MAVE Dissertation,
Lancaster University 2001

Social Ecology and Feminism:
Can Socialist Ecofeminism be the Answer?

Megan Salhus

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2	
2. Overview of Feminisms	4	
2.1 Essentialism	4	
2.2 Liberal feminism	5	
2.3 Cultural/Radical Feminism	6	
2.3.1 Problems with Cultural/Radical Feminism	8	
2.4 Marxist Feminism	9	
2.5 Socialist Feminism	10	
3. Overview of Social Ecology	13	
3.1 Problems with Social Ecology	15	
4. Feminist Critiques of Social Ecology	17	
5. Introduction to Ecofeminism	22	
5.1 Cultural Ecofeminism	23	
5.2 Marxist ecofeminism	25	
5.3 Socialist Ecofeminism	26	
6. Socialist Ecofeminism Answers	28	
7.  Arguments Against the Ecofeminist Position	30	
7.1 Spirituality	30	
7.2 Essentialism	31	
7.3 Non-inclusion	32	
7.4 Biological Determinism	33	
8. Social Ecofeminist Responses	35	
8.1 Spirituality	35	
8.2 Essentialism	37	
8.3 Non-inclusiveness	39	
8.4 Biological Determinism	39	
9. Conclusion	41	
Bibliography	43	

Introduction

In this work, I would like to examine the debate between the fields of feminism and social ecology regarding the need or desire for the separate endeavour of ecofeminism.  The evolution of all three bodies of theory is relatively recent, with ecofeminism being the youngest member of the trio.  This is an important debate because ecofeminist theory claims that gender oppression and the oppression of nature are intimately interlinked.  I will argue that if the feminist and the social ecology fields fail to communicate and disregard the connections drawn by ecofeminism, due to a myopic focus on early ecofeminist writings, then the resolution of humanity’s conflict between itself and the non-human world will remain an unrealisable goal.  Thus I will defend ecofeminism, and socialist ecofeminism particularly, against irrelevancy, against charges of strong essentialism, biological determinism, and non-inclusiveness, and will defend a role for strategic spirituality within the ecofeminism movement.

To this end, I will give an overview of feminist theory (Section 2), and of social ecology (Section 3), and then pinpoint some of the feminist concerns with social ecology, in Section 4.  Following this, I will introduce ecofeminist theories and try to show why socialist ecofeminism is the most likely to have a satisfactory response to the lack of feminist analysis in social ecology and the lack of ecological awareness and plans in feminist theory (Section 5).  In Section 6, I will outline the basic responses of socialist ecofeminism to the weaknesses of feminism and social ecology, and then in Sections 7 and 8 address four sets of arguments against ecofeminism and the socialist ecofeminist responses to them.  I conclude (Section 9) that socialist ecofeminism, because of its commitment to historical materialism, avoids the pitfalls of strong essentialism and biological determinism, and through its socialist base is inclusive of all races, classes and genders, and succeeds where feminism fails because of its focus on ecological reform.

2. Overview of Feminisms

2.1 Essentialism
As I will be referring to essentialism at some length within this paper, I will provide here a short definition of the concept.  Following Andrew Sayer, “essentialism is generally taken to be the doctrine that objects have certain essential properties which make them one kind of thing rather than any other”.  Essentialism has become somewhat of a dirty word in academic discourse because of its negative associations with the various “ism’s” of sexism, racism, etc.  Sayer later distinguishes between strong and moderate essentialism, a distinction which I think is crucial in the scope of the debate which I am considering here.  Strong essentialism is characterised by homogenisation and often by idealisation of the object (thus for example, an oppressed group such as women are characterised as being vacuous and vain, while simultaneously being raised up for their supposedly universal abilities of nuturance – thereby denying differences between individual women, and even to a large extent denying the possibility of there even being individual women).  Moderate essentialism, in contrast, says only that some things have essences (for example, water having the essence of the chemical formula of H2O, but also some institutions and other social entities) and other things, such as gender, do not.  Moderate essentialism can incorporate difference among individuals because it claims only that there are some features which are common to the objects in questions, not that all features are the same.  I will later argue that strong essentialism is not a necessary characteristic of ecofeminism, though some degree of moderate essentialism can and perhaps should be present in a theory which attempts to guide policy.
2.2 Liberal feminism
Over the last century and a half, women have been demanding that their status in society be critically examined.  Initially this was accomplished by challenging the popular (male) opinion that women were categorically unsuitable for public life.  Women were viewed as being primarily emotional rather than rational, and their nurturing qualities, while excellent for the purposes of domestic labour, were not considered appropriate for participation in the public realm.  Early feminists countered these claims by showing that women as well as men have the capacity for rational thought, discourse and deed.  In this characterisation of women, liberal feminism is moderately essentialist, in much the same way as society at large is (and continues to be) essentialist regarding the innate qualities and abilities of at least white able-bodied males, if not males in general.  Early feminists were characterised, therefore, by a commitment to the status quo, but with the modification of “women are people too”.  Liberal feminism to this day uses this approach to attain full civil autonomy for women.  Liberal feminism, as with liberal politics in general, is committed to capitalism as the economic mode of choice, because only capitalism allows individual freedom to contract out one’s abilities, be they financial, physical or mental.  As such, liberal feminism, to the extent to which it is concerned with environmental problems, advocates a market-based strategy for resolution.  Following Alison Jaggar, there are three other main strands of feminism to date, in addition to liberal feminism.  These are traditional Marxist feminism, radical (or cultural) feminism and socialist feminism.  In her book, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, Jaggar examines each of the four types of feminism in turn, and concludes that socialist feminism is the most promising, though at the time of her writing, she felt that socialist feminism was perhaps more of an idea than a reality.  I will give a brief overview of cultural and Marxist feminism and Jaggar’s criticisms thereof, before turning my attention to socialist feminism.

2.3 Cultural/Radical Feminism
Cultural feminism is characterised by a return to some of the traditionally reviled (by men) areas of female activity.  It is often strongly essentialist in its descriptions of women and fails to recognise that there are fundamental differences in the types and means of oppression suffered by women of different races, sexual orientations and economic status.  However, a moderately essential addendum to cultural feminism could be that there are some fundamental characteristics shared by women in their separate oppressions.  Allison Jaggar defines oppression as "a result of human agency, humanly imposed restrictions on people's freedom...oppression must also be unjust".  Cultural feminists argue that even if there are superficial differences in societies, all societies meet the above criteria in terms of their characteristic treatment of women.  While the strong essentialist claim that all women are the same in their oppressed status is not defensible, I think that the moderate essentialist claim that there are common features to the experience of women the world over has merit.  I will be discussing further arguments for and against essentialism in the context of ecofeminism in Sections 7.2 and 8.2 below.

