Dr Philipp RennerSenior Lecturer
My research interests lie in computational economics and game theory. I am particularly trying to understand the nature of incentive problems in a dynamic context. These kind of problems occur e.g. in taxation, manager remuneration and insurance. They pose a significant mathematical challenge for two reasons. On the one hand they are bilevel optimization problems. And on the other hand it is necessary to solve complicated dynamic programs.
PhD Supervision Interests
I am interested in any project that involves a novel computational challenge. It can be that either the size of the problem is prohibitive for conventional methods or that even writing down the solution conditions is hard. For example finding solutions to a high dimensional dynamic program or equilibria of a dynamic game.
Dynamic Principal–Agent Models
Renner, P., Schmedders, K. 11/2017 Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics
Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems
Renner, P., Scheidegger, S. 11/2017 Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics
A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
Renner, P., Schmedders, K. 03/2015 In: Econometrica. 83, 2, p. 729-769. 41 p.
Computing All Solutions to Polynomial Equations in Economics
Kubler, F., Schmedders, K., Renner, P. 2014 In: Handbook of Computational Economics. Elsevier p. 599-652. 54 p.
Computing generalized Nash equilibria by polynomial programming
Couzoudis, E., Renner, P. 06/2013 In: Mathematical Methods of Operational Research. 77, 3, p. 459-472. 14 p.
Finding all pure-strategy equilibria in games with continuous strategies
Judd, K., Renner, P., Schmedders, K. 07/2012 In: Quantitative Economics. 3, 2, p. 289-331. 43 p.