Event Details

This Seminar is hosted by the Economics Department

Prabirendra Chatterjee will present a seminar on "Fake Media Content, Cognitive Dissonance and Confirmation Bias"

with Andy Ng (Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University)

Abstract: In this paper we present an analytical model that studies the strategic role of fake media content in a media market. We first find the conditions under which a monopoly media platform would publish fake media content. Then we show that certain opposite patterns exist in a competitive environment. Our results suggest that existence of cognitive disorder such as confirmation bias may substantially polarize the news market. We also find that media platforms may find optimal profitability in publishing apparently less credible fake media content if the fake content can reduce consumers' cognitive dissonance. In a duopoly setting we show that even when fake news cannot reduce cognitive dissonance, sufficiently differentiated media platforms may still not publish authentic news at the equilibrium. Additionally, we show that under specific conditions both platforms publishing fake media content can turn out to be a Prisoner's dilemma equilibrium. Lastly, we show experimental validations of some of the key theoretical assumptions such as cognitive dissonance reduction and existence of confirmation bias) .