Cultural feminism is also often characterised by biological determinism, that is, by a viewpoint which regards the traditional abilities of women to be innate in their biology, rather than as a result of socialisation.  I would like to distinguish here between biological determinism and essentialism.  Biological determinism is a sub-category of essentialism, in that it refers only to biological abilities or traits that are necessary for a living being to be categorised as a specific type of creature.  Thus, an essentialist claim regarding being human may be that one carries a human genome, but a biological determinist claim may be that as a result of the specific genetic complement (such as carrying two X chromosomes as opposed to an X and a Y chromosome), certain behaviour is predestined and unalterable.  As a result of biological determinist beliefs, many cultural feminists have advocated a separatist policy; because if the traits of men and women are biologically determined, then there is little point in trying to reform the repressive and oppressive attitudes of men (as these are predestined by their possession of a Y chromosome), and therefore it is more efficient to simply disassociate oneself from men entirely.  Some radical feminists have gone so far as to say that all heterosexual intercourse (whether consensual or otherwise) is rape, because of the underlying, pervasive means of domination over women which are perpetuated in our culture’s sexual mores.  As such, many radical feminists advocate at least political, if not physical lesbianism.  Other varieties of cultural feminism advocate a more spiritual approach to life, invoking ancient female-centred practices such as Wicca and goddess worship, in place of detrimental patriarchal mainstream religions such as Christianity and Islam.  Overall, cultural and radical feminists call for a re-evaluation of the nature and value of “women’s work” and a subsequent change in predominant opinion regarding the contributions of women to society.  

2.3.1 Problems with Cultural/Radical Feminism
Because cultural feminism has exerted a strong influence on ecofeminist theory, I would like to consider some of the major problems associated with this body of theory.  Some problems with cultural feminism lie in its essentialist approach.  Socialist and liberal feminist politics have worked very hard in the last two decades in particular to problematise “the woman question”.  This has taken the form of questioning the basis for sexual stereotyping, challenging “the feminine” and actively creating a space for alternative conceptions – the inclusion of lesbian, black and third world feminisms have been particularly important.  Women, on this view, are socialised to be women, therefore there is no such category of “women” outside of patriarchal society.  As such, appealing to such a construct seems regressive and possibly harmful to the overall goal of the emancipation of women.  Cultural feminism is seen as embracing patriarchal stereotypes too easily and thereby to be undermining this progress.,  However, it is important to realise that the reversal of value dualities which is often endorsed by cultural feminists is meant to serve a specific political function.  By lifting up that which has been degraded and backgrounded (to use Val Plumwood’s term), cultural feminists aim to restore (or create) confidence in real-life women.  While this approach may have difficult theoretical implications, it is still effective in motivating people.  

Another difficulty with the cultural/radical feminist position is that separatist politics, while they may be necessary initially in order to provide a safe and encouraging atmosphere for women to air their thoughts and views, is ultimately self-defeating, because it does not induce the rest of society to change.  Given current capitalist structures, it is difficult if not impossible for women-run, decentralised, separatist businesses, residences, etc., to stay open or be commercially viable (even if a given co-operative is not run for profit, the rent on the building must still be paid, the workers must still be paid in order for them to eat, etc.).  Also, the radical feminist position on heterosexuality is unlikely to be attractive to the majority of “successfully” socialised women, thereby possibly alienating the very contingency whose co-operation and support is necessary for separatist politics at all.  Thus practically speaking, cultural/radical feminism is unlikely to be a widely accepted political strategy.

2.4 Marxist Feminism
Marxist feminism comes from an entirely different strand of political thought.  This variety of feminism takes the Marxist method of historical materialism to argue that the roles of women in capitalist society are a result of a dialectical process through the ages, which have encouraged the development of certain traits in women and in men.  As such, Marxist feminists claim that biology is gendered as well as sexed.  Marxist feminists are also highly critical of capitalist means of production because they associate the domination of women by men with the domination of workers by capitalists.  As such, the route to emancipation for women is the emancipation of the workers and a change in the means of production.  Marxist feminists do not engage with the characterisation of the worker, however, and generally focus on the role of women in production.  Neither does it necessarily engage with the role of so-called reproductive work (which is done largely by women), and in doing so may conceal a subtle misogyny.  Marxist thought is moderately essentialist in its claims regarding the universal oppression of the worker under capitalism and Marxist feminism follows mainstream Marxist theory in being moderately essentialist in its characterisation of the nature of the oppression of women.  It is not, however, strongly essentialist, due to its commitment to historical materialism.  As a socially-oriented project, Marxist feminism seems to have greater potential than liberal or cultural/radical feminism as a type of politics which can appeal to a broad range of women.  I will be considering possible objections and proposed solutions to Marxist feminist problems in the following section, in the context of socialist feminism.

2.5 Socialist Feminism
Jaggar maintains that the weaknesses of Marxist feminism are addressed by socialist feminism.  Socialist feminism, because of its commitment to addressing the social causes of domination and oppression, incorporates the best of Marxist feminism.  It retains the historical materialist perspective, which allows it to avoid accusations of (strong) essentialism, but critically examines the Marxist ideal of a worker.  Socialist feminism has shown that for traditional Marxists, the worker is in fact white, male and generally employed in the heavy industrial sector.  This ideal of a worker is hardly appropriate for addressing the concerns of women, which in our society generally include considerations of childcare, sick-leave for the care of dependants, domestic labour and other sexually defined tasks, as well as the well known problems associated with the capitalist workplace.  In addition, socialist feminist analysis shows how it is women who are systematically oppressed for the operation of capitalist society, even more than the male worker, because of three separate, but interlocking reasons.  Firstly, women are systematically paid less than male workers (this is true even today, as it is primarily women who are employed in marginal, part-time and benefitless jobs, such as clerical work, domestic help, and the various care professions, and still today receive lesser wages than men in the same positions in many fields).  Historically this was due to men needing to be paid a “family wage” as they were the primary breadwinners for families.  Today, this no longer holds true in much of the Western world, but the work that women do (which, especially regarding the clerical “industry” is essential for business to run in the information age) is still paid less, which has an added benefit for capitalism in that it tends to drive overall wages down.  Secondly, women are needed for sexual titillation of male workers, so that male workers’ minds are taken off the frustrations which are inherent in capitalist means of production.  Thirdly, women serve (generally outside of the paid labour force) as an outlet for the frustration and alienation of male workers through violence: rape, domestic battery, etc.  Thus, as Nancy Fraser argues, “male domination is intrinsic to capitalism, not accidental, and the institutional structure of this social formulation is actualised by gendered roles.”  Socialist feminism also examines the role of the family in the oppression of women and makes the observation that the nuclear family is a nexus for capitalist exchange and power-brokering and as such, will need to be critically deconstructed if a revolutionary society which is also free of the male dominance of women is to be achieved.  

