In May 2025 the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) unanimously concluded the Darwall v Dartmoor National Park litigation, confirming the Court of Appeal’s decision that section 10(1) of the Dartmoor Commons Act (the Act) confers on the public the right to wild camp on the Dartmoor Commons, subject to specific restrictions. Central to the debate was a focus on linguistic and contextual methods of statutory interpretation. In this commentary, however, attention will be directed to discussing the argument of legality put forward by the appellants. It will be argued that the UKSC correctly approached this debate from a rights-based perspective and that although debating this case through the lens of collective and individual rights fuels antagonistic narratives, concurrence is vital for reducing conflict in property policy.

The Darwalls are landowners owning land within Dartmoor National Park, with the Dartmoor National Park Authority (the Authority) being the organisation responsible for the park’s operation. In January 2023 the Darwalls successfully contended that s.10(1) of the Act precluded a right to wild camp, arguing that only activities conducted in line with the means of access, by foot or by horseback, or ancillary activities therein would be considered permissible open-air recreation. This was overturned on appeal, with the Court of Appeal concluding that the means of access did not qualify the types of outdoor recreation that could be undertaken, which was instead the role of local byelaws. Such byelaws did not prohibit wild camping. Following this judgment the Darwalls appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the outcome reached by the Court of Appeal. Most of the judgment focused on the methodology of statutory interpretation and the deduction of parliamentary intent. However, much remains in the ancillary arguments. Of particular interest is the discussion surrounding the disposition of landowners’ rights. It is submitted that the Court was correct to conclude that the Darwalls had indeed had their right to remove restricted, though not eradicated. Additionally, it must be considered whether viewing property policy through the lens of victors and losers is helpful, especially in a climate where environmentalism is a rising priority, and progressive land utilisation is urged as a solution to the challenges presented by industrialisation.

The UKSC’s judgment was correct to identify that the principle of legality was relevant, but not determinative. The principle prevents Parliament from taking away individual property rights without compensation unless the intention to do so is expressed clearly and unambiguously. S.10(1) of the Act makes explicit use of collective rights when referring to the public right of access to the commons and more implicit reference to individual rights in removing landowners’ right to remove, expressed in the Act through the loss of the right to bring a suit in trespass against people engaging in outdoor recreation. The loss of the ability to bring a suit in trespass, or the loss of the right to remove, is a clear hinderance on the Darwalls’ generalised powers as private land owners. Expressly transfering this right acts as a clear sign that such rights have been reorganised. The result is that, though erosive of the Darwalls’ individual rights, the transfer was facilitated through clear statutory language.

Though the byelaws are of limited use in determining the legislative context for establishing the right to wild camp, they do provide an insight into the operation of the principle of legality. The use of byelaws acts to transfer authority from the disjointed and unpredictable network of private landowners to a more co-ordinated system of governance under the Authority. This provides coherency that may otherwise be unachievable through individual action and sets out predictable rules for public access. This improves the consistency of the rules applied to public spaces ensuring both landowners and the public have their interests recognised. All this is to say that although private landowners have had their rights limited, the essential elements of those rights are not lost, but rather transferred to the Authority. Further, landowners still retain the right to remove regarding individuals breaching byelaws, and nothing suggests a change of legal ownership of the land from a private to public body. Therefore, it is convincing to identify that rights play an important role in this litigation, and the UKSC was correct to identify the relevance, but ultimate ineffectuality, of the principle of legality within this litigation.

However, the contention between collective and individual rights has spurred debate, with Ogden-Jones arguing that public access to the Darwalls’ land does not amount to a removal of rights. Whilst the notion behind this argument, the role of narrative in developing belligerent attitudes within land disputes, provides a valuable insight into the perspectives behind the litigation, suggesting that the Act does not involve the disposition of rights is unconvincing. The Act uses rights-based language to set out the public right to outdoor recreation, and contrasts this with the limitation on the right to remove, evidencing a clear rebalancing between collective and private rights. However, this argument does recognise that, despite redistribution, no right is truly lost, with landowners retaining the right to remove under specific circumstances. Moreover, there is little reason why the right to open air recreation cannot be balanced with the interests of the landowner. Here the conflict between private and collective rights fuels a historic struggle between landowners and those seeking access. The resolution of these conflicts is, as the UKSC noted, not a decision for the courts, instead lying with the various stakeholders, the DNPA as the governing authority, and ultimately Parliament.

Concludingly, the UKSC’s decision accurately builds on the decision of the Court of Appeal. Tension between individual and collective rights remain central to property disputes and this seems unlikely to change. Though moderately, the rights of Dartmoor landowners have been superseded by those of the public, and whilst some have argued that the enjoyment of national parks does not infringe the rights of landowners, this fails to recognise the essential language of the statute and the transfers of power it has enabled. Whilst an interest in open air recreation is not inherently rights-based, the facilitation of that interest is. Yet, by focusing too much on how power is shared through a system of rights, belligerent attitudes remain. Greater emphasis should be put on how different rights in land can be balanced, placating competing interests without the need for judicial scrutiny.

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