The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure on the CEO Market for Private Firms Seminar by Marcelo Ortiz
Friday 23 January 2026, 10:15am to 11:30am
Venue
FYL - Fylde LT 3 A17 - View MapOpen to
Postgraduates, StaffRegistration
Registration not required - just turn upEvent Details
Seminar on the Effect of Mandatory Disclosure on the CEO Market for Private Firms.
Leveraging the European reporting framework, we collect a large dataset of CEO appointments and transitions in private firms to examine how mandatory disclosure influences the CEO market for private firms. We find that more financial disclosure within an industry is associated with more executive turnover. Two mechanisms contribute to this result. First, disclosure enhances relative performance evaluation: following an increase in disclosure in the industry, underperforming executives are more likely to be replaced. Second, disclosure facilitates talent identification: executives of firms just above the disclosure threshold are more likely to be promoted (when they perform well) than those just below.
Speaker
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
I’m an Assistant Professor at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and affiliated with the Barcelona School of Economics and the Barcelona School of Management. My research lies at the intersection of Accounting and Corporate Governance. I’m fortunate that my research has been published in leading journals, including three publications in journals of the FT 50 List.
Contact Details
| Name | Asma Desai |
| Website |