In addition, socialist feminism critically examines the distinction between production and reproduction which is fundamental to the Marxist argument.  Socialist feminism shows that much of what is regarded as reproductive work actually involves many if not all of the elements of productive work, and that its conceptualisation  should therefore be addressed in any formulation of a revolutionary strategy (a recommendation which has proved notoriously difficult to attain in revolutionary circles, often prompting the formation of separate women’s movements in order to place feminist concerns on the revolutionary agenda).  Furthermore, the distinction may well have to be abolished altogether in order to attain true emancipation of the worker – both in the home and in the capitalist arena.  Socialist feminism is committed to an ideal of the human which is not gendered, but based on the abilities of individual people.  Ann Ferguson characterises this non-gendered ideal as gynadry, switching the traditional ordering so as to emphasise the transvaluation of traditional gender roles that will need to be accomplished in order to attain an equal society.  She emphasises, however, that because of reproductive activities, sex is likely to remain a more important indicator of individuality than other means (such as race).  Nonetheless, Ferguson believes that her conception is different from the traditional “equal but different” gender dualism.  I will consider possible objections to the socialist feminist position at length later in the paper.

3. Overview of Social Ecology

Social ecology is a doctrine which has been largely elucidated by the anarcho-communist, Murray Bookchin.  Bookchin has been involved in what can be termed the environmental movement since the early 1950’s, when he first published works on food additives.  Later moving into the nuclear protest movement, Bookchin finally produced what is still considered his main treatise on social ecology, The Ecology of Freedom, in 1982.  A revised version was brought out in 1991, in which the main change was a refutation of his earlier accolades for the then newly-emerging ecofeminism.  As this is the only major change in the new addition (and occurs not in the text itself, but in the introduction), I will be using the first edition in my examination of social ecology.  Social ecology is a plan for a new type of human community, with a new relationship with the non-human world.  Its inspiration stems from the widespread ecological disasters which seem to be a result of modern capitalist society’s attachment to economic growth, and the fetishisation of commodities as the means to human happiness.  Much of Bookchin’s work relies on the insights of Marx and Engels, in terms of dialectical relationships between humans, modes of production and the non-human world.  However, departing from traditional Marxism, Bookchin places the blame for current ecological disasters not only at the door of capitalism, but in the very nature of western civilisation;  namely, the fact that our society is organised in terms of nesting hierarchies, in which the old dominate the young, men dominate women, capitalists dominate workers, and the State bureaucracy dominates everyone, and humanity as a whole (at least in Western civilisation) dominates the non-human world.  Thus he sees the salvation of the non-human world, and indeed the salvation of humanity, to be found in the dissolution of hierarchical ties as such.  The ideal society, for Bookchin, is one in which democracy is direct, communities are at human-scale (an idea which he bases on the Greek polis), means of production are common, and work is not toil, but satisfying, fulfilling labour, in which mental and physical labour are not separated out as they are in centralised production (in both capitalist economies, and centralised socialist communities).  Bookchin claims that social ecology has its origins in humanity’s initial awareness of its own sociality – “not merely as a cognitive dimension of epistomology but as an ontological consociation with the natural world.”  By this Bookchin means that social ecology has its inspiration in the relationship which ancient communities had with the natural world; a relationship in which nature was an active partner in human society rather than being “mummified and muted” as in modern society.  In the ecological community of the future, relations between people and non-human nature will more closely resemble relations in what Bookchin calls “organic communities” – communities from the distant past which were characterised by a sexual division of labour and by the absence of hierarchy.  Bookchin’s unexamined acceptance of the sexual division of labour has been the cause of some feminist opposition, a position which I will cover more deeply in Section 4 below.  Ecological communities will also be characterised by a transformation of a wealth of things (which is the defining characteristic of our own civilisation) to a wealth of culture and individuality.
3.1 Problems with Social Ecology
As a utopian vision, social ecology has a few flaws.  The most fundamental of these is the lack of attention which Bookchin pays to the role of gender-based oppression in his model society, and the fact that this oppression underlies many of the characteristic features of modern society.  While Bookchin obviously isn’t endorsing the current status quo, he fails to provide a means for accomplishing the revolutionary utopia which will not incorporate the current androcentric bias.  Indeed in the introduction to The Ecology of Freedom, Bookchin states specifically that his work is meant to provoke thought on the part of the reader, not provide a sort of fait accompli which will provide a blueprint for the new world.  This notwithstanding, I believe that it is insufficient to simply claim that a, b, and c must be accomplished in order for humanity’s survival, without making at least a preliminary effort to describe how this might be done.  For example, a cornerstone of social ecology is small, human-scale communities, but Bookchin neither provides means for how to dismantle current cities which he despises, such as Los Angeles and other North American megalopolises, nor how to create new communities based on alternative technologies, when the rest of the world is not apparently ready for the transition.  For the same reason that radical feminist communes which require separatist policies find it difficult to succeed in capitalist society, so too do I think that prototype ecological communities will find it difficult to maintain themselves without an overarching network of many other such communities.  But, it seems naive to believe that these self-organised and democratic communities will simply spring up like mushrooms and topple the bureaucracies which run our nations.  Insofar as the realisation of goals is a problem for most utopian visions, perhaps social ecology should not be singled out, but nonetheless I think it would be valuable to pay a greater degree of attention to the nuts and bolts of the transition to the new society.

