's views are not dissimilar to those of Taylor. However, Rolston contends that different characteristics - such as sentience or ability for conscious reflection - add value, so that the more sophisticated a living organism, the more valuable it is. Alongside this individualist approach, Rolston also develops an understanding of intrinsic value applicable to ecosystems and species. Species, he argues, provide the normative genetic 'set' for the individual, and this genetic set is as evidently the property of the species as of the individual through whom it passes. A species is a form of life that defends itself and, according to Rolston, thus has value. The ecosystem, and indeed the biosphere as a whole, is a life-creating process. Ethical attention should be not focused on an ecosystem as an individual, but rather as an interconnected matrix within which life evolved and continues to develop. As the womb of life, both producing and nurturing it, the ecosystem is an appropriate unit for moral concern. It would be bizarre, Rolston insists, to value the organisms, the products of the system, without valuing the process which produced them. This wild, systemic value is entirely separate from human culture, exists independently of humans and is increasingly threatened by human development.

In developing a complex system of this kind, Rolston tries to take account of all the different kinds of concerns which might make up environmental ethics. But other environmental philosophers have concluded that, given the diversity of possible objects of moral concern (sentient animals, living organisms, ecosystems, species, the Earth, biodiversity etc.) and so many different approaches to environmental ethics (rights-theories, utilitarianism, virtues theories and so on) no single ethical approach could be right for every situation. Ethics can't fall into the "one size fits all" category! A series of debates in the environmental ethics journals about "moral pluralism" followed in the 1990s.

Moral Pluralism

What is moral pluralism? Well, that in itself is a tricky question to answer, because it has been defined and interpreted in lots of different ways. Most basically, it means operating with different ethical approaches on different occasions and situations. The clearest paper to use as a starting point here is Wenz's article 'Minimal, Moderate and Extreme Moral Pluralism' in Environmental Ethics 15 1993 p. 61-74.

Wenz argues that moral pluralism may take different forms, and provides his own three-fold classification, distinguishing extreme, moderate and minimal moral pluralism.

a) Extreme moral pluralism -characterised by 'alternations between different ethical theories' - so for instance someone who adopted an extreme view might on some occasions be a utilitarian, on others a Kantian, and so on.
b) Moderate moral pluralism - characterised as being where a single, overarching theory is 'pluralistic in the sense that it contains a variety of independent principles, principles that cannot be reduced to or derived from a single master principle'. This form of pluralism doesn't alternate between ethical theories, but has a plurality of principles which can't be reduced to one another (eg- minimising suffering, maximising the flourishing of ecosystems etc)
c) Thirdly, minimal moral pluralism refers to a moral theory which 'merely lacks a universal algorithmic decision procedure'. By this, Wenz merely means ethical approaches where a there is no definite, single right answer in all situations. (He points out that even utilitarianism, which looks completely unified, might fall into this category since, for instance, two different actions might be calculated to produce the same utility.)

This classification may be helpful in analysing environmental philosophy you are reading - or indeed, in developing your own approach.
Another way of thinking about moral pluralism is in terms of ethical frameworks or matrices that can be brought to bear on different situations. The environmental philosopher Andrew Brennan, for instance, argues that there is no one set of principles concerning just one form of value that provides ultimate government for our actions. Indeed, he maintains that an indefinite number of frameworks can be brought to bear. When we restrict our modes of thinking to just one framework, we thereby choose to ignore the perspective supplied by other relevant frameworks. Like Wenz, Brennan notes that moral pluralism may have different forms: first, the acceptance that different considerations may apply in different cases; and secondly (and more controversially) that in any particular situation, there is no single theoretical lens which provides a privileged set of concepts, principles and structure. Moral pluralism, Brennan argues, allows for exploration of the complexity of ethical issues rather than the imposition of a single ethical framework onto a complex situation.

There are ways in which moral pluralism seems very attractive, given the diverse theories and objects of concern in environmental ethics. But let's pause a moment to think about the possible problems.

Some Questions about Moral Pluralism

1) Can one maintain integrity as a moral agent if one switches between different moral theories when decision-making?
2) How do you decide which framework/theory to adopt in any particular situation? What do you do if two different frameworks/theories clash?
3) Or in the case of moderate moral pluralism, what do you do if different principles clash? Supppose you thought avoiding killing was a key principle, and so was ecosystem health; and you had a soaring deer population undermining the health of the ecosystem? Would you adopt a hierarchy of principles where one trumped the other? If so, would the hierarchy always be the same, or might it vary in different cases? Or would you try to find a practice, however difficult it was, that didn't cross either principle?
4) Doesn't moral pluralism provide an opportunity for you to choose the moral theory/framework you wanted anyway? (for extreme moral pluralism if a utilitarian approach doesn't come up with the answer you want, could you switch to being a Kantian for the day?)
Undoubtedly, moral pluralism raises problems. Yet at the same time, pluralist approaches to environmental ethics try to be context-sensitive, open-ended, and prepared to engage with the profound complexities of making ethical decisions. They acknowledge the impossibility of producing clear-cut answers in many ethical situations - especially when considering the difficult ethical questions engendered by human relations with the non-human world.

Last exercise for this block
When you have some rough answers to questions 1-4 above develop an argument using your own example (environmental or other) to persuade someone that your answer to either question 1 or 2 is the right one. For example, if you think someone can maintain integrity whilst applying different theories depending on the circumstances then outline a situation where this is being done (can be a thought experiment not real life).
Send your example and argument to the discussion site to see if you can convince your peers

Web Resource

As ever, the useful Ethics Updates page has some interesting papers on moral pluralism. See:
http://ethics.acusd.edu/metaethics.html

Summary of Block 3

This block introduced:

1) The idea of holistic environmental ethics as ethics where ecological wholes such as ecosystems and species are seen as morally considerable - sometimes of more value than the individuals which constitute them.
2) Aldo Leopold's land ethic, and his ideas of an expanding moral circle to the creation of a land ethic where 'a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the land community; it is wrong as it tends otherwise'.
3) The dispute between ethical individualists and holists, focusing on Callicott's paper 'Animal Liberation: a triangular affair' in which he argues - amongst other things - that individual organisms are only valuable with respect to their role in ecosystems, that animal liberation is nature-denying and that domesticated animals can't be liberated anyway. We also considered some individualist responses to such holistic positions, including Regan's accusation of environmental fascism.
4) Callicott's own construction of the land ethic including the evolutionary origin of ethics and the association of value with the community, including the ecological community.
5) Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis - the idea of the ecosystem writ large, but with a variety of different possible ethical interpretations, both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric
6) Ways of reconciling all these different approaches, including systems which take individuals and systems into account (like that of Holmes Rolston) and different interpretations of moral pluralism.

To complete this block make sure that you have responded to some of the exercises by sending a respond to the discussion site