TruthReading
Fodor, Psychosemantics, Chapter 13 in Lycan.Lecture where this is primarily covered
Week 14: "Truth"We have discussed what a belief is, and what language is, and we have always been bumping into meaning. Now we need to look at truth. THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTHWe have been assuming a view of truth, of what truth is. We have been assuming what is called the correspondence theory of truth. It is I think a very intuitive account of what truth is. It is the theory that truth is a property of propositions, and that a proposition has this property when it corresponds to a state of affairs in the world. So on this view first a proposition that is true purports to represent a state of affairs. We are familiar with this. But second the proposition is true if and only if the state of affairs it purports to represent really obtains. CLARIFICATION: WHAT IS A PROPOSITION?I haven't said anything careful about what a proposition is. We seem to need the notion if only because different natural languages seem capable of expressing in many circumstances the same thing. La plume de mon frere and My brother's pen seem to be saying the same thing. We express this fact by saying they are both expressing the same 'proposition'. CORRESPONDENCE THEORY: A PROBLEMAre there any difficulties with the correspondence view of truth? PAUSE Try a write one down before you read on. The general problem is this: what can be meant by 'corresponds with'? One approach has been to try and make use of the notion of a picture The following formula has been suggested: a proposition 'corresponds' with a state of affairs when it pictures it. So it might be held that 'the desk is in front of the seats' pictures through words and grammatical structure the possible location of a desk in the room. But it is difficult to see how to understand a 'picture' theory in other cases. Eg 1. 'If my brother were here, we could eat at the new cafe'. (A counterfactual statement) 2. 'You should wash the cat at least twice a day' (A normative statement.) In both cases it's not just the picture version of the correspondence theory that seems unable to cope. The idea that in these cases the proposition 'corresponds' to something is not at all clear. FODOR'S VERSION OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORYFodor uses the correspondence theory of truth in his paper Psychosemantics, which I return to in a spirit of masochism. Fodor's picture is that we are organisms, produced by evolution. The main business of our sense organs and brain-processing power - our 'cognitive system' - is to keep our behaviour adapted to our surroundings. For example, if a lion is approaching fast, it is the job of our sensory apparatus and our cognitive system to pick this up and instruct our musculature to take evasive action. He suggests we go along with the idea broadly that it does this by setting up inside us symbols, symbols which represent states of affairs outside us. If that approach is right, when a lion is approaching, somehow our cognitive system will set up in our brains a representation of that. That is the general picture. But to get clear about the issue of 'truth', we have to backtrack. How does a process in the brain get to stand for 'A lion is approaching'? We can assume a sensory apparatus. The cognitive system discriminates a situation - lion attacking - and a process in the brain is launched. This neuronac22213e.htm" target=_blank>Saith the wise
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