4. Feminist Critiques of Social Ecology

There are a number of critiques of the social ecology position which have been elucidated by feminists.  Notably, social ecology does not critically examine the nature of the prototype “organic” community on which much of Bookchin’s analysis rests.  Organic society, according to Bookchin, was non-hierarchical, and characterised by a sexual division of labour.  He is quick to point out that the division of labour at this time in history did not entail an atmosphere of domination, nor was it an example of hierarchy.  Rather, he maintains that it was formed of necessity, given the material scarcity of life in prehistory.  As such, the two spheres of sexually divided labour were complementary and each member of the community was prized for the contribution which she or he made.  As Noël Sturgeon has pointed out, Bookchin does not examine what “the implications of seeing the gendered division of labour as socially constructed [are] for his vision of a social ecological society”.  To put it more bluntly:  Why should women have been assigned, or accepted, the (domestic) roles to which he assigns them?  There is nothing logically necessary about women (and only women) doing what we now call domestic work.  Certainly, mothers with infants would have been unable to participate in hunting activities (at least for large animals), but I can see no prior reason why some women, at least, would not have formed warrior societies, thereby blurring the neat sexual division of labour.  Bookchin himself, in one paragraph maintains that “the physical differences between men and women clearly produce different sex-related capacities, at least in materially underdeveloped societies”, yet the following page, criticises the notion of “innate differences”.  Internal contradiction is problematic enough, but even more, Bookchin does not draw on the socialist feminist insight of the socially constructed nature of gender, and hence, given his own roots in socialist theory, fails to follow his theory through to its own logical conclusion.  This conclusion, I contend, should be that even in organic society, there was a socially constructed gender, which contained the seeds (even if not the day to day reality, at that time) of domination of women, and as such, the use of organic society as a model for new ecological societies will have the same problem, from a feminist perspective, because it will perpetuate the disadvantages of women.  Bookchin at times seems to recognise that the organic society held the beginnings of hierarchical relations, but at the same time, does not seem to recognise that it is therefore a flawed model.  It is necessary to emphasise that the category of “women” is problematic in feminist theory generally.  Feminists (especially socialist feminists) in the last quarter century have been very careful to point out that “woman” as a socially constructed identity does not have any necessary characteristics.  Rather, any individual person (presumably carrying two X chromosomes) has had her identity shaped by various forces of interlocking oppressions and privileges, depending on which sector of the world and society she was born in:  racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, etc.  In formulating a theory which does not address the socially constructed nature of “women’s” abilities and mothering qualities and women generally, Bookchin simply does not engage with a large body of theoretical feminist work.

Ynestra King, a theorist-activist who was initially closely involved with the social ecology project, has left in order to clarify and emphasise the difficulties which social ecology has with feminist perspectives.  Many of the “second-wave” feminisms have emphasised a spiritual approach to life, drawing on ancient traditions of earth-worship, Goddess worship and the traditions of Wicca.  While King herself is not overtly in favour of spiritual approaches, she and other theorists have recognised that spirituality may have an important role in the consciousness-raising activities of feminist activism.  Bookchin, on the other hand, has made scathing remarks towards any ecological or social theory which espouses any sort of spirituality, while again maintaining in his own writing that part of the problem with modern capitalist society is that it has despiritualised work and nature.  This can be clarified, I think, by an appeal to Joel Kovel’s interpretation of Bookchin’s work, in which he shows that Bookchin has two narratives:  the overtly dialectical social ecology thread, and a second, hidden, messianic thread in which any theory other than Bookchin’s must be rejected out of hand.  Using this interpretation, a feminist ecological vision which allows a place for spirituality must be rejected by Bookchin, as it is not incorporated within his own vision as and such becomes a threat to the messianic nature of his own social ecology.  Chris Cuomo has argued that while many spiritual practices can be strongly essentialist in their appeal to women and nature and supposed connections between them, has also argued that spirituality may play a very important role in motivating women to become part of a feminist struggle for emancipation from oppression (in all of its forms).  For feminisms to be successful, actual women must be involved, and denying a role for spirituality, which for many women has proved empowering, may alienate the very women that are needed.  As Sarah Begus has noted, “theory without practice quickly becomes irrelevant to women’s lives, while practice without the benefit of rigorous theoretical analysis can become parochial and myopic, oblivious to critical issues of history and social situation”.  Thus, while some element of spirituality is possibly necessary for the practice of feminist activism, it is important for feminist theorists to maintain a critical eye on the types and manifestations of spirituality and subject them to deconstruction as necessary, in order to expose possible negative connotations with patriarchal structures.  From a feminist perspective then, the outright rejection of any form of spirituality, be it a deep ecology transcendental self, a cultural ecofeminist earth worship, or a traditional practice of Wicca, is a flaw in social ecology, which may reflect an unconscious androcentric bias against emotion and connectivity with others.  Given Bookchin’s avowed distaste for any spiritual activity not expressly outlined in social ecology theory, his position is therefore especially lacking from a feminist-activist point of view.

A third argument against social ecology, which is not solely a feminist critique, is the problem of exactly how a society is to be managed without any sort of hierarchy.  Some forms of hierarchy (which are not necessarily characterised by domination) seem to be necessary, such as the relationship of a parent and child.  As Joel Kovel puts it “perhaps the little ones can be put in an autonomously run nursery, where they may learn the joys of freedom, preparing their own food and putting themselves to bed at night without anybody telling them what to do”.  It is perhaps necessary for Bookchin to address the nature of hierarchy more carefully, and possibly define (undesirable) hierarchy along similar lines to Jaggar's definition of oppression: “hierarchy is a specific form of domination in which those on the upper side unjustly deprive those on the lower side autonomy and self-determination by unfairly restricting their freedom.” Redefining hierarchy in this manner could avoid accusations such as those of Joel Kovel, because presumably a good parent-child relationship would not involved unjustly restricting the freedom of the child, but rather restricting its freedom so as to protect it – a goal which most people would find admirable.

