If I can remember being here 15 weeks ago I am the same person who appeared before you on this challenging spot 15 weeks ago.
'For, it being the same consciousness that makes a
man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only ...' Locke The Essay, Book 2 Chapter XXVII Para 10
Penelhum's formulation, Reader, p.430:
"Person a at time T2 is the same as person B at some earlier time T1 if and only if, among the experiences that a person A has at T2 there are memories of experiences that person B had at T1."
'This is the doctrine that in spite of the changingness of our mental lives, there is some hidden core to it that persists unchanged throughout, thus providing a backdrop against which the changes occur." Penelhum, Reader p.430.
'It follows from Descartes' view of mind that personal identity consists in the continuation of an immaterial substance, a mind or soul.' Woolhouse, The Empiricists, p.99.
Mysterious relationship to the physical world
You can't tell the difference between one self and a succession of selves.
Is there an alternative to the body as the ground for differentiating persons?