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Conflict resolution: When separatists compromise

Without compromise in these cases, we are left with two possible outcomes: either the, de jure, ‘parent state’ has lost the territory forever - and the entity either becomes internationally recognised, joins a neighbouring state or continues to exist in an international limbo - or the parent state chooses to ‘solve’ the conflict through military means and reintegrates the territory through force. The latter happened in cases such as Chechnya (Russia), Republika Srpska Krajina (Croatia) and most recently Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), while the former is often seen as the most likely trajectory for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Settlements are, however, occassionally reached in conflicts involving unrecognised states. Unlike its counterpart in Croatia, the Serb statelet in Bosnia, Republika Srpska, reluctantly agreed to a compromise in 1995; other entities such as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus appear on their way to reaching a compromise with their parent states; while yet others, such as Taiwan, have established a form of modus vivendi. But what accounts for flexibility in some cases and stubborn intransigence in others?

In the literature on self-determination conflicts, it is frequently recognised that demands for self-determination are not static; they tend to adapt to the changing circumstances, and to dynamics within the community, and what was once a demand for cultural autonomy can radicalise into a demand for full-blown independence (see, for example, Heraclides 1991). But the circumstances under which such demands can again move towards less maximalist positions, thereby enabling compromise, are less explored: does it depend on military stalemates and fears of imminent defeat; are changes in the internal balance of power more important; or does it come down to the nature of the settlement being offered? When analysing separatist demands we have to consider not only the viability of the project (or the entity) or the settlements that are being proposed; the position of separatist leaders are significantly affected by intra-communal dynamics and these impact on their willingness or lack thereof to compromise: Do they have to concern themselves with collective goals or can they pursue selfish interests and ambitious of grandeur? Can they take their followers with them in compromise, or do they stand a better chance of holding on to power if status quo is maintained? Separatist demands are, moreover, significantly affected by the international system; not only by the prospect of recognition, but also by international norms and practices more broadly. Both the impact of intra-communal forces and the effect of the international system are under-analysed in existing literature, but by better understanding such dynamics and the resulting flexibility of demands, we not only avoid dangerous simplifications of antagonistic groups forever locked in conflict, but should also become better at identifying possible solutions, as well as the right timing for these solutions.

The nature of unrecognised statehood puts the leaders under pressure: in the long run it is hard to maintain a narrative of future recognition and the daily hardship and insecurity become more difficult to justify. If combined with a gradual process of intra-communal democratisation, this could lead the leaders to look for a ‘way out’ and reluctantly embrace compromise if an acceptable settlement is offered.

This argument is fully developed in Nina Caspersen, “Where Separatists Fear to Tread: Rethinking Independence Strategies in Nagorno Karabakh” (journal article, currently under review)