5. Introduction to Ecofeminism

Ecofeminism has its roots in the feminist movements, but has evolved to become a separate entity.  It is reasonable to ask just why it is that there is thought to be any connection at all between ecology and feminism, or between nature and women.  I want to address this question briefly before I introduce the main strands of ecofeminism.  Karen Warren has outlined eight different sorts of connections which ecofeminists have found between women and nature.  These are:  1) historical connections (such as those identified by Carolyn Merchant regarding Baconian scientific thought and Enlightenment views), 2) conceptual connections (value dualisms and hierarchies, patriarchal world views, and conceptual sex-gender differences), 3) empirical and experiential connections (such as disproportionate environmental burdens borne by women, or alternatively cultural and spiritual ties to the earth which are celebrated by women), 4) symbolic connections (either those offering alternative spiritualities celebrating life-affirming traits of women and their relationship to the earth, or negative ones showing how the association of nature with women has led to environmental degradation when and where male-female relations are poor), 5) epistemological connections (critiques of dualistic epistemologies and Enlightenment rationalism), 6) political/praxis connections (grassroots protests involving women in animal rights, environmental degradation, etc., campaigns), 7) ethical connections (the development of ethical theories regarding humanity and non-human nature which are not male-biased, such as care ethics, kinship ethics and animal rights positions) and finally 8) theoretical connections (involving raising connections between women and nature and existing theoretical frameworks).  Whether or not one accepts all of these alleged connections, it seems to me that the identification of even some of these warrants closer attention on the part of theoreticians of environmental philosophy, and on the part of activists in the environmental and feminism movements.  Particularly pertinent to the discussion here are 1), 3), 6) and 7), because of their focus on the social aspects of human relations with the non-human world, and 4) is a very contentious proposal, the ramifications of which I will consider in detail in Sections 7.1 and 8.1 below.  Bearing these justifications for the ecofeminist project in mind, I will now turn to the discussion of prevalent ecofeminist positions.  Ecofeminism can be separated into three broad categories:  cultural ecofeminism, Marxist ecofeminism, and social or socialist ecofeminism.  While these categories do not map exactly onto Jaggar’s analysis of mainstream feminisms, I find the separation to be a useful tool for teasing out the differences between the various types of ecofeminism action and theory which have proliferated in recent years.  I will later argue (Sections 6, 7, and 8) that socialist ecofeminism addresses current human/non-human relations and offers a powerful alternative to current androcentric practices.

5.1 Cultural Ecofeminism
Cultural ecofeminism carries on the tradition of the radical feminism of Jaggar’s description.  Cultural ecofeminists include authors such as Susan Griffin, Charlene Spretnak and Starhawk, and many of the actions planned by, and participated in, by ecofeminists draw on the work of these authors.  Traditional academic feminism, however, has been loath to have its accomplishments and work associated with this sector of ecofeminism, because of accusations of essentialism and of lack of theoretical rigour.  While I have sympathy with this reaction, I must agree with Noël Sturgeon and with Chris Cuomo that essentialist approaches have merit in terms of their ability to motivate real people to action.  It is, however, very important that such approaches be subject to critical deconstruction so that any potentially harmful aspects can be brought to light and excised as necessary.  Thus, there can be a symbiotic relationship between cultural ecofeminist activism and theory, although this can only happen if academic feminists do not insist upon distancing themselves.  Cultural ecofeminism is a strong motivator for people interested in women’s empowerment, activism and the environment, and has served as an umbrella movement for many diverse people to come together.  Essentialist criticisms of cultural ecofeminism are against its claims (by some authors, at least) of there being a basic woman and a basic nature, and their supposed connection through some (not necessarily well-theorised) bond in a way that men are not.  These claims are problematic for the same reason that radical feminist claims were/are problematic, because of concerns of exclusion (and potential discrimination) on racist, heterosexist and classist grounds.  Because many well-known authors in cultural ecofeminism are white, middle-class American women, these accusations are important.  But, a certain level of essentialism is necessary in order for there to be identity politics at all (in other words, if no one can claim membership of a broad category such as women, because of other considerations of class, sexual preference, and race, then it becomes nigh impossible to have political action for “rights for women” etc.).  Thus, academic-activists such as Julie Cook and Maria Mies argue that over-academisation of ecofeminism (and possibly feminism as well) runs the risk of sterilising the movement and removing its radical social potential.

5.2 Marxist ecofeminism
Marxist ecofeminism takes the main insights regarding the interconnectedness of social class, capitalist production, and oppression, from Marxism, and the feminist realisation that women are historically-materially the global proletariat, and adds to this the idea that the domination and exploitation of nature is an extension of these other systems of oppression.  In so doing, Marxist ecofeminism calls for the elimination of discrimination against non-human nature so as to pave the way for a more equal society in which oppression of women, diverse races and cultures is abolished and a society-nature balance is achieved.  However, I think that Marxist ecofeminism falls prey to the same kind of deep androcentrism as Marxist feminism does -- namely that Marxist theory is simply not primarily concerned with the “woman question”, but with capitalist worker relations, and is therefore not predisposed to dealing with the woman question as anything other than a side concern.  Interestingly, Marxist ecofeminist Ariel Salleh views Marxist ecofeminism as being more able to surmount latent androcentrism than socialist ecofeminism.  This may be due more to her identification with Marxist dialectical historical materialism, which Jaggar views as being more closely adhered to by the socialist feminist proponents.  Thus the discrepancy may be due to a labelling difference, rather than a difference in actual policy.  The other difficulty with a commitment to Marxism as such is the political lack of success of organised socialism, and of the methods that are traditionally used by Marxist-Leninist groups.  The vanguard group mentality approach to revolution does not sit well with the integration of many strands of concern; including ecological, feminist, worker, anti-capitalist, etc., into one powerful movement.
5.3 Socialist Ecofeminism
Thirdly, there is social, or socialist ecofeminism.  The ecofeminist tradition which has retained the social, economic and class awareness of the multiple causes of oppression is the social, or socialist strand.  I believe that the dialectical historical materialism appealed to by Salleh is more closely approximated by socialist ecofeminism than by Marxist ecofeminism.  Historical materialism allows the observation that while in society today, women, depending on their geo-socio-economic-racial status, may have a closer connection with nature, this is socially constructed.  As such, socialist ecofeminism does not fall prey to essentialist claims, nor is it bound to the exclusion of men.  As a socially-constructed awareness, connection to and concern for nature can be taught and learned by women and men in different socio-economically privileged states.  Thus, as Lynne Segal, a socialist feminist, states “Neither ‘woman’ nor ‘man’, then, is consistently connected with ‘nature’.”  I believe that socialist ecofeminism therefore has great potential in uniting some very diverse strands of anti-capitalism.  Socialist ecofeminism does not privilege one sort of oppression over another, but recognises that the four pillars upon which modern capitalism rests (racism, naturism, sexism and classism), are intimately intertwined such that one cannot be designated the “prime” problem.  In do doing, socialist ecofeminism has the potential to unite sufficient followers to actually accomplish something politically.  

