Dr Orestis Troumpounis



Orestis Troumpounis obtained a Ph.D in Economics from Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona in 2011. His published and ongoing research uses game theoretic concepts and aims at understanding how institutions shape individuals’ and parties’ strategies in different (political) contexts. So far he has focused on the analysis of different electoral rules (such as proportional representation and participation quorums), different public funding systems and contest theory. He is also a member of the Lancaster Experimental Economics Laboratory where he has been conducting some experimental work.

Electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization
Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O., Xefteris, D. 21/10/2015 In: American Journal of Political Science.
Journal article

Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests
Balart, P., Flamand, S., Troumpounis, O. 13/08/2015 In: Social Choice and Welfare.
Journal article

Prize-sharing rules in collective rent-seeking
Flamand, S., Troumpounis, O. 27/05/2015 In: Companion to the political economy of rent seeking. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing p. 92-112. 21 p.
Chapter (peer-reviewed)

Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
Troumpounis, O., Xefteris, D. 2015 Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 36 p.
Working paper

Linking individual and collective contests through noise level and sharing rules
Balart, P., Chowdhury, S., Troumpounis, O. 2015 Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics
Working paper

Turnout and polarization under alternative electoral systems
Matakos, K., Troumpounis, O., Xefteris, D. 2015 In: The political economy of governance. Springer p. 335-362. 28 p.
Chapter (peer-reviewed)

Participation quorums in costly meetings
Flamand, S., Troumpounis, O. 04/2014 In: Public Choice. 159, 1-2, p. 53-62. 20 p.
Journal article

On the distribution of public funding to political parties
Troumpounis, O. 09/2012 In: Economics Letters. 116, 3, p. 367-370. 4 p.
Journal article