Socialist ecofeminist writing has quite a bit of utopian appeal as well.  Through its socialist roots and ecological focus, socialist feminist societies bear a great deal of resemblance to Bookchin’s ecological communities, except that socialist ecofeminist analysis makes plain the mechanisms by which various forms of oppression will not be perpetuated in the new society.  Through workers solidarity and control over decentralised means of production, socialist ecofeminism can overcome the classist and economic bugbears, and through explicit attention to the synergy between oppression of women and racism, the new feminist ecological community will be characterised by rotation of menial and mental tasks (thereby eliminating any residual associative racial or sexual tensions), childcare will be taken care of by all, on a rotating basis, incorporating children as responsible members of society from the age of ten, and through education and appropriate technology, ecological balance between human and non-human will be achieved.  I think that it is important to point out that the type of socialist ecofeminism which I am advocating here is not the kind of centralised, planned socialism which has recently become unglued in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Germany, and increasingly, China.  Where these socialist experiments were characterised by the vanguard group technique I mentioned above while discussing Marxist ecofeminism, the socialism which I am encouraging will/is characterised by a strong grassroots commitment to change at the so-called personal level, banding together in temporary coalitions as necessary to accomplish common goals at the municipal, national and international levels.  I believe that this sort of format has great potential in that it will be more difficult for the revolution to be co-opted by a small group of elite (who could then claim the advantages currently enjoyed by the primarily white male capitalist elite).

6. Socialist Ecofeminism Answers

Therefore, socialist ecofeminism can provide some solutions for the dilemmas faced by the ecological movement and by feminism.  The environmental movement is being increasingly co-opted by business deals, so-called co-operation between large mainstream NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and big business and/or government and as such is stagnating in terms of real change.  Salleh cites a litany of offences against the environment and against local peoples in the name of progress and environmental protection and expresses concern that real issues of change and examination of northern developed lifestyles at the expense of the poor the world over are simply not addressed by this approach to environmental reform.  Socialist ecofeminism, because of its strong roots in the people -- the workers, the homemakers, the food-producers -- is less likely to fall into the trap of lip service and no real change.  Numerous authors have noted that the only real solution to environmental degradation is in fact to change the consumer mentality which is currently in vogue.  These authors argue that the real problem with development is that it decouples production from demand and creates a false demand for items with no real use-value at the expense of other people’s real, material needs for food and housing.  This is shown by the  oft-quoted description of the global village (representing the proportions of the world) as one in which of the population of 100, six people own half the world’s wealth and those six are all citizens of the US, while 50 people are undernourished and 80 people are housed inadequately.  Socialist ecofeminism, in its utopian vision of the ecological society, sees a way to alleviate these social stresses while at the same time relieving the stress that our mismanaged use of the natural world places on the biosphere.

Socialist ecofeminism is also committed to a thorough examination of the effects of gendered society on women, men and children.  As such, it provides a useful foil for the ideas of Murray Bookchin, whose analysis of the origins of domination fails to take into account the biasing effect of gender on even his revolutionary vision.  In addition, socialist ecofeminism begins to address the problems inherent in traditional socialism (and by extension, in traditional socialist feminism) by providing an analysis of the interdependency of the social and the natural.  While traditional socialist regimes have proved disastrous on the environment, socialist ecofeminism draws on the environmental activism of its members and shows a possible way forward in the coming years.  Through this activism, socialist ecofeminism can provide an answer to the “how?” of social ecology.

7.  Arguments Against the Ecofeminist Position

I wish to consider here some objections to my presentation of socialist ecofeminism, and therefore the answers which it proposes.  In general, against the ecofeminist position, I can identify four major strands of argument.  These are firstly, the argument regarding the role of spirituality in ecofeminism.  Secondly, the accusations of essentialism which plague ecofeminisms of many varieties and sometimes all of them, depending on the critic.  Thirdly, arguments regarding non-inclusiveness.  Fourthly, arguments about biological determinism, which critics say is built into many varieties of ecofeminism.  I would like to expand on each of these four sets of arguments in turn, and then respond with the socialist ecofeminist response to each in the following section.

7.1 Spirituality
The bones of the argument against spirituality from both the feminist and the social ecology camps are the same.  Essentially, spirituality is seen as a regressive step, one in which women (in the feminist argument) or society (on the social ecology account) try to use the spiritual traditions of another culture, or the mythologised spiritual traditions of humanity’s ancient past as a means to reconnect to nature today.  Specifically in the feminist case, any desire to connect to nature is viewed with suspicion, given the negative history of the association of women and nature.  In the social ecology case, connection with nature is seen as a necessary complement to the ecological society, but not in a mythologised way.  Bookchin seems to advocate a respiritualised nature, but only insofar as our relations to and with it are concerned.  In other words, the ecological society will recognise the agency of nature, rather than viewing nature as a set of inanimate resources for human use.  This is to be distinguished from any form of worship, as far as I understand it, because for Bookchin, worship would lead to reformation of hierarchy, thereby undermining the basis for the ecological society.  From liberal feminism, worship is tainted by its patriarchal assumptions and foundations in many cases, but I am not sure that liberal feminism would condemn spirituality as such.  Cultural feminism would not, so long as the form of spirituality allowed women’s empowerment and not their continued subjugation to a patriarchal deity (and by extension to men on earth as well).  Therefore the argument against ecofeminism is that in accepting spirituality in the nature worship format (as presumably, from Bookchin’s perspective, an ecofeminist respiritualisation of nature along the lines which he proposes would be acceptable), ecofeminists undermine the progress which liberal feminists have made in decoupling nature and women, and also risk from the social ecology perspective, the actualisation of the revolution.  Nature worship as a kind of salve against day to day ugliness will rob people of the motivation to rise up against capitalism, on the social ecological account.  I will consider socialist ecofeminism’s answers to these accusations in Section 8.1 below.

7.2 Essentialism
Accusations of essentialism are a major concern for feminisms in general.  Following a wave of complaints from third world, black and lesbian feminists, western feminism has followed a post-structuralist, deconstructivist regime in which blanket statements of any sort regarding women, their actions, abilities and characteristics have been strictly taboo.  Ecofeminism, especially in its earliest incarnations, was therefore viewed with horror by established feminisms.  In claiming any sort of necessary connection between women and nature, ecofeminism was considered to be essentialist by definition.  It is, of course, important to distinguish between varieties of ecofeminism, especially those which have responded directly to essentialist criticisms.  The thrust of the anti-essentialist argument is that essentialism, especially essentialism which embraces the patriarchal connection of women with nature, is damaging to the feminist movement.  Allied to this criticism is that endorsing “feminine” characteristics will undermine the progress which other feminisms have made in deconstructing the bases for the “feminine”.  Deconstruction work in feminism has shown that gender is a social product, and that following this, the characteristics which are associated with the feminine gender are therefore also socially constructed to a large extent.  As such, ecofeminisms which endorse supposedly universal feminine traits of nuturance and attachment to nature are understandably not welcomed.  Social ecology is not as anti-essentialist as feminisms are, in regards to ecofeminism, largely because social ecology depends to some degree on the essentialist categories of gender, especially in its dependence on mothering qualities and the sexual division of labour in its own theories.  Again, I will respond to these criticisms in Section 8.2.

7.3 Non-inclusion
Thirdly, there is a body of argument against ecofeminism which reflects the earlier stages of main-stream feminisms.  Namely, that ecofeminism is a middle-class, white American movement which claims to speak for women in all economic and social circumstances.  Third world and black feminists within the United States have responded with varying degrees of acceptance to the non-inclusiveness of early ecofeminist theory.  Some other theorists have argued that ecofeminism is not sufficiently sensitive to the needs of the alternative sexuality movements, especially in the focus which some writers have placed on mothering and nurturing activities, which have been largely denied to the gay and lesbian community until very recently, and are accepted even now in only some areas of the western world.  Again, social ecology is not as concerned with this manifestation of ecofeminism, because its own theory is (thought to be) inclusive by virtue of its commitment to the overthrowing of hierarchies as such, which therefore include hierarchies of race, class and colonialism and presumably heterosexism, though this is not explicitly stated by Bookchin.  From this perspective, ecofeminism is not so much of a danger as simply inadequate (at least some forms of ecofeminism, at any rate).  I will address this concern in Section 8.3 below.

7.4 Biological Determinism
The fourth set of arguments against ecofeminism are against the supposed biological determinism inherent in many strands of ecofeminism.  This argument is closely allied with the anti-essentialism argument, but is distinguished by its specific attention to the claims (made primarily by cultural ecofeminists) that there is some innate knowledge about the earth which women have by virtue of their biology, and which is therefore inaccessible to men.  This argument is serious, because short of restricting reproduction to artificial means, men are a necessary part of society, and if their biology is such that they cannot act in a responsible, reciprocal manner with the non-human world (which is implied by the raising of female awareness of nature to a privileged and exclusive status) then the ecofeminist project is doomed.  Not only, of course, is the ecofeminist project doomed, but the feminist project in general is doomed, because if domination is brought down to biological determinism, then eradicating domination will be largely unattainable.  Social ecology, on the other hand, often makes an explicit appeal to biological determinism, in its dependence on the sexual division of labour and in its refusal to examine the foundation of its own visions of revolutionary society.  Insofar as social ecology theorists are concerned with the presence of biological determinism in ecofeminist theory, I believe that their criticism is comparable to that of feminist critiques.  Namely, that requiring women and only women to be the founders and members of the new ecological society, from the social ecology perspective is to violate the potential for fulfillment and co-operation which is inherent in men as well as women, but which is repressed in both as a result of capitalist society.  Thus the socialist ecofeminist response to both feminist and social ecology critiques of biological determinism will be the same.  I will discuss this reponse below in Section 8.4.

8. Social Ecofeminist Responses

Ecofeminism responses to the criticisms outlined in the previous sections are varied.  I will concentrate here on the responses I think can be claimed by socialist ecofeminism, as I believe that socialist ecofeminism has the strongest case for success in achieving and maintaining a feminist and ecological society.

8.1 Spirituality
To respond to the criticism of the inclusion of spirituality in ecofeminism, there are several possibilities.  The first is a pragmatic point about revolution.  In order for there to be a feminist revolution, a social ecology revolution, or preferably both together, a critical mass of people is required.  As I have outlined above, spiritual approaches can appeal to people in a way that more rigorous argumentation cannot.  Thus, without the acceptance of some elements of spirituality, or at very least without denying spirituality a place, even if not at the centre, socialist ecofeminism runs the risk of becoming a sterile academic discourse without a popular base.  This is not to say that socialist ecofeminism cannot continue to theorise and refine its deconstruction of the basis for spirituality -- this is very important work – but simply to say that socialist ecofeminism does not have to exclude spirituality in order to remain a valid theoretical proposal.  

1Secondly, people are spiritual beings in general.  People in all cultures have a need for ritual, which is satisfied in very diverse ways around the world.  The very proliferation of spiritual ways indicates that there may be a deep human need for connection with “something” bigger than the individual.  As such, by allowing a place for spiritual expression, socialist ecofeminism actually undermines the western patriarchal split between mind and emotion, political and personal, possibly to the advantage of society at large.  There will obviously be risks in accepting an element of uncontrollability, but if socialist ecofeminism is really dedicated to the creation of a society beyond class and race and sexual stereotyping and oppression, then it may do well to encourage diversity rather than infighting about whose approach is better.  Thirdly, in response to the feminist position that ecofeminist spirituality merely perpetuates patriarchal stereotypes, socialist ecofeminism need only maintain that this is not necessarily so.  Continued attention to deconstructing and examination of spiritualities allow the bases to be understood and then manipulated to the advantage of humanity, rather than to the advantage of one gender to the disadvantage of another (as is arguably the case in many mainstream religions).  Spirituality does not have to entail blind acceptance, but can rather embody a Bookchinite “respiritisation of nature”, which is arguably exactly what many forms of ecofeminist spirituality do.  In so doing, this  may provide exactly the critical mass of energy that is required to actually make a change.
8.2 Essentialism
The argument from anti-essentialism is often entirely blind to the nuances of ecofeminist positions.  Of the at least three separate (but I think complementary) strands of ecofeminism, some are more essentialist than others.  Social and socialist ecofeminism is quite expressly not essentialist, even though Marxist and cultural ecofeminisms are to a some extent.  In terms of feminist arguments against essentialism, it is interesting to note that liberal and Marxist feminisms have large elements of essentialism in their theoretical structures as well, though these have been recognised in post-modern and post-structuralist recent writings.  Again, as with spiritualism, not all essentialism is bad, any more than all forms of spiritualism are bad.  Rather, a certain appeal (though it is important that it be recognised as such) to a basic identity, be it woman, or race, or sexual orientation, may be necessary to acquire the mass of people necessary to effect change.  Differences recognised once the people have been motivated, provided that the initial use of essentialism was suitably deconstructed, can be dealt with through dialogue and communication.  Also following the socialist ecofeminist defence of spiritualism, denying all uses of essentialism is another effective method for sterilising the ecofeminist movement.,  

It is important, however, to address the ethics of this kind of strategic essentialism.  Is it acceptable to support an essence which is not necessarily true?  In terms of practicality, perhaps it is, however, practicality is not the sum total of ethical investigation.  I think that strategic essentialism can be problematic because of questions of who chooses the essence to be supported, on what grounds it is chosen, and for what purpose.  Essentialist claims have been used very successfully for a number of unsavoury ends through history (slavery, for example) and there is unfortunately not a way which I can see to assure that similar uses are not perpetuated now.  Ecofeminist essentialism, however, is more likely to be open to debate and discussion than previous essentialisms because of the structure of socialist ecofeminist politics and communities.  Therefore, I think that an appeal can be made from socialist ecofeminism to the kind of strategic essentialism advocated by Martha Nussbaum, without necessarily ending up in moral hot water.  Martha Nussbaum makes an eloquent appeal to the necessity of recognising some sort of human essence in order to formulate public policy which is sensitive to the capacity of people to have a flourishing life.  She argues for a “thick vague theory of the good” in which she identifies several essential qualities for a being to be considered human.  This theory allows for the provision by the state of the means for people to realise the elements of humanity – a goal which I think socialist ecofeminist society would endorse (provided, of course, that the state apparatus was sufficiently accountable to the people).  In addition, the thick vague theory of the good is less likely to cause division in a society on the basis of particular elements of a person (race, gender, etc.) because the conception is not particular.  Rather, an appeal to elements of humanity such as mortality and human infant experience is universal.  The use of this type of strategic essentialism in socialist ecofeminist theory is unlikely, I think, to be unethical, though of course the risk of irresponsible use remains.
8.3 Non-inclusiveness
Again, the socialist ecofeminist response to the non-inclusiveness argument is parallel to the response against the previous two arguments -- namely that to restrict the ability to say anything about anyone to people of the same demographic background, effectively excludes the very people that are needed for socialist ecofeminism to be successful in reforming society.  Critics of ecofeminism generally point to the fact that early ecofeminism was produced mainly by white middle-class Americans.  Some, such as Victoria Davion, go so far as to exclude from ecofeminist discourse third world ecofeminists such as Vandana Shiva, thereby effectively sealing the fate of ecofeminism as non-inclusive.  This action is by no means necessary.  Yes, ecofeminism may have started as a white middle-class Western movement, but it has remained so by no means.  Socialist ecofeminism in particular is committed to the inclusion of all races, orientations, classes and genders in an effort to undermine the systems of oppression which result in all of these diverse groups and people failing to recognise their common solidarity.  Thus throwing the ecofeminism baby out with the non-inclusive bath water is not an appropriate response.  Rather, a careful elucidation of the potential conflicts and sources of discrimination must be made in order to deal with it, when and where and if it occurs.  Creating schisms between types of ecofeminism (as accomplished by the ecofeminist/ecofeminine distinction which Davion proposes) is not the way to build a successful movement.

8.4 Biological Determinism
The anti-biological determinism argument against ecofeminism is very similar to the anti-essentialist argument.  As such, the socialist ecofeminist response is also parallel.  Again, not all forms of ecofeminism rely on biological determinism.  Some forms, such as social and socialist ecofeminism are at pains to point out that they do not subscribe to biological determinism.  Rather, through the idea of historical materialism, socialist ecofeminists show that gender roles and abilities are a result of a society’s particular historical development, and as such are subject to change, thereby allowing inclusion and participation of men and women in all aspects of life, depending on the individual abilities of the person concerned.  It is important to note as well, I think, that the ecofeminisms which do use biological determinism do so to a large extent rhetorically, and this technique should be recognised as such.  Thus, even the forms of ecofeminism which do use biological determinist methods could possibly be restated such that they did not.

9. Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the main points which I have presented here.  Firstly, feminism and social ecology need the insights of ecofeminism because both are lacking a critical component alone.  Feminism is lacking an awareness of ecological issues, which is a grave oversight for a political movement in these days of ecological crisis.  Social ecology is lacking a sufficiently critical acceptance of feminist insight, and relies too heavily on unexamined Enlightenment and androcentric characterisations of the abilities and roles of gender, and as such is not fully faithful to its own socialist roots or dialectical commitment. Therefore, ecofeminism is a necessary synthesis of these two bodies of thought.  I have considered arguments against the inclusion of spirituality in ecofeminism and have tried to show that while spirituality is never likely to be theoretically rigorous, it nonetheless serves a vital role in maintaining the momentum and energy of the ecofeminist movement and is therefore valuable.  I have also pointed out that the acceptance of spirituality does not entail necessary acceptance of patriarchal value systems (and may accomplish the opposite), and neither is it immune to critical deconstruction within the ecofeminist community.  I then considered arguments against ecofeminism regarding essentialism and biological determinism, and concluded that socialist ecofeminism is not open to these charges, though other forms (notably cultural ecofeminism) may be.  This notwithstanding, I defended a certain level of essentialism on the grounds that it is near impossible to have any sort of identity politics without at least some essentialism, and that it is therefore not sufficient grounds for rejecting ecofeminism out of hand.  In addition, I argued that a thick vague theory of the good, such as that proposed by Martha Nussbaum, which incorporates a conception of human essence, is possibly necessary for the creation of public policy which enables diverse people to fulfil their human potential.  Biological determinism is not necessary to the ecofeminist movement, and is definitely not necessary to socialist ecofeminism.  I also defended socialist ecofeminism against charges of non-inclusiveness and concluded that in fact, socialist ecofeminism makes an express effort to include the perspectives of as wide a range of people as possible, through its recognition of the interrelated causes of oppression (on the grounds of race, sexual orientation, gender, class, and species).  Socialist ecofeminism is committed to eradication of all these means of oppression and hence can hardly be accused of non-inclusiveness.

Socialist ecofeminism is, I think, the most promising route to a society which is egalitarian, or in Murray Bookchin’s words “a society of the equality of unequals” in which people are not discriminated against on the basis of their ability to produce or contribute, but rather are included and provided for on the basis of their membership of society.  Because socialist ecofeminism is ecologically aware, the society it promotes includes a nature recognised as having agency in itself, and hence promotes co-operation between humanity and non-human nature to a degree unknown in most of western society.  Socialist ecofeminism is therefore a utopian project, but one which I believe is worth continuing, rather than relinquishing to a tidal wave of unconsidered critiques.

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